Political Islam In West Africa And The Sahel - Islam Awareness
Political Islamin West Africaand the SahelRicardo Laremont, Ph.D., and Hrach Gregorian, Ph.D.SINCE 9/11, defense of the homeland hasbecome a particularly urgent issue for U.S.military planners. Consequently, foreign policyhas shifted to address a new array of challenges toU.S. interests. Among the requirements of the newsecurity environment is a deeper understanding ofthe global network of terrorist organizations inspiredby or directly affiliated with Al Qaeda. There are atleast three serious threats to U.S. security interestsin West Africa and the Sahel. In order of priority,these are—1. The emergence of radical, Al Qaeda-linkedIslamic elements in Nigeria and Niger.2. The existence of terrorist-financing networksinvolved in the purchase and sale of diamonds inSierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Proceeds from the sale of these“blood diamonds” are reported to fund Hizbullah;the Afwaj al Muquwamah al Lubnaiyyah (AMAL),or Lebanese Resistance Detachment; and Al Qaedaoperations.3. The migration of the Al Qaeda-linked SalafistGroup for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) fromsouthern Algeria to eastern Mauritania, northernMali, northern Niger, and northern Chad, whichindicates their intent to establish safe havens outsideAlgeria.Where is West? Where is North?The arc of Islam is almost a circle. The arc beginsin South Africa, where there are substantial numbersof Muslims of South-Asian and Southeast-Asianorigin, and stretches toward the northeast, touchingMozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia,Ethiopia, and Eritrea. The arc continues north andwest to include Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco and then curves south to WestAfrica and the Muslim-majority countries of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia,Military review January-February 2006Guinea-Conakry, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone,and arguably, Côte d’Ivoire. Burkina Faso, Ghana,Benin, Togo, and Liberia also contain substantialMuslim minority communities.Our focus is primarily on the West African and Sahelian Islamic movements. It should be emphasizedthat Al Qaeda and other radical Islamic movementsdo not organize their activities according to traditional concepts of regional politics. Rather, Islamicmovements in West and North Africa have alwaystranscended regional boundaries. Therefore, we needto reexamine the rigid concepts of “North Africa”and “West Africa” embedded in many European andAmerican perspectives. Such geographic distinctions have little relevance to leaders and participantsin Islamic movements. They also obscure a complexpicture, especially when adding countries of theSahel (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad) to themix. These countries are at the crossroads of Northand West Africa. Within the Sahel, North and Westare fluid concepts that often converge.An example of this phenomenon is Algeria, anunstable country whose government effectively controls the capital. In Algeria’s vast southern region,the state has a tenuous hold on power, and groupsopposed to it and to the United States operate withconsiderable freedom. Within this underpopulatedregion, Osama bin-Laden has sustained the operations of the GSPC, which opposes the governmentin Algiers.Not only has the GSPC attempted to overthrowthe Algerian Government, it has sought to extendits ideology and operations into the Sahel. Becausethe Algerian Government cannot exercise police andmilitary authority in southern Algeria, that region,nominally in North Africa yet adjacent to the Sahel,provides ample opportunity for penetration into WestAfrica. Communication between North Africa, theSahel, and West Africa has occurred from at least the27
8th century, when merchants in gold, salt, and slavesopened trade routes there. Now those trafficking inideas and arms are exploiting these same routes.1Nigeria: Oil, Islamism, andSurvivalNigeria is relevant to U.S. security interestsbecause it satisfies approximately 12 percent ofAmerica’s petroleum needs. In January 2004, Nigeria was sixth in the world in exports to the UnitedStates, following Saudi Arabia, Canada, Mexico,Venezuela, and Iraq. New discoveries in the Bightof Benin mean that Nigeria, Angola, and Gabon willremain important to U.S. energy interests for theforeseeable future. With a population of well over28100 million people, Nigeria is also a regional playerthat has carried out sensitive, dangerous peacekeeping missions in neighboring states and, thus, is ofkeen interest to students of Islamic radicalism inWest Africa.2Islam in Nigeria. Islam was introduced to northern Nigeria during the 11th century. It was seriouslypracticed first in Kano during the 14th century. In the16th century it was introduced in Katsina and in the17th century in Zaria and Zamfara. It was during theearly 19th century, however, that Islam first becamea true political force in the north.3Islamic politics and law emerged as importantfactors in the region when Uthman dan Fodio, aMuslim reformer, began a jihad movement in 1804January-February 2006 Military Review
