Archeology And Humanism: An Incongruent Foucault
KRITIKE VOLUME FOUR NUMBER ONE (JUNE 2010) 1-17DialogosArcheology and Humanism:An Incongruent FoucaultChris Calvert-MinorIntroductionAtension exists in Foucault’s writings concerning his alleged antihumanism. While his early archaeological period is taken to sedimenthis post-structuralist, anti-humanist methodology, Foucault still letshumanism creep into his writing, particularly in his later work. In the spirit ofcharity, I consider two ways of reading Foucault to overcome this tension:either (1) emphasize his post-structuralism over his humanist leanings or (2)take his humanism seriously and minimize his post-structuralism. Afteranalysis, neither reading is adequate. I conclude that Foucault’s oeuvre is bestunderstood simply as incongruent, contrary to his own remarks to unify hiswritings and methodologies.When a writer produces multiple works throughout a career, thetendency is to unify the discourses under the name of the author and mapprogressions, digressions, and regressions to illustrate coherence even in thepresence of obvious discontinuity. The focus of unity is on the author’ssubjectivity, a coherent tracing of the author’s originary discursive intentionsand, oftentimes, non-discursive personal needs that are deemed to composethe author’s works. Heightened attention is given to the author’s interiority inlight of the exteriority of social influence, economic materiality, and history.External factors are not excluded from analysis, but they are subject to theprimacy of beliefs, desires, and consciousness. This is a methodologicallyhumanistic (humanismm) interpretation or constitution of the collection ofdiscursive texts, the oeuvre, that sets the creative intentions and activities of thehuman as the locus of history above all social and historical structures. Formy purposes, I make a distinction between methodological and substantivehumanisms. Methodological humanism (humanismm) refers only to the processof unifying discourses or practices according to the consciousness of a humansubject or subjects; human consciousness frames all inquiry about the oeuvre,rather than, for example, structures that are out of our control. Substantivehumanism (humanisms) corresponds to theories emphasizing the importanceof humanity via some shared attribute, essence, or substance. In both cases,humanity is the center of consideration and importance, warranting the name of‘humanism,’ but they are different applications of the theme. 2010 Chris Calvert-Minorhttp://www.kritike.org/journal/issue 7/calvert-minor june2010.pdfISSN 1908-7330
2ARCHEOLOGY AND HUMANISMStructuralists and post-structuralists alike oppose humanisticmconstitutions. Whether such thinkers favor static or dynamic structures, theyrelegate the human subject to a deprivileged space, and the oeuvre is unifiedaccording to sets of structural criteria much different than humanistmclassifications. The author ceases to be the criterion of unity. Instead, boththe author and the collection of texts are delineated by constitutional structuresthat alter the interpretation of what constitutes the “author” and theappropriate collection of texts. Often characterized as a post-structuralist,Michel Foucault provocatively asks, “What difference does it make who isspeaking?”1 The author per se is not important nor is the author’s proper nameas a proper name. What is important is how the author’s name plays a certain rolein a discursive classification system. Foucault identifies this as the authorfunction, the “characteristic of the mode of existence, circulation, andfunctioning of certain discourses within a society” organized around theauthor’s proper name but going well beyond the normal functioning of aproper name.2Formulation of the author function leads Foucault to emphasizestudying discourses based purely on their modes of existence and theirparticular functionings and attributions that shape and are shaped by thecultures they circulate, instead of focusing on the author. In The Archaeology ofKnowledge, Foucault challenges humanisticm understandings of books and oeuvresand goes in the direction of a “project of a pure description of discursive events as thehorizon for the search for the unities that form within it.”3 We should nolonger investigate an author’s originary acts and threads of consciousness thatlink collections of texts. Rather we should stay on the level of the discoursesthemselves and engage the texts descriptively to uncover the rules of discursiveformation that give rise to those particular statements rather than otherpossible statements.In later writings, however, Foucault comments on the relationshipbetween his well-noted methodologies of archaeology, genealogy, and ethics ina manner that unifies them according to his own consciousness, whileapparently still holding the post-structuralism of his archaeological period.Foucault unintentionally assents to a humanisticm interpretation of his owncollection of texts, even as he assents to an anti-humanisticm rendering ofhistory. He says,So that in these three areas – madness, delinquency, andsexuality – I emphasized a particular aspect each time: theestablishment of a certain objectivity, the development ofa politics and a government of the self, and theelaboration of an ethics and a practice in regard to1 Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?” in The Foucault Reader, ed. by Paul Rabinow(New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 120.2 Ibid., 108.3 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Tavistock PublicationsLimited, 1972; reprint, London: Routledge, 2000), 27.
