Investigating The Memory Of Operation Spring
Investigating the Memoryof Operation SpringThe Inquiry into the Black Watch andthe Battle of St. André-sur-Orne, 1944-46Alexander Fitzgerald-Black“In memory of the men of the Black Watch of Canada and their comrades who fought forthe liberation of Europe and the hope of a better world.” – Black Watch (Royal HighlandRegiment) of Canada Association plaque, Point 67Operation Spring, the ill-fated 25July 1944 attack by II CanadianCorps against German defences onVerrières Ridge, has become “oneof the most controversial militaryoperations in all of Canadian history.”1At the centre of this controversy isthe fate of the Black Watch (RoyalHighland Regiment) of Canada andMajor Frederick Philip Griffin, theyoung officer who took commandthat day after the death of thebattalion’s commanding officer. Theprincipal source of the controversyis how survivors remembered thesecatastrophic events.2Memory is a powerful butflawed part of the human psyche.Memories are intensely personal,impressionistic, always susceptibleto the present, and in constant dangerof being lost. Fear of this loss is oneof the reasons why we establish sitesof memory, what Pierre Nora refersto as lieux de memoire.3 A visit to theCanadian Battlefields Foundationviewing area at Point 67, overlookingVerrières Ridge, will find a plaquededicated by the Black Watch (RHR)of Canada Association explaining thebattalion’s role in Operation Spring.This plaque provides one who isAbstract: The scholarly literature forthe Black Watch role in OperationSpring is largely based on survivortestimony compiled by C.P. Stacey’sArmy Historical Section duringand after the war. Stacey and histeam faced a significant challengeunderstanding what happened to theBlack Watch on 25 July 1944 usingrecollections almost exclusively. Didthis significant use of memory in theinvestigation of Operation Springcompromise the scholarly record?This study argues that Stacey and theArmy Historical Section, consciousof the limitations of memory, werediligent in gathering and handling thisevidence with the goal of determiningthe fate of Major P.F. Griffin and theBlack Watch. Consequently, a clearunderstanding of how the historicalrecord was created is available toassist future historians in examiningthe role of memory in writing Canada’smilitary history.familiar with the controversy someinsight into how lieux de memoire areconstructed by taking into account,in this case, the work of historiansas well as the oral traditions createdin the years and decades after theevent by those who lived it. The firstparagraph of the plaque reports thebasic evidence historians have relied Canadian Military History, Volume 21, Number 2, Spring 2012, pp.21-32.upon: the battalion “was ordered tobegin Phase 2 of Operation ‘Spring,’the advance to Fontenay-le-Marmion.Believing that Phase 1, the captureof May-sur-Orne was partiallysuccessful, higher command pressedthe Black Watch to ‘go ahead.’” Thisexplains why the unit was orderedto continue with the operation eventhough hindsight tells us that by thatpoint there was little hope for successin the second phase. The secondparagraph reads “Major PhilipGriffin, who assumed commandof the battalion when LieutenantColonel S.S.T. Cantlie was killed inaction earlier that morning, receivedorders to advance directly from St.Martin-de-Fontenay over the crestof the ridge to the objective.” Thisstatement represents the collectivememory of the Black Watch thatMajor Griffin was pressured byhigher authorities into making whatturned out to be a tragic tactical error.Historical accounts confirm thatsenior commanders were naturallyanxious to achieve as many objectivesof the plan as possible, but haveuncovered evidence, again based onpersonal recollection and thereforenot conclusive, that Griffin made the21
Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies Air Photo Collection 0312-4015&4017ultimate decision to attack directlyfrom St. Martin.4Whichever version is closest to thetruth, the result was the destructionof the attacking companies: a totalof 307 casualties including 123 dead,101 wounded and 83 prisoners ofwar.5 The purpose of this article isto examine how memory has beenused by historians, the regiment,and others to piece together whatoccurred on that fateful day. In the22fall of 1945 the minister of nationaldefence tasked Colonel C.P. Stacey,director of the Army HistoricalSection in Ottawa (just promotedfrom his wartime position as historicalofficer for the overseas army atCanadian Military Headquarters inLondon), to investigate the BlackWatch’s action of 25 July 1944, whichhad already become the subject ofcontroversy. This is an unusual caseof nearly forensic historical analysisof a battalion-size engagement, andthe comprehensive documentationcreated by the investigators allows usto trace how the historical record wasassembled. The fact that the historicalstaff had to depend heavily on thetestimony of survivors of the battleprovides an unusual opportunityto assess the possibilities and limitsof memory as a source. It makesfor a significant case study becausethe survivor testimony which the
