A Virtual SDN-Enabled EPC Architecture
A Virtual SDN-Enabled EPCArchitectureFuture Networks 2014 Michael Jarschel 26-09-2014102/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014
SDN & NFV Synergyas illustrated by ETSIInnovative third-partyapplicationsNetwork abstractionsfor faster innovationOpenInnovationSoftwareDefinedNetworks LTE ?NetworkFunctionsVirtualizationCAPEX & OPEXreductionHow can we apply these concepts to the LTE EPC?202/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014
Software Defined Networking & Network Functions VirtualizationSDN Separation of control and data plane Logically-centralized controlNFVRelocation of network functions fromdedicated appliances to generic servers Programmability of the network302/10/2014ConfidentialApplication PlaneVirtual Network FunctionController PlaneHypervisorData Planex86 Server Nokia 2014
SDN & NFV Deployment Modes: VNF PassthroughProduction TrafficSelect Production FlowsVNF 1VNF 2Hypervisorx86 ServerSDN Switch402/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014VNF 3
SDN & NFV Deployment Modes: Service ChainingProduction TrafficSelect Production FlowsVNF 1VNF 2VNF 3SDN –enabled Hypervisorx86 ServerSDN Switch502/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014
SDN & NFV Deployment Modes: Service Chaining Virtual SDN ControllerProduction TrafficSelect Production FlowsSignaling TrafficVNF 1SDNControllerSDN –enabled Hypervisorx86 ServerSDN Switch602/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014VNF 3
Functional MappingLTE EPCMMESDN/NFVHSSWANeNBSGWPGWHow to map the EPC functions onto the SDN/NFV architecture?702/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014
SASER SIEGFRIED: SDN-based SGW First step: focus on SGW functionality Proof of concept demonstration presented at:- Mobile World Congress 2014, Barcelona- SASER Midterm Review, Berlin- SIGCOMM 2014, Chicago Partners:802/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014
Control Plane ArchitectureSGW-C enFlowPacket ForwardingEntityForwarding Backplane902/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014Split protocol stack along transport andadaptation/termination functionsDefine a hierarchy of reusable proxy OpenFlowcontrollers acting as datapaths to the north andcontrollers to the southA controller may occupy resources offered tohim by the underlying layer, thus shaping thedata model offered towards the northIn addition, the set of capabilities(actions/matches) may be restricted in order tosuppress cross-layer violations by higher layercontrollers
Flexible reuse of existing infrastructure to guarantee best experienceHomeBenEventAnnData centerSGWNE NUC** CAM Cloud Application ManagerNUC Network Utilization ControlSGW Serving Gateway1002/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014CAM*OperatorControl CenterSGWAppSGWController
Flexible reuse of existing infrastructure to guarantee best experienceHomeEventBenData centerAnnSGWNE NUC** CAM Cloud Application ManagerNUC Network Utilization ControlSGW Serving Gateway1102/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014CAM*OperatorControl CenterSGWAppSGWController
Flexible reuse of existing infrastructure to guarantee best experienceHomeEventBenAnnData centerSGWNE NUC** CAM Cloud Application ManagerNUC Network Utilization ControlSGW Serving Gateway1202/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014CAM*OperatorControl CenterSGWAppSGWController
Flexible reuse of existing infrastructure to guarantee best experienceHomeEventBenAnnVideocallData centerSGWNE NUC** CAM Cloud Application ManagerNUC Network Utilization ControlSGW Serving Gateway1302/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014CAM*OperatorControl CenterSGWAppSGWController
Flexible reuse of existing infrastructure to guarantee best experienceHomeEventBenAnnData center1SGWSGW SGWApp ControllerNUC** CAM Cloud Application ManagerNUC Network Utilization ControlSGW Serving Gateway1402/10/2014Confidential Nokia 20141CAM*OperatorControl CenterSGWAppSGWControllerNE 1. Deploy SGW App and Controller CAM
Flexible reuse of existing infrastructure to guarantee best experienceHomeEventBenAnnData center1SGWSGW SGWApp ControllerNUC** CAM Cloud Application ManagerNUC Network Utilization ControlSGW Serving Gateway1502/10/2014Confidential Nokia 20141CAM*OperatorControl CenterSGWAppSGWController2SGW1. Deploy SGW App and Controller CAM2. Program virtual GW SDN CAM