C. CALVERT-MINOR3oneself. But each time I also tried to point out the placeoccupied here by the other two components necessary forconstituting a field of experience. It is basically a matterof different examples in which the three fundamentalelements of any experience are implicated: a game oftruth, relations of power, and forms of relation to oneselfand to others.4Foucault regards these “elements” as the three axes that define ourcomplex experience.5 Thus, whenever Foucault privileged knowledge andtruth, power and domination, or technologies of the self in his analyses, hebelieved he was not discounting his other methodologies; rather, he wasrestricting his methodological domain in order to emphasize one componentof the total field of experience, a form of methodological bracketing.6 Foucaultthen unifies his three methodologies according to his understanding of the fieldof experience, where each aspect elucidates part of the experiential whole.Foucault constructs a tripartite meta-methodology based upon his conceptionof experience and his intention to express that conception. Foucault’s orderingof his own texts revolves around himself as the author, and this is a humanisticminterpretation. This understanding of his own project is clearly at odds with hispost-structuralism as a tension forms between his humanisticm ordering andanti-humanisticm declarations against such an ordering. Foucault does thatwhich he argues against.If we value some congruence in the reading of an author’s work, asFoucault does with his own, there are two interpretations that could minimizethis tension in Foucault: either (1) read him through his own post-structuralismand privilege his archaeological work over his humanismm or (2) take hishumanismm seriously and lessen the import of his post-structuralist remarks.To some, this tension may seem like nothing more than a small quibble againstFoucault. One may admit that Foucault neglects to account for himself in thehistorical classification of his own methods and lapses into a humanisticmproject, but that, nonetheless, this is only a minor complication. The thrust ofhis anti-humanist project remains intact if one does not take too seriously hiscomments on unification. The import of his work, one may say, is found in hisparticular historical analyses and not in his own unifying thoughts about them.I believe that most who are sympathetic to the early Foucault will deemphasize his humanisticm comments in virtue of preserving his poststructuralist anti-humanismm. This is an appeal to the first interpretiveapproach to Foucault. But is this a sustainable approach?4 Michel Foucault, “Polemics, Politics, and Problemizations: An Interview,” in TheFoucault Reader, 387.5 Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,”in ibid., 351-2.6 This is parsimonious with Deleuze’s interpretation of Foucault’s later work, thatFoucault undertook a shift in emphasis towards the subject rather than discourse. See GillesDeleuze, Foucault (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).
4ARCHEOLOGY AND HUMANISMIn this essay, I argue that the first interpretive approach is notsustainable, but neither is the second, more humanist approach. I first arguethat Foucault’s post-structuralist method is itself internally inconsistent, that hisanti-humanismm is self-defeating because it entails humanismm. Such a resultrenders Foucault’s post-structuralism problematic to use as a lens to read theentirety of his work. Secondly, I take up Foucault’s humanistm interpretationof his own works, the attempt to unify the three methods across his works, andshow that Foucault’s archaeological method conflicts with his later genealogyand ethics because of the unacknowledged substantive humanism (humanisms)imbedded within them. Thus, I conclude that Foucault’s oeuvre should be leftas it is, simply incongruent.7Archeology and the ArcheologistIn this section I show how Foucault’s archaeological anti-humanismmis self-defeating; it contradicts its own presuppositions regarding thedescription of differing epistemological eras, or epistemes. The consequence isthat one cannot use Foucault’s own archaeological method to understand andorganize the corpus of his work. One cannot privilege Foucault’s antihumanismm as the unifying centerpiece of his oeuvre as the first interpretiveapproach would have it.In the space between explicit social and scientific codes andmateriality, the space between the intentional and the physical, Foucault’s earlywork engages in an “archaeological” project to uncover the “positiveunconscious” of discursive corpuses of knowledge (connaissance) that produceregularity and order.8 He believes that there is much more to the regularity ofdiscursive practices than can be explained by attributions to originaryintentional subjects or the structural materials of social and cultural milieus.9This positive unconscious is an epistemological framework that the subjectsand discourses of the period embody without questioning its validity and, yet,they