DFID’s Humanitarian Emergency Response In The Horn Of Africa
DFID’s HumanitarianEmergency Responsein the Horn of AfricaReport 14 – September 2012
ContentsExecutive Summarypage 11Introductionpage 22Findingspage 8Objectives3page 8Deliverypage 12Impactpage 15Learningpage 19Conclusions and Recommendationspage 22Annexpage 25Abbreviationspage 30The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) is the independent body responsible for scrutinisingUK aid. We focus on maximising the effectiveness of the UK aid budget for intended beneficiaries and ondelivering value for money for UK taxpayers. We carry out independent reviews of aid programmes andof issues affecting the delivery of UK aid. We publish transparent, impartial and objective reports toprovide evidence and clear recommendations to support UK Government decision-making and tostrengthen the accountability of the aid programme. Our reports are written to be accessible to a generalreadership and we use a simple ‘traffic light’ system to report our judgement on each programme or topicwe review.GGreen: The programme performs well overall against ICAI’s criteria for effectiveness andvalue for money. Some improvements are needed.G AGreen-Amber: The programme performs relatively well overall against ICAI’s criteria foreffectiveness and value for money. Improvements should be made.A RAmber-Red: The programme performs relatively poorly overall against ICAI’s criteria foreffectiveness and value for money. Significant improvements should be made.RRed: The programme performs poorly overall against ICAI’s criteria for effectiveness andvalue for money. Immediate and major changes need to be made.
Executive SummaryMillions of people in the Horn of Africa suffer chronic foodinsecurity and vulnerability. They live on the edge ofcrisis. When rains fail, they face hunger, malnutrition andloss of livestock; without help, they face death. This isexacerbated by conflict, corruption and lack of politicalwill to acknowledge and address the extent of the crisis.When the rains failed in late 2010 and again in early2011, the chronic situation became a crisis. Over 12million people were affected. Tens of thousands died.Despite early warnings from August 2010, the mainhumanitarian response did not take place until July 2011.This report assesses the value for money andeffectiveness of DFID’s emergency response in the Hornof Africa. DFID spent over 200 million on this response,making it the third-largest donor after the US and EU.OverallAssessment: Green-AmberDFID played a leading role in the humanitarian response,applying pressure to host governments and other donorsto act and working alongside them in a co-ordinatedresponse. DFID’s programmes benefited vulnerablepeople in the worst-affected areas. We made field visitsto Kenya and Ethiopia, where we observed good impactand value for money.DFID and the humanitarian system as a whole, however,lacked flexibility to respond to the emerging crisis in theregion and more could have been done to anticipate whathad become a chronic situation. Earlier action could havealleviated some of the suffering and loss of livelihoods.There are significant challenges to building resilience andsustainability in this vulnerable region which need to beaddressed to work towards longer-term solutions.ObjectivesAssessment: Green-AmberDFID’s humanitarian objectives were clear, relevant andrealistic. DFID focussed on the needs of beneficiariesand showed a good understanding of national andregional contexts.DFID aimed to balance the need for a speedy responsewith managing risks and exerting political influence toencourage national government ownership and burdensharing among donors. While DFID was aware of theunfolding situation, it could have been better prepared interms of resource and had more flexible mechanismsbuilt into programmes.DeliveryAssessment: Green-AmberDFID’s multilateral focus, funding via UN agencies andmulti-donor funds, is appropriate to ensure a co-ordinatedresponse. There was, however, variable performancefrom selected agencies and delivery via consortia of civilsociety organisations was not always effective due totheir lack of preparedness to work together.The use of DFID’s limited human resource could havebeen more efficient and processes for additionalapprovals were onerous. Overall, however, DFIDdelivered relatively well against its objectives.ImpactAssessment: Green-AmberDFID-supported programmes have benefited some of themost vulnerable people in the worst-affected areas. DFIDapplied good practices to be accountable to intendedbeneficiaries. Inflexibility in DFID and the humanitariansystem, however, meant that action was delayed. Earlieraction, especially in Somalia, could have alleviatedsuffering and, while death rates in Kenya and Ethiopiawere not high, both livestock and livelihoods were lost.Long-term resilience and sustainability require strongerpolitical engagement and development strategy.Similarly, greater