Empire: The Emergence Of Early Modern States And Empires .

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M01 GETZ4099 01 SE C01.qxd5/21/107:57 PMPage 16Part I The Rise of Early Modern Empires, c.1350–1650CHAPTER 1Empire: The Emergence ofEarly Modern States andEmpires in Eurasia and AfricaThe world of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was shaped by “modern” empires thatspanned the globe or dominated great regions of it. Emerging from industrial societies such asBritain, the United States, France, Japan, the Soviet Union, and more briefly Germany and Italy,these states were constructed and maintained by vast armies and navies with military superiority over the peoples they conquered. Their empires were sustained by enormous industrialeconomies whose managers and profiteers benefited from empire. They were justified by contemporary ideologies of race, technology, and religion that proclaimed a duty to dominate andto “civilize” other peoples.These empires have often been studied as part of a “new” imperialism that resulted fromgreat transformations in the nineteenth century. They are described as the products of thechanges wrought by modernity upon Europe: industrialization, new sciences and scientificracialism, liberalism. In future chapters, we will explore exactly these connections. However, thenineteenth- and twentieth-century empires were, in fact, rooted in long-term trends that connected them to earlier eras of history and to the history not just of Europe but of the entire world.Perhaps most significantly, the empires of our recent past faced remarkably similar challenges tothose of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. These empires of the early modernperiod—as it is often termed—also struggled to centralize power in the hands of the state, to convince merchants and the general populace of the metropole to support their policies of imperialism, and to find ways to rule the culturally, spiritually, and economically diverse people of theirempires and to bind them together.Can we connect the technologies and strategies of these early modern empires with those ofthe nineteenth- and twentieth-century empires? Geographically, the imperial cores of the twoperiods do not match up. The largest empires of the early modern period were centered in Asiaand North Africa: the Mongol state, Ming China, Tı̄mūrid (Mughal) India and Central Asia, andthe Ottoman Empire. The only comparable European empires were those of the Spanish andAustrian Habsburgs and Portugal. The great imperial centers of the modern era in northernEurope, Japan, and the United States were either politically fragmented or politically peripheralin this earlier period. The longest direct geographical continuity that existed was the Russian16

M01 GETZ4099 01 SE C01.qxd5/21/107:57 PMPage 17Chapter 1 Empirestate centered upon Muscovy, which expandedalmost unceasingly from the fifteenth to the twentieth century.Yet as the first four chapters of this bookwill show, the early modern era was a period ofincreasing globalization and the building ofeconomic and intellectual connections betweenregions of the world. This rising interconnectedness made it possible for states like England(later Britain) to begin to learn techniques ofcolonial rule from established powers like theMughals. The migration of peoples and expanding trade gradually enriched establishedstates like France and built new nations like theUnited States. The flow of technologies spreadmilitary expertise and equipment to regions likeJapan where they could become tools of empire.In this chapter, we explore the rise of earlymodern empires in Eurasia and North Africaduring the period 1380–1650. We suggest that anumber of large, cohesive imperial statesemerged during this period—partially as aresult of a sharing of ideas and technologies,which itself was made possible by the Eurasiansystem created by the Mongol Empire. We thengo on to explore several ideas about the ways inwhich these empires came into being and operated: the rise of gunpowder military economies,the emergence of alliances between differentsectors of society, and the development ofunique but interestingly interconnected culturesof imperialism. This leaves for chapter 2 thelarger issues of early modern imperial interaction and colonialism. Alone, however, thesechapters do not