Theories For Mental Health Nursing - SAGE Publications Inc

2y ago
32 Views
6 Downloads
1.75 MB
20 Pages
Last View : 5m ago
Last Download : 3m ago
Upload by : Samir Mcswain
Transcription

Theories forMental HealthNursingA Guide for Practiceedited byTheo Stickley & Nicola Wright00-Stickley & Wright Prelims.indd 38/2/2013 6:54:18 PM

SAGE Publications Ltd1 Oliver’s Yard55 City RoadLondon EC1Y 1SPSAGE Publications Inc.2455 Teller RoadThousand Oaks, California 91320SAGE Publications India Pvt LtdB 1/I 1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial AreaMathura RoadNew Delhi 110 044SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd3 Church Street#10-04 Samsung HubSingapore 049483Introduction and editorial arrangement Theo Stickley andNicola Wright 2014Chapters 1 and 6 Alastair MorganChapter 2 Andrew Clifton and David BanksChapter 3 Dawn FreshwaterChapter 4 Paul CassedyChapter 5 Philip KinsellaChapter 7 Fiona McCandless-SuggChapter 8 Nigel Plant and Aru NarayanasamyChapter 9 Theo Stickley and Helen SpandlerChapter 10 Sally Binley and Theo StickleyChapter 11 Tim SweeneyChapter 12 Julie Repper and Rachel PerkinsChapter 13 Lorraine RaynerChapter 14 Gary Winship and Sally HardyChapter 15 Gemma Stacey and Bob DiamondChapter 16 Louise ThomsonChapter 17 Margaret McAllisterChapter 18 Anne FeltonChapter 19 Marie ChellingsworthChapter 20 Patrick CallaghanChapter 21 Ann ChildsFirst published 2014Editor: Alex ClabburnAssistant editor: Emma MilmanProduction editor: Katie ForsytheCopyeditor: Jane FrickerProofreader: Bryan CampbellIndexer: Silvia BenvenutoMarketing manager: Tamara NavaratnamCover design: Wendy ScottTypeset by: C&M Digitals (P) Ltd, Chennai, IndiaPrinted and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd,Croydon, CR0 4YYApart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or privatestudy, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright,Designs and Patents Act, 1988, this publication may be reproduced,stored or transmitted in any form, or by any means, only with theprior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case ofreprographic reproduction, in accordance with the terms of licencesissued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerningreproduction outside those terms should be sent to the publishers.Library of Congress Control Number: 2013932399British Library Cataloguing in Publication dataA catalogue record for this book is available fromthe British LibraryISBN 978-1-4462-5739-5ISBN 978-1-4462-5740-1 (pbk)00-Stickley & Wright Prelims.indd 48/2/2013 6:54:18 PM

1Philosophy of Mental HealthALASTAIR MORGANLearning Objectives Understand the importance of philosophical ideas in mental health theory andpractice.Understand the four main themes of philosophical controversy in mental health care.Apply these themes to concrete examples in contemporary mental health practice.IntroductionThere is a strong case to be made that the discipline of philosophy should be centralto all mental health care and practice. What is it about mental health and mentalillness that should lead us to philosophical enquiry? Radden (2004) has articulated the centrality of philosophical questions to any interrogation of the concept ofmental disorder. She writes that:Conceptions of rationality, personhood and autonomy, the preeminent philosophicalideas and ideals grounding modern-day liberal and humanistic societies such as oursalso frame our understanding of mental disorder and rationales for its social, clinicaland legal treatment. (Radden, 2004: 3)When we think through questions of what it means to experience mental distresswe are immediately confronted with a range of philosophical questions. These canbe questions about personal identity, ownership of thoughts and experiences and01-Stickley & Wright Ch-01.indd 18/2/2013 6:54:22 PM