ISLAM IN AFRICAurging the creation of a Muslim state governed bya Muslim leader with Sharia (Islam law or the lawof Allah) as the basis for law and governance. As aresult of Dan Fodio’s efforts, an Islamic state wascreated in the north in the 19th century, and with theimplementation of Sharia, Islam moved from the social to the political realm. This precedent for Islamicgovernment continues to reverberate in Nigeria.4While Islam became the dominant religion in thenorth, it also obtained many converts among theYoruba in the southeast, where it was most likelyintroduced during the 17th century. By the end ofthe 18th century, Islam had reached as far south asLagos, and throughout the 19th century, it continuedto expand. To hear northerners tell it, Yoruban Islamdiffers from that practiced in the north because ofindigenous religious and Christian influences, whichhave created a more eclectic form of Islam that tendstoward syncretism. This difference sometimes putsYoruban Muslims at odds with the north’s morepuritanical practitioners.5Nigeria’s colonial legacy. Contemporary Nigeria is deeply divided. It is an artificial nation-statecobbled together originally by the British. For mostof British colonial rule the Muslim north perceiveditself as separate from the Christian and animistsouth. Furthermore, Britain ruled the two regionsdifferently. British legal, governance, and administrative procedures were instituted in the south. Inthe north, the British governed through influentialMuslim clerics and compliant local officials. TheBritish modified indigenous practices as necessary toassure the continuation of colonial rule, but they didnot fundamentally disturb Islamic practices. Still, tomaintain control, they did manipulate local Muslimsocial and political institutions.6Under Britain’s indirect rule in northern Nigeria,the application of Islamic law advanced withouthindrance. This was especially true with regard topersonal law (for example, family, marriage, andinheritance law). British colonial administrators alsopermitted the application of Sharia in some aspects ofcriminal law, although they removed Sharia’s morestringent penalties such as stoning for adultery andamputation or death for theft. In sum, British colonialpractices allowed Islam to remain an important socialand political force in the north.Modern Nigerian politics. During the 1950s,the first 20th-century advocates for Sharia in NigeriaMilitary Review January-February 2006appeared. Islamist ideals became central to the goalsof the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), whichbecame one of the most important political parties inNigeria at the end of the colonial era. Ahmadu Bello,the Sardauna of Sokoto and a grandson of Dan Fodio,created the NPC in 1949. The organization was oriented toward the restoration of the Sokoto Caliphateand the application of Islamic law minimally to northern Nigeria but ideally to all of Nigeria. Bello laboredassiduously for Muslim causes and Sharia during boththe colonial and postcolonial periods. He also alliedhimself with Abubakar Gumi, a leading Muslim intellectual who established a critical link between theNPC and the Al Saud family in Saudi Arabia.7External support to Nigerian Islamist parties,mosques, and madrasas is not new. During this earlyperiod, the Islamist party received external supportfrom Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, Sudan, Lebanon,and Senegal. This support led to the expansion ofKoranic schools and the use of Arabic as a meaningfullanguage for communication.8When Nigeria became independent in 1960, itsnew government attempted to deal with the legaltraditions in the north and the south by creating apenal code for the north and a criminal code for thesouth. The new government also ended the colonialpolicy granting criminal jurisdiction to Sharia courts.In place of jurisdiction, it established a general Shariaappeal court. The court’s staff included a chief Qadi(an Islamic judge), a deputy Qadi, and two otherjudges. However, these measures only partly pacifiedcertain Muslim militants who wanted full restorationof Sharia to the north, including Sharia’s sternercriminal laws and punishments.Controversy over Sharia surfaced again in 1978when Nigeria attempted to draft a new constitution. From 1956 until 1978, first the British colonialgovernment and then the independent Nigerian Government permitted a northern regional constitutionthat consigned the administration of Islamic law toWhy has Islamic law gained sucha following in northern Nigeria?For a citizenry fatigued by crime,corruption, and state ineffectiveness, it has great appeal.29
