The Carver Village Controversy
The Carver VillageControversyBy Teresa LenoxRestricted to designated areas, Miami's growing black communityhad little choice in where they could purchase land, build a home, or renta decent apartment. In 1951, the pressure of population expansionfinally broke the rigid barriers of segregation in Miami. Acts ofviolence and terrorism followed.In the early morning of September 22, 1951, thunderous dynamiteblasts tore gaping holes in the walls and foundation of Carver Village,an apartment complex located in the Edison Center section of Miami.'For months, Carver Village had been the center of an emotional andcontroversial issue--black integration of a white neighborhood.Housing in Miami's black community had been a serious problemfor several years in Miami. Twice in 1951 citizens voted overwhelmingly for slum clearance and public housing. Everyone agreed thatsomething had to be done about the deplorable conditions in the blackneighborhood. 2 The largest of the ghettos, the Central Negro District,housed approximately 37,000 blacks in 136 residential blocks. Most ofthe residents did without electricity, running water, and garbage collection, creating conditions ripe for contagious diseases.3 The slums hadto be cleared and public housing provided for the displaced residents.On this issue blacks and whites agreed. Yet, no one could agree onwhere to locate the new black housing project.4One black housing project had been built in 1937. Located in EdisonCenter, the Liberty Square project had been heralded as the largesthousing project in the south and the most beautiful in the country.However, Liberty Square was surrounded by a six-foot stone wall. 5 TheTeresa Lenox is Research Historian for Metro-Dade Division of Historic Preservation, a partner in the historical consulting firm of ResearchAtlantica, and a graduate student at Florida Atlantic University.
40 TEQUESTAwall, a physical and mental barrier, stood as a reminder to blacks to keepout of the white areas. For the black community, the wall became asource of tension. For the whites, it stood as a safeguard against blacksinvading their neighborhood. That was all soon to change.6Malcolm Wiseheart and John Bouvier had built two private housingprojects in Edison Center; one black project inside the wall and onewhite project on the other side. Units in the black project filled quicklywhile units in the white project, known as Knight Manor, remained halfempty. Realizing the need for black housing, Wiseheart and Bouvierrenamed 216 units Carver Village and opened them to blacks in June of1951. This decision tore down the barrier of segregation and began awave of terrorism that brought shame to the city and citizens of Miami.7In 1951, Miamians voted twice for slum clearance and publichousing.News of the owner's decision to rent to blacks spread quickly throughKnight Manor. The white residents immediately formed the DadeCounty Property Owner's Association. They retained attorney WilliamJ. Pruitt to help keep blacks out of Knight Manor. Led by Ira DavidHawthorne, the Property Owner's Association met with the Miami CityCommission several times to plead for help with their problem. Thecommissioners, however, understood that something had to be doneabout the shortage of black housing and refused to help the association.Shocked by the City Commission's decision, citizens and residents tookmatters into their own hands.8
The Carter Village Controversy41On July 14th the Ku Klux Klan distributed hate literature and burnedgiant letter Ks in four locations around Carver Village. The campaignescalated when Knight Manor residents organized an "IndignationMeeting" and "Mammoth Motorcade" to demonstrate white supremacy. After the meeting, cars filled with whites circled Carver Villagehonking horns and flashing search lights. During the motorcade anemployee of The Miami Daily News shot and wounded a black man. 9Mr. Daniel Francis, a long-time resident of the area, recalled thatduring more than one motorcade whites threw rocks at windows inCarver Village. Whites also posted signs and patrolled the area duringthe summer, warning blacks of trouble if they moved into CarverVillage. Tensions rose to fevered pitch when reports surfaced that 76units of Carver Village had been sold to black project managers GeorgeBubee and Stanley Sweeting. '1All efforts by the white community to keep blacks out of CarverVillage failed. The first blacks moved in during the week of August 11.In September, David Hawthorne, of the Property Owners' Association,again went to the City Commission to ask for help. This time herequested that the city secure Carver Village through negotiations orcondemnation. Hawthorne believed this would end the tension and hehad little problem convincing the commissioners. Before a packedmeeting, commissioner