Policing The Peace After Yugoslavia: Police Reform Between .
GRIPS Policy Research CenterDiscussion Paper: 10-07Policing the Peace after Yugoslavia:Police Reform between External Imposition and Domestic Reform1Dr. Florian Bieber2University of KentUnited KingdomPrepared for the GRIPS State-Building Workshop 2010: Organizing Police Forces inPost-Conflict Peace-Support Operations, January 27-28th, 2010ABSTRACTSince the mid-1990s, a plethora of international organizations—from the UN and OSCE tothe European Union and NATO—have been extensively involved in the reform of policeforces across the post-conflict regions of former Yugoslavia. The various international actorshave employed a diverse tool kit of police reform, from creating new police forces fromscratch to reforming existing, ethnically divided forces.This paper will trace the different efforts in post-conflict settings by discussing policing byinternational actors, efforts at imposing police reform, post-conflict police assistance andchange to policing through conditionality, drawing on the rich empirical record from Croatia,Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Despite these extensive efforts, theresults have been modest. Lacking clear international or European standards, police reformhas been the subject to uneven and changing expectations and contradictory demands.This work was supported in part by Global COE Program "The Transferability of East AsianDevelopment Strategies and State Building", Mext, Japan.1I would like to thank GRIPS and the participants of the workshop “Organizing Police Force in Post-ConflictPeace-Support Operation” on January 27-28th, 2010 for their comments.2Email: bieberf@gmx.net.
GRIPS Policy Research CenterDiscussion Paper: 10-07AGE5DAIntroduction1. International Policing2. Internationally Imposed Police Reform3. Short-term Post-Conflict Police Reform4. Police through Conditionality5. ConclusionBibliography2
GRIPS Policy Research CenterDiscussion Paper: 10-07IntroductionPolice Forces across Central and Southeastern Europe have experienced afundamental transformation since the fall of Communism over two decades ago. Thetransition from authoritarian single-party rule to multiparty democracy necessitated aprofound change of the police: enforcing the rule of law, protecting human rights andnot viewing citizens as potential threats and subordinates.3 New challenges arose inaddition, such as organized crime, often linked to political power centers,discrimination of minorities (esp. Roma) and political violence. This plethora of needswhich drove police reform in Central and Southeastern Europe has been compoundedby the large scale violence which most countries emerging from Yugoslaviaexperienced in the process of the wars of Yugoslav succession.Police forces during the wars and conflicts were often the main source of violence,discrimination and ‘ethnic cleansing’. They were not embodying the ‘monopoly of thelegitimate use of force by the state’: Run by states against minorities, by secessionistsagainst other ethnic groups and political opponents, being not legitimate, holding nomonopoly over the use of force, they became subservient to new nationalist politicalelites and their ranks swelled with paramilitaries who had little or no understanding ofpolicing. The Serbian police included for example the notorious Unit for SpecialOperations (Jedinica za specijalne operacije, JSO), also know as Red Berets, whichincluded members of paramilitary units from Croatia and Bosnia and committed warcrimes in all three wars and whose members assassinated Serbian Prime MinisterZoran Djindjić in March 2003. The police in Serbia as an example for one of the mostpoliticized police forces in the region was directly controlled by president SlobodanMilošević until his fall in 2000 and served as his praetorian guard against domesticdissent and was a key actor in ethnic cleansing in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo duringthe wars.4For their central role during the conflicts police reform has been understood to be apillar of post-conflict reconstruction, not only in former Yugoslavia, but also in otherethnic and civil conflicts from Northern Ireland to Sudan. The reforms which areinitiated in the post-conflict period have to meet six particular challenges. Firstly, theyneed to penalize and ideally remove police officers who have been involved in seriousbreaches of human rights during the conflict. Second, former combatants need totransition to civilian jobs and police forces are often the obvious employers. Third,police forces need to be made more representative of the larger populationcomposition, which in most cases entails increasing the share of minority members inthe police force. Fourth, police reform is necessary in order to allow for the return ofminorities and to provide a secure environment in which democratic elections cantake place. Fifth, police reform is inherently political and often controversial as thestructure of the police reinforces the political structures after the war. Theseinstitutions, such as regional autonomy, are often integral part of the peace settlement.Finally, the policing practice needs to be professionalized and reformed. While allaspects seek to transform police forces from a cause of conflict to a legitimate3Robert I. Mawby, “The Impact of Transition: A Comparison of Post-Communist Societies withEarlier ‘Societies in Transition,’ András Kádár (ed.), Police in Transition (Budapest: Central EuropeanUniversity Press, 2001) pp. 23-31.4On the structure of the Serbian police during the 1990s see Budimir Babović, Analysis of RegulationsRegarding Responsibility for Control of the Interior Ministry of the Republic Serbia, 2.4.2003. Exhibit465, Case IT-02-54-T, Slobodan Milošević, ICTY.3
