Multiple Independent Levels Of Security
20-CS-6056/20-CS-5156Security Vulnerability AssessmentMultiple Independent Levels of Securityfor assisting the creation of systems that are resistant to attackers
Safety Critical SystemsWhatA system whose failure may result in one or more of the following: death or serious injury loss or severe damage to property or equipment environmental harmExamplesLife support systems: space, underwater, ventilators Robotic surgery machines: surgeon does not have to be there!Nuclear reactor control systems: 3 Mile Island, ChernobylAmusement rides: Schlitterbahn Waterpark, Kansas CityBattery management for hybrid vehiclesDrive by wire: human gestures to computers that control carFly by wire: human gesturesAir traffic control systemsSewage treatmentWater supplyElectric power grid
High Assurance SystemsMathematical evidence (theorem prover) that a system will functionexactly as intended at all timesThe size and complexity associated with software that monitors,controls, and protects flight critical products continues to grow. This iscompounded by an increased use of autonomous systems which arejust as complex, if not more so, since many operator responsibilitiesare supported and replaced by software in unmanned systems.Further, these systems are subject to cyber-enabled attacks, therebynecessitating another level of complex software to ensure security.GE Research devoted a team to research and develop a new suite oftools to address the challenges with design, development, andverification of these software-intensive products.The goals were to develop technology, processes, and tools thatresult in more efficient software and system development asmeasured by cost and cycle time, and to enable new capabilities suchas autonomy and the Industrial Internet.--- from GE research
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityWhathigh-assurance security architecture based on the concepts ofseparation and controlled information flow – for safety-criticalsystems and multi-level data communicationsEnclave 1MILS architecturetransforms datafrom one classificationlevel to anotherSeparate data streams(no communicationbetween streams)Enclave 2Enclave 3Independent, secureenclaves, differentclassification levelsSecurity policies protectclassified data
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityWhathigh-assurance security architecture based on the concepts ofseparation and controlled information flow – for safety-criticalsystemsimplemented by separation mechanisms that support bothuntrusted and trustworthy componentsensures security cannot be bypassed by an alternatecommunication pathensures a system is tamperproofunauthorized changes to configuration & data is preventedensures a system can be evaluatedrequires: modular components, well specified, compact,simple components, formally provable propertiesis always invokedevery access and message is checked by an appropriatesecurity monitor
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityWhathigh-assurance security architecture based on the concepts ofseparation and controlled information flow – for safety-criticalsystemsimplemented by separation mechanisms that support bothuntrusted and trustworthy componentsensures security cannot be bypassed by an alternatecommunication pathensures a system is tamperproofunauthorized changes to configuration & data is preventedensures a system can be evaluatedrequires: modular components, well specified, compact,simple components, formally provable propertiesis always invokedevery access and message is checked by an appropriatesecurity monitoremploys one or more separation mechanisms: separation kernel,partitioning communication system, physical separation
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityHowMILS is a layered approach with lower layers providing securityservices to higher layersEach layer is responsible for security services in its own domainand nothing elseThe layered approach limits the complexity and scope of securitymechanisms so evaluation becomes possiblesep kern partitioning, scheduling, and secure comm between partitions
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityHow
Multiple Independent Levels of SecuritySupports Foundational Security Policies:End-to-end Information FlowPolicy for checking integrity of data moving from onecomponent to anotherPolicy for authorization of movement of informationEnd-to-end Data IsolationPolicy says how transparent data is (to other users/processes)data are accurate and coming from official/trusted sourceHas policies for partial disclosure of information (e.g. headers)Tradeoff: many-user access means higher concurrency andworse performanceEnd-to-end Periods ProcessingWhile sensitive information is being processed, all otherapplications and data use are prohibitedAfter processing, the memory must be sanitized to removecrypto variables and so onEnd-to-end Damage LimitationApplication error damage does not propagate to other partitions
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityWhatsupports enforcement of one or more application/systemspecific security policies by authorizing information flow onlybetween components in the same security domain or throughtrustworthy security monitors which analyze data looking forsuspicious behavior or unauthorized system changesMILS architecture allows for execution of multiple applications atpotentially multiple security levels or classificationsEach is protected from others and each may communicate withthe others based on mechanisms that support policy enforcementThe old way to get separation was to have physically separatecomputers, networks, and displays – not practicalThe new way to get separation allows enclaves of differentclassification levels to run on the same processor, even