consideration of how to meet thespecific needs of women and girls during a crisis isneeded. DFID has engaged in these areas already andshould build on this in the future.LearningAssessment: GreenGDFID is widely respected for its experience and expertise.DFID has a strong focus on learning and improvementand is working to incorporate learning in a practical way.More robust and shared models for chronic situationmanagement should be developed and disseminated.Key recommendationsRecommendation 1: DFID should work towards acohesive early-warning system, with triggers for actionpre-agreed with other key organisations andgovernments. It should engage with key organisations onthis issue within six months.Recommendation 2: DFID should build on existing goodpractice to develop, within six months, a new model forflexibly addressing recurring crises in the Horn of Africa.Recommendation 3: DFID should build on its existingengagement with host governments and key agencies todevelop lasting solutions. It should target key areas suchas infrastructure development that are needed to addresschronic poverty. It should use its expertise andexperience to tackle challenging areas such as thesustainability of pastoralism and refugee camps. Thisshould be incorporated into DFID’s plans for 2013-14.1
1 IntroductionIntroduction to the Horn of Africa1.11.2World Food Programme (WFP) and manyinternational civil society organisations (CSOs)in 2010 and 2011; andThe Horn of Africa is a group of countries situatedin East Africa. For the purposes of this report, weuse ‘Horn of Africa’ to refer to Kenya, Somalia andEthiopia, the three most severely affected1countries in the 2011 food crisis. The regioncontains large expanses of arid and semi-arid landand is prone to drought. The 90-100 million peopleliving in these areas rely heavily on subsistence2farming. Approximately 15-20 million of these arepastoralists (nomadic herders), many of whom3regularly cross borders in search of pastureland.These communities rely on regional rainfallpatterns: the ‘short rains’ between October andDecember and ‘long rains’ between March andJune each year. Periodically, these rains fail. Ethiopia is the second most populous countryin Africa, with 80 million people. It hasexperienced strong economic growth in recentyears. The government took power from theone-party communist state in 1991. Progresshas been made towards democracy, althoughthe Department for International Development(DFID) comments that ‘there is still a long way5to go’. DFID considers Ethiopia to have ‘acapable government that is demonstrablycommitted to addressing poverty, with animpressive record of pro-poor spending, soundfinancial management and relatively littlecorruption’.6 The government maintains tightcontrols over development and humanitarianactivities. CSO activities are restricted and havelimited influence.While the region faces common environmentalchallenges, the political contexts vary by country: Kenya is the largest economy in East Africa,where ‘development is stubbornly constrainedby high levels of corruption and impunity bypolitical, government and business leaders’. 4Political tension and uncertainty remainfollowing contested elections in December 2007and post-election violence. The governmentallows aid agencies access but has notprovided strong leadership for such agencies; Somalia is a failed state, without effectivegovernment since 1991. Southern Somaliasuffers ongoing conflict and violence. AlShabaab, a proscribed terrorist group, controlsmuch of this region. Several major donors,including the United States of America (US) andsome European Union (EU) member states,have drastically reduced funding due to theiranti-terrorism legislation. Security concernsmake access extremely challenging for aidagencies. In addition, Al Shabaab banned the1.3Chronic food insecurity and entrenched poverty1.41The Horn of Africa is the geographical region which often also includes Eritreaand Djibouti. The scope of this report focusses on Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia –the three most severely affected countries in the 2011 drought.2World Bank, 2009, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL and KenyaCensus, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 0Brochure.pdf.3Pastoralism and Conflict in the Horn of Africa, Africa PeaceForum/Saferworld/University of Bradford, date docs/WebLaikipia.pdf.4Operational Plan 2011-2015, DFID Kenya, updated June 1/op/kenya-2011.pdf.Refugees fleeing Somalia add a further dimensionto the political context. The Office of the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR) estimates there to be approximately onemillion Somali refugees in neighbouring countries,a third of whom left Somalia in 2011. Over 453,000live in Dadaab, Kenya, the largest refugee camp inthe world, which is over 20 years old, with another167,000 living in Dollo Ado camp in Ethiopia.Within Somalia, a further 1.36 million people areestimated to be internally displaced.7People in the Horn of Africa suffer chronic foodinsecurity. Periodic droughts afflict the region.When combined with a series of other factors(such as conflict, poor infrastructure, populationincreases, overgrazing of pastureland, competingpolitical and ethnic agendas, desertification, globalfood price increases and competition withcommercial interests for land) the effects aredevastating. Communities lose crops and livestock,5Operational Plan 2011-2015, DFID Ethiopia, updated June 1/op/ethiopia-2011.pdf.6Operational Plan 2011-2015, DFID Ethiopia, updated June 1/op/ethiopia-2011.pdf.7Ethiopia Opens New Camp for Somali Refugees, UNHCR, December 2011,http://www.unhcr.org/4ed8d89a6.html.2
