Summary Of Economic Projections - November 2-3, 2010
SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic ProjectionsNovember 2–3, 2010Table 1: Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Governors and ReserveBank Presidents, November 2010PercentVariable2010Central tendency1201120122013Longer run20102011Range220122013Longer runChange in real GDP. . . . . .June projection. . . . . . .2.4 to 2.53.0 to 3.53.0 to 3.63.5 to 4.23.6 to 4.53.5 to 4.53.5 to 4.6n/a to n/a2.5 to 2.82.5 to 2.82.3 to 2.52.9 to 3.82.5 to 4.02.9 to 4.52.6 to 4.72.8 to 5.03.0 to 5.0n/a to n/a2.4 to 3.02.4 to 3.0Unemployment rate. . . . . .June projection. . . . . . .9.5 to 9.79.2 to 9.58.9 to 9.18.3 to 8.77.7 to 8.27.1 to 7.56.9 to 7.4n/a to n/a5.0 to 6.05.0 to 5.39.4 to 9.89.0 to 9.98.2 to 9.37.6 to 8.97.0 to 8.76.8 to 7.95.9 to 7.9n/a to n/a5.0 to 6.35.0 to 6.3PCE inflation. . . . . . . . . . .June projection. . . . . . .1.2 to 1.41.0 to 1.11.1 to 1.71.1 to 1.61.1 to 1.81.0 to 1.71.2 to 2.0n/a to n/a1.6 to 2.01.7 to 2.01.1 to 1.50.9 to 1.80.9 to 2.20.8 to 2.40.6 to 2.20.5 to 2.20.4 to 2.0n/a to n/a1.5 to 2.01.5 to 2.0Core PCE inflation3. . . . . .June projection. . . . . . .1.0 to 1.10.8 to 1.00.9 to 1.60.9 to 1.31.0 to 1.61.0 to 1.51.1 to 2.0n/a to n/a0.9 to 1.40.7 to 1.50.7 to 2.00.6 to 2.40.6 to 2.00.4 to 2.20.5 to 2.0n/a to n/aNOTE: Projections of change in real gross domestic product (GDP) and of inflation are from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the yearindicated. PCE inflation and core PCE inflation are the percentage rates of change in, respectively, the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and theprice index for PCE excluding food and energy. Projections for the unemployment rate are for the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the yearindicated. Each participant's projections are based on his or her assessment of appropriate monetary policy. Longer-run projections represent each participant’sassessment of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy. TheJune projections were made in conjunction with the FOMC meeting on June 22-23, 2010.1. The central tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest projections for each variable in each year.2. The range for a variable in a given year includes all participants' projections, from lowest to highest, for that variable in that year.3. Longer-run projections for core PCE inflation are not collected.Authorized for Public Release – 1 of 35
SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic ProjectionsNovember 2–3, 2010Table 1aEconomic Projections for the First Half of 2010*(in percent)Central Tendencies and RangesCentral TendencyRangeChange in Real GDP2.7 to 2.72.7 to 2.7PCE Inflation1.0 to 1.01.0 to 1.0Core PCE Inflation1.1 to 1.11.1 to 1.1PCE 01.01.01.01.0Core PCE 11.11.11.11.1Participants' ange in Real 72.72.7* Growth and inflation are reported at annualized rates.Authorized for Public Release – 2 of 35
SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic ProjectionsNovember 2–3, 2010Table 1bEconomic Projections for the Second Half of 2010*(in percent)Central Tendencies and RangesCentral TendencyRangeChange in Real GDP2.1 to 2.31.9 to 2.3PCE Inflation1.4 to 1.81.2 to 2.0Core PCE Inflation0.9 to 1.10.7 to 1.7PCE 01.21.41.41.6Core PCE 90.91.11.11.1Participants' ange in Real 32.12.1* Projections for the second half of 2010 implied by participants' November projections for the first half of2010 and for 2010 as a whole. Growth and inflation are reported at annualized rates.Authorized for Public Release – 3 of 35
SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic ProjectionsNovember 2–3, 2010Table 2: November Economic Projections(in percent)ProjectionYearChange in Real GDPUnemployment RatePCE InflationCore PCE 1.31.20.90.81.01.21.81.02.01.11.81.01.0Authorized for Public Release – 4 of 35
SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic ProjectionsNovember 2–3, 2010Table 2 (continued): Economic ProjectionsProjectionYearChange in Real GDPUnemployment RatePCE InflationCore PCE 1.81.41.11.02.02.02.01.21.51.62.01.21.3Authorized for Public Release – 5 of 35
SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic ProjectionsNovember 2–3, 2010Table 2 (continued): Economic ProjectionsProjectionYearChange in Real GDPUnemployment RatePCE 52.02.01.52.01.72.01.51.82.02.01.6Authorized for Public Release – 6 of 35Core PCE Inflation
SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic ProjectionsNovember 2–3, 2010Figure 1. Central tendencies and ranges of economic projections, 2010–13 and over the longer runPercentChange in real GDP5Central tendency of projectionsRange of projections432Actual1 rcentUnemployment gerrunPercentPCE ngerrunPercentCore PCE inflation32120052006200720082009201020112012NOTE: Definitions of variables are in the notes to table 1. The data for the actual values of the variables are annual.Authorized for Public Release – 7 of 352013
SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic ProjectionsNovember 2–3, 2010Uncertainty and Risks - GDP Growth2(a): Please indicate your judgment of the uncertainty attached to your projections relative tolevels of uncertainty over the past 20 years.Number of participants20151050Lower(C)Broadly similar(B)Higher(A)2(b): Please indicate your judgment of the risk weighting around your projections.Number of participants20151050Weighted to downside(C)Broadly balanced(B)Weighted to upside(A)Individual ResponsesRespondent2(a)2(b)123456789A A A A A A B A AB C C B C B B C C10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18ABACABABAuthorized for Public Release – 8 of 35BBABABAAAC
SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic ProjectionsNovember 2–3, 2010Uncertainty and Risks - Unemployment Rate2(a): Please indicate your judgment of the uncertainty attached to your projections relative tolevels of uncertainty over the past 20 years.Number of participants20151050Lower(C)Broadly similar(B)Higher(A)2(b): Please indicate your judgment of the risk weighting around your projections.Number of participants20151050Weighted to downside(C)Broadly balanced(B)Weighted to upside(A)Individual ResponsesRespondent2(a)2(b)123456789A A A A A A B A AB A A A A B B A A10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18ABAABBAAAuthorized for Public Release – 9 of 35BBABABABAA
SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic ProjectionsNovember 2–3, 2010Uncertainty and Risks - PCE Inflation2(a): Please indicate your judgment of the uncertainty attached to your projections relative tolevels of uncertainty over the past 20 years.Number of participants20151050Lower(C)Broadly similar(B)Higher(A)2(b): Please indicate your judgment of the risk weighting around your projections.Number of participants20151050Weighted to downside(C)Broadly balanced(B)Weighted to upside(A)Individual ResponsesRespondent2(a)2(b)123456789A A A A A A C A BB C C C B C B B B10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18ABACAAAAAuthorized for Public Release – 10 of 35BBABABBBAB
SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic ProjectionsNovember 2–3, 2010Uncertainty and Risks - Core PCE Inflation2(a): Please indicate your judgment of the uncertainty attached to your projections relative tolevels of uncertainty over the past 20 years.Number of participants20151050Lower(C)Broadly similar(B)Higher(A)2(b): Please indicate your judgment of the risk weighting around your projections.Number of participants20151050Weighted to downside(C)Broadly balanced(B)Weighted to upside(A)Individual ResponsesRespondent2(a)2(b)123456789A A A A A A C A BB C C C B C B B B10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18ABACAAAAAuthorized for Public Release – 11 of 35BBABABBBAB
L o n g er-ru n P r o je c tio n s1 (c ). I f y o u a n tic ip a te t h a t t h e c o n v e rg e n c e p ro c e s s w ill ta k e s h o r te r o r lo n g e rt h a n a b o u t five o r six y e a rs , p le a s e in d ic a te b e lo w y o u r b e s t e s tim a te o f th ed u r a tio n o f t h e c o n v e rg e n c e p ro c e ss . Y ou m a y a lso in c lu d e b e lo w a n y o th e re x p la n a to r y c o m m e n ts t h a t y o u t h in k w o u ld b e h e lp fu l.Respondent 1:Expect convergence to take somewhat longerRespondent 2:We anticipate that the convergence process will take about five to six years.Respondent 3:Convergence to the real economy’s equilibrium and to the inflation objective within five years requires lowerlong-term interest rates than what is assumed in the baseline outlook. As a result, while the economy