give a global picture. Thus inchapters 3 and 4 we expand our scope to includethe Americas, sub-Saharan Africa, and thePolynesian Pacific: early modern imperial systems that themselves grew from earlier Eurasianand North African roots.17largest of these empires blossomed first inEurasia: the Iberian Peninsula (Portugal andSpain), eastern Europe (Russia and the AustrianHabsburgs), Central Asia (the Ottoman andTı̄mūrid Empires), and China. Together with aconstellation of smaller states, their emergencereversed a period of political and economic fragmentation following the Black Death of the1340s–1380s and the collapse of the MongolEmpire. Within a century, for the first time inhuman history, they began to connect all of theworld’s continents in commercial, intellectual,and biological ties. Although each empire wasunique, and each emerged in the context of distinctive local events, nevertheless their expansionreflected similar attempts to control the resurgentinter-continental commerce of the fifteenth andsixteenth centuries and to mobilize new technologies and equipment.These great Eurasian empires were merelythe largest manifestations of a trend of statebuilding that stretched across Eurasia and parts ofAfrica from the end of the fourteenth centuryonward. At the beginning of the early modernperiod, for example, Europe possessed 500–600co-existing polities. By the late nineteenth century, this number was reduced to 25. Across eastern Europe and Central Asia in the sametimeframe, Russia swallowed 30 independentstates and khanates. In mainland South-East Asia,22 independent states that existed in 1350 werereduced to 3 by 1823.1 Similar consolidationstook place in South Asia, where large states likeVijayanagar and especially the Mughal Empirerapidly overcame fragmented princedoms. OnEurasia’s southern fringe, the Ottoman Empirecame to span three continents, fusing togetherSouth-West Asia, the Balkans, and North Africa.Nearby, the Horn of Africa was consolidated inthe hands of a few large states of which the mostexpansive was Abyssinia (Ethiopia). Gradually,THE EMERGENCE OF THE EARLYMODERN STATE SYSTEMBeginning in the late fourteenth century, a rush ofempire-building washed across the world. The1Victor Lieberman, “Transcending East-West Dichotomies:State and Culture Formation in Six Ostensibly DisparateAreas,” Modern Asian Studies, 31 (1997), 463–546.

M01 GETZ4099 01 SE C01.qxd185/21/107:57 PMPage 18Part I The Rise of Early Modern Empires, c. NanjingDelhiAgraTimbuktuGaoSão Salvador005001000 miles500 1000 kmMughal EmpireHabsburg Empire in EuropeMing ChinaOttoman EmpirePrincipal directions of imperialexpansions, late 16th – early 17th c.Songhai EmpireRussian EmpireKongo KingdomEarly Modern Empires of Eurasia and North Africa, c. 1550

M01 GETZ4099 01 SE C01.qxd5/21/107:57 PMPage 19Chapter 1 Empirethe process was extended to areas beyond theolder Eurasian trading zone to new regions ofsub-Saharan Africa. There, however, the independent consolidation of large states was overtaken by the extension of European maritimeempires and especially by the effects of theAtlantic slave trade. In the Americas, the largestates and independent communities that hadformed a political and commercial network oftheir own were overcome by European armies,settlers, and diseases after 1492.While the political regimes of each statewere unique, they were all characterized to varying degrees by three linked processes. The firstwas centralization, by which both power andauthority tended to become consolidated under asingle state authority, usually a ruling monarchor dynastic family and a royal or imperial court.The second was rationalization, by whichauthority and power in the state became increasingly subject to a permanent, organized bureaucracy at the center of the state. The third wasexpansion, by which states increased in size andin some cases developed imperial institutionsand relationships.The context in which these processes tookplace was the disintegration of the MongolEmpire.2 From about 1220 to well into the latefourteenth century, the great bulk of Eurasia hadcome under the control of this single politicalentity. Only the fringes of the landmass—Europe, Japan, South and South-East Asia, andNorth Africa—had remained independent. Theresult of this unique unification had been a flowering of “cultural and artistic