Extended Producer Responsibility Stakeholder Concerns And .

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White PaperExtended Producer Responsibility:Stakeholder Concerns and Future Developments

Extended Producer Responsibility:Stakeholder Concerns and Future DevelopmentsA report prepared by the INSEAD Social Innovation Centre with the support ofEuropean Recycling Platform (ERP)Nathan KunzAtalay AtasuKieren MayersLuk Van WassenhoveINSEAD Social Innovation CentreBd de Constance77305 FontainebleauFRANCE

About INSEADINSEAD is one of the world’s leading and largest graduate business schools, with campuses in France,Singapore and Abu Dhabi. As a global educational institution, INSEAD’s mission is to create a learningenvironment that brings together people, ideas and cultures from around the world, in order totransform businesses and individuals through business education.With 146 faculty members from 34 countries, INSEAD teaches more than 1,300 degree participantsannually in MBA, Executive MBA, Master and PhD programmes. In addition, more than 12,000executives participate in INSEAD’s Executive Education programmes each year.Besides education, INSEAD also conducts research through its research centres. The present projectwas carried out by the INSEAD Social Innovation Centre, an inclusive platform for cross-disciplinaryresearch, education, projects and engagement in the area of business in society. This centre aims todevelop innovation for sustainable economic, environmental and social prosperity. Its fields ofresearch include Corporate Social Responsibility & Ethics, Humanitarian Research, SocialEntrepreneurship and Sustainability.About the authors:Nathan Kunz, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, INSEAD Social Innovation CentreAtalay Atasu, Associate Professor, Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of TechnologyKieren Mayers, Executive in Residence, INSEAD Social Innovation CentreLuk Van Wassenhove, The Henry Ford Chaired Professor of Manufacturing, Professor of Technologyand Operations Management, INSEAD Social Innovation CentreContacts:Miranda Helmes, CommunicationsINSEAD Social Innovation CentreBd de Constance - 77305 Fontainebleau - FranceTel: 33 1 60 72 91 16Email: social.innovation@insead.eduWeb: edgementsThe authors wish to thank European Recycling Platform (ERP) for funding and supporting thisresearch. The authors would also like to thank the 23 interviewees who answered our questions.2

About ERPEuropean Recycling Platform (ERP) started its operations in August 2005 in response to theintroduction of the European Union’s Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive.ERP’s mission is to ensure cost-effective implementation of the WEEE, Batteries and Packaging EPRlegislations for the benefit of participating companies and their customers. This is achieved throughinnovative waste management strategies and by encouraging national implementation of theDirectives according to a set of core principles fundamental to the protection of consumers andbusinesses, as well as the environment. ERP operates directly or through solid partnerships in 16countries—Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands(partnering with WEEE NL), Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey and the UK. Expansionto further countries will soon follow.Contacts:Samantha Charalambous, CommunicationsEuropean Recycling PlatformTel: 39 02 92 14 74 79Email: info@erp-recycling.orgWeb: http://erp-recycling.org3