2THEORIES FOR MENTAL HEALTH NURSINGthe nature of the self and its relationship to the world and other people. These canalso be questions about how we can classify and label mental health conditions andwhat our evidence is for labelling them as diseases. How do we understand thebiological underpinning of mental illnesses and what is the relationship betweenthe mind and the brain? How are we justified in detaining and treating people withmental illnesses against their will?Furthermore, the very nature of mental distress and the experiences that accompany it raise questions that are often akin to a process of philosophical questioning.Mental distress can be characterised as a set of experiences that are centrally concerned with meaning and the self in a manner quite different from physical illnesses. Although one might question one’s life, identity and relationships whendiagnosed with a serious physical illness like cancer, it is not the illness itself thatis a repository of such meanings but the impact it has on your life. In contrast,mental illnesses such as depression and psychosis are themselves full of meaning about who one is, how one relates to the world and the significance of one’slife and experience. Fulford et al. (2003) argue that the discipline of psychiatry isunique amongst medical specialities in that its central concepts and categories arenot only difficult to define but highly contested. A person experiencing psychosismay not label their disorder in medical terms and may actively dispute any medical description of their experience as schizophrenia. Mental distress is thus a fieldof complex and contested definitions and an experience which itself is a crisis ofmeaning, identity and relations with the self and the world, hence the centralityof philosophical questions in mental health care and day-to-day practice (Fulfordet al., 2003).What is philosophy?The literal meaning of philosophy comes from the Ancient Greek meaning ‘love ofwisdom’. In the Theaetetus, Plato outlines a concept of philosophy as a fundamentalquestioning of the basis of the world in an attitude of wonder (Plato, 1987). Thisfundamental questioning leads philosophy to a desire to uncover the foundationsof knowledge. This philosophical project is encapsulated in the work of Descarteswho wrote in his Meditations that his philosophical goal was to uncover the solidand certain foundations for all knowledge (Descartes, [1641] 1984). Interestingly,the method by which Descartes attempted to do this was through a radical scepticism; he doubted everything to try and identify a secure and certain foundation forall knowledge. In this project, Descartes united two key elements of philosophy, a01-Stickley & Wright Ch-01.indd 28/2/2013 6:54:22 PM

Philosophy of Mental Health3critical and sceptical deconstruction of knowledge, alongside the attempt to providefoundational underpinnings for knowledge.Later philosophers were critical of this attempt to provide certain foundationsfor knowledge as the supreme philosophical task. They preferred a more modestdescription of philosophy as a critical reflection upon the possibilities, justificationand limitations of thought. This critical reflection may not produce certainty, onlyplausible beliefs based upon limited evidence. Hume argues that philosophy cannotprovide ultimate foundations for thought and that it can only draw plausible andprovisional conclusions based on a critical examination of the evidence of experience (Hume, [1739–40] 2000). This conception of philosophy as critique, as thediscipline that outlines the limits and boundaries of rationality became a key taskof philosophy in the late eighteenth century and through the nineteenth century.Philosophy is therefore an abstract enquiry into fundamental questions of existence, knowledge and morality. These areas are often broken down in the followingmanner as questions of ontology (namely questions about existence – what kinds ofthings are there in the world), epistemology (questions of knowledge – truth, validity,the limits of reason) and questions of ethics (what is right and what is wrong andhow do we characterise a ‘good’ society). This set of definitions makes philosophysound very withdrawn from everyday life; however, increasingly philosophers havefelt it important to be engaged in applications of knowledge and to try to clarify theconcepts underpinning institutions, practices and ways of living.Philosophy of mental healthPhilosophy is characterised as the threefold investigation into questions of existence, knowledge and ethics. Therefore, philosophy of mental health can be characterised as an enquiry into these questions as they apply to mental health care(Thornton, 2007). In this chapter, I will focus on four main areas of interest forthe philosophy of mental health. As Banner and Thornton (2007) argue that anyphilosophy of mental health needs to be oriented around practice and become aphilosophy of mental health care, I will outline a contemporary issue that appliesthese philosophical questions in practice in each one of these areas.The four areas for philosophy of mental health are as follows: The question of human consciousness, and particularly the relationshipbetween mind and brain. How do we characterise the fundamental nature ofhuman consciousness and what is the relationship between conceptions of the01-Stickley & Wright Ch-01.indd 38/2/2013 6:54:22 PM