personal law matters only. In 1978, a new draft constitution recognized Sharia lower courts while at thesame time creating a Federal Sharia Court of Appealto hear and review Sharia case appeals. The 1978draft, which became the 1979 constitution, displeasedadvocates for Islamic law because it provided foreventual Supreme Court review (that is, a nonreligious review) of Sharia court cases.9Tension over the roles of Sharia in the Nigerianstate and religion in Nigerian society led Islamic lawproponents to flex their political muscle. Governors ofthe northern states strongly advocate Sharia, not leastbecause they stand to gain much politically by takingsuch a stance. The governors’ role in this advocacyarguably distinguishes Nigeria from other states inWest and East Africa where radicalism is primarilyarticulated by Islamist organizations. Governmentalinitiatives to extend application of Sharia have disturbed Christians in the north and have led to uneasethroughout the rest of the country, mostly amongnon-Muslims. In northern Nigeria, the most conflictridden cities have included Kano and Kaduna, wherethere are substantial Christian communities. Smallercities and towns in Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Bauchi,and Zaria have also experienced violence.10In Nigeria, in addition to Sunni activism for Sharia,violence-prone Shia sects are emerging. These sectshave been involved in clashes in Kano, Kaduna, andZaria, where they are most prominent, and in Katsina,Maiduguri, and Bauchi. Most often led by Ibrahimal-Zakzaky, the sects refer to Ayatollah RuhollahKhomeini as their source of inspiration for revolutionary leadership.11From 1966 to 1999, Nigeria was ruled mainly bymilitary leaders. In 1999, when a civilian government led by southerner Olusegun Obasanjo tookpower, governors in the Muslim north revived a callfor the restoration of Sharia in all elements of socialand political life. Since the restoration of democraticrule under Obasanjo, an estimated 10,000 Muslimsand Christians have died in religious violence. Muslim and Sharia advocacy in the north and attendingdiscomfiture among non-Muslims and southernershas created substantial political tension, severelyweakening and, at times, threatening the stability ofthe country’s nascent democratic regime. Obasanjohas been wary of challenging the northern governorson the question of implementing Sharia.12Why has Islamic law gained such a following in30northern Nigeria? For a citizenry fatigued by crime,corruption, and state ineffectiveness, it has greatappeal. “Clean governance” had similar allure inAlgeria, when the Front Islamique du Salut firstbegan to organize.The Sharia movement in the north has also advanced because of continued substantial supportfrom external sources in Sudan, Iran, Libya, Syria,Palestine, and especially Saudi Arabia. In addition toovert Muslim philanthropic activity, funds for radical Islamic movements reach Nigeria via courier orthrough informal banking systems resembling the hawala of East Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East.Because there are no paper trails for hawala bankingtransactions, it is well-nigh impossible to prove thatthese radical financing schemes exist. This evidentiaryburden will, most likely, not be overcome.13Besides Sharia advocacy, Islam also operates inNigeria through the military. Northern Muslims dominate the Nigerian officer corps, a tradition carried overfrom colonial times when the British recruited primarily from northern Muslim communities. Most of themilitary leaders who ruled Nigeria between 1966 and1999 were northern Muslims. Only a minority of thosewho served as chief of state were Yoruba or Igbo.14Sierra Leone, Liberia,and Côte d’IvoireAfter Nigeria and the Sahel, the region that shouldconstitute the second area of concern includesLiberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. In thesecountries, Lebanese merchants in particular and AlQaeda-connected agents secondarily have traffickedin black-market diamonds, gold, coltan, and tanzanite. Over 100,000 Lebanese reside in Côte d’Ivoire,6,000 in Sierra Leone (30,000 before the SierraLeone civil war), and 20,000 in Senegal. Lebanesediamond merchants have at times willingly and atother times under pressure contributed to the fundraising activities of Hizbullah and AMAL. Throughoutthe 1980s and 1990s, Lebanese merchants linkedto these organizations brokered illicit diamonds inSierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire, as well asin Angola, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Namibia, SouthAfrica, Tanzania, Congo-Brazzaville, the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.Emerging research suggests that Al Qaeda, Hizbullah,and AMAL have occasionally merged their terrorist-financing initiatives.15January-February 2006 Military Review
