NATO, SOF And The Future Of The Alliance A Monograph By US .
NATO, SOF And The Future Of The AllianceA MonographbyMAJ Joseph M. MouerUS ArmySchool of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, KansasSAMSAY 06-07Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIESMONOGRAPH APPROVALMajor Joseph M. MouerTitle of Monograph: NATO, SOF And The Future Of The AllianceApproved by:Monograph DirectorKevin C. M. Benson, COL, ARDirector,School of AdvancedMilitary StudiesRobert F. Baumann, Ph.D.Director,Graduate Degree Programsii
AbstractNATO, SOF and the Future of the Alliance, by MAJ Joseph M. Mouer, United States Army, 49pages.NATO continues to transform itself from a Cold-War institution. Originally designed todefend Western Europe from a conventional attack from the Soviet Union, the alliance is nowextending its operational reach well beyond the borders of Europe. The realization that securityfor the alliance is integrated in the global security environment was first realized during the warsin the former Yugoslavia. During this conflict, NATO’s Cold War structure proved inadequate toaddress security issues that emanated from outside the alliance but impacted on its security.Although NATO began experimenting with organizational restructuring immediately after the fallof the Soviet Union, the Balkan crisis acted as a catalyst and pressured NATO into adopting theCombined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept which provides NATO with greater operationalflexibility. However, NATO is still primarily structured to conduct military operations againstconventional nation-state entities as exemplified by the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), acorps-level reaction force. In order to successfully respond to the threats of the 21st Century,NATO will require adopting changes in its organizational structure. This monographrecommends that NATO complete earlier transformational efforts by incorporating SpecialOperations Forces (SOF) into its permanent organizational structure to meet current and futurechallenges. The monograph argues NATO’s current relevancy is undermined by the lack of anorganic SOF command and control headquarters at the strategic and operational levels. There isrobust internal capacity at the tactical level within NATO; missing are the operational andstrategic headquarters necessary to leverage that Special Operations capability to conductunilateral or combined operations across all levels of war. Without the effort to create such anorganization within NATO, the alliance will be unable to respond effectively to asymmetricthreats originating from outside North America and Europe.iii
TABLE OF CONTENTSINTRODUCTION. 1CHAPTER ONE. 5NATO: Past and Future . 5NATO Defined . 5NATO’s Political And Military Structure . 7NATO’s Continuing Relevence. 10Collective Defense vs. Collective Security . 11NATO And The Global War On Terror . 13The Need For NATO SOF Command And Control. 16What SOF Can Do For NATO . 17Conclusion. 19CHAPTER TWO. 21NATO SOF Command and Control . 21The Evolution of NATO Command and Control . 21NATO SOF Command and Control . 25NATO Combine Joint Special Operations Component Command . 25US SOF Command and Control . 27Conclusion. 33CHAPTER THREE . 35Building NATO SOF. 35SOF – A Primer . 36Getting it Right from the Start. 39NATO Missions and SOF Capabilities . 42Conclusion. 45CONCLUSION . 46Origins of Change. 46NATO, 911 and Afghanistan. 47The Future of NATO . 49BIBLIOGRAPHY . 51iv
List of FiguresFigure 1. Anatomy of a Crisis . 18Figure 2. Anatomy of a Crisis II. 19Figure 3. NATO Military Organization. 24Figure 4: Relationship Between SACEUR, ISAF, and SOCCENT . 29Figure 5. Recommended Additions to NATO’s Organizational Structure. 31Figure 6. Expansion of NATO’s Set . 43Figure 7. US SOF/NATO SOF Mission Crosswalk . 45v
INTRODUCTIONCreated to protect postwar Western Europe from the Soviet Union, the alliance is nowseeking to bring stability to other parts of the world. In the process, it is extending bothits geographic reach and the range of its operations. In recent years, it has playedpeacekeeper in Afghanistan, trained security forces in Iraq, and given logistical support tothe African Union's mission in Darfur. It assisted the tsunami relief effort in Indonesiaand ferried supplies to victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United States and to those of amassive earthquake in Pakistan.Foreign Affairs, Sept 06 1The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been undergoing tremendouschanges since the breakup of the Soviet Union. With a mandate to operate “out of area” or go“out of business”, NATO had been seeking ways to reorganize from a Cold War institution into asecurity organization capable of addressing many of the security concerns that have emergedsince the fall of the Soviet Union. The effort to address organizational shortfalls, underway