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityImportanceMilitary needs systems that are very highly safe and secureMILS architectures can be evaluated according to theCommon CriteriaThe US military requires evaluation to high security standardsCOTS components that have a very high evaluation are desirableas they can save plenty of money in design and certification costsMajor application: military jetsImagine: a squadron of planes is suddenly disabled in the airdue to enemy intrusionF-35 Joint Strike Fighter Communications, Navigation,Identification (CNI) system uses a MILS architectureMajor application: control of nuclear power generationMajor application: control of sewage treatment systems
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityAssured Data and Process SeparationSeparation kernel –provides multi-level secure operation on general purposemulti-user systems.Middleware services traditional OS functions are taken from the kernel and putin middleware to make the separation kernel small andevaluablePartitioning Communication System extends MILS software security policies to the network:end-to-end information flow, data isolation, periodsprocessing, damage limitation.Physical Separation -
Multiple Independent Levels of SecuritySeparation KernelPurpose: provide multi-level security on general purposemulti-user systems
Multiple Independent Levels of SecuritySeparation KernelPurpose: provide multi-level security on general purposemulti-user systemsCreates an environment which is indistinguishable from that of aof a distributed physical system
Multiple Independent Levels of SecuritySeparation KernelPurpose: provide multi-level security on general purposemulti-user systemsCreates an environment which is indistinguishable from that of aof a distributed physical systemIt must appear as if each enclave is a separate, isolated machineand that information can only flow from one machine to anotheralong known external communication lines
Multiple Independent Levels of SecuritySeparation KernelPurpose: provide multi-level security on general purposemulti-user systemsCreates an environment which is indistinguishable from that of aof a distributed physical systemIt must appear as if each enclave is a separate, isolated machineand that information can only flow from one machine to anotheralong known external communication linesIt must be proved that there are no channels for informationflow between enclaves other than those explicitly provided
Multiple Independent Levels of SecuritySeparation KernelPurpose: provide multi-level security on general purposemulti-user systemsCreates an environment which is indistinguishable from that of aof a distributed physical systemIt must appear as if each enclave is a separate, isolated machineand that information can only flow from one machine to anotheralong known external communication linesIt must be proved that there are no channels for informationflow between enclaves other than those explicitly provided Data isolation ensures an enclave can't access resources inother enclaves Periods processing ensures applications within enclavesexecute for the specified duration in the system schedule Information flow defines permitted info flows between enclaves Fault isolation ensures a failure in one enclave does not impactany other enclave within the system
Multiple Independent Levels of SecuritySeparation KernelSeparation Kernel Protection Profile:High assurance systems require proof that system meetscritical safety and security requirementsProtection profile provides a formal notion of systemarchitecture and data flows that can be subjected toformal analysis (theorem provers)The following can be proved formally from PP:Protection of all resources from unauthorized accessSeparation of internal resources used by (target of evaluation)functions from exported resources made available to subjectsIsolation and partitioning of exported resourcesCorrect mediation of information flows between partitionsand between exported resourcesCorrect auditing procedures
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityCommon CriteriaOriginal version:Certification of single products such as processors,operating systems, applicationsAdapt the protection profile to the product at a given EALLabs or NSA evaluatesLater version:Allows certification of composed productsTwo or more evaluated products can be combinedbase component dependent componentComposition class:composition rationaledevelopment evidencereliance of dependent componentbase component testingcomposition vulnerability analysisThe products may be from different organizations
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityCommon CriteriaLater version:Ensure base component provides at least as high anassurance level as the dependent componentSecurity functionality in support of security requirements ofdependent component is adequateDescription of interfaces used to support security functionsof dependent component is providedTesting of base component as used in composed TOE isperformedResidual vulnerabilities of base component are reportedand an analysis of vulnerabilities arising from compositionare considered