Motivation For This ReportBy attaining an overall collection and recycling volume of 2 million tonnes of waste electrical andelectronic equipment (WEEE) in 2013, European Recycling Platform (ERP) reached an importantmilestone in its development. In its 8 years of operation, ERP had collected approximately 2.5 timesthe volume of all consumer electronics waste recycled in the entire US in 2011,1 or the volume of allWEEE collected in Germany, Italy, UK and Spain in 2010.2ERP reached its first major milestone of 1 million tonnes in July 2010, 5 years after starting itsoperations. The 2 million tonnes milestone was reached in October 2013, only 3 years later. Thisdemonstrates ERP’s growth in recent years, due in large part to its expansion into additionalcountries as well as organic growth of collection.Removing hazardous gases from end of life electrical appliances has allowed ERP to prevent therelease of 3,000 tonnes of ozone-depleting substances3 (i.e., CFCs). The release of these substancesinto the atmosphere would represent a global warming potential of 19 million tonnes of CO2equivalents.4 Recycling valuable waste for reuse in new products is another benefit deriving fromthese 2 million tonnes of WEEE. Over these first 8 years of operation, ERP recovered 16 tonnes ofgold, 130 tonnes of silver and 160,000 tonnes of copper.5 Besides the positive impact on theeconomy, the recovery of these amounts of valuable metals obviated the need for their extraction, ahighly energy-consuming task that would have emitted approximately 2.7 million tonnes of CO2.6Together with the benefits from recovering CFCs, this equals 21.7 million tonnes of CO2 equivalentsavoided, or nearly 40% of Denmark’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2011.7To mark this important milestone, ERP supported INSEAD in conducting a study on the future ofextended producer responsibility. The publication of this report also coincides with the 14 February2014 deadline for the transposition of the WEEE Directive Recast into national legislation in EUMember States. This report therefore provides a timely and interesting view on the future ofextended producer responsibility.1US EPA (2013). Municipal solid waste in the United States: 2011 facts and figures, p.68Eurostat (2014b). Waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE)3ERP (2014)4RWTH Aachen University (2010). Analysis of WEEE output flows on the greenhouse effect5ERP (2014)6RWTH Aachen University (2010). Analysis of WEEE output flows on the greenhouse effect7Eurostat (2014c). Environment24

Executive SummaryDeveloped at a time when waste had come to be seen as a cost producers should pay for, theconcept of extended producer responsibility (EPR) evolved into a legislative tool to handle this cost,using the mechanism of producer responsibility organisations (PROs). Increasing commodity pricesover the last decade are changing this paradigm, however, and waste is increasingly considered as apotential source of revenue. Legislation has largely failed to adapt to this paradigm shift, andtherefore does not fit the reality of waste markets anymore. Indeed, from the legislative tool it wasinitially, EPR has developed into a market driven by multiple forces, one in which legal and marketbased approaches try to cohabit, which has led to an inefficient and partially dysfunctional system.Our report aims to explore recent advances in EPR and to provide recommendations for thestakeholders involved in this market. After a brief introduction on the history of EPR in Europe, wediscuss pending issues in the current practice of EPR, with particular emphasis on the WEEE Directiveand its Recast as they are the focus of recent discussions on implementation. Then, based on a seriesof interviews with a set of stakeholders, we analyze the perspectives and key concerns regarding EPRimplementation.From the analysis of stakeholder concerns, we identify five factors that limit or disrupt the stabilityand effectiveness of EPR systems: Commodity dynamics8: Volatile commodity prices influence leakages of waste outside theEPR system and the value producers recover from wasteVolume dynamics: Uncertain volumes of waste collected by PROs limit planning of futureinvestment for waste operatorsCompetition dynamics: Variations in the level of competition between PROs may change theefficiency of EPR marketsRegulatory dynamics: The possibility of unexpected changes in future legislation maynegatively impact the stability needed by producers and waste operatorsDesign dynamics: Potential product design changes lead to uncertainty in terms of waste tobe recycled in the futureAs they play against the long-term stability that businesses need to operate, these different factorsshould be alleviated through some legal and operational mechanisms. For example, we recommendflexible adaptation at national levels of a limited number of general principles imposed by theEuropean Commission. In order to let competing PROs contribute to increasing performance andefficiency, we also suggest national authorities further open EPR markets to competition. We alsorecommend that PROs take a role in providing stability to EPR markets, thus helping to improve theeffectiveness of EPR in achieving its objectives.8In this paper, the term dynamics is used in the sense of “the forces or properties which simulate growth, development or change within asystem or a process” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2014)5