GRIPS Policy Research CenterDiscussion Paper: 10-07representative of an inclusive state to maintain peace, the different priorities often pullthe reform efforts into contradictory directions.International intervention in the form of assistance, advice, policing, mentoring,training, enforcement and coercion shaped the evolution of post-conflict policing informer Yugoslavia. It is this international intervention into policing that is the focus ofthis paper. This does not include general assistance and advice provided to stateauthorities in conducting policing or reforming the police, but more concertedexternal intervention, focusing particularly on the post-conflict environment. Inparticular, we will focus on four aspects of international intervention in police reformwhich will be discussed in detail: First, we will look at international policing, whereinternational organizations exercised executive policing functions and re-build policeforces from scratch. Second, we will explore externally imposed police reforms, i.ewhen changes to the police structure are primarily driven by external actors, even ifthey are formally implemented by local institutions. These two first forms of externalintervention are particular to the (semi-)protectorates in Kosovo and Bosnia andHerzegovina, where international actors have held a broad range of competences.Third, we will discuss short-term post conflict assistance which includes measuresthat have assisted governments to reform police forces in response to a conflict, as hasbeen the case in Southern Serbia and Macedonia. Finally, we will explore howconditionality of the European Union has sought to facilitate the reform of policeforces, taking the example of Bosnia.In addition to the European Union, most international intervention in the context ofpolicing have been carried out by the Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE) and the United Nations. Beyond these three core actors, bilateraldonors have shaped the police reform agenda, as has NATO, which through a leadrole in peace-keeping has often held executive police competences, in particularthrough the KFOR mission in Kosovo.As we shall see, the record of this experience has been mixed. While conflicts haveended, bloated militarized police forces have become more professional and inclusive,political influence remains strong. Furthermore, external intervention has beenstruggling to convince local authorities to ‘buy into’ the reform processes. As such,police reform has shared greater similarities with other aspects of publicadministration reform, rather than defense reform which has generally been moresuccessful due to clearer standards of armed forces and the lead role of NATO in theprocess.5 In particular, there has been a frequent disconnect between the emphasis ontechnical assistance by external actors and the political relevance of police forces andthe content of the reform process.1. International PolicingInternational policing constitutes the highest degree of external imposition. Itencompasses both an executive role for international police officers, including thepower to arrest citizens, and the complete reconstruction of a new local police force.Despite extensive external involvement in policing, international police officers haveonly actively conducted policing in Kosovo and in Eastern Slavonia. The rarity ofsuch extensive external involvement, including beyond the Western Balkans, is hardly5On this for Bosnia see the research project of the author and Gülnur Aybet on EU and NATO statebuilding in Bosnia, http://intbosnia.wordpress.com/.4
GRIPS Policy Research CenterDiscussion Paper: 10-07surprising. States are unlikely to complete relinquish one of its core functions andinternational actors are generally ill-prepared to provide executive policing—fromlinguistic and cultural obstacles to the large number of international police officersrequired. In Kosovo, external policing became a necessity as after the ceasefirenegotiated between NATO and the Yugoslav government in June 1999 all Yugoslavand Serbian security personal withdrew from the province, leaving a complete powervacuum behind in Kosovo. Due to the apartheid-style policies of SlobodanMilošević’s Serbia, few Albanians remained in the security forces and most KosovoSerbs in the security forces were unwilling to remain in Kosovo under internationalauspices for the fear of retribution by