Flexible reuse of existing infrastructure to guarantee best experienceHomeEventBenAnnVideocallVideocallData center1SGWSGW SGWApp ControllerNUC** CAM Cloud Application ManagerNUC Network Utilization ControlSGW Serving Gateway1602/10/2014Confidential Nokia 20141CAM*OperatorControl CenterSGWAppSGWController2SGW1. Deploy SGW App and Controller CAM2. Program virtual GW SDN CAM
Flexible reuse of existing infrastructure to guarantee best experienceHomeEventBenData centerSGWSGW SGWApp ControllerNUC** CAM Cloud Application ManagerNUC Network Utilization ControlSGW Serving Gateway1702/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014CAM*OperatorControl CenterSGWAppSGWControllerAnnSGW
Flexible reuse of existing infrastructure to guarantee best experienceHomeEventBenData centerSGWSGW SGWApp ControllerNUC** CAM Cloud Application ManagerNUC Network Utilization ControlSGW Serving Gateway1802/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014CAM*OperatorControl CenterSGWAppSGWControllerSGW
Flexible reuse of existing infrastructure to guarantee best experienceHomeEventBenData centerSGWNE NUC** CAM Cloud Application ManagerNUC Network Utilization ControlSGW Serving Gateway1902/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014CAM*OperatorControl CenterSGWAppSGWController
Nokia FutureWorksQuestions ?2002/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014
2102/10/2014Confidential Nokia 2014
SDN/OpenFlow. SDN/OpenFlow. NBI. SGW-C App. SDN/OpenFlo w. Split protocol stack along transport and adaptation/termination functions. Define a hierarchy of reusable proxy OpenFlow controllers acting as datapaths to the north and controllers to the south. A controller may occupy resources
Alien ALR-9750 (Nanoscanner) 915 MHz RFID RW EPC Class 1 Alien ALR-9780 915 MHz RFID ALR-8780 866 MHz RFID* RW EPC Class 1 EPC Class 1 Gen 2 Alien ALR-9800 (Continuous) RW EPC Class 1 EPC Class 1 Gen 2 Alien ALR-9800 (On Demand) RW EPC Class 0, 1 EPC Class 1 Gen 2 Avery 6405 WO EPC Class 1 AWID MPR-2010AN, MPR-2080* RO EPC Class 0
sdn.301 security protocol3(sp3) sdn.401 security protocol4(sp4) sdn.701 messagesecurity protocol sdn.702 directoryspecs forusewith msp key management sdn.601 keymanagement profile sdn.902 kmp definitionof servicesprovided bykmase sdn.903 kmp servicesprovided bykmase sdn,906 kmp traffickey attribute negotiation access control sdn.801 .
SDN 40-24-100C aND SDN 40-24-480C DImENSIoNS Catalog Number Dimensions - mm (in) h w D SDN 5-24-100C 123.0 (4.85) 50.0 (1.97) 111.0 (4.36) SDN 10-24-100C 123.0 (4.85) 60.0 (2.36) 111.0 (4.36) SDN 20-24-100C 123.0 (4.85) 87.0 (3.42) 127.0 (4.98) SDN 5-24-480C 123.0 (4.85) 50.0 (1.97) 111.0 (4.36) SDN 10-24-480C 123.0 (4.85) 60
SDN Waypoint Enforcement Insight #1: 1 SDN switch Policy enforcement Insight #2: 2 SDN switches Fine-grained control Legacy devices must direct traffic to SDN switches Ensure that all traffic to/from an SDN-controlled port always traverses at least one SDN switch
Lab 5: Configuring VXLAN to provide network traffic isolation Lab 6: Introduction to OpenFlow Lab 7: SDN-routing within an SDN network Lab 8: Interconnection between legacy networks and SDN networks Lab 9: Configuring Virtual Private LAN Services (VPLS) with SDN networks Lab 10:
SDN in Access network, SDN in Optical Layer & MPLS on top Working in orchestration Depends on -Control Plane, SDN Controllers, APIs Communication through Open Interfaces Access SDN SDN to MPLS Control Plane API Function Edge Gate way Programmable MAC/VLAN/PBB & MPLS to MPLS Mapping Ethernet CPRI/dRoF
SDN security issues [31-37] Security policies in SDN [28,38-52] DDoS [53-56] DDoS vulnerability in SDN [33,36,57] Policies for rescuing SDN from DDoS [58-69] DDoS, distributed denial of service; SDN, software-defined network. focusing on DDoS issue, followed by the comparison of various proposed countermeasures for them. Table I has
a result of poor understanding of human factors. Patient deaths have occurred as a result. Example: unprotected electrodes n Problems: Device use errors - improper hook ups, improper device settings n Solutions: “Ergonomic or Human factors engineering - See “Do it by Design” and AAMI Human Factors Engineering Guidelines.