Table of ContentsABOUT INSEAD .2ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.2ABOUT ERP .3MOTIVATION FOR THIS REPORT .4EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .51. HISTORY OF EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY .71.1. Initial Motivation and Objectives .71.2. Development .71.3. What Has Been Achieved So Far?.81.4. Future Developments .92. THE WEEE DIRECTIVE .112.1. Origins of the WEEE Directive .112.2. What Has the WEEE Directive Achieved? .112.3. What Was Missing in the WEEE Directive? .132.4. WEEE Directive Recast.142.5. Remaining Challenges .153. STAKEHOLDER VIEWS ON EPR .173.1. Stakeholders .173.1.1. Producers .173.1.2. PROs .173.1.3. Waste Operators .173.1.4. National Authorities .173.1.5. Municipalities .173.1.6. Trade Associations .183.1.7. Clearing Houses / National Registers .183.1.8. Retailers .183.1.9. Environmental and Consumer NGOs .183.1.10. European Commission . 183.1.11. Illegal Informal Sector .183.1.12. Communities .183.2. Stakeholder Map .193.2.1. The PROs Stakeholder Map .213.2.2. Analysis of Stakeholder Salience .223.3. Stakeholder Interviews and Analysis . 233.4. Points of Stakeholder Agreement and Disagreement .323.5. Stakeholder Perspectives Summary .334. FUTURE OUTLOOK . 344.1. Commodity Dynamics .354.2. Volume Dynamics .354.3. Competition Dynamics .364.4. Regulatory Dynamics .374.5. Design Dynamics .374.6. Discussion .384.7. Conclusions .41LIST OF REFERENCES .43APPENDIX – LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS INTERVIEWED .466

1. History of Extended Producer Responsibility1.1. Initial Motivation and ObjectivesOver 20 years ago, the idea that producers should finance the collection and recycling of theirproducts and packaging at end of life began to globally transform waste management policy andpractices. Initially conceived in the early nineties, extended producer responsibility (EPR) wasintended primarily to provide incentives for producers to design products more easy to reuse andrecycle, with fewer and less hazardous materials to discard at end of life (Lifset, 1993; Lindqvuist andLifset, 2003). In addition, EPR was expected to support improved collection, recycling and treatmentof waste. Unlike an eco-tax, the scope of EPR was not limited to financial obligations for producers,but also included information, logistics, waste management and even product designresponsibilities.1.2. DevelopmentEPR was first implemented for packaging throughout EU Member States in the early nineties, withGermany leading the way in 1992 with its legislation on the avoidance of packaging waste(Verpackungsverordnung),9 which became a model for further adoption in Europe. The EU PackagingWaste Directive of 1994 established collection and recycling targets for Member States (94/62/EC)10and essential requirements for the design of packaging, but did not require that producers financewaste collection and recycling. The national legislatures of Member States themselves implementedthe financial responsibility for companies producing, filling and distributing packaging. Following theadoption of EPR for packaging by EU Member States, the model was then also implemented forbatteries and household appliances in a number of European countries. The EU adopted Directivesimplementing EPR for End-of-Life Vehicles (2000/53/EC)11 in 2000, Waste Electrical and ElectronicEquipment (WEEE) (2002/96/EC)12 in 2003 and Batteries in 2006 (2006/66/EC,13 through a revision tothe original 1991 Batteries Directive).The concept of EPR has also been applied to other waste streams such as chemicals, tyres, paper andoils in several European countries.14 Similar legislation has also been implemented or is in theprocess of being implemented in other parts of the world (e.g., the US, Canada, Japan, China,Australia and South America). Currently, 32 states in the US have some form of e-waste legislation inplace, with recent focus on TVs and monitors; however, no federal-level regulation exists.15 Takeback laws for batteries, some mercury-containing devices, paint, lamps and pharmaceuticals exist atvarying legislative levels in the US.9Federal Republic of Germany (1991). Verordnung über die Vermeidung von Verpackungsabfällen (Verpackungsverordnung)European Parliament and Council (1994). Directive 94/62/EC of 20 December 1994 on packaging and packaging waste11European Parliament and Council (2000). Directive 2000/53/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 onEnd-of-Life vehicles12European Parliament and Council (2003). Directive 2002/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 onwaste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE)13European Parliament and Council (2006). Directive 2006/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 onbatteries and accumulators and waste batteries and accumulators14European Commission & Bio Intelligence (2012). Use of economic instruments and waste management performances: Final report, p.10215Electronics TakeBack Coalition (2013). Brief comparison of state laws on electronics recycling107