achievement” andlong-distance trade.3 These developments werecatalyzed by the Mongol rulers’ ability to safeguardoverland trading routes and to provide relative2Some scholars argue that commercial integration of Eurasiaand North Africa goes back much further. See, for example,Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills, eds., The World System:Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand (New York: Routledge,1994).3This phrasing is taken from the influential modern panEurasian work of Janet Abu-Lughod, Before EuropeanHegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350 (New York:Oxford University Press, 1989), 4.19safety and stability across vast stretches ofEurasia.4 Cities in a band across Eurasia and surrounding the Indian Ocean and the Mediterraneanand China seas—London, Bruges, Genoa, Venice,Constantinople, Cairo, Bukhara, Samarkand,Hormuz, Kilwa, Cambay, Calicut, Malacca, andGuangzhou—flourished in these conditions forming a vast “archipelago of towns.”5 Each city wasa center of commerce and production, connectedto surrounding agrarian regions and to long-distance trading partners by economic, political, andsocial links.The causes of the mid-fourteenth-century collapse of this network are debated, but the verynature of its connectedness may have been onekey culprit. Like a two-edged sword, the connections that enabled societies across the Old Worldto share wealth and innovations also made themdependent upon each other. The collapse of oneprop of the system was bound to affect the others.In this context, a series of diseases, bad harvests,and political upheaval across the Mongol domainssignaled the beginning of a commercial decline.Perhaps the most significant was the outbreak ofepidemics that stretched far beyond the borders ofthe empire. The best known of these was thedreaded Black Death, which spread rapidly alongboth overland and maritime trade routes, devastating both commercial towns and the surroundingcountryside from China across the vast expanse ofEurasia and North Africa to England.6 The effectsof the epidemic were exacerbated in some regionsof Asia by a series of bad agricultural years.74One of the best short treatments of the Mongols comes in theDavid P. Ringrose’s superb survey of global interaction.Ringrose, Expansion and Global Interaction, 1200–1700(New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001), 5–24.5Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18thCentury, vol. III, The Wheels of Commerce (New York:Harper & Row, 1984), 30.6William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (New York:Anchor Books, 1976), 132–146. Admittedly, McNeill’s workremains controversial and some scholars have suggested thatcontemporaneous plagues in various parts of the world mayhave been caused by a variety of epizootics.7K.N. Chaudhuri, Asia Before Europe: Economy andCivilisation of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),246–268.

M01 GETZ4099 01 SE C01.qxd205/21/107:57 PMPage 20Part I The Rise of Early Modern Empires, c. 1350–1650Moreover, Black Death may have come at a periodof great vulnerability for the Old World economicnetwork, as there is some evidence that parts ofEurasia were already experiencing a commercialdownturn as early as the 1330s.8The economic depression of the mid-fourteenthcentury was hard on many societies, but it was devastating to the Mongol leadership that relied heavilyon income from trade to run their vast empire. InAsia, insurgents began to see this weakened condition as an opportunity to challenge their Mongolrulers, and these challenges form the context for theorigins of four early modern empires: MingDynasty China and the Ottoman, Russian, andMughal Empires.China was in the early fourteenth century thehead—if not the heart—of the Mongol state.Chinggis Khan had begun the assault on China in1210, and his grandson Khubilai had defeated thelast rulers of the Chinese Song Dynasty in a 12-yearcampaign that ended in 1279. Calling themselvesthe Yuan dynasty, Khubilai and his successorsruled China from approximately 1271 to 1368.Yet Yuan leadership began to decline as early asthe 1330s, as factional intrigue weakened the central government and rebel movements emerged inthe provinces.9 The most significant of thesemovements was the Daoist Red Turban movement, whose leader Zhu Yuanzhang captured theYuan