ISLAM IN AFRICAEvidence suggests that from 1998 until2001, Al Qaeda raised millions of dollarsfrom diamond sales, collaborating withexisting Lebanese networks to make thedeals possible.Determining whether Al Qaeda continues toengage in illicit diamond trading in Sierra Leone,Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire is difficult. U.S. law enforcement and intelligence officials have differingopinions. Public records, however, indicate that AlQaeda, Hizbullah, and AMAL operatives still tradein diamonds to raise funds. David Crane, a formerinspector general at the Pentagon and the currentprosecutor for the Special Court on Sierra Leone, iscertain that Al Qaeda is working in the region. Doingso, he says, because “no one is bothering with them[or] no one is checking on them.”16Al Qaeda operatives Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah,Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani (arrested in Pakistan on 25July 2004), and Fazul Abdullah Muhammed usedLebanese contacts to establish diamond-buying andmoney-laundering operations in Sierra Leone from1998 to 2001. These individuals had been trained byAbu Ubadiah al-Banshiri and Wadih El Hage (personal secretary to Osama bin-Laden) to trade diamondsin West Africa. Al-Banshiri and El Hage previouslyhad traded in diamonds and other precious gemstonesin Kenya and Tanzania from 1993 until 1997. Ontheir arrival in Sierra Leone, Abdullah, Ghailani, andMuhammad established immediate contact with AzizNassour (an avid AMAL supporter and the principaldiamond merchant for Zaïre’s Mobutu Sese Seko)and Nassour’s cousin Samih Ossaily, known diamondtraffickers for AMAL and Hizbullah.17Reportedly, in October 1998 El Hage sent Abdullah, Ghailani, and Muhammad to West Africa to selldiamonds for the express purpose of financing AlQaeda terrorism. Evidence suggests that from 1998until 2001, Al Qaeda raised millions of dollars fromdiamond sales, collaborating with existing Lebanesenetworks to make the deals possible. Al Qaeda operatives had experience laundering the profits from thesale of gemstones in Tanzania and Kenya, so theyunderstood how easily money was to be made in suchtrade in West Africa. Charles Taylor, Liberia’s formerpresident, is said to have collaborated with Hizbullah,AMAL, and Al Qaeda operatives in their diamond-Military Review January-February 2006purchasing and money-laundering activities.18Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire will remain of interest because Middle East and Al Qaedaelements traffic there in high-quality, uncut diamonds,which are resold in Antwerp, the United Arab Emirates, and Hong Kong. Besides diamonds, agents havealso been active in trafficking gold, tanzanite, andcoltan. Tanzanite mining in Tanzania is of specialinterest because the gem’s miners and traders reportedly support Bin Laden. The Al-Taqwa mosque, ledby Imam Sheik Omari, appears to be the center of BinLaden’s support in the Tanzania mining areas.19The Sahel: Niger, Chad, Mali, andMauritaniaTo date, Muslim militants have not enjoyed muchsuccess in the urban centers of Niger, Chad, Mali, andMauritania. However, given the weakness of the governments and the general poverty of the region, theseare fertile fields for the cultivation of radical Islam.Demographic and economic conditions in the regionare quite similar to Afghanistan’s. Moreover, Muslimmilitants are present and continue to proselytize.The countries of the Sahel are sparsely populatedand poor. Militant groups like the Algerian-basedGSPC can encamp in these regions and go undetectedfor long periods of time. They promise the poor thatIslamic government or a return to Sharia will alleviatetheir misery. A minority of the region’s Muslim leaders have claimed that the area’s extreme poverty andextraordinary reliance on foreign aid are the fruits ofnot living according to the principles of Islam and thedictates of Sharia. Furthermore, the four states havepoorly funded, poorly trained military and policeforces. This weakness has enabled Islamist forces,principally under the leadership of the GSPC, whichis based in southern Algeria and connected to AlQaeda, to infiltrate the region and create new basesfor operations.20Niger. Islam was brought to Niger as early as the10th century by Tuaregs from the Fezzan regionof Libya, just north of the Niger border. Niger haslong been connected to Libya by trade routes. Nigeralso connects southward to the Hausa and Kanuri inNigeria. While Niger’s connection to Libya is meaningful, the relationship between Niger and Nigeria isprofound. In Niger the quotidian languages are Hausaand French; in Nigeria they are Hausa and English.Niger is intimately linked to northern Nigeria bylanguage, ethnicity, and religion.2131