Army Historical Section assembledcontinues to serve as the basis forscholarly research. This is also afield of contested memory, for thetraditions of the regiment, whichdraw upon the memory of at leastone officer whose early recollectionswere gathered by Stacey’s team,have diverged from the conclusionsreached by the official historians.Because human memory ofspecific events, especially in thetrauma of battle, is so selectiveand malleable, 6 Stacey generallydid not rely on the recollectionsof individuals. The importantexceptions were the disasters atHong Kong (1941), Dieppe (1942),and Operation Spring where thechaotic circumstances preventedthe keeping of written message logsand other dependable records. TimCook, in Clio’s Warriors, refers to“the hidden history of war – thatwhich was not documented in theofficial records.”7 During the interwarperiod, when Colonel A.F. Duguidwas working on the first volume ofthe official history of the Canadiansin the First World War, he attemptedto include this hidden history in hiswork by drawing on the memoriesof the fighting soldier – or at leastthe views of the higher ranks. Hequickly realized that interviewingand corresponding with these officers“often left him susceptible to overtpressure to conform his judgementsto an individual’s point of view. Asa result, Duguid was always forcedto judge critically everything thatwas presented for the possibility ofenhancing reputations.” 8 He alsoacknowledged a need to be consciousof contradictions within thoseaccounts and between memoriesand the written record. Stacey andhis team encountered both of thesechallenges in their work on OperationSpring.In the completed official historyThe Victory Campaign, published in1959, Stacey relied upon the evidencegathered in 1945‑6, and distilled forthe minister’s office in CanadianMilitary Headquarters (CMHQ)Report No.150 of February 1946.The account of the Black Watch’sattack in The Victory Campaign cites31 interviews done with survivorsfor the 1946 report, mainly otherranks , about what happened once theassaulting companies were cut off:It appears that on or just beyond thecrest they ran into a well-camouflagedenemy position strengthened withdug-in tanks. What remained of thebattalion was now “pinned down”by intense close-range fire. Furtheradvance being out of the question,Griffin ordered his men to maketheir way back individually as bestthey could.9The figures in Stacey’s conclusionin The Victory Campaign that 60 menmade it over the crest of the ridge,of whom 15 returned, was based ona memorandum drafted for Stacey’sinvestigators in December 1945 byLieutenant-Colonel Eric Motzfeldt,who set down his own memory of theaction together with the recollectionsof four other officers who had servedthat day and survived the war.The Victory Campaign recorded the“impression” on the part of theofficers and the other ranks “that thetank and artillery support plannedfor their attack did not materialize,”but then reported, on the basis offurther interviews in 1945‑6 amongthe gunners and armoured personnelwho had participated in the action,that every effort had in fact beenmade to deliver the support. Theartillery had fired as planned, but therounds had landed too far in advanceof the bogged down infantry to help– or even be noticed – by them. Thetanks’ push on the right flank hadbeen stopped, with heavy casualties,by sustained fire from Germanarmour and anti-tank guns.10Subsequent published studies ofthe Black Watch attack have relied onthe survivors’ memories gathered bythe historical section. Reginald Roy,while a member of the section in theearly 1950s, had used the interviewsfrom the 1945‑6 investigation todraft the extended “narrative” onOperation Spring 11 upon whichStacey based the shorter account inThe Victory Campaign. When Roypublished his own important book,1944: The Canadians in Normandy(1984), the chapter “Storm of Steelon Verrières Ridge” made still fulleruse of the material gathered in 1945‑6.There are passages quoted fromthe transcripts of interviews withfive survivors of the attack to offera “glimpse of their situation oncethey were up the slope and about tomove over the slight crest down toFontenay-le-Marmion.” 12 Roy alsoused the account of Captain R.E.Bennett, which is unique in that thetestimony was recorded on 1 August1944, within a week of the battle.In fact, Bennett had discussed hisexperiences with Ralph Allen, warcorrespondent for the Toronto Globeand Mail, on 27 July and suppliedmany of the same details he laterrecorded on 1 August, confirmationthat the information was fresh fromthe battlefield. Bennett did notparticipate in the attack on Fontenay– his platoon was at that time engagedwith German troops that infiltratedback into the Black Watch’s assemblyarea – but he had been present whenearly on the morning of 25 JulyGriffin regrouped the battalion, andarranged for the artillery and tanksupport originally planned for thedawn attack to be laid on later inthe morning. Bennett, who did notsurvive the war, was inspired byGriffin’s calm and confidence, and theeffective control he exerted. Bennett’saccounts, both as reported in thepress and in his own memorandum,strongly suggest that Griffin madehis own decisions to carry on withthe attack, and to strike directly forFontenay on the reverse slope, ratherthan first dealing with May-sur-Orneon the flank of the forward slope.1323