operate without being able to recognize its presence. Foucault isinterested in mapping these epistemic rules of formation, these rules of order,that prescribe what statements can be created and limit the extent of thedomain of thought. Foucault writes,7 This is similar to Peter Dews’ assessment in “The Return of the Subject in LateFoucault,” in Radical Philosophy, 51 (1989), 37-41. Dews’ reasoning is that Foucault must havefound postmodern thought too limiting to speak meaningfully about freedom; thus, he neededto introduce the concept of the subject. I also agree with Joan Reynolds’ judgment that Foucaultmoved away from his post-structuralism to a “pragmatic humanism” (“‘Pragmatic Humanism’ inFoucault’s Later Work,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37:4 (2004), 951-979. In the samesentiment as Dews, Reynolds writes that this allows for Foucault to write about ethics andfreedom. However, while Reynolds underplays Foucault’s incongruence, my aim is to make theincongruence clear.8 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, VintageBooks Edition (New York: Random House, Inc., 1994), xi.9 Ibid., xiii.
C. CALVERT-MINOR5Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given inthings as their inner law, the hidden network thatdetermines the way they confront one another, and alsothat which has no existence except in the grid created by aglance, an examination, a language; and it is only in theblank space of this grid that order manifests itself indepth as though already there, waiting in silence for themoment of its expression.10Where Foucault uncovered the origination of specific concepts in hisprevious archaeological works (e.g., the concepts of madness and disease), inThe Order of Things he shifts his attention to larger archaeological structures thatunderlie considerable expanses of time and distinguish themselves throughcomparative discursive discontinuities with adjoining periods. These largerstructures are the epistemes of the time period, the total set of transversalunifying relations that constructs the knowledge infrastructure of a given timeperiod in all of its aspects (subjects, disciplines, and systems) and constitutes itsdiscursive regularities.11 The episteme is not the composition of extantknowledge; it is the set of conditions for the constitution of knowledge.Epistemes are temporally localized, not universal, so that ahistorical truths andconcepts are jettisoned in favor of the “historical a priori,” where what countsas ‘true’ and ‘meaningful’ are given without dispute and determined by theepistemological possibilities generated. These rules of formation create theconditions for true discourse and meaningful language without necessitatingthe expression of any particular set of statements over another within the realmof epistemic possibility.Truth is not a transcendent reality; it iscontemporaneous with discourse – immanent, yet logically prior, to discursivepractices. Truth becomes historicized and changes with change in theepisteme. This is, then, a defining difference between Foucault’s notion of theepisteme and the tenets of structuralism. Epistemes are not immutable oruniversally static; they determine the possibilities of discourse at the micro levelof specific practices and languages, but there remains a macroscopicindeterminate element across periods, which structuralists deny.The archaeological method for discovering epistemes is through theanalysis of discourses and discourses alone. Documents become monuments forarchaeological analysis, bifurcated from subjectivity and consciousness.Foucault is only interested in the rules of formation, the games of truth andmeaning, that immanently constitute the discourses and reveal the inner law ofthe episteme.12 Foucault does not wish to invoke the authority of a sovereignbehind an oeuvre or relate archaeology to psychology or anthropology,disciplines that make human subjectivity the engine of human production.Archaeology is a rewriting of what has already been written in a way that avoidsIbid., xx.Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 191.12 Ibid., 138-40.1011
6ARCHEOLOGY AND HUMANISMthe humanismm of most other historiographical recountings. Archaeologicalanalysis means to be thoroughly anti-humanistm.These discursive practices are identified and subjected to comparativeanalyses with other discourses so that their differences are made manifest. Inthis sense, archaeology is always a study of plurality since the contours ofdifference are required, already implying disparate regularities betweendiscourses. The archaeologist notes how the discourses distinguish themselvesfrom other modes of discursive thought that make visible epistemologicalbreaks. For Foucault, these analyses are genuine discoveries, rather thaninventions, since the archaeologist must operate within a blank space that isdefined by the “exteriority of its vicinity” in order to conduct an archaeologicalanalysis.13 One cannot be influenced by the epistemic conditions one seeks