A multiethnic country of approximately 10 mil- East policy, they focus their severest criticism onlion people, Niger is 56 percent Hausa, 22 percent the United States.Djerma-Songhay, 8.5-percent Tuareg, 8-percentChad. Like its neighbors in the Sahel, Chad liesFulani, and 4-percent Kanuri. Ninety percent of at the crossroads between north and sub-Saharanthe population is Muslim. Within Niger’s Mus- Africa. About four-fifths of its territory—almost thelim community, two strainsentire area north of the 10thof Islamic practice are evi- Noticeable numbers of teachers parallel—is populated by Musdent: one steeped in mysti- and clerics are arguing that politi- lim peoples. In the south, too,cal, subjective Sufi practice;principally in the larger cities,the other adhering to stricter, cal reform, the end of corruption, there are sizeable MuslimSaudi/Wahhabi-inspired fun- and the amelioration of economic communities.damentalism. Sufism finds its life will be made possible by aChad has a population estifollowers in Say, Tessaoua, return to a more militant form mated at 9.25 million peopleZinder, Maradi, Gouré, andwith a growth rate of 3.07Dosso. The Wahhabi-inspired of Islam and the restoration of percent (the world growth rateMuslims have operated prin- Sharia.in 2003 was 1.17 percent). Ofcipally in Dosso and Maradi,the total population, 54 percentwhere they have instigated violence against resident are Muslim, approximately one-third are Christian,Sufis. The fundamentalists have organized them- and the remainder practice traditional indigenousselves into two groups: the Association of Islamic religions. The majority of Chadian Muslims adhereGroups and Culture (led by Cheikh Souleiman to a moderate branch of mystical Sufism known asYoussouf) and the Niger Islamic Association (led the Tijaniyya, which incorporates some local Africanby El Haji Aboubacar Issa).22religious elements. Only a minority of the country’sIn addition to homegrown fundamentalist militant Muslims are considered fundamentalist. They areactivities, the Algeria-based GSPC has reportedly led by imam Mahamadou Mahamat, also known asorganized attacks near the Chad border against the Sheikh Faki Suzuki, in N’Djamena.Niger Government. In the United States and EuropeBecause of Mahamat’s fundamentalist activities,most attention has been rightly focused on Nigeria, the Chadian Government banned him for extendedespecially with the rise of the Sharia movement in the periods from preaching, and from 1998 to 1999, heNorth. Niger, however, cannot be ignored, given that was under house arrest, being charged with incitingIslamic organizing continues to take place there.religious violence. In July 2002 the state’s SuperiorBecause of its poverty, Niger is extremely reli- Council of Islamic Affairs rebuked Mahamat andant on foreign aid and philanthropy, which often another imam, Haroun Idriss Abou-Mandela, forcome from the coffers of the Saudis, Moroccans, preaching religious and ethnic division. In 1999 theLibyans, and occasionally the Iranians. Niger also government arrested and detained for a year yet anhas one of the highest fertility rates in the world. other imam, Sheikh Mahamad Marouf, for preachingThis conjunction of extreme poverty (US 200 gross anti-Tijaniyya diatribes. Adding to the problem arenational product per capita) and high fertility has itinerant Muslim imams, principally from Sudan,created conditions like those found in Afghanistan Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, who often visit Chad tobefore the Taliban’s rise. The danger exists that Ni- preach.23ger, if ignored, could become hospitable to IslamicThere are at least 200 ethnic groups in Chad, theextremism. The ideology is already being planted most important being the Sara, the Arabs, the Maba,in mosques and schools underwritten by the Saudis, and the Toubou. The most numerous, the Sara, whoMoroccans, Iranians, and Libyans. Noticeable num- reside mainly in the south, controlled Chadian politicsbers of teachers and clerics are arguing that political from 1961 until the assassination of President Francoisreform, the end of corruption, and the amelioration Tombalbaye in 1975 and the creation of a coalitionof economic life will be made possible by a return government controlled by northerners in 1979.24to a more militant form of Islam and the restorationNext in importance are the Arabs. They have aof Sharia. Perceiving imbalances in U.S. Middle significant presence in commercial activity, and32January-February 2006 Military Review