Nevertheless, the quite differentview that grew in the regimentin postwar decades – that Griffinhad been compelled by higherlevels of command to undertake theattack – became the focus of a majorcontroversy in the early 1990s. Theregimental traditions featured in thedocudrama entitled “In DesperateBattle: Normandy 1944,” part of TheValour and the Horror series televisedby the Canadian BroadcastingCorporation in early 1992. Atissue in the ensuing controversywas a meeting between BrigadierW.J. Megill, commanding the 5thCanadian Infantry Brigade of whichthe battalion was a part, and Griffinshortly before the Black Watch attack.Megill recalled that he suggestedthat the Black Watch should secureMay before moving on to Fontenay.The production discounted Megill’sversion. In a subsequent article inMaclean’s magazine, the docudrama’sproducer Brian McKenna cited thememory of Captain Campbell Stuart,the battalion’s adjutant on 25 July1944, who “hotly disputed” Megill’srecollection. Responsible for wirelesscommunications between Griffinand brigade, Stuart rememberedconstant pressure to attack. Griffin’sreplies “stress[ed] the foolhardinessto attack” but the meeting withMegill – which Stuart was not presentfor – convinced the major that “thehonour of the regiment was at stakeand [he] ordered the attack to goforward.” 14 Stuart was one of theofficers who had assisted Motzfeldt inthe preparation of the memorandumfor the official historians in December1945. That memorandum noted hisrecollection of the wireless messagesfrom higher authorities urging thatattack take place, but did not drawthe larger conclusions of Stuart’slater reflections, which, the Maclean’sarticle suggests, strongly influencedthe television production.The meeting between Griffin andMegill had already figured in studies24of the Normandy campaign thatbegan to appear in the 1980s. It mustbe noted that Megill’s recollection,decades after the event, is the onlyrecord of the conversation. Stacey’sreport on the investigation of 1945‑6mentions that the meeting took place,but does not describe what wasdiscussed.15 Historians have assumedthat Megill’s later recollections aboutthe details of the meeting are correct.For instance John A. English wrotethat Megill “reluctantly acquiesced inthis decision [to bypass May] largelybecause of Griffin’s enthusiasm andthe promise it held for success.” 16English believed that Griffin, havingrecently taken command of thebattalion, should have been directedby Megill to change his plan to takeaccount of enemy resistance that wasstronger than expected.17 Roy, in his1984 book, took a slightly differentview. He noted that both routes toFontenay – direct or through May– would have met stiff resistance,18and thus underscored the focus ofboth commanders on the seizureof Fontenay. Terry Copp, whointerviewed Megill, has echoed thisview. By bypassing points of enemyresistance and heading straightfor the final objective Griffin wasproposing the aggressive actionsenior commanders demanded.Copp acknowledged that it wasmost unfortunate that Megill didnot intervene if his recollection iscorrect. Copp did, however, questionthe tendency to inject hindsight intothe analysis of the action of the BlackWatch as everyone can agree, withhindsight, that the battalion shouldhave focused first on securing itsstart line in St. Martin against theenemy troops who had infiltratedinto the area, and then taken Maybefore attempting the final phaseagainst Fontenay.19 Bill McAndrewemphasized the imperative forcaution in an article that respondedto the controversy over the CBCdocudrama:It is exceedingly doubtful that wewill ever know the precise contentand tone of that fateful conversation.Megill may have simply acceptedGriffin’s view; he may have urgedor insisted that Griffin go becausehis superior commanders werepressing him to hurry; or the twoinexperienced battle commandersmay have agreed they had a chance.Rather than pronounce a fatuouscategorical judgment on that humandilemma, we would be better advisedto consider its nuances and hope thatnone of us has to experience whatthese men faced that early morning.20Such caution, the presentpaper argues, has in fact alwayscharacterized the historiographyof Operation Spring, in large partbecause of the care with whichthe official history team in 1945‑6approached the challenge of capturingand assessing the memories ofparticipants. This conclusion is basedon an examination of records thatshow how the official team carriedout its task, a subject not directlytreated in the published literature.Rather ironically, in view of thecontroversy over contested memoriesfollowing broadcast of the Valourand the Horror in the early 1990s, theinvestigation of 1945‑6 began as anexercise in political damage controlbecause of disquiet in Montreal overthe disaster that had befallen thecity’s most prominent regiment.In order to understand whyan investigation into OperationSpring took place it is necessary toreview contemporary newspapers,which provide insight into whatthe general public knew about thebattle. A flurry of articles by RossMunro, lead war correspondent forthe Canadian Press, and Ralph Allen,war correspondent for the TorontoGlobe and Mail, were published on 26and 27 July 1944. On 26 July Munrodescribed an “All-Day Uphill BattleFought by Canadians” in which he