toanalyze; the archaeologist must remain externally neutral to the discursiveconcepts one studies in order to conduct a project of pure description. Thearchaeologist discovers the actual rules of formation immanent to the surfaceof discourse, rather than shaping the field of inquiry according to one’s own setof normative criteria, concepts, and projects.If Foucault is successful here, he alleviates the problem ofhermeneutics, the problem of uncovering only that which is a product of ourown interpretations.One is not forbidden to consider the variousinterpretations that have been postulated by historians. Yet, Foucaultcautiously warns that we are not constrained by these prefabricated epistemicgroupings. “I shall take as my starting-point whatever unities are alreadygiven ; but I shall not place myself inside these dubious unities in order tostudy their internal configurations or their secret contradictions.”14 Instead,Foucault tentatively holds these unities to scrutinize and dismember them toconstruct legitimate reformed unities that are based on the comparativedifferences they reveal in relation to other discursive unities.In The Order of Things, Foucault surveys the discursive landscape oftexts beginning roughly from the sixteenth century up through modern timesand discovers two great discontinuities in the Western epistemologicalinfrastructure, thus, producing three epistemes: the Renaissance, the Classical,and the Modern, in chronological order. Each embodies its own set ofconditions for intelligibility. The Renaissance episteme is based on resemblancewhere the world is conceived as one continuous chain of signifiers and thesignified, all linked by relations of similarity. For example, the seeds of theaconite plant are “tiny dark globes set in white skinlike coverings” resemblinghuman eyes and, hence, are taken to be signs of our eyes and used as ocularmedicine.15 The immense diversity of life and materials are associated togetherthrough the chain of resemblances so that even the greatest being, God, andthe most insignificant parts of the universe can be traced and related to oneIbid., 17.Ibid., 26.15 Foucault, The Order of Things, 27.1314
C. CALVERT-MINOR7another. Resemblances are the grounds of knowledge set within a wellconnected intrarelated universe of significations.The Classical episteme privileges representation as the condition forknowledge; language is capable of ordering the universe through self-evidentrepresentation, which grounds and makes possible the absolute certainty ofknowledge. Language is given the special function of being the medium oforder, able to categorize objectively the rational array of objects and categoriesthat are already present in the world. The Classical episteme assumes that thereis an absolute order that can be captured through adequate representation,through adequate codification. Classical discursive practices systematize simpleclassifications into tabular form and move gradually to more complexclassifications building upon the simples. When all of the data is gathered andthe tables complete, absolute certainty is attained. As Foucault describes,The Classical episteme can be defined in its most generalarrangement in terms of the articulated system of mathesis,a taxinomia, and a genetic analysis. The sciences always carrywithin themselves the project, however, remote it may be,of an exhaustive ordering of the world; they are alwaysdirected, too, towards the discovery of simple elementsand their progressive combination The center ofknowledge, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, isthe table.16This gave rise to the upsurge of Classical biological, economic, andphilological classification systems that spatially locate all simples within a twodimensional taxonomic schema. In philosophical discourse, representationbased on simples is the keystone of Descartes’ foundationalism where he firsttheorizes the one absolute simple of the cogito and then builds anepistemological edifice upon it using the notions of ‘clear’ and ‘distinct’ ideas,notions that rely on the transparent demarcation of true concepts and beliefsby the faculty of language; language that is already capable of order becomesthe principle of order.Yet, with all the possibilities for representation, the Classical epistemecould not represent that which is closest to itself, the representer and the act ofrepresenting; the representer is, simultaneously, the nearest and the farthest torepresentation. The one who represents is nearest because she is the originand center of all representations, an infinite space by which all things can beorganized. However, the representer is also the farthest; if the epistemologicalspace of the knowing subject lacks any aspect of finitude or immanence, thereis no recourse for self-classification in the field of knowledge that is comprisedof finite, immanent relations between objects and categories. This does notmean that the Classical episteme fails to recognize the representer in the16Ibid., 74-5.