since1989, received heightened attention during the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s.The wars in Bosnia and Kosovo forced NATO to conduct its first offensive military operationssince its founding. Yet the highly integrated command and control structure which served NATOso well during the Cold War proved inadequate to meet the complex challenges found in postSoviet Eastern Europe. In addition to conducting operations outside Western Europe, asenvisioned by NATO’s founding mandate, the wars in the former Yugoslavia challenged NATOto begin the process of reassessing its organizational structures. Yet in spite of the wars in theformer Yugoslavia, institutional inertia persisted. Indeed, Bosnia and Kosovo, still well withinEurope, did not require NATO to seriously consider carrying out operations against threatsemanating from more distant corners of the globe. This state of mind was shattered on September11, 2001. After the attacks on New York and Washington D.C., NATO, first time in its history,1Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” Journal of Foreign Affairs (Sep-Oct2006), 105-114.1
invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 states that an attack on one member is tobe considered an attack on all members. As a result, NATO is currently conducting operations inplaces never envisioned by its members even just a few years ago. Yet the need to continue theprocess of institutional change continues. This monograph analyzes one such area of requiredchange – NATO’s lack of an institutional or permanent Special Operations capability.This monograph analyzes NATO’s post-Cold War efforts to transform the organizationand argues that a Special Operations capable command and control structure is required forNATO to address many future security challenges. Without such a capability, NATO will notfully complete many of its ongoing transformational efforts and ultimately fall short of itspotential to address future security threats. As alluded to earlier, the fall of the Soviet Unionrequired NATO to respond to critics’ charge that the institution lacked relevancy. Chapter onedescribes NATO’s structure at the political/strategic level and argues that NATO is more relevantthan ever before. As the Soviet Union dissolved, the many of the former Soviet states in EasternEurope strived for NATO membership. This desire for NATO membership rests on two keymotivations: the desire for protection against the possible re-emergence of an aggressive Russianstate and a desire to move closer to Western Europe and its economic prosperity. With thisexpansion, NATO moved away from an organization comprised mainly of wealthy nations to anorganization representing the political and security aspirations of 26 nations, many of whom hadlived under the harsh economic conditions imposed on them by powerful enemies. Finally,chapter one shows that although individual NATO member nations possess Special Operationsforces, those forces are not institutionalized within the NATO structure and thus NATO’s use ofthose forces are, at best, ad hoc and inefficient.In chapter two, this monograph examines the history of NATO reorganization at theoperational level with specific emphasis on NATO’s adoption of the Combined Joint Task Force(CJFT) concept. By analyzing the command and control structure currently adopted by NATO, it2
is argued that NATO has in place a framework that combines the best elements of the integratedcommand and control structure used during the Cold War with the more flexible command andcontrol functions adopted after the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. Yet even with this flexiblecommand structure, NATO has overlooked a key component necessary to provide adequateresponse to the challenges of the 21st Century: a Special Operations Component Command(SOCC). Indeed, under each of the Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) within NATO, therecan be found a Land Component Command (LCC), Maritime Component Command (MCC) andAir Component Command (ACC) to provide NATO with the ability to create a CJTF tailored tothe specific requirements of the mission. Again, starkly lacking is the SOCC. Yet even with aSOCC in place, a few more questions require answering. For instance, what Special Operationscapabilities should NATO possess? What missions would such a force be expected to perform?Chapter three analyzes European and North American SOF capacity and suggests possiblecompositions and capabilities of a NATO Special Operations Force (NATO SOF).In chapter three this monograph provides specific recommendations on the compositionand capabilities for NATO SOF. It is argued that NATO will require less direct action (DA) orspecial reconnaissance (SR) expertise than currently resides cumulatively within individualNATO member nations’ forces. Instead, this monograph will posit that a balanced force capableof conducting a wide spectrum of Special Operations is more conducive to meeting NATO’sfuture challenges. Specifically, it is contended that the model for NATO SOF should be theUnited States Army Special Forces (USSF). By modeling off this US Army force, NATO candevelop a balanced force capable of both responding to crisis as well as developing long-termengagement operations within specific targeted countries deemed by the NATO leadership topose future threats to European and North American security.Currently, there is no institutionalized NATO SOF command and control nor forcesdedicated to conduct Special Operations under alliance mandates. This grave lack of capability3