isanticipated to revert back to maximum employment within a five years horizon, inflation is likely to remainbelow the target.Respondent 4:N/ARespondent 5:I expect the convergence process will be similar to that outlined in the long-run projection reportedin the Tealbook, with the output and unemployment gaps reaching zero in about five years, and the PCEprice inflation rate reaching its long-run value of 2 percent in six to seven years.Respondent 6:N/ARespondent 7:N/ARespondent 8:I expect, as in Tealbook, that inflation may take longer than five to six years to return to the 2% level Iconsider most consistent with our dual mandate.Respondent 9:N/ARespondent 10:Given the recession’s depth, uncertainty in the business community about government programs and regula tory change, higher prospective marginal tax rates, and the difficult adjustments that are needed, convergencemay well require the full six years.Respondent 11:By 2015-16 potential growth is 2.4%, down from our current estimate of 2.5-2.7%, as the baby boomersretire. A reasonable estimate for the long-run unemployment rate is 4% to 6%. We would expect, withappropriate policy and no further adverse shocks, unemployment to be in this range and the output gap tobe around zero by 2016.We assume long-term inflation expectations to be anchored around 2.5% on a CPI basis and the FOMC’s
inflation objective to be around 2% for the PCE deflator and around 2.5% for the CPI. Under these condi tions, with the output gap around zero, we would expect PCE inflation of around 2%.Respondent 12:The convergence process may be slightly shorter than 5-6 years.Respondent 13:N/ARespondent 14:I anticipate that the convergence process for real GDP growth will be substantially shorter than 5-6 years,perhaps on the order of 3-4 years for real growth (with a period of overshoot of real growth in the interimduring recovery), and an overshoot (above 1.5%) in the interim in inflation as a consequence of significantpast growth in the monetary base supported by longer term asset purchases that cannot be sold off over avery short time period. I anticipate that the decline in the unemployment rate will lag behind the recoveryof real growth.Respondent 15:In light of the severity of the recession and the historical norms of jobless recoveries and recoveries thatfollow financial crises, the convergence process for unemployment will likely take longer than five to sixyears. In addition, I am concerned that further monetary stimulus and delay in removing extraordinarypolicy accommodation will lead to financial imbalances that could eventually destabilize the economy andfurther prolong the convergence process. These same monetary forces could also cause long-term inflationexpectations to become unanchored and lengthen the convergence process.Respondent 16:unemployment may take considerably longerRespondent 17:My view has been that, In light of the severity and breadth of shocks to the economy and the consequentsignificant impacts on government, firm, and household behavior, the convergence process may well extendbeyond five or six years to something closer to a total of eight years. At this point, we are a couple of yearsinto that process, so an additional five or six years from the present now seems about right.Respondent 18:N/A
U n c e r ta in ty an d R isk s2 (a ). (O p tio n a l) I f y o u h a v e a n y e x p la n a to r y c o m m e n ts re g a r d in g y o u rju d g m e n t o f t h e u n c e r ta in ty a tta c h e d to y o u r p r o je c tio n s r e la tiv e to levels o fu n c e r ta in ty o v e r t h e p a s t 20 y e a rs , y o u m a y e n te r th e m b elo w .Respondent 1:Higher uncertainty caused, in part, by adoption of nonstandard policies.Respondent 2:No Comment.Respondent 3:N/ARespondent 4:The liquidity trap conditions that we find ourselves in today add substantial uncertainty to the outlooksfor both growth and inflation. There are few historical precedents to inform us how an economy evolvesunder such conditions, including how it responds to the unconventional policies we must use to address theseconditions. Potential changes in fiscal policies also add uncertainty to the outlook, though these are a largerissue for the medium and longer-term forecast than the near-term projection.Respondent 