8ARCHEOLOGY AND HUMANISMuniverse, but it could not make intelligible the representer as a representation, as afinite, immanent object among other objects, something to be tabularized.The mark of discontinuity between the Classical and Modernepistemes lies in the Modern episteme’s ability to create the conditions forradical self-reflection, a self-awareness that situates humankind organicallywithin history and finitude. The knower recognizes that she herself, herknowledge, and her act of knowing emerge from historical, cultural,philological, and biological contexts; she recognizes that she is finite and isherself, in many ways, just another object in a field of objects. The knowerbecomes the known and for the first time “humanity,” as a represented objectof study, exists, not as part of an ideal taxonomic system, but as occupying areal place in history. Humanity gains a deep-seated historicity. This does notmean that the Modern subject is conceived only as empirical. She is stillregarded as the transcendent knower who unifies the field of knowledge – onlynow, there is more in the field.For Foucault, this conception of humanity raises deep problemsprecisely because the empirical and the transcendental are held together in anunstable manner. The human is conditioned wholly by external factors (e.g.,environment, biology, character, and language) and, yet, she is supposed to bethe transcendental subject who has decisive control over herself and herknowledge; the human is understood to be a historical product, but she issupposed to be the sole originator of her own history. Foucault describes thisunusual development as the analytic of finitude which emerges in at least threetenuous binaries: the transcendental-empirical, cogito-unthought, and retreatreturn of the origin.17 Briefly, the transcendental-empirical doublet means thatthe transcendental aspect of humanity determines the form and possibility ofthe empirical, while the empirical is conceived as the necessary content for theformation of the transcendental. The cogito-unthought doublet refers tohumanity as the source of thought that happens to be born from unthought,the materiality of the world, whereas the unthought is pursued by the cogito inhopes of assimilation so that its ideational generative abilities remain primary.The unthought is everything not thought, even as the cogito attempts toencompass everything under thought. The retreat-return of the origin is ameans to explain that humanity’s origin is ever-retreating from empiricaldisclosure because humanity is not the source of its own being; the social andmaterial exteriority of humanity extends infinitely beyond us, even as the originis ever-returning because humanity deems itself the creator of history, the onewho makes history possible. The historical origin of humanity is both internaland foreign to the conception of humanity. It is for these reasons, theseunstable binaries, that Foucault proclaims that the end of “man” is nearing.18Invented by the Modern episteme, the concept of humanity will cease to existwhen the Modern episteme slips away.1718Ibid., 312-34.Ibid., 387.
C. CALVERT-MINOR9Such is Foucault’s archaeological method and its use in delineating thethree most recent epistemes. Is this a workable method? Can it be coherentlyimplemented to map epistemes? Is the archaeological position a legitimateepistemological position?To help answer these questions, I appeal to an unlikely thinker, BishopGeorge Berkeley, to illustrate a now well-known point. Though he has longbeen discounted as providing a viable philosophy, he was masterful at handlingobjections. The motto of his immaterialism, esse est percipi, means that all thatexists is that which is perceived, and this implies that that which is notperceived does not exist, that it is not possible for something to exist withoutbeing perceived. Objectors quickly retorted that all that is required to debunkBerkeley’s idealism is to imagine an unperceived object, thus, making it at leastpossible that there exists something unperceived. To this, Berkeley eloquentlywrites,But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me toimagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing inthe closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer,you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this,I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certainideas which you call book and trees, and at the same timeomitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceivethem? But do not you yourself perceive or think of themall the while?19To engage in the act of trying to imagine an unperceived object isalready a failed attempt, for one cannot subtract oneself as a perceiver from theact. Foucault theorizes that the epistemological position of the archaeologist isexternally neutral to the discourses under study and that the fruit of his labor isa pure description of the discursive rules of formation immanent to the texts.Foucault is asking us to believe that we can accurately describe the conceptualframework of foreign concepts without the importation of our own concepts.In the spirit of Berkeley, we should certainly ask: can the archaeologist subtractherself from her methodology to the extent that Foucault requires? Theanswer is ‘no’ because we have no recourse to archaeological theorizingwithout our own concepts; to avoid using our own concepts in any analysismakes as little sense as trying to imagine an unperceived object. And this is afamiliar point in post-positivist philosophy, stating that all observation, theoryformation, and interpretation do not occur in vacuums, but are thoroughlyconstituted by our cognitive capacities and conceptual systems.20 In brief, the19 George Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. by G. J. Warnock (New York:The World Publishing Co., 1969), 75.20 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd Edition (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1996); W. V. O. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” OntologicalRelativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Laurence BonJour, TheStructure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); Sandra Harding,
