Audit Of The Disaster Recovery Plan
Audit of the Disaster Recovery PlanReport # 11-05Prepared byOffice of Inspector GeneralJ. Timothy Beirnes, CPA, Inspector GeneralKit Robbins, CISA, CISM, CRISC, Lead Information Systems Auditor
TABLE OF CONTENTSBACKGROUND . 1OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY . 3AUDIT RESULTS . 4Executive Summary .4Alternate Disaster Recovery Facilities are Adequate .6Testing of the Disaster Recovery Plans .9Testing of the Infrastructure Disaster Recovery Plan .9Testing of the Supervisory Control and DataAcquisition (SCADA) Disaster Recovery Plan .11Business Requirements and Business Involvement Needed.13Disaster Recovery Risk Management Oversight Team Needed .15Adequate Change Control and System Stability .17
BACKGROUNDIn accordance with the Office of Inspector General’s Fiscal Year 2011 Audit Plan,we conducted an Audit of the Disaster Recovery Plan. The Disaster Recovery Planprovides support for the District’s mission critical systems and infrastructure in case of acatastrophic event to the Primary Data Center in the Emergency Operations Centerlocated at District Headquarters in West Palm Beach, Florida. There are three differentDisaster Recovery groups at the District: 1) the Information Technology InfrastructureSystems Section, 2) the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Section, 3)and the Emergency Management, Safety and Security Section. Disaster recovery isdefined as a number of elements that allow a business to resume operations after a majorincident that results in complete interruption of service. The required elements include ahot site or a cold site and restart services. A hot site has all the equipment needed fordata applications to continue operations. A cold site is a similar disaster recovery service,but the installation and possible purchase of additional equipment may be needed. A coldsite could be a separate building with electricity only and no computer systems. Restartservices are resources needed to resume operations. The decision of using a hot site or acold site is based on the District management’s risk tolerance and the cost. The conceptof spending resources to protect against threats that may never materialize may seeminefficient in these economic times; yet, it is important to note that the costs of disasterrecovery plans is far lower than being unable to resume operations soon after a disaster.In early 2007, the Information Technology Infrastructure Systems Section createda Project Management Plan for an alternate data center. This provided a hot site withcomputer systems, network, processing, and storage capacity. A Project Oversight Teamidentified the primary mission critical systems to include SAP, email, BlackBerry, andWebEOC.1 The Team identified the need for the Information Technology infrastructureto support a copy of these systems at the site.In 2007, Network Access Point (NAP) of the Americas in Miami, Florida, waschosen as the alternate data center hot site due to its multiple safeguards and backups as ahosting facility. This alternate site met the minimum separation requirement of 50 miles1WebEOC is the District’s web-enabled crisis management system.Office of Inspector GeneralPage 1Audit of the Disaster Recovery Plan
required by the Project Management Plan, and the immediate space availability allowedfor an implementation prior to the 2007 Hurricane Season. Terremark World Wide, Inc.2operates the Network Access Point of the Americas. The District has contracted for 200square feet of space at a cost of 239,000 annually. The Disaster Recovery Plan Teamtests data recovery at the alternate data center in Miami on a semi-annual basis.The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is a separateinformation technology system that is not included in the Infrastructure Section’sDisaster Recovery Plan. Some Information Technology Bureau employees help with theSupervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) testing. The backup equipment islocated at the Fort Lauderdale Field Station and is tested to ensure that the MicrowaveCommunication Equipment, SCADA Equipment, and Software (Telvent OASyS DNASCADA Suite) work properly. This test, known as a Telvent OASyS Mode Switch Test,ensures that the District will be able to maintain and operate the Central and SouthFlorida (C&SF) Project structures (control gates and pumps) from the backup facility.This Mode Switch Test is conducted on a semi-annual basis. In case of a total disaster tothe Emergency Operation Center / Control Room and the Primary Control Center atDistrict Headquarters, the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systemoperations will be performed at the Backup Control Center located at the District’s FortLauderdale Service Center.Lastly, in case of a disaster at the Emergency Operations Center at DistrictHeadquarters, the alternate Emergency Operations Center facility for the employeeshelping the Emergency Management, Safety and Security Section will be relocated to theDistrict’s Okeechobee Service Center. The Information Technology Bureau will helpalign with the District’s Business Continuity Plan, which is the business strategy forreturning to normal business operations. The “Hurricane Freddy Exercise” is part oftesting this Business Continuity Plan, and simulates a hurricane situation at the District.The Continuity of Operations Plan exists at the District as the Business Continuity Planand is outside the scope of this audit.2Terremark World Wide, Inc. was recently purchased by Verizon Communications, Inc.Office of Inspector GeneralPage 2Audit of the Disaster Recovery Plan
OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGYThe overall objective of our audit was to determine whether the DisasterRecovery Plan is meeting its goals and is operating efficiently and effectively.Specifically, our objectives focused on determining whether: 1) the District has acomprehensive up-to-date disaster recovery plan, 2) the District has defined locationswhere the disaster recovery plan could be executed, and 3) the District’s DisasterRecovery Plan was periodically tested and any necessary adjustments were incorporatedinto the plan.The District’s business solutions and the importance of the disasterrecovery plan were the main focus of the audit.To achieve our objectives, we gathered evidence through inspections, analyses,and observations of the disaster tests. Recommendations were made where we identifiedareas for improvement. We interviewed relevant District Disaster Recovery Plan staffresponsible for infrastructure support and testing.We reviewed disaster recoverydocumentation, system documentation, organizational charts, and observed the analysesand testing of the current systems deemed mission critical. The methodology includedinterviews with system administrators, system owners, and other Disaster Recovery Planstaff to ascertain the status, maturity, and overall efficiency of the Disaster RecoveryPlans. The scope included the review of the current efficiency and effectiveness of theDisaster Recovery Plans. The Continuity of Operations Plan exists at the District as theBusiness Continuity Plan3 and is outside the scope of this audit.Our audit was conducted in accordance with Generally Accepted GovernmentAuditing Standards (GAGAS). These standards require that we plan and perform theaudit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for ourfindings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidenceobtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our auditobjectives.3Business continuity is a blanket term for measures taken to keep a business running in the face of variousthreats. It includes disaster recovery, backup, and contingency planning or consulting services.Office of Inspector GeneralPage 3Audit of the Disaster Recovery Plan
AUDIT RESULTSExecutive SummaryOverall, our audit revealed that the current Disaster Recovery Plans haveimproved significantly in comparison to previous plans. There is sufficient planning,budgetary, and project management control processes in place to ensure that the activitiesand applications support the District’s business processes and meet the operational needsafter a disaster. Our review of the Disaster Recovery Plans disclosed that progress andcontinuous improvements have been made through testing and resolving minor issues.All three of the alternate facilities for disaster scenarios are sufficiently fulfilling theobjectives of the plans. Mission critical data (SAP, email, BlackBerry, and WebEOC)and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system’s data are adequatelyreplicated in real-time with only seconds of delay.The Disaster Recovery Plans are designed to far exceed its current Recovery TimeObjective and Recovery Point Objective goals. The basic objectives of Recovery TimeObjective and Recovery Point Objective are the starting point of business requirements tohelp drive the risk and cost of disaster recovery. The Recovery Time Objective is definedas how quickly the systems and services are operational after a disaster. Overall, theDistrict’s original Recovery Time Objective is to resume operations within twenty-fourhours after a disaster. The Recovery Point Objective is defined as how much data loss isacceptable. Overall, the District’s original Recovery Point Objective is eight hours ofdata loss, (i.e., one day’s worth of data loss). SAP, email, BlackBerry, and WebEOChave a Recovery Time Objective of four hours and a Recovery Point Objective of fiveminutes. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems have a RecoveryTime Objective of four hours and a Recovery Point Objective of zero data loss.Even though the Disaster Recovery Plans are continuously improved and aresufficiently supporting the District’s mission critical systems, the following are someadditional opportunities we recommend to fully realize the efficiency of the District’sinvestment.Office of Inspector GeneralPage 4Audit of the Disaster Recovery Plan