5:The aftereffects of the financial crisis, turmoil in Europe, and uncertainty regarding the effects of unconven tional monetary policy increase uncertainty regarding the outlook for economic growth relative to the past20 years. The heightened risks to the outlook for economic activity, as well as the elevated variability ofcommodity prices, increase uncertainty regarding the outlook for inflation.Respondent 6:N/ARespondent 7:Inflation expectations would be more firmly anchored under an appropriate monetary policy, and uncertaintywould therefore be lower than the trailing 20-year average.Respondent 8:I judge the outlook for GDP growth and unemployment to be unusually uncertain due to the challengesand asymmetric downside risks associated with the presence of the zero bound, and increased reliance onnonconventional policies with uncertain multipliers. Fiscal contraction in many advanced economies createsrisks to the outlook and the possibility of further shocks to the financial systemRespondent 9:N/ARespondent 10:N/ARespondent 11:Quantitative judgment based on the standard deviation of the FRBNY forecast distribution for GDP growthand core PCE inflation relative to the forecast errors over the last 20 years.Respondent 12:Financial market conditions continue to improve and the economy is in recovery. However, the soft patch
this summer has led me to revise down my near-term forecast and contributes to some increased uncertaintyin my forecast. In addition, the effect of the extraordinary monetary policy in place and uncertainties sur rounding the future path of policy, including the timing of the exit from accommodative policy, contributeto uncertainty around my inflation forecast.Respondent 13:N/ARespondent 14:N/ARespondent 15:The uncertainty surrounding my projections remains higher than normal. I generally agree with Tealbook’sassessment of the sources of uncertainty, but I would add fiscal policy to the list. Various aspects of fiscalpolicy - such as questions of fiscal sustainability, the expiration of the Bush tax cuts, and indexation ofthe AMT - add considerable uncertainty to the outlook. The public’s uncertainty about the conduct ofmonetary policy is also adding to uncertainty in the economic outlook.Respondent 16:volatility was unusually low over the past 20 yearsRespondent 17:N/ARespondent 18:N/A
U n c e r ta in ty an d R isk s2 (b ). (O p tio n a l) I f y o u h a v e a n y e x p la n a to r y c o m m e n ts re g a r d in g y o u rju d g m e n t o f t h e ris k w e ig h tin g a r o u n d y o u r p r o je c tio n s , y o u m a y e n te r th e mb elo w .Respondent 1:N/ARespondent 2:No comment.Respondent 3:N/ARespondent 4:Even though we see the risks to GDP growth as broadly balanced, we believe the unemployment rate out look risks are weighted to the upside. Firms have displayed an unusual ability to squeeze out gains in laborproductivity during the recession and early expansion. We see a possibility that going forward we could besurprised again at firms’ ability to meet increases in demand with further gains in output per worker. Wealso see an upside risk to the unemployment rate forecast from a faster-than-anticipated recovery in laborforce participation,The potential additional slack associated with the upside risk to the unemployment rate implies a cor responding downside risk to our inflation outlook. In addition, there is a downside risk to inflation if thecontinued low readings on actual inflation show through to some downward movement in inflation expecta tions.Respondent 5:The limited appetite for further fiscal stimulus both in the United States and abroad means that fiscal policyactions are unlikely to damp future negative shocks to the economy. In addition, the anticipated recoveryof the housing market may take much longer than we expect. As a result, the risks to the outlook foreconomic activity are weighted somewhat to the downside. Correspondingly, the risks to the outlook for theunemployment rate are weighted to the upside. The inflation risks appear to be roughly balanced.Respondent 6:N/ARespondent 7:N/ARespondent 8:The fact that monetary policy is constrained by the zero bound and fiscal policy is constrained by the needto address unsustainable longer-term budget deficits creates an asymmetry in the ability of policymakers torespond to upside and downside shocks, resulting in risks to growth that are weighted to the downside andrisks to unemployment that are weighted to the upside.Respondent 9:The assumed pickup in growth in 2011 and beyond remains hypothetical; there is little actual evidence thatthat is happening. Re inflation, the dollar, commodities pose an upside risk, but there is also some risk ofmore disinflation, which is not at all uncommon following deep recessions.Respondent 10:
