SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021 - Aerospace Security
APRIL 2021SPACET H R E ATASSESSMENT2021AuthorsTODD HARRISONKAITLYN JOHNSONJOE MOYEMAKENA YOUNGA REPORT OFTHE CSISAEROSPACESECURITYPROJECT
ABOUT CSISThe Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatestchallenges.Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 2015, succeedingformer U.S. senator Sam Nunn (D-GA). Founded in 1962, CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who hasserved as president and chief executive officer since 2000.CSIS’s purpose is to define the future of national security. We are guided by a distinct set ofvalues—nonpartisanship, independent thought, innovative thinking, cross-disciplinary scholarship, integrity and professionalism, and talent development. CSIS’s values work in concerttoward the goal of making real-world impact.CSIS scholars bring their policy expertise, judgment, and robust networks to their research,analysis, and recommendations. We organize conferences, publish, lecture, and make mediaappearances that aim to increase the knowledge, awareness, and salience of policy issues withrelevant stakeholders and the interested public.CSIS has impact when our research helps to inform the decisionmaking of key policymakers andthe thinking of key influencers. We work toward a vision of a safer and more prosperous world.CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should beunderstood to be solely those of the author(s). 2021 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.Center for Strategic & International Studies1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NWWashington, DC 20036202-887-0200 www.csis.orgABOUT ASPThe Aerospace Security Project (ASP) at CSIS explores the technological, budgetary, and policyissues related to the air and space domains and innovative operational concepts for air andspace forces. Part of the International Security Program at CSIS, the Aerospace Security Projectis led by Senior Fellow Todd Harrison. ASP’s research focuses on space security, air dominance,long-range strike, and civil and commercial space. Learn more at aerospace.csis.org.ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThis report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed tothis report. As always, the Aerospace Security Project team would like to thank Jeeah Lee, PhillipMeylan, and Emily Tiemeyer for their contributions to the editing, publication, and design of thisreport. Additional thanks to Thomas G. Roberts for his substantive contributions to this effort.CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed above should beunderstood to be solely those of the authors. These views similarly do not necessarily reflectthe official policy or position of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.All information is accurate as of March 12, 2021.IISPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021
CONTENTSINTRODUCTION.1TYPES OF COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS.3Kinetic Physical. 4Non-kinetic Physical. 4Electronic. 4Cyber. 4CHINA.8Space Organization. 9Counterspace Weapons. 10RUSSIA.12Space Organization. 12Counterspace Weapons. 13IRAN.17Space Organization. 17Space Launch Capabilities. 18Counterspace Weapons. 19NORTH KOREA.21Space Organization. 21Space Launch Capabilities. 22Counterspace Weapons. 22INDIA.24Space Organization. 24Counterspace Weapons. 25OTHERS.26France. 26Israel. 26Japan. 27South Korea. 27United Kingdom. 27WHAT TO WATCH.28ABOUT THE AUTHORS.30IIISPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021
INTRODUCTIONTHE PAST YEAR HAS BEEN ONE OF UNCERTAINTY andunpredictability driven by the Covid-19 pandemic, theensuing global recession, and political change in theUnited States. For space security, however, 2020 waslargely a year of continuity and predictability. Perhaps the mostnotable change in the space environment since the last CSISSpace Threat Assessment was published is the addition of some900 SpaceX Starlink satellites to low Earth orbit (LEO), bringing the total constellation size to more than 1,200, as shown inFigure 1. This is the largest satellite constellation in history by awide margin, and it already makes up roughly a third of all operating satellites in space.1 SpaceX continues to build out its constellation, with launches of 60 Starlink satellites at a time everyfew weeks.Several notable developments in space policy also occurred inthe United States over the past year. Before leaving office, theTrump administration issued three new space policy directives(SPDs). SPD-5 directed government departments and agenciesto develop cybersecurity policies and practices to improve theprotection of government and commercial space assets from cyberattacks.2 SPD-6 updated national policy for the developmentand use of space nuclear power and propulsion, and SPD-7 updated policy and guidance for space-based positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) programs and activities.3 The NationalAeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) also unveiled theArtemis Accords in 2020, which includes 10 principles nationsmust agree to abide by to be part of the Artemis program. Bythe end of the year, eight other countries had signed on to theaccords and Brazil issued a statement of intent to sign.4Figure 1 SpaceX’s Starlink Constellation as of February25, 2021The standup of the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Space Commandcontinued throughout the year as expected. The Space Forcesubmitted its first budget request for 15.4 billion, and 15.3 billion of this was transfers from existing accounts within the AirForce.5 The Space Force also published its first capstone document, Spacepower Doctrine for Space Forces, which was morenotable for its continuity with current policy and doctrine thanany significant changes.6 The new commander of U.S. SpaceCommand, U.S. Army General James Dickinson, issued his commander’s strategic vision in February 2021, which focused ondeveloping a warfighting mindset throughout the command,maintaining key relationships with allies and partners, and improving integration across the U.S. government and with commercial space organizations.7Throughout the year, other nations continued development andtesting of counterspace weapons. Most notably, Russia conducted several antisatellite (ASAT) tests in 2020. As detailed later inthis report, Russia tested a co-orbital ASAT weapon in July 2020,and it tested a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in December 2020. These activities are not new and reflect a patternof behavior in which Russia has continued to develop and reconstitute its counterspace capabilities.1SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021astriagraph