Consider replacing the alternate data center at the Network Access Point of theAmericas in Miami, the Backup Control Center at the Fort Lauderdale ServiceCenter, and the backup Emergency Operations Center at the Okeechobee ServiceCenter with one location. Consider a location 105 miles away from DistrictHeadquarters and the feasibility of using other Water Management Districts’facilities in a reciprocity type arrangement. Consider integrating all disaster tests in a single Disaster Recovery Strategic Plan. Consider assigning the responsibility of coordinating a single Disaster RecoveryPlan to an appropriate District Project Manager outside of the InformationTechnology Bureau. Consider incorporating the single Disaster Recovery Plan into the BusinessContinuity Plan. Consider creating a Disaster Recovery Risk Management Oversight Team thatdefines critical business systems on an annual basis. The District’s risk toleranceshould be determined to establish what functions are mission critical to resumeDistrict operations. Determine an updated, acceptable Recovery Time Objective and a Recovery PointObjective for the single Disaster Recovery Plan.Office of Inspector GeneralPage 5Audit of the Disaster Recovery Plan
Alternate Disaster Recovery Facilities are AdequateThe Disaster Recovery Plans use three different locations depending on thesystems involved and the functionality needed to run different District operations. Incase of a catastrophic event at the Emergency Operations Center, the following threelocations would be used as alternate sites for disaster recovery. All three alternatefacilities appear to be adequate. The Network Access Point of the Americas in Miami (Terremark) would beused for SAP, email, BlackBerry, and WebEOC. The Fort Lauderdale Service Center would be used for Supervisory Controland Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. The Okeechobee Service Center (or optionally the Saint Cloud Field Station)would be used as the Emergency Operations Center for the employeesnormally in the West Palm Beach Emergency Operations Center.The current Emergency Operations Center building that houses the Primary DataCenter was recently upgraded from a Tier I facility to a near Tier III facility (concurrentlymaintainable site infrastructure).February 2012.Construction for the upgrade was completed inATier III facility isappropriateforcompanies supportinginternal and externalclientstwenty-fourhours a day, sevendays a week, such asservice centers, butcan schedule limitedservice as acceptablefor short periods. ANetwork Access Point of the Americas in Miami - Terremark Building.Alternative site for IT Infrastructure Systems.Tier III facility is sometimes used for companies spanning multiple time zones withemployees spanning regional areas. Based on Disaster Recovery best practices, theOffice of Inspector GeneralPage 6Audit of the Disaster Recovery Plan
offsite Disaster Recovery site should have the same physical control and environmentalmonitoring as the original site, i.e., Emergency Operations Center. It should not besubjected to the same natural disaster as the original site and thus should not be located inproximity of the original site. The Okeechobee Service Center (or optionally the SaintCloud Field Station) is a Tier I facility that is used as an alternative to the EmergencyOperations Center in case of a disaster.The alternate data center for SAP, email, BlackBerry, and WebEOC systems inthe Infrastructure Disaster Recovery Plan is a Tier IV facility at the Network AccessPoint of the Americas in Miami. A Tier IV facility (fault tolerant site infrastructure) isjustified for companies with an international market presence delivering 24 hours a day,365 days a year services in a highly competitive client-facing market. Also, a Tier IVfacility is needed for large, global companies where utilization of information technologyprovides a competitive advantage. The Network Access Point of the Americas in Miamiis a Tier IV facility that is used as an alternative to the near Tier III facility of theEmergency Operations Center.Disaster Recovery outsourcing of the alternate data center is common for aninitial implementation partnership to improve service and efficiency levels, manageinternal workload, provide specific expertise, and get the systems ready for a disasterrecovery scenario. The Disaster Recovery Infrastructure Section Team has demonstratedthat its partnership with Terremark, Inc., and their facility works well.ContinuedDisaster Recovery outsourcing may be used to add business value, streamline processes,provide staffing augmentation for limited term projects, and provide specific, niche skills.However, the cost of outsourcing the alternate data center must be determined based onDistrict management’s risk tolerance. The District’s management needs to determine itsRecovery Time Objective and whether outsourcing the alternative data center is efficientand effective.For the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, the DisasterRecovery Plan is using the Backup Control Center at the Fort Lauderdale Service Center.This is a sub Tier I to Tier I (basic site infrastructure) facility. A Tier I facility is forbusinesses with information technology mainly enhancing internal processes and who usea web-presence primarily as a passive marketing tool. An example of a Tier I facilityOffice of Inspector GeneralPage 7Audit of the Disaster Recovery Plan