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityCommon CriteriaLater version:Composition Assurance PackagesBuild on results of previously evaluated entitiesCAP-A: Structurally composedSecurity functional requirements are analyzed justusing the outputs from the evaluations of componentsCAP-B: Methodically composedSecurity functional requirements are analyzed usingoutputs from component evaluations, specification ofinterfaces and high level component design of thecomposed systemCAP-C: Methodically composed, tested & reviewedCAP-B involvement of the base componentdeveloper
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityCommon CriteriaMILS is a good fit for the Common Criteria certification:MILS was designed as a component architectureComponents are designed by multiple vendorsComponents are certified at multiple EAL levelsComponents assist with security policy enforcementExample: Separation kernel & MILS Message Router (MMR):base: Separation kerneldependent: MMREvaluate Separation KernelPP exists, security target exists, target: EAL 6 Evaluate MMRNo PP, artifacts reviewed, target: EAL 5Evaluate Composed MILS ComponentsDefine a Security Target for the composed systemDecide on a Composition Assurance Level (CAP)If done right, certification results for combined systemcan be re-used by multiple vendors
Multiple Independent Levels of SecuritySeparation KernelAvailable fromGreen Hills Software https://www.ghs.com/Integrity 178B RTOS used in F-16, F-22, F-35, Airbus 380Very tiny kernel – 4K linesKernel is evaluated to NSA EAL 6 (semi-formally verified)Lynx Software Technologies http://www.lynx.com/LynxSecure separation kernel and embedded hypervisorLynxOS-178 RTOS (LynxOS on Atari 1040ST in 1986-1989)SYSGO https://www.sysgo.com/PikeOS – small set of privileged servicesUsed in products certified by the French NIS AgencyWind River Systems https://www.windriver.com/VxWorks MILS platform compliant with Separation KernelProtection Profile (SKPP) from the NSAOK Labs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open Kernel LabsOKL4 microkernel – in billions of mobile devices
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityPartitioning Communications System (PCS)A communications security architecture compliant with aninformation flow separation policyExtends the MILS architecture to network flowsWorks with a separation kernel to ensureSystem security channels cannot be bypassedSystem can be evaluatedIs always invoked – policies are always checkedSystem is tamperproofSupports (a kind of) formal proof of correctness
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityFormal Proof of CorrectnessIntroduce and define States of a system in terms of securityDefine transition rules from State to State based on variouskinds of triggers (e.g. input or clock timer firing)Check that the initial State is considered secureFor each transition from State A to State B, check that ifA is considered secure then B can be considered secureThen we have a proof that the system is secure
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityFormal Proof of CorrectnessOperation:Triple: (subject, object, operation)Example: (franco, sshd, execute)Subjects and Objects labeled with security levels in partial order32514But each subject has a current security level and a maximumsecurity levelThus subjects can be 'downgraded' in security temporarilyAccess control matrix (M): gives permissions for a givenoperation (o) on particular sets of security levels (l)A State: (o,M,l)
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityFormal Proof of CorrectnessPolicy types (discretionary and mandatory):Discretionary: access may be permitted (i.e. (s,o,op))No read-up: subject may not read object at higher security levelNo write-down: subject can't write to object at lower levelSubjects are processes, memory is an objectSubjects have access to memorySubjects can act as channels by reading one memory objectand writing that information to another memory objectTrusted subjects are exempt from no write-down policySubjects can be 'downgraded' in security temporarily to loosenthe mandatory restrictionsA State is secure if all current access triples (s,o,op) arepermitted by the policies aboveA State transition is secure if it is between two secure StatesIf the initial State is secure and all transitions are secure thenthe system is secure
Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityFormal Proof of CorrectnessOperations for a real-time OS:Execute:Read:Write:Read and write:Get-read: requests read access to an objectRelease-read: release an objectGive-read: grant read access to another processRescind-read: withdraw read permission given to anotherprocessCreate-object: OS has to check write access on the objectdirectory is permitted and the security level of the objectdominates the security level of the e-object-current-security-level:
Multiple Independent Levels of Security Common Criteria Later version: Ensure base component provides at least as high an assurance level as the dependent component Security functionality in support of security requirements of dependent component is adequate Description of interfaces used to support security functions of dependent component is .
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