capital at Beijing in 1368, took the title theHongwu Emperor, and established the Mingdynasty, with authority over all of the coreprovinces of China.10 This massive polity thusbecame the first of the major states to assert itsindependence from the Mongols.The first half of the fourteenth century alsowitnessed a decline of Mongol power in SouthWest Asia (the Middle East). Here the most significant challenger was a small Turkic-speakingstate ruled by the Bey Osman (Bey 1281–1299,Sultan 1299–1326), which had for decades paidtribute to the Mongol emperors. In 1299, Osmandeclared his (then still small) state independentfrom Mongol Rule, and it came afterward to benamed in his honor the “Ottoman” state.11 Osmanand his successors rapidly claimed territory notonly from the Mongols, but also from theByzantine Empire to the west, from whom theyacquired Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia, southernSerbia, and in 1392, Albania.12 They briefly lostground again in the fourteenth century to the brilliant Mongol warrior-lord Tı̄mūr (known in thewest as Tamerlane), but upon his death in 1405his empire immediately contracted, enablingthe Ottomans to re-establish themselves. Bymid-century, Anatolia (modern Turkey) was reconquered and the Ottomans were able toadvance again in Europe. The accession ofMehmed II (1451–1481) to the Sultanate openeda new period of expansion and the developmentof a truly imperial Ottoman state. The descendentsof Tı̄mūr maintained hold only of Persia, until theywere defeated in 1501 by an alliance of Persianreligious and military figures led by a soldier whocrowned himself Shah Ismā’ ı̄l I (1501–1524). ThisSafavî (or Safavîiyya) state quickly became theOttomans’ main rival in the east.13Arising to the east of Persia, the greatMughal Empire is most often associated withnorthern India. In fact, however, it too emergedout of the Tı̄mūrid upheavals of the late fourteenth century. The founder of the Mughalemperor, Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur (hereafter known as Babur, 1526–1530), claimeddescent both from Tı̄mūr and Chinggis Khan.14118Frank9and Gills, The World System, 179–180.F.W. Mote, Imperial China 900–1800 (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1999), 518–528.10Ibid., 563–564. See also the English or Chinese versions ofThe Cambridge History of China, vols. 7 and 8, The MingDynasty, edited by Denis C. Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).See Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age1300–1600 (London: Phoenix Press, 1994). First published1973.12Ringrose, Expansion and Global Interaction, 44.13H.R. Roemer, “The Safavî Period,” in The CambridgeHistory of Iran, vol. 6, The Timurid and Safavî Periods, editedby Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1986), 190–193.14John F. Richards, The New Cambridge History of India, vol. 5,The Mughal Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1993), 9, 44–47.

M01 GETZ4099 01 SE C01.qxd5/21/107:57 PMPage 21Chapter 1 EmpireBabur led his followers to northern India fromCentral Asia in the 1520s, and in 1526 hedefeated the Muslim rulers of Delhi, the Lodifamily. Gradually, they extended their sway overAfghan and Hindu rivals. Under Akbar(1556–1605), the Mughals occupied much ofnorthern India including the rich and fertileregion of Bengal. By the end of Akbar’s reign, theMughal state comprised a vast, multi-ethnic, andstill expanding empire.The Mughals, Ottomans, and Safavîs sharedan Islamic identity with the Mongols, but aChristian successor to the Mongols also cameinto being in the western portion of their domain.The Slavic state of Russia began as the GrandDuchy of Muscovy, which for much of the thirteenth century was a leading tributary to theMongol Khanate of the Golden Horde. As thepower of the Mongol state waned in the fourteenth century, that of Muscovy increased, allowing the Grand Dukes to flex their muscles on themargins of the Khanate. In 1478, Grand DukeIvan III conquered his once-powerful neighboringcity-state of Novgorod.15 By the mid-sixteenthcentury, allied to other former subjects of theMongols, the Muscovite Russians were powerfulenough to take on two Muslim-dominatedMongol successor states located to their east—theKhanates of Kazan and Astrakhan. Kazan wasconquered in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1556. Theconquest