Library and Archives Canada PA 115819Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. Stacey and the staff of the Canadian Army Historical Section in London, 19 April 1944. From l. tor.: William Ogilvie, O.N. Fisher, Captain Heathcote, L. Wrinch, C.P. Stacey, J. Engler, A.T. Sesia, G.C. Pepper, G.R. Martin.reported that “British staff officerssaid the Canadians face the strongestopposition to appear on any onesector of the Normandy front andthat the fighting has been extremelyheavy.”21 Allen’s 27 July article in theGlobe compared the fighting to thatof the First World War22 while on thesame day Ross Munro noted that anofficer had described the operationas “disappointing.”23 That same dayin the Toronto Star the front-pageheadline was “Canadian Drive TiesUp Half Nazi Normandy Armour,”24reflecting how the operation wasalready being rationalized as aholding attack. On 2 August Allenemphasized the territorial gain ofthe operation, specifically, how twoOntario battalions (both veterans ofthe Dieppe raid) fought off fierceGerman counterattacks to holdVerrières village.25 While there weresome reports of disappointments, inthe immediate aftermath of the battlethe successes were highlighted.Wartime censorship delayed thebrutal truth only for seventeen days.On 27 July Allen of the Globe andMail had filed a 1,000-word accountthat made the front pages of severalnewspapers in Canada on 12 August,with the original filing date andthe notation publication had been“delayed” at the head of the piece.“Black Watch Units Died Alone inTrap,” the headline in the Globe, leftno doubt there had been a disaster.above May-Sur-Orne on July 25,in the heart of a powerful Germantank, gun and infantry position,all that was left of their gallantspearhead was swallowed up,platoon by platoon, section bysection, finally man by man.Their ammunition ran outas a ring of Germany heavy gunsand lighter automatic weaponswent about its deadly work withthe calculated precision of a firingsquad. Finally, even the thintrickle of wounded, half-walking,half-crawling to the rear, came toHere is the epitaph of aan end. As a desperate little partyregiment. Three words only:of headquarters and support“Don’t Send Reinforcements.”personnel prepared to fight itsFrom the four rifle companiesway forward in the forlorn hopethat comprised almost the fullof making a partial rescue, the lastfighting strength of the Blackman out bore this message fromWatch (Royal Highlander ofthe battalion’s 24-year-old actingCanada), the rest was silence.commanding officer: “don’t sendTrapped on a barren ridge justreinforcements .”25
Black Watch ArchivesOfficers of The First Battalion, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, 24 September 1943Front Row: Captain R.E. Bennett, Captain E. Motzfeldt, Captain J.P.W. Taylor, Captain V.E. Traversy, Lieutenant-Colonel S.S.T. Cantlie,Field Marshal Lord Wavell, Major B.R. Ritchie, Major A.G. Stevenson, Captain F.P. Griffin, Captain J.L. Duchastel de Montrouge,Captain J.P.G. Kemp.Middle Row: Lieutenant R.A. Horwood, Captain G.A. Demers (RCAPC), Lieutenant R.D. Yuile, Lieutenant E.S. Duffield, Captain A.P.Bates, Lieutenant J.P. Cowans, Lieutenant A.R.W. Robinson, Lieutenant M.H. Cassils, Lieutenant G. Birks, Lieutenant I.H. Louson.Back row: Lieutenant J.G. Smith (RCCS), Lieutenant J.E. Fox, Lieutenant F.A Heubach, Lieutenant C.G. Bourne, Lieutenant S.E. Griffin,Lieutenant F.T. Rea, Lieutenant D.A McAlpine, Lieutenant G.S. MacInnes, Lieutenant J.K. Neil. (Names of officers mentioned in text are italicized.)The inspirational part of thestory reported in detail CaptainR.E. Bennett’s account of Griffin’sleadership when he took command inthe early morning amidst the heavyfighting with the German forcesthat had infiltrated behind the BlackWatch’s start line:Major Griffin set the whole battalionan example I can’t describe. He gotmen under cover in St. André whilehe arranged for a new artilleryprogram, and if he ever thoughttwice about the possibility that theattack would have to be cancelled,he never showed it. His orders wereto go ahead, and as he moved amongthe companies under constant firefrom mac
The Inquiry into the Black Watch and the Battle of St. André-sur-Orne, 1944-46 Alexander Fitzgerald-Black “In memory of the men of the Black Watch of Canada and their comrades who fought for the liberation of Europe and the hope of a better world.” – Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada Association plaque, Point 67
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