Louie Bandel offered the motion to beginnegotiations "to condemn buildings at Carver Village.and to acquirethem by eminent domain for municipal purposes other than publichousing." Bandel also went on record stating that this resolution wouldnot be a permanent solution to the problem. Earlier during the meetingCommissioner Perrine Palmer asked Hawthorne what would preventthe owners from allowing Blacks to rent their property east of CarverVillage. Hawthorne assured Palmer that whites already occupied thoseunits. Unconvinced, Commissioner Palmer offered an amendment tothe resolution--the city acquire the entire project owned by Wiseheartand Bouvier. This suggestion received thunderous applause from theaudience. Bandel refused to accept the amendment."At this point, the meeting turned into a political battlefield. WhenBandel refused to accept the amendment, Palmer accused him of "tryingto fool these people, because the election is close." He went on: "I amgoing to second Mr. Bandel's resolution with my tongue in my cheek."With this, Bandel retorted, "You are determined to beat me in theelection.I welcome your opposition." The resolution passed four toone. The City of Miami would acquire, through condemnation, Carver
42 TEQUESTAVillage and the units would be used as fire and police sub-stations andoffice space for the city's sewage disposal project.12The commission's decision to condemn Carver Village only addedmore tension to the situation. The MiamiDailyNews called the decision"a vote-getter, no more and no less." Everyone seemed to agree thatmaking Carver Village out-of-bounds for blacks did nothing to solvethe real issue. As one black man put it, "Negroes went out to EdisonCenter not to make trouble. They went out there so they could live inclean apartments with little yards around them. You don't see much ofthat in Negro town." 13Some citizens were outraged at the commission's decision. AttorneyVictor Levine, referred to the decision as an "extravagant squanderingof tax funds." As a taxpayer, Levine filed a suit to halt the condemnationproceedings. After all, the cost of acquiring Carver Village exceededMiami's Treasury by 1.3 million. 14The situation literally exploded on September 22, 1951. At 2:15 a.m.,two 100-pound boxes of dynamite ripped two holes into the walls of anuntenanted building in Carver Village. The dynamite shattered windows, twisted doors off their hinges, and ripped off the roof. Policeestimated the damage to be in excess of 200,000. A third boxcontaining 80 sticks of dynamite failed to detonate. The blasts shookthe whole Northwest section of Miami. Dan Francis, who lived a fewblocks away, grabbed his shotgun and headed for Carver Village. "Yousee," he stated, "I knew what had happened." A large group of blacksand whites gathered around Carver Village, but the newspapers reported no other disturbances. The Miami Police Department followedseveral leads to no avail. 15As police kept guard, an uneasy quiet prevailed at Carver Village.City Attorney John W. Watson drafted a letter to the Assistant U. S.Attorney, Fred Botts, asking an opinion on the legality of a declarationof a state of emergency "in view of civil rights statutes."16 Except foralarming area residents, the bombing of Carver Village "aroused noserious public reaction." 17 David Hawthorne asked the City Commission to vacate the Negroes from Carver Village; they refused hisrequest, stating no law existed by which they could be evicted. After afew weeks Wiseheart and Bouvier hired a night-watchman to patrolKnight Manor and the police removed their guards.'8In spite of increased purchases of arms and ammunition by whites,the month of October saw no disturbances at Carver Village. Thedynamiting, however, continued. Three times during the month of
The Carter Village Controversy43October, Jewish synagogues and schools were blasted. Miami PoliceChief Walter Headley saw no connection between these bombings andthe Carver Village bombing. He perceived the blasts at Carver Villageas the work of professionals, while the bombings of the synagoguesappeared amateurish. The police chief said, "the explosions wereCommunist-inspired to incite racial hatred." 19Police inspect Carver village after bombing, 1951.A writer for The Nation magazine saw it differently. "The Ku KluxKlan," he wrote, "have long used terror to keep Negroes inside theghettos assigned to them, and their program for exploiting any minorityhas included anti-Semitism." He went on to cite Miami's long historywith the Klan and police support given the organization. 20 DavidHawthorne went so far as to accuse Blacks of the bombings in order toreceive Jewish support. 2 1 Indignant over the bombing of their synagogues, the Jewish community united with the black community todemand a stop to these acts of violence.