might be a mid-size business with a facility that is safe at a Category Three Hurricanelevel (111-130 mph winds). The Fort Lauderdale Service Center is a Tier I facility that isused as an alternative to the near Tier III facility of the Emergency Operations Center /Control Room.Recommendation1. Consider replacing the alternate data center at the Network Access Point of theAmericas in Miami, the Backup Control Center at the Fort Lauderdale ServiceCenter, and the backup Emergency Operations Center at the OkeechobeeService Center with one location. Consider a location 105 miles away fromDistrict Headquarters and the feasibility of using other Water ManagementDistricts’ facilities in a reciprocity type arrangement.Management Response:Concur: The Information Technology Bureau will consider replacing the currentalternate data center at the Network Access Point in Miami with a multi-purposefacility located at least 105 miles away from the District Headquarters.Toaccomplish this, we will write a Business Case that will summarize the attributesof each option to allow the business to make the selection decision.Uponcompletion, this information will be forwarded to District senior management forfunding consideration. Completion of the Business Case will be completed byJune 1, 2012.In addition to funding, a multi-purpose facility concept must have agreementbetween Information Technology, Emergency Management and OperationsControl for the purpose and use of such a facility.Emergency Management has been in contact with the Emergency ManagementDirector for the Department of Environmental Management (DEP) regardingmeeting with the other water management districts on a variety of emergencymanagement issues. We will place this item on the agenda for discussion duringthis upcoming meeting. This meeting will be completed by June 1, 2012.Office of Inspector GeneralPage 8Audit of the Disaster Recovery Plan
Responsible Department:Information Technology and Emergency ManagementEstimated Completion:June 1, 2012Testing of the Disaster Recovery PlansThe testing of the Disaster Recovery Plans disclosed the recovery processesacross the District have been accomplished.The Disaster Recovery Teams havesufficiently prepared and continuously improved the disaster recovery plan.Allsignificant requirements have been met. There has been a demonstration of the progressby the documented disaster recovery testing procedures and the continuous improvementof the process.The Disaster Recovery Plans are designed to far exceed its current Recovery TimeObjective and Recovery Point Objective goals. The basic objectives of Recovery TimeObjective and Recovery Point Objective are the starting point of business requirements tohelp drive the risk and cost of disaster recovery. The Recovery Time Objective is definedas how quickly the systems and services are operational after a disaster. Overall, theDistrict’s original Recovery Time Objective is to resume operations within twenty-fourhours after a disaster. The Recovery Point Objective is defined as how much data loss isacceptable. Overall, the District’s original Recovery Point Objective is eight hours ofdata loss, (i.e., one day’s worth of data loss). SAP, email, BlackBerry, and WebEOChave a Recovery Time Objective of four hours and a Recovery Point Objective of fiveminutes. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems have a RecoveryTime Objective of four hours and a Recovery Point Objective of zero data loss. Wenoted that the testing and development process also helps to ensure that the DisasterRecovery Plans’ activities support District’s mission critical systems and the District’sstrategic priorities.Testing of the Infrastructure Disaster Recovery PlanThe Disaster Recovery Infrastructure Section Team plans and executes at leasttwo full tests for the established mission critical systems annually. The lessons learnedOffice of Inspector GeneralPage 9Audit of the Disaster Recovery Plan