of Kazan and Astrakhan decisivelyturned Russia into a truly multi-ethnic empire,under a self-proclaimed czar (emperor).16 It alsoopened up the steppe lands of Central Asia andthe sparsely populated reaches of Siberia to theexpansion of the Russians, who were limited inthe west by emerging European rivals.These European peoples, located at theextreme western limit of Mongol strength, hadnever been conquered by them. In any case,15Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire, translated byAlfred Clayton (Harlow: Longman Press, 2001), 14–16.16Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: TheMaking of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800 (Bloomington:Indiana University Press, 2002), 105–110. See also Kappeler,The Russian Empire, 14–22.21Europe’s fragmented geography—its islands,peninsulas, and mountain chains—has throughout history made it difficult for any single state torule the continent effectively. The exception wasthe Habsburg Empire, which at its heightincluded Spain, the Low Countries, Burgundy,Austria, Bohemia, parts of Hungary, and positions in Italy and North Africa as well as a growing empire in the Americas. Yet even this vastdomain proved too large to rule effectively. Itsterritories could not be effectively mobilized forunified action, it only gradually developed a unified state bureaucracy, and it dissolved quitequickly under pressure.The Habsburg Empire was formed largelythrough marriage, and it’s worth briefly listingthe weddings that built their dominion. TheHabsburgs were descendents on the male side ofa leading German aristocratic family, the Dukesof Austria. In the fifteenth century, members ofthe Habsburg family were regularly elected HolyRoman emperors, although this latter title gavethem little real additional authority or poweroutside of their ancestral lines. Their horizonsbecame greatly widened by the wedding ofMaximilian Habsburg (Holy Roman EmperorMaximilian I, 1486–1519) to Mary, heiress ofBurgundy, in 1477. This added to his ancestraldomains not only the territory of Burgundy ineastern France, but also Mary’s family possessions in the Netherlands. A second wedding—that of Maximilian’s son Philip the Handsome toJoan of Aragon-Castile—doubled the size of theHabsburg inheritance. As the heir to Ferdinandof Aragon and Isabella of Castile, Joan gavePhilip claim to Spain as well as territories inItaly and the Americas. Maximilian alsoarranged a double wedding for himself and forhis daughter that sealed an alliance with therulers of Bohemia and Hungary (VladislavJagellon) and of Poland-Lithuania (SigismundJagellon) in 1515. 17 Following the death of17Victor S. Mamatey, Rise of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1815(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 1–7.

M01 GETZ4099 01 SE C01.qxd225/21/107:57 PMPage 22Part I The Rise of Early Modern Empires, c. 1350–1650Vladislav while fighting the Ottomans at the battle of Mohács in 1526, Bohemia became aHabsburg domain, while Hungary was partitioned between the Habsburgs, Ottomans, and anindependent Transylvania.Upon Maximilian I’s death, therefore, hisgrandson Charles was not only elected HolyRoman Emperor Charles V (1519–1556), but alsoinherited an enormous domain stretching acrossmuch of Europe. Yet he almost immediately recognized that his inheritance was too vast for oneindividual to rule. Choosing to focus on Spainand its dependents, Charles therefore turned theadministration of the eastern territories includingthe Austrian hereditary lands over to his brotherFerdinand in 1521. In 1555, Charles abdicated asHoly Roman Emperor in Ferdinand’s favor(1555–1564) and, in the following year, turnedthe Spanish division of the Empire over to his sonPhilip II (King of Spain, 1556–1598). The Habsburgdomains were now permanently divided, althoughthe two branches of the family remained intertwined and allied.Philip II inherited the throne of an increasingly wealthy, largely unified Spain with extensivecolonies in the Americas (discussed in chapters 3and 4) as well as in the Philippines and withdominion over the Netherlands. It was at this pointthat the Habsburg Empire in Spain transformeditself into a Spanish Empire. In the years prior tothe Habsburg marriages, Ferdinand and Isabella ofSpain had forged from their domains both aSpanish identity and a unified