The purpose of this annual report from the CSIS Aerospace Security Projectis to aggregate and analyze publicly available information on the counterspace capabilities of other nations. It is intended to raise awareness andunderstanding of the threats, debunk myths and misinformation, andhighlight areas in which senior leaders and policymakers should pay moreattention. This year’s report focuses on the changes in counterspace capabilities and new developments that have occurred or come to light overthe past year. A more complete history of counterspace developments canbe found on the new CSIS space threat interactive timeline, available e/. This onlinetool will be updated periodically throughout the year and allows users toeasily navigate through the large body of publicly available information onspace threats, sorting by country, type of threat, and year.This report and the interactive tool are not a comprehensive assessment ofall counterspace activities because much of the information on what othercountries are doing is not publicly available. The information in this reportis current as of March 12, 2021.2SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021
COUNTERSPACE WEAPONSTYPES OFCOUNTERSPACEWEAPONSSIllustration A ballisticmissile can be usedas a kinetic physical counterspaceweapon.3PACE IS AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ENABLER OF economic and military power. The strategic importance of space has ledsome nations to build arsenals of counterspace weapons to disrupt, degrade, or destroy space systems and hold at risk the abilityof others to use the space domain. However, the strategic importance ofspace has also spurred renewed efforts to deter or mitigate conflict and protect the domain for peaceful uses. For example, the U.S. Space Force’s capstone publication on spacepower notes that, “military space forces shouldmake every effort to promote responsible norms of behavior that perpetuate space as a safe and open environment in accordance with the Laws ofArmed Conflict, the Outer Space Treaty, and international law, as well asU.S. government and DoD policy.”8Counterspace weapons, particularly those that produce orbital debris,pose a serious risk to the space environment and the ability of all nationsto use the space domain for prosperity and security. This chapter providesan overview and taxonomy for different types of counterspace weapons.Counterspace weapons vary significantly in the types of effects they create,how they are deployed, how easy they are to detect and attribute, and thelevel of technology and resources needed to develop and field them. Thisreport categorizes counterpace weapons into four broad groups of capabilities: kinetic physical, non-kinetic physical, electronic, and cyber.SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021
COUNTERSPACE WEAPONSKINETIC PHYSICALKINETIC PHYSICAL COUNTERSPACEweapons attempt to strike directly ordetonate a warhead near a satellite orground station. The three main forms ofkinetic physical attack are direct-ascentASAT weapons, co-orbital ASAT weapons,and ground station attacks. Direct-ascent ASAT weapons are launched fromEarth on a suborbital trajectory to strikea satellite in orbit, while co-orbital ASATweapons are first placed into orbit andthen later maneuvered into or near theirintended target. Attacks on ground stations are targeted at the terrestrial sitesresponsible for command and control ofsatellites or the relay of satellite missiondata to users.Kinetic physical attacks tend to cause irreversible damage to the systems affected and demonstrate a strong show offorce that would likely be attributable andpublicly visible. A successful kinetic physical attack in space will produce orbitaldebris, which can indiscriminately affectother satellites in similar orbits. Thesetypes of attacks are one of the only counterspace actions that carry the potentialfor the loss of human life if targeted atcrewed ground stations or at satellites inorbits where humans are present, suchas the International Space Station (ISS) inLEO. To date, no country has conducteda kinetic physical attack against anothercountry’s satellite, but four countries—the United States, Russia, China, and India—have successfully tested direct-ascent ASAT weapons.lites or cause components to overheat.High-powered microwave (HPM) weapons can disrupt a satellite’s electronicsor cause permanent damage to electrical circuits and processors in a satellite.A nuclear device detonated in space cancreate a high radiation environment andan electromagnetic pulse (EMP) thatwould have indiscriminate effects onsatellites in affected orbits. These attacks operate at the speed of light and,in some cases, can be less visible tothird-party observers and more difficultto attribute.Satellites can be targeted with lasersand HPM weapons from ground- orship-based sites, airborne platforms, orother satellites. A satellite lasing systemrequires high beam quality, adaptiveoptics (if being used through the atmosphere), and advanced pointing controlto steer the laser beam precisely—technology that