N/ARespondent 11:Quantitative judgment based on the difference between the projection and the expected value from theFRBNY forecast distribution.Respondent 12:The incoming data has led me to shade down my near-term path for growth compared to my June forecast.Going forward, I view the risks to growth as balanced and inflation as weighted to the upside. Historicalpatterns in the data suggest the rebou
12 2013 3.0 6.5 2.0 2.0 13 2013 4.7 7.1 1.2 1.2 14 2013 3.8 7.0 1.5 1.5 15 2013 3.8 7.0 1.6 1.6 16 2013 4.0 7.5 2.0 2.0 17 2013 4.6 7.4 1.4 1.2 18 2013 4.6 6.1 1.4 1.3 SEP: Compilation and Summary of Individual Economic Projections November 2 3, 2010 Authorized for Public Release 5 of 35
Table 34: Projections of the total population, 2012-2032 according to the high projections scenario . 100 Table 35: Projections of the total population, 2012-2032 according to the medium projections scenario . 101 Table 36: Projections of the total population, 2012-2032 according to the low projections scenario 103
Projections of Education Statistics to 2022 . is the 41st report . in a series begun in 1964. It includes statistics on elementary and secondary schools and postsecondary degree-granting . institutions. This report provides revisions of projections shown in . Projections of Education Statistics to 2021. and . projections of enrollment .File Size: 2MBPage Count: 194Explore furtherYouTubewww.youtube.comNewsmax – Breaking News News Videos Politics, Health .www.newsmax.comFox News - Breaking News Updates Latest News Headlines .www.foxnews.comSingle sign-on for education Cleverclever.comWelcome to Costco Wholesalewww.costco.comRecommended to you based on what's popular Feedback
Projections of Education Statistics to 2026 . is the 45th report . in a series begun in 1964. It includes statistics on elementary and secondary schools and degree-granting postsecondary institutions. This report provides revisions of projections shown in . Projections of Education Statistics to 2025 and projections of enrollment, graduates .File Size: 1MBPage Count: 177
Summary of Economic Projections In conjunction with the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting held on December 15–16, 2020, meeting participants submitted their projections of the most likely outcomes for real gross domestic product (GDP) growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation for each year from 2020 to 2023 and over the longerrun.
26 Extended essay results November 2010 39 27 Theory of knowledge results November 2010 40 28 Distribution of additional points November 2006–November 2010 41 29 Mean points score worldwide November 2006–November 2010 42 30 Mean grade worldwide November 2006–November 2010 42 31 Pass rate worldwide November 2006–November 2010 43
La première partie du cours est une introduction aux projections de population. Voici les objectifs de la première partie : Présenter les concepts fondamentaux liés aux projections de population dont la fécondité, la mortalité et la migration. Expliquer l’utilité des projections de population dans le processus décisionnel.
Projections of Education Statistics to 2025 . is the 44th report . in a series begun in 1964. It includes statistics on elementary and secondary schools and degree-granting postsecondary institutions. This report provides revisions of projections shown in . Projections of Education Statistics
Academic Phrasebank. Setting objectives –student tip “It is important that your chosen research question is clearly focused and well written; answering it must be achievable in the time available to you!” Your research question and the objectives to achieve it. Your research title Your dissertation title is important as it tells your reader what your dissertation is about ! Titles often .