Spain, largelythrough wars with the Muslim rulers of southernSpain known as the reconquista (or reconquest).18The dual monarchs also sponsored overseas adventures such as that of Christopher Columbus.Ferdinand and Isabella were succeeded by theHabsburg Charles V, child of Philip the Handsomeand their daughter Joan. Yet throughout his reign,Charles saw Spain as merely one of his domains,and visited it only intermittently.19 His son Philip,by contrast, recognized Spain as the center of hisempire, and its overseas colonies as an imperialperiphery.The reconquista produced not one but twogreat early modern maritime empires. Spainshared the Iberian Peninsula with Portugal, aswell as with several Islamic states, and their histories are intertwined with each other. In the latemedieval period, the peninsula was a zone ofintense intermingling and interaction betweenMuslims, Christians, and Jews. Yet relations werenot always friendly, and the two Christian statesof Spain and Portugal became unified largely outof a struggle to evict their Islamic rivals. Thesmaller, more westerly Portuguese state coalesced earlier than the larger Spanish state, and byaround 1250 it was virtually territorially complete. Thus in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the task of the Portuguese monarchs wasnot to expand the state within the peninsula but tosubdue alternate power centers—the nobility, thechurch, and the military orders. All of theseremained useful tools, as we will see, but had tobe subverted to the monarch’s authority. This taskwas largely completed by 1410.20 For the remainder of the modern period, Portugal under its kingswould be an expansionist independent state,except for a brief period of unification with Spainbetween 1580 and 1640.In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,Portugal and Spain took the energy that had builtthem into powerful states and turned it outward.Neither had neighboring territory, but both hadAtlantic coastlines and access to favorable oceancurrents. Thus, both states turned their attention toAtlantic Islands such as the Canaries. Portuguesemonarchs Dom João II (1481–1495) and DomManuel I (1496–1521) sponsored commercialexpeditions along the West African coast and theestablishment of fortified positions meant to dominate the gold trade with West Africa, of which themost important was São Jorge da Mina, built in1820Henry Kamen, Empire: How Spain Became a World Power1492–1763 (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 16–17.19Ibid., 49–67.See Sanjay Subrahmanyan, The Portuguese Empire in Asia,1500–1700: A Political and Economic History (Harlow:Longman, 1993), 30–36.

M01 GETZ4099 01 SE C01.qxd5/21/107:57 PMPage 23Chapter 1 Empire231482 on what came to be known as the GoldCoast.21 Successive voyages brought Portugueseexpeditions further down the coast, culminating inBartholomeu Dias’s “doubling,” or passing andreturning, of the Cape of Good Hope in southernAfrica. By 1498, a squadron under the commandof Vasco da Gama entered the Indian Ocean, connecting the Iberian states to the vast Indian Oceantrading zone.22 A second wing of Iberian overseasacquisition brought sailors flying Spanish andPortuguese flags across the Atlantic to theAmericas, a story told in chapters 3 and 4.The great empires of the early modern erawere in constant interaction with other, smalleremerging states. In North Africa, for example,Spain, Portugal, and the Ottomans interacted witha variety of local Muslim authorities. Some, likethe Barbarossa brothers Arrudj and Khayruddin,accepted Ottoman suzerainty in return for aidagainst the Spanish. In this way, the areas comprising coastal Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia werebrought informally into the Ottoman tributarysystem.23 In Morocco, on the other hand, theSa’ādi family managed to play the Ottomans,Spanish, and Portuguese against each other and inthis way to build an independent state.24 In NorthEast Africa, the development of the independentChristian Ethiopian (Abyssinian) state similarlyput it in a position to preserve its independencefrom the Ottomans by seeking an alliance withPortugal in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.In Asia as well, small and medium-sizedstates gradually coalesced in the early modernperiod. The unification of Japan was one significant example. Split by feuding