ISLAM IN AFRICAArabic is second to French as the spoken language. political empowerment of non-Muslim SaransThird among the ethnic groups are the Maba, who caused considerable consternation among Arab andoccupy central Chad and are concentrated in Abeche Toubou Muslims in central and northern Chad. Theand Am-Dam. The Toubou are also of special in- northerners, in particular, had difficulty acceptingterest. Historically active in insurgencies against black political leadership. Throughout the 1960s,established governments, the Toubou live in the Algeria, Egypt, and Sudan supported northern rebelnorthernmost regions of Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti movements that focused on wresting power from theand spill over into the Fazzan of Libya, creating an leaders in the south. Moreover, northern Muslimsimportant Libyan connection.25often went to Khartoum and Cairo for religiousUnderstanding Chadian politics is impossible education; thus, Chadian Muslims from the northwithout considering Libyan and Sudanese interests. deepened their ties with Islamists. On returningThe three countries have been linked culturally and to Chad, they reorganized and launched militarypolitically since at least the 8th century. For example, attacks on the Chadian Government. After Sadiqthe first commercial road establishing commerce al-Mahdi’s accession to power in the Sudan in 1966between Tripoli and the “Land of the Blacks” was and Muammar Qaddafi’s seizure of power in Libyathe Garamantes road, which began in Tripoli then in 1969, Sudanese and Libyan support of Chadiancoursed through Ghadames, Libya, before ending at Muslim rebels became more overt.28Gao in the Mali Empire. That commercial passageQaddafi was especially supportive of rebel effortswas established in 1500 B.C. by Berbers. To the east to change the Chadian Government. Qaddafi’s panof the Garamantes road lie three other trade routes Islamist, pan-African orientation led him to dream ofbeginning in Tripoli and endingan “Islamic State of the Sahara”in Chad: the Bilma trail, the Darb Qaddafi’s pan-Islamist, that would encompass Libya,al-Arabain or Forty Days Road,Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Niger, andpan-Africanorientationledand a third route from BenghaziMali. In pursuit of that dreamin Libya to Waddai in Chad. him to dream of an “Islamic during the 1970s, Qaddafi triedThese four routes allowed for State of the Sahara” that to influence the outcome of poLibyan (and Egyptian) penetra- would encompass Libya, litical events in Chad, Sudan, andtion into sub-Saharan Africa.Niger. From the late 1970s on,Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Niger, he supported Chad’s rebels, andThe most important fact aboutIslam in Chad is that it is prac- and Mali.on 6 January 1981 he declaredticed by approximately 55 perthe “complete unity” of Libyacent of the population in the northern four-fifths of and Chad.29the country. These northern Muslims have religiousIn 1982, Qaddafi declared his intention to incorconnections to Libya and the western region of Su- porate Niger into Libya. These actions concerned thedan (especially Darfur), connections informed by French Government, which wished to retain influence19th-century jihads initiated in Libya and Sudan. in West Africa. French military intervention, first toAlso, Sufi brotherhoods, especially the Libyan Sa- support Tombalbaye and then to support Chadiannusiyya and the Sudanese Mahdiyya, have followers resistance leader Hissène Habré, reversed Qaddafi’sin Chad. 26military adventures in Chad. In turn, Qaddafi providedAfter Chad gained independence in 1961, two financial support for Idriss Déby—one of Habré’sideological movements emerged from the Muslim defectors—and Déby overthrew Habré in Decembercommunity. Older Muslim leaders supported a 1990. Under both Habré and Déby, northern ethnicconservative movement not oriented toward Islamic groups were most prominent in government, especialmilitancy. Younger Muslims, primarily in the south ly the Toubou, Zagahwa, Hadjerai, and Bedeiyat.and center of the country, led a more militant factionDéby, however, has been fairly consistent aboutwith a pan-Islamist orientation.27monitoring and repressing insurgent Islamist moveWhen the French transferred political control to ments, although this has not resulted in their completeChad in 1961, the governmental offices were as- elimination. In March 2004, it was reported that Chad’ssigned to the Sara ethnic group in the south. This army had killed 43 members of the Algerian-basedMilitary Review January-February 200633