1.3. What Has Been Achieved So Far?The transfer of responsibility for waste collection, treatment and recycling from municipalauthorities to producers is complex. Within any country there can be hundreds of differentproducers and potentially thousands of waste collection points. The logistics involved for any oneproducer to organise the collection of their own products from end-users, or even any small share ofthe overall waste flow, is highly impractical and overly expensive in almost all cases. Because of this,an economy of scope based on a recycling scheme using producer responsibility organisations (PROs)emerged. PROs organise and administer the collection and recycling of waste on behalf of producers.Duales System Deutschland in Germany was the first PRO, and is still one of the largest.16 PROstypically charge per type and amount of packaging material (e.g., aluminium, plastic, wood, card),appliance or battery each producer puts on the market in order to finance the waste they collect,treat and recycle on producers’ behalf over any given period.17Other approaches exist in which governments charge fees or taxes to producers and then pay forwaste collection and recycling (e.g., for WEEE in Taiwan, Korea18 and Hungary19), or where wastecontains enough value to finance treatment and recycling without intervention by producers, as isthe case for automobiles in the EU. Nevertheless, the emergence of PROs marked a major turningpoint in waste management. Today, hundreds of PROs have been established for packaging,batteries and WEEE on a worldwide basis. Mayers (2007) estimated there were more than 250 PROsin Europe, and with additional Member States implementing EPR legislation in recent years, thisnumber has undoubtedly increased.Reasonable progress has been made in meeting packaging targets, as packaging recycling andrecovery increased from 54.6% in 2005 to 63.6% in 2011 (EU-27 average),20 exceeding the target of60% since 2008. Similarly, a collection rate of 32% was achieved for batteries in 2012,21 against acollection target of 25%. A collection rate of 37% was achieved for WEEE in 2010,22 and thecollection target of 4 kg per capita stated in the WEEE Directive was reached in 21 of 27 EU MemberStates in 2010.23 Whether higher future targets can be met under EPR requirements is questionableas a substantial amount of waste is simply unavailable to EPR systems. In some countries, consumersare not legally obliged to separate their waste for recycling, and disposing of smaller items in theirnormal household bins is just easier. Waste with positive scrap value, such as aluminium or steelcans, paper, clear glass, automobiles, large appliances and lead-acid batteries, is often simplycollected privately by recyclers. A substantial proportion of products, such as TVs, mobile phonesand PCs, are still exported to China and Africa, where they are being resold for use, or worse, arerecycled illegally below standards.Overall, PROs only appear to be effective for collecting waste that is costly to treat, a factor notconsidered in the original EPR Directives. Increased prices for metals recovered from automotive16Duales System Holding (2014). WebsitePRO Europe (2014). Website18Chung, S.-W. & Murakami-Suzuki, R. (2008). A comparative study of e-waste recycling systems in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan fromthe EPR perspective: implications for developing countries19Perchards (2007). WEEE legislation and compliance in the 27 EU Member States20Eurostat (2014a). Recycling rates for packaging waste21EPBA (2013). The collection of waste portable batteries in Europe in view of the achievability of the collection targets set by BatteriesDirective 2006/66/EC, p.522Eurostat (2014b). Waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE). Collection rate was calculated as defined by Directive 2012/19/EU:Weight of WEEE collected / Average weight of EEE put on the market in 3 preceding years23Eurostat (2014b). Waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE)178