1 Introductionentrenching poverty and making them even morevulnerable, as illustrated in Figure 1.are already vulnerable and have been historicallypoorly politically represented. These combinedfactors resulted in a food crisis in the region.Despite the early warnings, the humanitariancommunity did not significantly scale up until July2011, as is discussed later in this Introduction. Aninter-agency evaluation of the Somali responsefound that:Figure 1: Knock-on impacts of drought‘Following the below-normal 2011 spring rains in theHorn, the food security of pastoralists and populationsin marginal farming areas deteriorated sharply. Inaddition, shortages of grazing resources for livestockresulted in abnormal migrations, whereby pastoraliststravelled long distances and grouped animals in areaswith limited remaining pasture and water. This causedlivestock health and market prices to fall markedly, withmilk production declining significantly for most affectedhouseholds.’81.5As a result, millions of people live on the edge ofcrisis. When rains fail they face hunger,malnutrition and further loss of livestock; withouthelp, they face death.1.6DFID has existing programmes aiming to addressthese challenges. DFID had allocated 427 millionto the Horn of Africa for the 2011-12 financial yearbefore the 2011 drought occurred.9 Of this amount: 49 million was allocated specifically to addresslong-term challenges of ‘poverty, hunger andvulnerability’; and 48 million was allocated to meet moreimmediate humanitarian needs.1.7Following the drought, the humanitarian budgetwas increased and over 159 million was spentduring the 2011-12 financial year.2011 humanitarian emergency1.8A global weather pattern, known as La Niña,occurred during the summer of 2010. This led tothe failure of consecutive rains in the Horn of Africain late 2010 and early 2011 and the most severedrought since 1995 in some areas. The main areasaffected were south-central Somalia and poor,rural areas of Kenya and Ethiopia, where people8Drought in the Horn of Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Responses, Notesby the Secretariat, UNEP, August 2011,http://www.unep.org/roa/amcen/Amcen Events/4th ss/Docs/AMCEN-SS-IV-EG4.pdf.9Of the 427 million included in DFID’s Operational Plans for the region in 201112, 290 million was budgeted for Ethiopia, 44 million for Somalia and 93million for Kenya. ‘Famine was not inevitable, nor was the scale ofhuman suffering caused by the drought crisis.Earlier action could have prevented or at leastsubstantially mitigated the worst aspects of thecrisis. This did not happen on the scale requiredand the humanitarian system (including thedonors) shares some responsibility for this’; and ‘Between August 2010 and June 2011, therewas a systemic failure of contingency planningand early action in response to the emergentcrisis in Somalia in late 2010 and early 2011.This was a failure both of preventive action andof early relief, the combination of which couldhave mitigated some of the worst aspects of thecrisis.’101.9See Figure A1 in the Annex for a timeline of the2011 drought.1.10 The 2011 drought caused great suffering in termsof acute food insecurity and loss of livelihoods. Itwas Africa’s worst food security crisis sinceSomalia’s 1991-92 famine.11 12.4 million peoplewere affected.12 News reports suggested that alarge proportion of livestock died in some regions.Tens of thousands of people are estimated to havedied, mainly Somali women and children, either inSomalia itself or as refugees.1310IASC Real-Time Evaluation of Response to the Horn of Africa Crisis – Somalia,Draft Report, Valid International, E%20Somalia%202012.pdf.11Somalia Dekadal Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring, FSNAU and FEWSNET, 25 July 2011, Humanitarian Requirements Document for the Horn of Africa Drought 2011,OCHA, 28 July 2011,http://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/HRD 2011 Horn of Africa SCREEN.pdf.13Due to restricted access, particularly in Somalia, actual impacts are hard toquantify. Some estimates of mortality in Somalia put the figure at up to 100,000.Estimates 501364/main20088015.shtml; ature5.htm.3