10ARCHEOLOGY AND HUMANISMnormativity of our own concepts seeps into all “descriptive” projects – and thismeans that no project is purely descriptive. Foucault inadvertently assents toprojects of theorizing that are fundamentally inconceivable. His error is thefailure to theorize himself as the archaeologist adequately in his own poststructuralist methodology.Foucault’s mistake presents a substantial problem for him. Discussingthe transition between the Classical and Modern epistemes, Foucault makes thecomment, “When discourse ceased to exist and function within representationas the first means of ordering it, Classical thought ceased at the same time tobe directly accessible to us.”21 This is a crucial statement Foucault needs tomake to demarcate the Modern from the Classical episteme, but it derails hisarchaeology. Classical thought is not directly accessible to us in the sense thatit is set within an epistemological infrastructure that is foreign to us. We, asModern archaeologists standing outside that infrastructure, neither use nor“think” the same kinds of concepts as those Classical texts we are studying.22Therefore, we must use our own epistemological orderings and concepts tounderstand those foreign discursive practices because there is no otherrecourse; the Modern archaeologist is wholly constituted as a knowing subjectby the epistemological framework of the Modern episteme. Thus, to reiterate,the discourses we analyze must be constituted by our Modern epistemic rulesof formation. If this is what we must do, it is then strange that Foucault speaksof distinct foreign epistemes with altogether different rules of formation. Thissituation makes it hard even to refer meaningfully to this kind of utterly foreignepisteme. As others have argued, if we conceive of “foreign” epistemes at all(or conceptual schemes as Donald Davidson writes), they cannot be absolutelyforeign because we have to locate them on a common coordinate axis inrelation to our own episteme in order for us even to understand them.23 Thepresumptive nature of rationality means that we must interpret other peopleWhose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women’s Lives (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1991); Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology (Oxford: BlackwellPublishers Ltd, 1995); and Linda Alcoff, Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1996).21 Foucault, The Order of Things, 304.22 Foucault is inconsistent on exactly where the archaeologist stands in relation to thediscourses he studies. In The Order of Things, Foucault clearly believes that he himself is speakingas a Modern and that there is no complication mapping discursive rules of the Renaissance andClassical epistemes as well as the episteme he inhabits (The Order of Things, xxii, 385). However,in The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault remarks that it is only after we have passed an episteme,when it becomes outside to our own, that we can begin archaeological analysis. Thus, this impl
Foucault identifies this as the author function, the “characteristic of the mode of existence, circulation, and functioning of certain discourses within a society” organized around the author’s proper name but going well beyond the normal functioning of a proper name.2 Formulation of the author function leads Foucault to emphasize
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debate was that between Sartre and Heidegger. On one side Sartre proclaimed in his 1945 lecture (Sartre 1946) that ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’; on the other side Heidegger responded in his 1946 ‘Letter on Humanism’ (Heidegger 1947) that it was nece
Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism publishes scholarly papers concerning philosophical, historical, or interdisciplinary aspects of humanism, or that deal with the application of humanist principles to problems of everyday life. EPH encourages the exploration of aspects and applications of
Negotiation Strategies with Incongruent Facial Expressions of Emotion Cause Cardiovascular Threat Peter Khooshabeh (khooshabeh@ict.usc.edu) 1, 3 Celso de Melo (demelo@usc.edu) 2 Brooks Volkman (volkman@psych.ucsb.edu) 1 Jonathan Gratch (gratch@ict.usc.edu) 3 Jim Blascovich (blascovi@psych.ucsb.edu ) 1 Peter J. Carnevale (carnevale@usc.edu) 2
Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology ----- Writing and Difference----- Margins of Philosophy Shoshana Felman, The Scandal of the Speaking Body Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language
with reference to teaching and learning English as a second language in the course-book. The findings of this study revealed that teachers and materials developers use humanism teaching theory and humanistic approach to promote the materials to fit into the needs and preferences of the learners and to facilitate the learning process.
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