waste, lead-acid batteries and WEEE has increased the volume of waste diverted from PROs toprivate commercial recycling. For example, the amount of valuable WEEE recycled outside of EPRsystems in Germany more than tripled between 2006 and 2013.24 Access to waste is becoming aconcern and ensuring compliance with collection targets may be challenging in the future unlesssome issues are tackled appropriately.Most countries have just one PRO for packaging and batteries, but over the last decade competitionhas been introduced in some Member States. Since some competition authorities ruled that themarket must be open to more than one player, the services PROs provide are increasingly openingup for competition. For example, for packaging, European producers may choose between PROs inthe UK, Poland and Germany; for WEEE and batteries, competing PROs have now been establishedin most EU Member States. Within these countries, competition between PROs has improvedefficiency. In Germany, for example, competition between packaging PROs helped reduce wastemanagement costs and improve recycling services.25 Consequently, other EU Member States, such asIreland and Portugal, are similarly considering introducing competition among PROs for packaging.EPR has introduced many administrative requirements for producers, PROs and recyclers to monitorthe quantities of products and packaging sold and collected as waste within each period. Everymultinational company must report the number of products it places on the market to numerousPROs in the countries in which it operates, and dedicated employees and resources must beallocated to keep on top of the task. Several countries with more than one PRO operating havedeveloped national registers to keep track of overall volumes sold and collected as waste withintheir country. Additionally, to ensure that each PRO does its fair share, many countries haveestablished either national clearing houses or reconciliation processes to intervene in and balancePRO collection responsibilities to ensure the amount of waste they are responsible for collecting andrecycling is proportionate to their producer members’ collective share of recycling and treatmentobligations.One particular challenge still remains for the adoption of EPR for waste: as yet, producers have verylittle EPR-induced financial incentive to design their products or packaging to be easier to treat andrecycle at end of life. Both the End-of-Life Vehicles and WEEE Directives assign producers individualresponsibility to treat and recycle waste from their own products.26 The reality, however, is very farfrom this: in practice each producer shares the average costs of collectively recycling mixedcategories of types of waste products (Mayers et al., 2013).1.4. Future DevelopmentsWhile the Packaging Waste and End-of-Life Vehicles Directives have not changed since theirinception, the Battery Directive has been amended five times since its original incarnation in 1991,and was revised substantially in 2006. The 2006 revisions clarified that producers were to be maderesponsible for financing waste battery collection and recycling (2006/66/EC)27, and also set binding24Stiftung EAR (2014). Amount of opting örE for each collection groupFederal Republic of Germany (2012). Sektoruntersuchung duale Systeme - Zwischenbilanz der Wettbewerbsöffnung (B4-62/12), p.45 &p.5626European Parliament and Council (2003). Directive 2002/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 onwaste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), Article 8.227European Parliament and Council (2006). Directive 2006/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 onbatteries and accumulators and waste batteries and accumulators259

collection targets. The WEEE Directive (see Section 2) underwent its first major revision or “Recast”in 2012 (2012/19/EU).28 This Recast, described in detail in Section 2.4, appears to be the mostsubstantial revision of any EPR Directive to date.Under the WEEE Directive Recast, during 2015 the EC plans to investigate how producers can bemade more responsible for their own waste costs, and various EU Member States such as the UK29and Denmark30 are already investigating different potential approaches for increasing incentives forproducers to consider recyclability in their product designs. For example, up to now producersselling mercury-free LCD displays pay the same as those selling displays with mercury.31Similarly, packaging PROs have also started to question if charging recycling fees by weight issufficient to incentivize producers to develop packaging that is easier to recycle.32 For example,under current approaches, producers that use mixed packaging in which different types of materialsare glued or fastened pay the same fees as producers using packaging that is easy to separate duringrecycling. Eco-Emballages, the PRO for packaging in France, has already implemented a fee structureof incentives and penalties to reward and penalize producers according to the actual design of theirpackaging and corresponding cost of recycling.33,34To summarize, two decades after the original idea of EPR was first implemented, a number ofproblems limit the effectiveness of the approach. Only a fraction of waste volumes are collectedunder EPR, Member States’ regulatory frameworks are not harmonized and are administrativelycomplex for producers, and EPR has had very limited influence on design. PROs are at a critical pointin terms of what their future strategy, direction and role will be within EPR. Very few analyses haveattempted to ascertain and bring together an overview of EPR that considers different wastestreams, and few studies have considered the need of businesses for a more stable and predictableEPR environment. This report assesses the current situation for EPR, with input and consideration ofdiverse views from different stakeholder groups, as discussed below.Accordingly, in what follows, we start with a discussion of EPR in Eu

With 146 faculty members from 34 countries, INSEAD teaches more than 1,300 degree participants annually in MBA, Executive MBA, Master and PhD programmes. In addition, more than 12,000 executives participate in INSEAD’s Executive Education programmes each year. Besides education, INSEAD

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