4THEORIES FOR MENTAL HEALTH NURSINGhuman mind or psyche and its biological underpinning in neurochemical processes in the brain? Can we reduce experiences that are attributed to a personto neurochemical reactions in the brain, or are these fundamentally differentlevels of explanation? The question of mental illness as a disease. Can we classify mental distress as aform of disease or is it better understood as a response to societal and individualpressures rather than a form of illness? Should we classify and label forms ofmental distress and can these classifications be validated, or should we dispensewith all classification and attempt to understand distress in individual or narrative terms? The question of understanding the subjective experience of mental distress. Howis it possible to understand and empathise with a mad experience? Should wetry to explain it through biological processes or is it possible to empathise andunderstand the content of madness? The ethical issues in psychiatry, particularly the question of coercion and care.The ethical underpinning of mental health practice will be addressed in detailin a later chapter of this book, so here I will just consider briefly a contemporarycontested ethical issue in mental health practice.Mind and brainThe background to the mind/brain problem in psychiatry is the question of the biomedical model in psychiatry. The biomedical model remains the dominant modelin mental health care, but it has been contested right from the origins of psychiatry as an academic and clinical discipline in the mid-nineteenth century (Double,2003). Fulford et al. (2006) outline the origins of present-day psychiatry in what isoften termed its ‘first biological phase’ from 1850 through to 1910, when the firstprofessor of psychiatry, Wilhelm Griesinger, famously wrote that all mental illnessis a disease of the brain (cited in Fulford et al., 2006: 146). The goal of psychiatry was to define an area of illness for mental disorders that could be analogouswith that of physical illness. Therefore, the idea was that all mental illness could beshown to have a biological underpinning in terms of a brain disease, and that theunderlying basis of mental illness would be either some form of inherited geneticabnormality or a pathological alteration in neurochemistry. Underlying this beliefwas a larger philosophical claim for biological reductionism. This is the idea thatall experiences of the person can be reduced to their determinants in the brain. Astrong reductionism will argue that mental illnesses should not be understood as01-Stickley & Wright Ch-01.indd 48/2/2013 6:54:22 PM

Philosophy of Mental Health5experiences occurring in a person, but only explained as biological abnormalities.The German psychiatrist Kurt Schneider gave a very succinct outline of this form ofreductionism when he argued that when we assess a person experiencing psychosis:Diagnosis looks for the ‘How’ (form) not the ‘What?’ (the theme or content). WhenI find thought withdrawal then this is important to me as a mode of inner experience and as a diagnostic hint, but it is not of diagnostic significance whether it is thedevil, the girlfriend or a political leader who withdraws the thoughts. Wherever onefocuses on such contents, diagnostics recedes; one sees then only the biographicalaspects or the existence open to interpretation. (cited in Bentall, 2004: 31)Schneider, here, expresses a central belief of biological psychiatry. Engagement withthe content of experiences is of limited importance. These are just surface expressions of an underlying disease process that is ultimately biologically determinedand driven.A variant of reductionism, which could be termed a weak reductionism, will arguethat biological vulnerabilities interact with environmental stressors and personalexperiences to produce illnesses. The stress vulnerability model in mental healthcare is a variant of a weak reductionist approach, in that it hypothesises a biologicalvulnerability that is then only later expressed or developed due to the stresses theperson faces (Zubin and Spring, 1977).The reductionist approach to human consciousness is based on a philosophicalargument that all states of human consciousness can be fundamentally explained bytheir reduction to neurological states. A prominent exponent of such a view is thephilosopher Patricia Churchland. She argues that when we want to explore whatit means to think, feel and decide then we should not explore the meanings that aperson attributes to such activities. Rather we should look at the neural underpinnings of the activities, and it is these neural underpinnings that ultimately explainour behaviour. Churchland (2004) writes that:. . . what I know depends on the specific configuration of connections among my trillion neurons, on the neurochemical interactions between connected neurons, and onthe response portfolio of different neuron types. (Churchland, 2004: 42)This reductionist argument leads to an emphasis on altering our neurochemicalmakeup through psychiatric drugs to ameliorate problems in our mental health(Moncrieff, 2008). However, many philosophers are critical of reductionist arguments and want to argue that complex human experience cannot be reduced to01-Stickley & Wright Ch-01.indd 58/2/2013 6:54:22 PM