results in continuous improvements. On January 21, 2011, the first full recovery test wasattempted. The Disaster Recovery Infrastructure Section Team performed this test fromDistrict Headquarters using the data (SAP, email, BlackBerry, and WebEOC) stored atthe Network Access Point of the Americas facility in Miami. Due to minor technicalissues, partial tests had to be re-performed in February and March 2011. On April 15,2011, another full test was attempted at the Miami facility. The test was a completesuccess, far exceeding the Recovery Time Objective and Recovery Point Objective. TheTeam did an excellent job of using primary and secondary employees and proved theycould execute the Disaster Recovery Plan to recover data. The testing successfullybrought data from the systems in Miami back to the original systems at DistrictHeadquarters.All employees performing these tests reside within the Information TechnologyBureau and currently no internal customers are involved in the test.InformationTechnology Bureau internal customers are defined as all District employees that are notin the Information Technology Bureau. An effective Disaster Recovery Plan is drivenprimarily by planning and involving from relevant District users. Disaster Recovery Planfor a computer system usually focuses on alternative procedures for processingtransactions. It is important to delineate these processes that can be put in place while thecomputer system is not available during the recovery time.It appears there is amisconception that Information Technology is responsible for all of disaster recovery.However, the Information Technology employees are responsible for technical assistanceand not for the functionality testing.Recommendation2. Continue using primary and secondary Information Technology employees toexecute the Disaster Recovery Plan. Consider requiring internal customers tocreate the business requirements and test the functionality.Management Response:Concur: The Information Technology (IT) Bureau will continue to use primaryand secondary Information Technology employees to execute the DisasterOffice of Inspector GeneralPage 10Audit of the Disaster Recovery Plan
Recovery plan where there is sufficient staff and skill set available. We willrequest the involvement of the business community in the disaster testing processat an early stage and during the Disaster Recovery test to ensure their specificneeds are addressed and tested, and to increase our resilience to a disaster’simpact. We will also request that internal customers create the businessrequirements. Information Technology is planning an IT-only Disaster Recoverytest involving our remote site by February 4th 2012, and a more comprehensivetest involving our remote site plus relevant IT customers by June 1st 2012.Responsible Department:Information TechnologyEstimated Completion:June 1, 2012Testing of the Supervisory Control and DataAcquisition (SCADA) Disaster Recovery PlanThe Disaster Recovery Team for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition(SCADA) (the “SCADA Team”) system plans and executes at least two full mode switchtests annually. The lessons learned results in continuous improvements. On April 14,2011, we observed the first partial mode switch test that was attempted. It was successfulwith some minor technical issues. The SCADA Team performed this test from DistrictHeadquarters. On May 25, 2011, we observed a full mode switch test that included theelimination of the microwave connectivity in the B66 building at the West Palm BeachHeadquarters. The SCADA Team performed this full test using the Backup ControlCenter at the Fort Lauderdale Service Center. There were issues with retrieving some ofthe data at the Backup Control Center. Telvent, the software vendor, helped address theissues with the District Team. On June 29, 2011, we observed another full mode switchtest conducted using the Backup Control Center at the Fort Lauderdale Service Center.Again there were minor issues; for example, slowness of retrieving data was caused byinconsistent system configuration. This issue was resolved by reviewing the error eventlog and the configuration has now been synchronized. Again, there were additionalOffice of Inspector GeneralPage 11Audit of the Disaster Recovery Plan
lessons learned and minor issues were addressed, but the ability to open and close floodgates and executing the District’s core mission of flood control was a success. TheSCADA Team showed continued improvement through the tests and engaged watermanagers as well as other relevant District staff during execution of the test at the BackupControl Center.Recommendation3. Consider integrating all disaster tests to a single Disaster Recovery StrategicPlan.Management Response:Concur: The Emergency Management Section is responsible for District-wideemergency management planning activities using an “all hazards” approach. Thetwo primary planning documents related to this recommendation are theComprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) and the Continuity ofOperations Plan (COOP). Each of these plans have a specific language to addressdisaster recovery strategic planning activities. To better ensure the importance ofemergency procedures associated with the alternate data center, EmergencyManagement will add specific language related to this topic to both the COOPand CEMP. This information will be added by June 1, 2012.Each year during the Hurricane Freddy Exercise the Emergency ManagementSection designs the exercise scenario to test and validate identified plans,procedures and activities. We have in the past and will continue to build inexercise goals and objectives related to this recommendation. The HurricaneFreddy Exercise is scheduled for June 5th and 6th in 2012. Prior to the exercise wewill test the Network Access Point data transfer capabilities and the results will beincluded in the Freddy After-Action Report.Office of Inspector GeneralPage 12Audit of the Disaster Recovery Plan