Albanians. Thus, Kosovo lacked any statestructures and institutions as KFOR soldiers entered the region. However, KFORsoldiers competed against the Kosovo Liberation Army which also sought to fill thevacuum created by the Serbian state withdrawal.6 In this environment, policing wasfirst carried out by peacekeepers with little training and capacities in regular policeduties. As a consequence, KFOR was unable to prevent large scale revenge attacksagainst Serbs and other minorities by radical Albanians, taking the lives of up to athousand persons during the summer of 1999 and the expulsion of a majority of Serbsand most Roma from Kosovo.7Prior to the establishment of an international police force in Kosovo, the only regionalexperience with an international police force and the complete reconstruction of apolice force had been in Eastern Slavonia. Eastern Slavonia was the eastern mostregion of Croatia bordering Serbia and the only part of the self-declared mini-state ofthe Republic of Serbian Krajina left in the fall of 1995 after the successful Croatianmilitary operations Flash (Bljesak) and Lightening (Oluja). The region came undertemporary international administration in late 1995 through the Erdut Agreementwhich foresaw the reintegration of the region into Croatia. While the Croatian Serbauthority had not disappeared, as the Serbian state had in Kosovo, the overwhelmingmilitary victory of the Croatian state elsewhere placed the local Serb authorities inweak bargaining position. As a result, the local Serb forces, including the policewhich emerged out of paramilitary units during the Croat war in 1991/2, weredisbanded and the entire region demilitarized. 8 In its place, the UN missionestablished the Transitional Authority Police Force (TAPF), a multiethnic police thatwas formed with assistance from the Croat state institutions and the local Serbauthorities with rough parity of Serbs and Croats.9 The TAPF eventually consisted of811 Serb, 815 Croat officers and 52 from other ethnic groups. The force was trainedby the UN who also maintained observers in all local police stations. In addition, a 50person special international police unit existed in parallel with the local police,established under UN mandate.10 They were forced to accept an executive role for theUN mission in the region (UNTAES) which would oversee the reintegration of theregion in Croatia. The international police was in Eastern Slavonia was able to makesome high-profile arrests during the UN mandate, but never played more than an6Tim Judah, Kosovo. What Everyone needs to know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 93.Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories. Rule and Reconstruction(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 46, 49.8Art. 3, Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium,12.11.1995.9Sanja Kutnjak Ivković, “Distinct and Different: The transformation of the Croatian Police,” MarinaCaparini, Otwin Mareni (eds), Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe. Process andProgress (Geneva and Münster: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and LitVerlag, 2004), p. 206.10Ibid, p. 46.75
GRIPS Policy Research CenterDiscussion Paper: 10-07auxiliary role to the reforms of the local police force. By December 1997 theresponsibility over the police was transferred to Croatian government after thegovernment promised to maintain the ethnic composition, but all other specialarrangements or international involvement ended.11In Kosovo, the international policing slowly emerged after the entry of KFOR. Thetwo main policing structures were the internationally staffed civilian police force(CIVPOL) and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), which was recruited locally, butremained under UN control until 2005.12 Local political institutions at the Kosovolevel were only established in 2001, following the promulgation of the UN imposedConstitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo thatestablished the ‘Provisional Institutions of Self-Government’ (PISG) and generalelections. Furthermore, the UN was reluctant to relinquish policing competences tothe new authorities due to the sensitivity of policing, in particular when it came toretaining minority members among its ranks and protecting Serbs and minorities (esp.Roma) from attacks.The CIVPOL was the first civilian police force to take over from KFOR in the monthsfollowing the end of the war. Unlike the KFOR, however, it was unable to deploy inthe immediate aftermath of the war and it would take CIVPOL up to a year to reachits planned strength. The mission was first established with quickly transfer ofmembers of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and in 1999 countedonly 1,800 police officers. By 2000, its number had more than doubled to 4,450, atwhich level it approximately remained until 2004.13 Among the international policeofficers, approximately two thirds formed part of the CIVPOL, while the remainderconstituted special police units and the border police.14 The reasons for the slow-buildup of the international police