The remoteness and general inaccessibilityof the Saharan regions of Mali, Chad, Niger,and Mauritania make them ideal locationsfor the organization of terrorist networks.GSPC. Among the dead were individuals fromNiger, Nigeria, and Mali. The presence of thesenon-Algerians in the GSPC reveals that the groupsuccessfully recruited outside Algeria, principallyin the Sahel. Given the difficulty of surveillancein remote and often inaccessible areas, historicalties to regimes in Libya and Sudan, and now thepenetration by GSPC operatives, Chad and Nigershould be of considerable concern to those prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism.31Mali. Mali’s estimated population of over 11million people can be divided according to northerngroups (Tuaregs and Moors) and southern groups(Mande-language speakers such as the Bambara, Malinke, and Soninke). The southern group comprises50 percent of the total population. Although eachethnic group speaks its own language, 80 percentof Malians communicate in Bambara.Islam, introduced to Mali in the 11th century, hasalways been practiced in a rather moderate, tolerantform, with considerable leeway given to practitionersof Islam mixed with traditional African religionsand to those who favor African religions in a purerform. The considerable influence of the QadiriyyaSufi sect in Mali has moderated Wahhabi tendenciesand helped counterbalance Saudi Arabian and Libyansupport to Malian Islamic movements.While Wahhabi-influenced jihad movements inSenegambia had some effect in Mali, that effect didnot last long. Wahhabi or jihadist movements havenot yet found a place in Malian society. Despite thistradition, a harder, more militant form of Islamicpolitics has appeared recently in Bamako, the capital. Imam Mahmoud Dicko, the influential directorof Bamako’s Islamic Radio
ISLAM IN AFRICA urging the creation of a Muslim state governed by a Muslim leader with Sharia (Islam law or the law of Allah) as the basis for law and governance. As a result of Dan Fodio's efforts, an Islamic state was created in the north in the 19th century, and with the implementation of Sharia, Islam moved from the so-
POLITICAL ISLAM Religious Islam is defined as doctrine concerned with going to Paradise and avoiding Hell by following the Koran and the Sunna. The part of Islam that deals with the “outsider”, the Kafir, is defined as political Islam. Since so much of the Trilogy is about the Kafir, the statistical conclusion is
Chapter 12: Political Landscape of Sub-Saharan Africa 345 IAN E. A. YEBOAH AND SAMUEL ARYEETEY-ATTOH Introduction 345 Sub-Saharan Africa: A Landscape of Political Instability 346 Causes of Political Instability in Sub-Saharan Africa 350 Zaire: A Microcosm of Political Chaos 356 The Political Geography of Apartheid in South Africa 358
Islam merupakan upaya mengatasi beberapa problem kejiwaan yang 10 Hamdani Bakran Adz-Dzaky. Konseling dan Psikoterapi Islam (Yogyakarta: Al-Manar, 2008), 228. 11 Fuad Anshori, Aplikasi Psikologi Islam (Yogyakarta: 2000), 242. 33 didasarkan pada pandangan agama Islam. Psikoterapi Islam mempercayai
Johannesburg, South Africa Auckland Park Theological Seminary Polokwane, South Africa Taberna Dei Academy Kempton Park, South Africa Kaleideo Congregation Centurion, South Africa AFM of South Africa Witrivier, South Africa Africa School of Missions Irene, South Africa Full Gospel Church of God College Cullinan, South Africa Berea Bible School
management in Africa 3. Community involvement in natural resources management in Africa – regional overviews 3.1 Introduction: Different understandings of, and approaches to, CBNRM in different regions 3.2 Central Africa 3.3 East Africa 3.4 Southern Africa 3.5 West Africa 3.6 Summary 4. What has CBNRM achieved in Africa? The ‘3Es .
acuan hidup mereka. Peranan media dalam Islam mestilah menonjolkan prinsip yang selari dengan ajaran yang telah ditetapkan oleh Islam. Dalam konteks komunikasi Islam yang mempunyai ruang lingkup yang lebih luas tentang media, Islam telah menetapkan bahawa media Islam mestilah selari dengan peranan agama Islam.
KATA PENGANTAR Dewasa ini kajian tentang Islam Nusantara sangat banyak diminati tidak hanya oleh orang Islam di Nusantara saja tetapi juga oleh orang-rang Islam Luar Negeri. Studi Islam Nusantara, berkaitan dengan ajaran atau nilai Islam secara dogmatis dan aplikatif yang berm
Laboratory astrophysics for stellar applications 221 the atomic data was, and in many cases, still is required. In this Talk and Proceedings Review paper we take stock of the achievements of Laboratory Astrophysics in terms of the advances made in the new atomic data now available to astronomers for iron group element neutral, singly and doubly ionised species, and also look to future data .