44 TEQUESTAOn November 30th at 2:12 a.m. a second blast rocked Carver Village,totally demolishing two units. The culprits again placed the dynamitein an untenanted building, suggesting that they did not want to kill butonly intimidate. Mrs. Senecheria, the wife of Miami's new mayor, toldreporters that she had received a threatening phone call. The caller toldher "to get the Negroes out or we'll blow the whole place apart." Thenight watchman, employed by Bouvier and Wiseheart, had driven pastthe complex just a few moments prior to the blast and saw "nothing outof the ordinary." A bomb expert from Chicago, in Miami to aid localofficials, sorted through the debris, but found little evidence. PoliceChief Headley insisted the explosion was "an attempt [by the Communists] to create racial discord." 22Black leaders accused the Miami police of not doing enough to haltthe bombings. Outraged, Miamians demanded a stop to the violencethat swept their resort city. The dust had barely settled from the lastexplosion when, on December 2nd, three more bombs exploded. Thefirst blast hit Carver Village at 3:57 a.m., but caused no damage. Thesecond blast thirty minutes later shattered the windows of a Jewishsynagogue. The third bomb exploded harmlessly at 5 a.m. in asouthwest residential area.2 3Finally, spurred into action, Governor Fuller Warren dispatchedAdjutant General Mark Lance of the Florida National Guard to Miamito study the situation. The Governor also sent an investigator from hisoffice to assist local officials in their investigations. Miami policebelieved the bombings on December 2 to be the work of pranksters.Regardless of who was responsible, the citizens of Miami were frightened and ashamed. Jewish and black leaders met with the city andcounty commissions to plead for an end to the bombings. The Committee Against Bombing, a Jewish group headed by Bumett Roth, offeredthe Miami City Commission a plan to end the violence. Their plancalled for F.B.I. intervention, regulated dynamite sales, and a 5,000reward for the capture of those responsible for the recent atrocities. 24A newly elected city commission met on December 5. Guarded bysix policemen and four detectives, the commissioners took severalactions to help end the wave of bombings. In order to attack what theyfelt to be the basic problem, the commission passed an emergencymeasure to obtain additional low-cost housing and federally financedslum clearance. To get the slum clearance underway as soon aspossible, they passed a resolution asking the Miami Housing Authorityto acquire Knight Manor, Carver Village, and the adjacent vacant land
The Carter Village Controversy45(also owned by Bouvier and Wiseheart) to be used for a low-costhousing project. 25 The previous commission had recommended thepurchase of only Carver Village. This change in decision suggests thatMiami city officials were ready to do something about housing the blackcommunity.At the meeting, speaking on behalf of the property owners of EdisonCenter, David Hawthorne stated, "It is unfair for the authorities touphold this situation since these colored people have not invested thefirst dime in this white section." Mr. Hawthorne recommended that thecommission declare an emergency and clear Carver Village of all itsresidents. The commissioners had no comment.2 6The commission also passed three specific resolutions in response tothe bombings. First, they offered a 3,000 reward for the apprehensionof the criminals responsible for the bombings. Second, they created a 5,000 fund for the police department to pay for overtime relating to thebombings. Third, they passed an ordinance regulating the sale and useof dynamite in Miami. All of the commission's decisions passedunanimously. 27Miami received some unwanted national attention after the December2 bombings. The Justice Department began a study as requested by theAnti-Defamation League. 