severely limits NATO’s ability to conduct the full spectrum of operations necessary to supportOPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM; it will alsoseverely undermine the conduct of any future endeavors required of NATO forces. By creating apermanent command and control element such as those already existing to provide C2 to GeneralPurpose forces (GPF), NATO can greatly enhance both its relevancy and ability for success in the21st Century.4
CHAPTER ONENATO: Past and FutureThe North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington in April 1949, created an alliance forcollective defense as defined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 2 Therefore, from itsinception NATO can be viewed as a complement to the United Nations’ attested aspiration topromote global peace and stability. However, while the United Nations was conceived topromote the vision of global collective security, NATO was devised for a more specific purpose:defending Western Europe against the Soviet Union. 3 This is an important distinction and hashad recent NATO planners and outside pundits questioning the role and relevancy of NATO in apost-Soviet global environment. It will be argued in this chapter that NATO remains not onlyrelevant to North American and European stability but vitally so. Additionally, as the security ofEurope and North America become increasingly tied to the global security climate, NATO’s needto address security issues traditionally outside its sphere of influence will continue to grow.These pressures will require NATO not only to continue expanding into Eastern Europe, but moreimportantly, to leverage other global organizations outside of NATO’s orbit and attempt to solvea wide variety of political and military issues before they are felt in Europe and North America.NATO DefinedIt is important to note that NATO is as much a political organization as it is a militaryone, if not more so. As a political entity, NATO has the ability to leverage the combined politicalweight of its members to achieve its collective military goals. In the current conflict againstterrorist organizations, this is no small thing. Terrorism preys upon the political will of its2NATO Handbook 2006 (NATO Office of Information and Press: Brussels, Belgium), 9.Ibid., 16.35
opponents much more than it does on simple military considerations. To be sure, there willalways be differences among NATO-member nations as to the specific application of militaryforce necessary to deal with terrorism, but this fact does not undermine any collective politicalstatement NATO makes opposing terrorist organizations that pose a significant threat to thecollective security of its members.NATO’s political power has grown greatly with its expansion into Eastern Europe.Through the formal inclusion of former Warsaw Pact nations into the alliance, NATO hasredefined its solely defensive military role and moved towards a political body whose clout isonly exceeded by the United Nations itself. The power to leverage the political will of itsmembers can translate into much needed political legitimacy when NATO undertakes anyendeavor, military or otherwise. Historically, this has been the underlying reason for NATO’ssuccess against an aggressive Soviet Union and is depicted anecdotally by former United StatesChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Crowe. Crowe asked the late MarshalSergei Akhromeyev why the Soviet Union never attacked into Europe. Akhromeyev’s answerwas that to attack one country meant to attack all 16 NATO members and that was more than theSoviet Union was willing to do. 4 This tale underscores the strength of the alliance. That NATOis currently comprised of 26 nations makes this tale even more poignant.The specific mechanism by which NATO settles upon its goals is through a political bodycalled North Atlantic Council (NAC). 5 The NA
NATO, SOF and the Future of the Alliance, by MAJ Joseph M. Mouer, United States Army, 49 pages. NATO continues to transform itself from a Cold-War institution. Originally designed to . In chapter two, this monograph examines the history of NATO reorganization at the
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