6THEORIES FOR MENTAL HEALTH NURSINGbrain states and that it does make sense to talk about the mind rather than thebrain. The philosopher Alva Noe has written that consciousness can only be understood in terms of an interaction between brains, bodies and environments. The term‘mind’ then can be used to refer to what Noe terms a ‘living activity’ rather thanreduced to neural states (Noe, 2009: 7). Neural structures are of course necessaryfor consciousness to occur, but they are not the whole picture, and consciousnesscannot be understood separately from human history, activity and culture, according to this argument. The biomedical model in psychiatry can therefore be seen toreduce minds to brains and to downplay the centrality of experience and society inthe construction and causation of mental distress (Double, 2003).Mind and brain: contemporary issues in neuroscienceOne of the key contemporary interfaces where issues of mind and brain have cometo the fore is through the growth of neuroimaging technologies. This is an areawhich is increasingly being used in mental health research if not in practice. Oftensubjects of research are asked to perform specific activities whilst having their brainsscanned and then the results of such scans are produced and attempts are made tocorrelate brain activity with specific dysfunctions in people labelled with mentalillness. These neuroimaging techniques are termed fMRIs (functional MagneticResonance Imaging). The use of the term functional relates to the notion of aresearch subject performing an activity whilst being scanned. The philo sophicalbasis of much of this research is reductionist; the notion that you can reduce acomplex set of behaviours, experiences and meanings to a specific activity that canthen be correlated with levels of blood flow in the brain. These technologies thatfunction through the production of images produce a powerful force for reductionist philosophies. As Johnson (2008) writes, these images function through producing a representation of a host of activities as reducible to brain states. Theseimages of ‘active brains’ are powerful cultural icons of our time. As Fernando Vidal(2009) has pointed out, we are replacing a concept of ‘personhood’ with a concept of‘brainhood’, an identity that ultimately refers all meaning to patterns of activity ata neuronal level. Cohn (2004) has indicated how such neuroimaging remains tiedto a notion of reductionism due to its isolation of all activity to a specific, calculableand repeatable set of functions that are then, themselves, only loosely mapped onto the production of chemical activity in the brain. The philosopher and physicianRaymond Tallis has termed the dominance of neuroscientific discourse a form of‘neuromania’ (Tallis, 2011).01-Stickley & Wright Ch-01.indd 68/2/2013 6:54:22 PM