28 Representative Louis B. Heller, a Democrat from New York, said that if the Justice Department did not push theinquiry immediately, he would introduce a severe bill to curb suchaction "against racial and religious groups, their property and institutions."29 Heller also wrote a letter to Florida's Attorney General, J.Howard McGrath, urging him to find the culprits of this "wave ofvandalism" and bring them to justice before the violence spread to othercommunities.3 0The violence did spread into a north Florida community. On the nightof December 25, 1951, a bomb exploded beneath the home of theNational Association for the Advancement of Colored People's leader,Harry T. Moore. Moore died enroute to the hospital; his wife wascritically injured. At first, some officials believed the bomb-murder ofHarry Moore to be linked with the Miami bombings.3 1 This could neverbe proven. However, the thread of hatred, bigotry, and violence hadbeen woven into all of these incidences.The murder of Harry Moore brought swarms of F.B.I. agents intoFlorida. On January 8, 1952, Attorney General Howard McGrathwidened the F.B.I. investigations to the bombings in Miami. Meanwhile, the national director of the Anti-Defamation League, Benjamin
46 TEQUESTAEpstein, met with Governor Warren to confer about a statewide program to halt the violence. Epstein recommended a survey of local areasto determine racial or religious tension and a project, at the communitylevel, to combat the "basic issues of racial and religious hatreds." 32On November 30th, Carver Village was bombed for a second time.As February approached, with no further bombings reported, Miamians began to calm down. But, the recent violence had not beenforgotten. F.B.I. agents continued their investigations while officialslaid the groundwork for a proposed Dade County Council on Community Relations. The Council, composed of leading white and BlackMiami citizens, set as its objective a community-wide effort to better
The Carter Village Controversy47relations between racial and religious groups. In New York, TheAmericans Protesting Florida Terror suggested an "Americanism"educational program for Florida." In Washington, D.C., Representative Heller proposed a federal law carrying a penalty of death for actsof violence inspired by racial or religious prejudice. In addition,Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey asked for an immediatereport by the F.B.I. on the recent wave of terrorism in Florida and fora determination by the Justice Department on the adequacy of federallaws. 34Finally, on October 6, 1952, over a year after the first bomb was set,Attorney General James P. McGranery asked a federal grand jury toreview the evidence gathered by the F.B.I. concerning Carver Villagebombings. McGranery stated that he believed "there have been violations of the Civil Rights statutes.and other federal laws." 35 The jurythought that the testimony on Carver Village would take approximatelythree weeks. The first witnesses to testify were the F.B.I. agents whohad investigated the possible civil rights violations at Carver Village.The jury also ordered twelve other witnesses to produce all records ofthe John B. Gordon Klavem of the Ku Klux Klan in Hialeah. OnDecember 9, two months later, the federal grand jury returned indictments against fourpeople; three men and a woman: William G. OrwickHarvey G. DeRosier, Arthur F. Udgreen, and Mrs. Helen Russell. ALfour surrendered to federal authorities after being indicted for peljury. 36The grand jury charged William Orwick, a linotype operator iMiami, on two counts of making false statements pursuant to thFederal Employees Loyalty Program and to the provisions of thiNational Security Act of 1947. Orwick told F.B.I. agent Melvin Jettthat he had not been a member of the Ku Klux Klan since 1946 and thathe had no knowledge that Sports, Inc., in Hialeah, was used as a frontfor John B. Gordon's Klavem. Investigators showed that Orwick hadbeen a member of the Klan during the years 1950 and 1951 and that healso knew Sports, Inc., to be a Klan meeting place, because he haoattended regular meetings there. 37The indictment against Harvey G. DeRosier, a Post Office employee, stated that he had given false statements to the Postal LoyaltyBoard. Apparently the Loyalty Board learned that DeRosier had beera member of the John B. Gordon Klavem, and that through his job at thePost Office, had been assembling information concerning organizations opposed to the Klan. DeRosier denied membership in the Klan,