factions of feudallords, or daimyo, Japan lacked anyone who couldclaim to represent a centralized authority until1615, when Tokugawa Ieyesu eliminated his finalrival for the position of shogun, or state warlord,in 1614.25 In South-East Asia, a small number ofcohesive states emerged in the fifteenth centurylinked economically to China. These includedboth trading city-states such as Melaka and Acehand larger agglomerations such as Burma, Siam,and Vietnam. While China was economicallyintertwined with South-East Asia, it interferedmilitarily with its southern neighbors onlytwice—intervening in Vietnamese (Annamese)politics in 1406–1427 and in Burma in the mid1440s.26 It was following the Chinese withdrawalafter 1427 that the local Le dynasty establisheditself as the rulers of Vietnam.Vietnam and other emerging South-EastAsian states rapidly built commercial links toSouth Asia trading partners. These included notonly the Mughal Empire but also a number ofemerging states at the tip of the Indian sub-continent such as the Hindu state of Vijayanagar. Thesein turn were linked to maritime towns such asHormuz and Aden on the Arabian Peninsula, tothe emerging Ottoman Empire, and to a string ofEast African city-states that shared a set of culturaland linguistic attributes that we now knowas Swahili. These Swahili polities—includingthe important port-cities of Mogadishu,Malindi, Sofala, and Mombasa—were connectedto resource-rich states of the African interior.Several of them experienced significant population expansion in the fifteenth century, as IndianOcean trade revived.27Between the east coast of Africa and SouthEast Asia, the Indian Ocean formed a vast andmulti-national maritime zone of exchange—therichest in the world—with the Mughal Empire asits central pivot. Chinese merchants participatedas well. In the first part of the fourteenth century,2125John Vogt, Portuguese Rule on the Gold Coast 1469–1682(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1979), 21–34.22J.H. Parry, The Age of Reconnaissance (London: PhoenixPress, 2000), 131–148. First printed 1963.23“Algeria, Tunisia and Libya: the Ottomans and Their Heirs,”in UNESCO General History of Africa, vol. 5, Africa from theSixteenth to the Eighteenth Century (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1999), abridged edition, 120–134.24“Morocco,” in Africa from the Sixteenth to the EighteenthCentury, 104–119.George Sansom, A History of Japan 1334–1615 (Stanford:Stanford University Press, 1961), 397–406.26Jung-pang Lo, “Policy Formulation and Decision-Makingon Issues Respecting Peace and War,” in Chinese Governmentin Ming Times, edited by Charles O. Hucker (New York:Columbia University Press, 1969), 41–72.27See Derek Nurse and Thomas Spear, The Swahili:Reconstructing the History and Language of an AfricanSociety, 800–1500 (Philadelphia: University of PennsylvaniaPress, 1985), 80–98.

M01 GETZ4099 01 SE C01.qxd245/21/107:57 PMPage 24Part I The Rise of Early Modern Empires, c. 1350–1650the great maritime cities of the Indian Ocean fromMelaka to Mombasa were visited by the vastChinese fleets of the Muslim eunuch-admiralZheng He. These great convoys ended in 1433,yet less ostentatious but equally significant commercial networks continued to tie the entireregion together in annual trade circuits.28 TheOttomans, too, participated in this trade followingSultan Selim I’s (1512–1520) 1516 conquest ofEgypt. Ottoman control over this strategic linkbetween east and west helped to drive thePortuguese toward an alternate route into theIndian Ocean around the southern tip of Africa.The wealth of the Indies was a major attractionfor Europeans, and the Portuguese were only thefirst of a number of states to support voyages ofexploration and piracy that aimed to possess atleast part of it. Portuguese and Spanish expeditions were rapidly followed by others mounted byFrench, British, and multinational groups.29The parallel developments of large empiresand centralizing states in many parts of Asia,Africa, and Europe in this period should notobscure differences among them. Some of thestates described earli

16 Part I The Rise of Early Modern Empires,c.1350–1650 CHAPTER 1 Empire: The Emergence of Early Modern States and Empires in Eurasia and Africa M01_GETZ4099_01_SE_C01.qxd 5/21/10 7:57 PM Page 16. Chapter

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