mission are in part specific to Kosovo and in partrepresentative of a broader problem of international police missions. UNMIK gainedthe mandate to administer the police mission only at the beginning of internationaldeployment and was thus unable to plan for such a mission ahead of time.15 A generalproblem, experienced frequently with civilian missions in post-conflict intervention,has been the deployment gap. Civilian members to missions cannot be drawn up assoldiers and in particular qualified professionals are often not readily available fordeployment. This pertains specifically to policing as few countries can spare largenumbers of police officers. This gap has lead to often low standards among theinternational officials. Reports of the executive and non-executive UN police missionsin Kosovo and Bosnia frequently noted that police officers were at times unable tospeak English or even to drive—both formal requirement—or came frombackgrounds that raised legitimate doubts over the good policing practices they mightbe bringing to the countries.16 In Kosovo, some 46 countries contributed to CIVPOL11Caplan, Op. Cit., p. 58.Jeremy M. Wilson, “Reconstruction of Kosovo’s Police and Justice Systems,” The Annals of theAmerican Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 605 (2006), p. 153.13Ibid., p. 158.14Human Rights Watch, Failure to Protect. Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, Vol. 16,No. 6 (July 2004), p. 14.15Wilson, op. cit., p. 159.16Timothy Donais, “The Limits of Post-Conflict Police Reform,” Michael A. Innes (ed.), BosnianSecurity after Dayton. 2ew Perspectives (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 186; “UN SexAbuse Enquiry in Kosovo,” The Scotsman, 6.6.2005; Eric Jansson, “Kosovo raises concern over UNstaff role,” Financial Times, 16.9.2005.126
GRIPS Policy Research CenterDiscussion Paper: 10-07in March 2004, with the larges contributors being from the USA, India, Germany, andJordan, but also including police officers hailing from Zimbabwe.17In addition to providing civilian policing and to taking over these functions fromKFOR, the international police mission had the explicit goal to prepare the transitionto the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) that would eventually take over from CIVPOL.The first recruits of the KPS were already trained in 1999 and the ratio of KPS toCIVPOL police officers increased steadily, with KPS overtaking the number ofinternational police officers by 2002. The KPS was recruited by the UN and trainedby the OSCE in a program that be similar to later training programs in Macedonia andSouthern Serbia, discussed below, involving 20 weeks training at a police academyand followed by 15 weeks of field training. 18 The number of KPS police officersreached 5,700 in March 2004, more than twice the number of international policeofficers.19In recruitment UNMIK paid particular attention to secure the adequate representationof minorities to help not just build an inclusive police force, but also to secure thelegitimacy of the new institutions among the Serb community that had remainedskeptical and at time outright hostile towards these emerging Kosovo institutions. Inthis regard, KPS was successful as by 2003, 84% of its members were hailing fromthe Albanian community, 9% from Serbian background and 7% from othercommunities, slightly overrepresenting minorities. 20 This careful distribution,however, should not be mistaken for a multiethnic police force. As Serbs andAlbanians in particular live in segregated areas, the police tended to reflect the localdemographics and contain few member of a different group in any given region.21Despite this success in terms of minority recruitment, the KPS, together with CIVPOLand KFOR, however, took a serious blow to their legitimacy in March 2004 whenthree days of rioting by extremist Albanians resulted in the torching of Serb Orthodoxchurches, houses and the displacement of several thousand Serbs. The internationalpresence itself became a target of the mob violence with around 60 members fromeach KFOR, CIVPOL and KPS injured. The violence and the inability of KPS toeffectively stem the attacks revealed a number of weaknesses of the internationalpolice effort: the officers pay and morale was low and training and equipment forcrowd control was limited. 22 More importantly, the failure to prevent the violencedisclosed larger structural weaknesses of international policing. Coordination withinKFOR and between KFOR, the UN police and KPS was minimal and lines ofauthorities were confused. Similarly, none of the security providers appeared to beequipped and trained for large-scale crowd control and civil disturbances.23 While theMarch 2004 woul
6 Tim Judah, Kosovo. What Everyone needs to know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 93. 7 Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories. Rule and Reconstruction, 10. GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper: 10-07 . GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper: 10-07 .
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