48 TEQUESTAsaying that he had resigned in 1950 when he learned the nature of Sports,Inc. The jury charged that DeRoser had not resigned but, in fact, hadbeen installed as Klan Kludd (chaplain) in January of 1951.3 8In response to the bombings, in 1953, the Florida Legislaturepassed legislation to control the sale of dynamite.Arthur Udgreen, a Miami laborer, was charged with one count ofmaking false statements to the F.B.I. Udgreen told F.B.I. agents that hehad not taken part in any Klan activities. The indictment states that heparticipated in the Miami burnings on July 14,1951. 39Mrs. Helen Russell, a 55-year-old resident of Edison Center, wascharged with perjury. She denied under oath that she had met with a
The Carter Village Controversy49committee of Klansmen to discuss ways of preventing blacks frommoving into Carver Village and had requested the assistance of theKlan. The jury also reported that as vice president of the Edison CenterCivic Association, Helen Russell organized the protest motorcade inEdison Center during the summer of 1951.40 To reporters, Mrs. Russellreplied, "I've never lied in my life.I've got a daughter and a finehusband. I've never even been in traffic court."4 1The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Grand Jury had reason tobelieve that the John B. Gordon Klan had something to do with the waveof violence that shook Miami between September and December, 1951.Despite months of investigation and 3,200 pages of testimony taken inconnection with the bombings of Carver Village, thejury never indictedany one of the bombers. The jury said in its defense, "Dynamite leavesno traces, making crimes difficult to solve." 42 Jurists criticized theabsence of laws dealing with the purchase of dynamite and recommended tighter controls. In addition, the jurors pointed to "the Negrohousing problem in Miami," stating that the Carver Village bombingsdemonstrated "the urgent need for slum clearance and adequate housings." 43 Referring to the Ku Klux Klan, the jury said, "It is a cancerousgrowth.a foul pollution in the body politic.[and] is founded on theworst instincts of mankind." 44Testimony concerning Carver Village continued until March, 1953.Then, suddenly, the jury swung the spotlight to the murder of HarryMoore. In its investigation, the F.B.I. uncovered a "reign of terror" inFlorida that covered a three- to- four year period. In Miami, the CarverVillage and synagogue bombings led the incidences cited. The jury alsodiscovered that the home of a black woman, Maime Woodward, hadbeen burned to the ground in 1947 because it was located within a whiteresidential area. Most of the violence had taken place in central Florida.In June, 1953, the Grand Jury indicted six men on counts of perjury.Reportedly, these men had denied under oath that they had beenmembers of the Ku Klux Klan or that they had taken part in a series ofviolent acts in central Florida from 1949 to 1952. 45Though the Grand Jury insinuated that the Ku Klux Klan was involvedin the bombings of Carver Village, they could never prove it. So,instead, the jury and everyone else came to the same conclusion, that thebombings of Carver Village had been caused by the failure of the Cityof Miami and its officials to provide adequate housing for the Blackcommunity. Though the jurors attempted, in their feeble way, tochastise the community for its failings, they failed to point out the