1 Introduction1.11 Figure 2a shows how food insecurity is classified.Figure 2b shows the extent of food insecurity in theregion and populations affected.1.13 Below, we describe the situation in each country.Figure 2b: Food insecurity in July 2011 in the Horn ofAfricaFigure 2a: Food insecurity classifications14Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)IPC classifications combine a range of indicators to givean overall view of food insecurity. The levels of foodinsecurity and some of the indicators are given below.IPC levelCrudeAcuteLivelihoodMortality Malnutrition Assets (e.g.Rate15Ratelivestock orfarmland)Stressed %Accelerated andcritical depletionor loss of accessEmergency1-215%-30%Near completeand irreversibledepletion or lossof accessCatastrophe/ 2famine 30%Effectivelycomplete loss;collapse1.12 Empirical data suggest that delays in early actionresult in additional costs. It is much cheaper toprevent than to treat malnutrition, for example. Astudy by Oxfam found that protecting core livestockherds is up to 14 times cheaper than rebuildingthem once they have been decimated by drought.1614Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, Technical Manual Version 1.1,IPC Global Partners, 2008, Crude Mortality Rate is defined as the number of deaths per day per 10,000people.16Briefing on the Horn of Africa Drought 2011: Disaster Risk Reduction –Fundamental to Saving Lives and Reducing Poverty, Oxfam, August 2011; Impactof a Commercial Destocking Relief Intervention in Moyale District, SouthernEthiopia, Dawit Abebe, Adrian Cullis, Andy Catley, Yacob Aklilu, Gedlu Mekonnenand Yodit Ghebrechirstos, Overseas Development Institute, 2008.Key:Source: Catastrophe famineEmergency Crisis [.]StressedNone or MinimalEstimated number of food insecure population.OCHA, July 2011Somalia1.14 Famine was officially declared by the UnitedNations (UN) on 20 July 2011 in the lower Shabelleand Bakool regions of southern Somalia.17Significant numbers of people fled the drought andconflict in Somalia. UNHCR estimates that ‘as aconsequence of the deadly combination of [the2011] drought, insecurity and widespread humanrights abuses, 300,000 Somalis – mostly womenand children – had fled to neighbouring countries’18by the end of August 2011. These flows played acentral role in escalating the crisis in the region.1.15 Meanwhile, in Somalia, nearly 4 million peoplewere in crisis. Among these, 3.2 million peopleneeded immediate, life-saving assistance (2.817UN Declares Famine in Two Regions of Southern Somalia, UN News Service,20 July 2011, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID 39086.182012 Regional Operations Profile – East and Horn of Africa, UNHCR, June2012, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a846.html.4
1 Introduction19million in the south). In early July 2011, 390,000children under five were acutely malnourished and170,000 severely malnourished. Figure 3 givesmore information on how malnutrition rates areused as indicators.1.16 Reasons for the severity of the effect of drought inSomalia were multi-faceted, as outlined above. Inaddition, donor funding in Somalia declined by halfbetween 2008 and 2011, mainly due to the drop inUS contributions. DFID maintained and increasedmuch-needed humanitarian support in the region.Figure 3: GAM and SAMGlobal Acute Malnutrition (GAM) and Severe AcuteMalnutrition (SAM) rates are key indicators in ahumanitarian crisis. GAM is defined as when a child isbelow 80% of the average weight-to-height ratio for ahealthy population. SAM is defined as when a child isbelow 70% of the average ratio. Once the SAMthreshold is reached, victims need to be admitted to afeeding centre and given specialist foods by medicalpersonnel as they are in such a poor state of health asto be unable to care for or feed themselves. SAMremains a major killer of children under five years ofage. See the Annex for further information aboutmalnutrition rates.Kenya1.17 In Kenya, according to the May 2011 Famine EarlyWarning Systems Network (FEWS NET) foodsecurity outlook, the food security of 2.4 millionpeople was at stressed or crisis levels. Theyrequired immediate assistance as a result ofdrought and high food prices.201.18 High levels of acute malnutrition were widespreadin northern and eastern Kenya, with the TurkanaEast and Mandera West regions recording 37.4%and 32.6% GAM respectively.211.19 In the first five months of 2011, 53,641 new Somalirefugees and asylum seekers had been registeredin Kenya. This compared to 27,651 during thesame period in 2010. Most of the refugees arrivedin poor health. The GAM rate among arrivals was15% and diseases
Introduction to the Horn of Africa 1.1 The Horn of Africa is a group of countries situated in East Africa. For the purposes of this report, we use ‘Horn of Africa’ to refer to Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, the three most severely affected countries in the 2011 food crisis.1 The region contains large expanses of arid and semi-arid land
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