is costly and requires a highdegree of sophistication. A laser can beeffective against a sensor on a satellite ifit is within the field of view of the sensor, making it possible to attribute theattack to its approximate geographicalorigin. An HPM weapon can be used todisrupt a satellite’s electronics, corruptdata stored in memory, cause processorsto restart, and, at higher power levels,cause permanent damage to electricalcircuits and processors. HPM attacks canbe more difficult to attribute because theattack can come from a variety of angles,including from other satellites passing by in orbit. For both laser and HPMweapons, the attacker may have limitedability to know if the attack was successful because it is not likely to produce visible indicators.The use of a nuclear weapon in spacewould have large-scale, indiscriminateeffects that would be attributable andpublicly visible. A nuclear detonation inspace would immediately affect satellites within range of its EMP, and it wouldalso create a high radiation environmentthat would accelerate the degradation ofsatellite components over the long termNON-KINETIC PHYSICALNON-KINETIC PHYSICAL COUNTERSPACE weapons have physical effectson satellites or ground systems withoutmaking physical contact. Lasers canbe used to temporarily dazzle or permanently blind the sensors on satel4Illustration A laser is anexample of a non-kineticcounterspace weapon.SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021
COUNTERSPACE WEAPONSfor unshielded satellites in the affectedorbital regime. The detonation of nuclear weapons in space is banned under thePartial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, whichhas more than 100 signatories, althoughChina and North Korea are not included.9ELECTRONICIllustration A truck-mountedjammer is a type of electroniccounterspace weapon.IllustrationCyberattacks can beused to take controlof a satellite anddamage or destroy it.5ELECTRONIC COUNTERSPACE weaponstarget the electromagnetic spectrumthrough which space systems transmitand receive data. Jamming devices interfere with the communications to orfrom satellites by generating noise in thesame radio frequency (RF) band. An uplink jammer interferes with the signal going from Earth to a satellite, such as thecommand and control uplink. Downlinkjammers target the signal from a satellite as it propagates down to users on theEarth. Spoofing is a form of electronic attack where the attacker tricks a receiverinto believing a fake signal, produced bythe attacker, is the real signal it is tryingto receive. A spoofer can be used to injectfalse information into a data stream or,in extremis, to issue false commands toa satellite to disrupt its operations. Userterminals with omnidirectional antennas,such as many GPS receivers and satellitephones, have a wider field of view andthus are susceptible to downlink jammingand spoofing from a wider range of angleson the ground.10Electronic forms of attack can be difficultto detect or distinguish from accidental interference, making attribution andawareness more difficult. Both jammingand spoofing are reversible forms of attack because once they are turned off,communications can return to normal.Through a type of spoofing called “meaconing,” even encrypted military GPS signals can be spoofed. Meaconing does notrequire cracking the GPS encryption because it merely rebroadcasts a time-delayed copy of the original signal withoutdecrypting it or altering the data.11 TheSPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021technology needed to jam and spoofmany types of satellite signals is commercially available and inexpensive, makingit relatively easy to proliferate amongstate and non-state actors.CYBERWHILE ELECTRONIC FORMS OF ATTACKattempt to interfere with the transmissionof RF signals, cyberattacks target the dataitself and the systems that use, transmit,and control the flow of data. Cyberattacks on satellites can be used to monitordata traffic patterns, intercept data, orinsert false or corrupted data in a system.These attacks can target ground stations,end-user equipment, or the satellitesthemselves. While cyberattacks requirea high degree of understanding of thesystems being targeted, they do not necessarily require significant resources toconduct. The barrier to entry is relativelylow and cyberattacks can be contractedout to private groups or individuals. Evenif a state or non-state actor lacks internalcyber capabilities, it may still pose a cyber threat.A cyberattack on space systems can result in the loss of data or services being provided by a satellite, which couldhave widespread systemic effects if usedagainst a system such as GPS. Cyberattacks could have permanent effects if, forexample, an adversary seizes control of asatellite through its command and control system. An attacker could shut downall communications and permanentlydamage the satellite by expending itspropellant supply or issuing commandsthat would damage its electronics andsensors. Accurate and timely attributionof a cyberattack can be difficult becauseattackers can use a variety of methods toconceal their identity, such as using hijacked servers to launch an attack.
COUNTERSPACE WEAPONSTable 1TYPES OF COUNTERSPACE WEAPONSTypes of AttackGroundStation AttackAttributionVariableattribution,depending onmode of attackCan beLaunch site canattributed byLaunch site canbe attributedtracking previousbe attributedly known ible or reversible depending on capabilitiesIrreversibleIrreversibleReversible orirreversible;attacker may ormay not be ableto controlAwarenessMay ormay not bepubliclyknownPublicly knowndepending ontrajectoryMay ormay not bepubl
TODD HARRISON. KAITLYN JOHNSON. JOE MOYE. MAKENA YOUNG. A REPORT OF . THE CSIS . AEROSPACE SECURITY PROJECT. II. SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021. ABOUT CSIS. The Center for Strategic and Internati
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