50 TEQUESTAinequity of keeping blacks in segregated areas. No one saw, exceptperhaps the black community, that they had a right to decent housing nomatter where it might be located.In October, 1952, Bouvier and Wiseheart opened more apartmentsin Knight Manor to blacks. The Miami City Commission rescinded itsresolution of December 5, 1951, to acquire Bouvier and Wiseheart'svacant property near Carver Village. Instead, they changed the property's zoning from residential to industrial. Erection of any morehousing in the Carver Village area had been blocked. The MiamiHousing Authority said it would acquire "the development for whitepublic housing, but only if new areas are designated for Negro housing."46Today, if you ride by Carver Village it shows no signs of havingbeen the site of some of Miami's most extreme racial violence. TheMiami Housing Authority never took over the disputed complex. JohnBouvier became the sole owner after Malcolm Wiseheart's death. 47Carver Village appears clean and well-kept. Potted flowers sit outsideand young children play on the manicured lawn. However, somethingis missing. There are no white faces to be seen. After the bombings,black families continued to move in and the whites slowly moved out.Only remnants of the six-foot stone wall that once surrounded LibertySquare remain. Perhaps the remnants remain as a reminder to the blackcommunity of the hardships they underwent just to find a decent placeto live.FOOTNOTES1. Miami Daily News, 22 September 1951.2. Miami Daily News, 17 October 1951.3. David Gillogly and Reinhold Wolff. "Housing in the MiamiArea: Effects of the Postwar Building Boom" (Miami: Bureau of Business andEconomic Research, University of Miami, 1951), 12.4. New York Times, 1 January 1952.5. James E. Scott. "Miami's Liberty Square Project," The Crisis,49 (March,1949), 87.6. Daniel Francis interview with author, Miami, Florida, 17 November1987.7. Charles Abrams. ForbiddenNeighbors. (New York: Harper & Brothers,1955), 123.8. Stetson Kennedy. "Miami: Anteroom to Fascism," The Nation, (December 22. 1951), 546; Abrams, Forbidden Neighbors, 123; City of MiamiCommission meeting minutes, 5 December 1951.
The Carter Village Controversy519. Miami Herald, 14 July 1951; Abrams, ForbiddenNeighbors, 123.10. Francis interview11. Miami Times, 11 August 1951; City of Miami Commission minutes, 19September 1951.12. City of Miami Commission minutes, 19 September 1951.14. Ibid.; Abrams, ForbiddenNeighbors, 12515. Miami DailyNews, 22 September 1951; Francis interview 1987, MiamiDaily News, 24, September 1951.16 New York Times, 23 September 195117. Kennedy, "Fascism," 547.18. Miami Times, 29 September 1951.19. Kennedy, "Fascism,"547; Miami Daily News, 1, 9, 15, October 1951.;New York Times, 1 January 1952.20. Kennedy, "Fascism," 54721. City Commission minutes, 5 December 1951.22. Miami Daily News, 30 November 1951.23. Ibid.24. Ibid.25. City Commission minutes, 5 December 1951.26. Ibid.27. Ibid.28. New York Times, 4 December 1951.29. New York Times, 7 December 1951.30. New York Times, 9 December 195131. Miami Daily News, 26 December 1951; Miami Herald,26 December1951; New York Times, 27 December 1951.32. New York Times, 9 January 1952.; New York Times, 31 December 1951.33. New York Times, 3 February 195234. New York Times, 9 February 1952.; New York Times, 15 February 1952.35. New York Times, 5 October 195236. New York Times, 11 December 1952; United States District Court.United States of America vs. William G. Orwick (Miami: Southern District,1954), Case 8363-m-Cr. The Federal Employee's Loyalty Program wasestablished for the purpose of eliminating employees of the U. S. Governmentwho were disloyal. Membership in any organization designated by theAttorney General to be subversive was in violation of the Loyalty Program.38. United States of America vs. Harvey G. DeRosier (Miami: SouthernDistrict, 1954), Case 8760-m-Cr.39. New York Times, 11 December 1952.40. "First Fruits" Time (December 22, 1952), 18.41. New York Times, 26 March 1953.42. Miami Herald,26 March 1953.43. New York Times, 26 March 1953.; Miami Herald,26 March 1953.44. New York Times, 26 March 195345. Miami Herald,3 March 1953.; Miami Herald, 4 June 1952.46. Miami Herald,7 January 1953.; Miami Herald,6 March 1953.47. Donald Skoglund interview with author, Miami, Florida, 3 November1987.
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Village. Tensions rose to fevered pitch when reports surfaced that 76 units of Carver Village had been sold to black project managers George Bubee and Stanley Sweeting.'1 All efforts by the white community to keep blacks out of Carver Village failed
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