Philosophy of Mental Health7A central irony of this reductionist approach is that it has occurred at the timewhen biological science is moving away from reductionist models. This is particularly the case in genetics where the idea of defined heritable diseases through specific genetic abnormality is increasingly questioned in what has been termed the‘postgenome era’ (McInnis, 2009). Following the complete mapping of the humangenome in the early twenty-first century, scientists were shocked to discover thatthere were far fewer human genes than had previously been hypothesised (McInnis,2009). This has moved research away from the pursuit of discrete genetic abnormalities that could underlie mental disorders and towards the complex relationshipbetween how genes are expressed and the interrelationship between environmentand gene expression. As McInnis (2009) writes, this is a move away from the possibility of reducing complex mental disorders to singular genetic causes.What this brief survey of current controversies in medical research in neuroscience demonstrates is the continuing relevance and importance of philoso phicaldiscussions of consciousness to current understandings and conceptualisations ofmental distress. Do we understand mental distress as simply the byproduct of aneuro chemical misfiring, or as the complex unfolding of human experience in responseto interpersonal and societal stresses? Ultimately, in the absence of clear pathologicalunderpinnings for most mental illnesses, this debate becomes one of philoso phicalargument and justification.Can we classify mental distress as an illness?A central philosophical question for the practice of mental health care is the ontological status of mental illness itself. When we talk about mental distress are wediscussing a disease process that is akin to physical illnesses, or is it better to conceptualise mental distress as a series of responses to life pressures? If we do dispensewith a concept of disease then why do we include psychiatry within the medicalsciences? If the classification of mental disorders continues to take place in theabsence of underlying biological findings then how can we validate diagnoses andguarantee that clinicians are diagnosing correctly, or should we dispense with thewhole process of diagnosing mental disorders?The historical background to this set of questions lies in the absence of biologicalmarkers for most mental illnesses. Although biological markers for diseases affecting the older person such as dementia have increasingly been identified, the majorclassifications for disease within psychiatry have been developed in the absenceof identifiable, underlying biological pathology (Read et al., 2004). Therefore, you01-Stickle

1 Philosophy of Mental Health ALASTAIR MORGAN Learning Objectives Understand the importance of philosophical ideas in mental health theory and practice. Understand the four main themes of philosophical controversy in mental health care. Apply these themes to concrete examples in contemporary mental health practice.

Related Documents:

Bruksanvisning för bilstereo . Bruksanvisning for bilstereo . Instrukcja obsługi samochodowego odtwarzacza stereo . Operating Instructions for Car Stereo . 610-104 . SV . Bruksanvisning i original

10 tips och tricks för att lyckas med ert sap-projekt 20 SAPSANYTT 2/2015 De flesta projektledare känner säkert till Cobb’s paradox. Martin Cobb verkade som CIO för sekretariatet för Treasury Board of Canada 1995 då han ställde frågan

service i Norge och Finland drivs inom ramen för ett enskilt företag (NRK. 1 och Yleisradio), fin ns det i Sverige tre: Ett för tv (Sveriges Television , SVT ), ett för radio (Sveriges Radio , SR ) och ett för utbildnings program (Sveriges Utbildningsradio, UR, vilket till följd av sin begränsade storlek inte återfinns bland de 25 största

Hotell För hotell anges de tre klasserna A/B, C och D. Det betyder att den "normala" standarden C är acceptabel men att motiven för en högre standard är starka. Ljudklass C motsvarar de tidigare normkraven för hotell, ljudklass A/B motsvarar kraven för moderna hotell med hög standard och ljudklass D kan användas vid

LÄS NOGGRANT FÖLJANDE VILLKOR FÖR APPLE DEVELOPER PROGRAM LICENCE . Apple Developer Program License Agreement Syfte Du vill använda Apple-mjukvara (enligt definitionen nedan) för att utveckla en eller flera Applikationer (enligt definitionen nedan) för Apple-märkta produkter. . Applikationer som utvecklas för iOS-produkter, Apple .

Mental Health, Mental Health Europe NGO and the UK Royal College of Psychiatrists7. "No health without mental health" has also been adopted by the Irish organisation Mental Health Ireland, Supporting Positive Mental Health. Burden of Mental Disorders Mental disorders have been found to be common, with over a third of people worldwide

mental illnesses, stigma associated with mental health nursing, and negative perceptions of psychiatric patients and mental health care create barriers to attracting new nursing graduates to choose mental health nursing for their career (Happell et al., 2014, Hoekstra et al., 2010, Linden and Kavanagh, 2012, Nadler-Moodie and Loucks, 2011,

3.2 european Policy 12 3.4 Happiness and wellbeing debates 14 4.0 Concepts and definitions: what is mental health? 15 4.1 Dual continuum model of mental health 16 4.2 Measuring mental health 17 5.0 Benefits of mental health promotion 19 5.1 Benefits of preventing mental illness 19 5.2 Benefits of promoting positive mental health 22