Responsible Department:Emergency ManagementEstimated Completion:June 10, 2012Business Requirements and Business Involvement NeededAs there is value in having different quality disaster recovery tests for separateinformation systems and a business need for these mission critical Disaster RecoveryPlans, the business requirements and involvement used to support these tests need someimprovement.It appears the leaders of the different business processes had littleinvolvement with the requirements and execution of the information used for the DisasterRecovery Plans.Also, the prioritization of these business critical systems is notcontinually reviewed by a steering committee.In general, the Information Technology Strategic Plan and the District-widegovernance vision delineate a standard for the involvement of the internal customerswhen it comes to disaster scenarios.This establishment by management allowsleadership to make knowledgeable decisions in regards to future priorities for internalcustomers. However, internal customers are not always involved. Portfolio managementmanages the risk and the value to the internal customers of projects. District-widegovernance best practices use a business case and portfolio management to prioritizeprojects. Projects with extended timeframes and expanded needs of scope increase thedegree of risk and cost for the District. The main benefit of addressing the managementleadership with the challenge of having internal customer involvement is that the Districtwill show District-wide governance vision with prioritized projects. Disaster recovery,backup, and contingency planning are elements of the bigger Business Continuity Plan.The Information Technology Bureau assists with the Business Continuity Plan, butshould not be the core group for measures taken to keep a business running in the face ofvarious threats. This should be a business owner outside of the Information TechnologyBureau.Office of Inspector GeneralPage 13Audit of the Disaster Recovery Plan
Recommendations4. Consider assigning the responsibility of coordinating a single Disaster RecoveryPlan to an appropriate District Project Manager outside of the InformationTechnology Bureau.Management Response:Concur: Emergency Management has this responsibility currently. Plans aredeveloped in the Emergency Management Section that has District-wideapplication. However, each Bureau/Section within the District is responsible fordeveloping operational procedures that will explain “how” these plans will beexecuted.Each of these groups has Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)Coordinators that work very closely with Emergency Management to ensureconformity and applicability with umbrella District-wide plans.EmergencyManagement reviews procedures and meets with the SOP Coordinatorsperiodically. Emergency Management will continue to work with the IT Bureauto ensure applicable emergency plans and procedures are updated and tested.Responsible Department:Emergency ManagementEstimated Completion:On-going5. Consider incorporating the single Disaster Recovery Plan into the BusinessContinuity Plan.Management Response:Concur: As required by Florida Statutes, Chapter 282: Communications and DataProcess is an Annex to the District’s Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP). TheIT Bureau will provide the Information Technology Disaster Recovery Plan toEmergency Management for review. Emergency Management will review thisAnnex to determine what additional information should be included to strengthenthe COOP.Office of Inspector GeneralPage 14Audit of the Disaster Recovery Plan
Responsible Department:Information Technology and Emergency ManagementEstimated Completion:March 30, 2012Disaster Recovery Risk Management Oversight Team NeededA formal Disaster Recovery Risk Management Oversight Team has been lackingsince the original reorganization of the Information Technology Bureau about sevenyears ago. The original process that was used to create a Disaster Recovery Plan
Jun 01, 2012 · audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence . District’s original Recovery Time Objective is to resume operations within twenty-four hours after a disaster. The Recovery Point Objective is defined as how much data .
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