The 15th Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2019 - Genron NPO
The Genron NPOANALYSIS PAPER:The 15th Joint Public Opinion PollJapan-China Public Opinion Survey 2019In Cooperation With:Japan: Public Opinion Research CenterChina: Horizon Research Consultancy GroupOctober, 2019
Survey Overview The Genron NPO and China International Publishing Group conducted joint opinion polls targeting thecitizens of Japan and China in September 2019. This survey has been administered annually since 2005,when Japan-China relations were at its worst. This year marks the 15th year that this poll has beenconducted. The objective of the survey is to continuously monitor the state of mutual understanding andperceptions of the Japanese and Chinese public towards one another as well as the changes that ensueover time.The opinion poll in Japan was administered through the placement method (in which the survey washand-delivered to homes and then collected) between September 7 and September 28, targeting men andwomen above the age of 18. A total of 1,000 valid responses were obtained. Respondents were 48.6%male and 51.4% female. The age range consisted of 2.4% under the age of 20, 11.9% between the ages of20 and 29, 14.7% between the ages of 30 and 39, 17.5% between the ages of 40 and 49, 14.5% betweenthe ages of 50 and 59 and 39% over the age of 60. The educational background of respondents were 5.7%junior high school diploma and under, 49.3% high school diploma, 20.6% junior/technical collegediploma, 21.7% bachelor’s degree and 1.1% master’s degree or higher.The opinion poll in China was administered through individual interviews between September 7 andSeptember 20, targeting men and women over the age of 18 in 10 cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou,Chengdu, Shenyang, Wuhan, Nanjing, Xi’an, Qingdao and Zhengzhou. A total of 1,597 valid responseswere obtained. Respondents were 48.7% male and 51.3% female. The age range consisted of 2.8% underthe age of 20, 20.2% between the ages of 20 and 29, 24.4% between the ages of 30 and 39, 26.2%between the ages of 40 and 49, 17.8% between the ages of 50 and 59, and 8.7% above the age of 60. Theeducational background of respondents were 9.2% junior high school diploma and under, 32% highschool/technical high school diploma, 30.9% technical college diploma, 25.6% bachelor’s degree, 0.6%double degree and 1.2% master’s degree or higher.Apart from this opinion poll, The Genron NPO and China International Publishing Group alsoconducted the same survey targeting the intellectuals in both countries. This survey targeting intellectualswas administered together with the public opinion poll in order to complement the general understandingof the Japanese and Chinese peoples by comparing expert/intellectual perspectives with the resultsobtained from the public opinion poll. Most intellectuals in both Japan and China do not depend solelyupon domestic media or the internet as their means of obtaining information on one another’s countries.Rather, contrary to the general public, intellectuals obtain information by actually traveling abroad orthrough direct contact with friends and acquaintances in the other country.In Japan, the same survey used for the public opinion poll was emailed between September 12 andOctober 9 to approximately 2,000 intellectuals consisting of domestic business managers, academics,press, and government employees who had previously participated in The Genron NPO’s discussions and1Copyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.
surveys. A total of 404 responses were obtained. Respondents were 86.4% male and 11.6% female, andconsisted of 1% under the age of 20, 2.2% between the ages of 20 and 29, 5.2% between the ages of 30and 39, 11.6% between the ages of 40 and 49, 26% between the ages of 50 and 59, and 52.5% over theage of 60. The educational background of respondents were 0% junior high school diploma and under,3% high school diploma, 2% junior/technical college diploma, 59.9% bachelor’s degree, and 31.4%master’s degree or higher.In China, phone interviews were administered between September 7 and September 20 to 5,350intellectuals from the Horizon Research Consultancy Group’s database, consisting of 45,000 peopleincluding business leaders, government officials, journalists, experts and public organization officials. Atotal of 600 responses were obtained. The educational background of respondents was 13.5 % technicalcollege diploma, 60.7% bachelor’s degree, 6.8% double degree, 17.2% master’s degree and 1.8% doctoraldegree.※Percentages may not add up to 100% in some cases as the numbers here are rounded off to one decimal point and non-responses arenot included.2Copyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.
1. Impressions of One Another’s CountriesImpression of the Other CountryThe Chinese people’s impression of Japan has improved, with 45.9% stating that they have a“favorable” impression of Japan, recording the highest this percentage has been since the surveybegan in 2005.By contrast, while there has been some improvement in the Japanese people’s impression of China,84.7% still have an “unfavorable” impression, showing results that contrast with those of theChinese. There was a slight increase in those with a “favorable” impression of China, but thispercentage still only amounted to 15% of total responses.【Impression of the Other 3%86.8%88.8% 8.6% 31.8%26.6%21.4%27.3%20.8% 15.6%9.6% 1.7%20152016Japanese public opinion: favorable/ relatively favorableJapanese public opinion: unfavorable/ relatively unfavorableChinese public opinion: favorable/ relatively favorableChinese public opinion: unfavorable/ relatively unfavorable3Copyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.15.0%11.5%201720182019
Reasons Behind the Impression of the Other CountryThe greatest reason for the “favorable” impression of China among the Japanese was the “increasedfamiliarity of the Chinese due to greater numbers of Chinese visitors and private exchanges” at 40%,largely surpassing last year’s 32.8%. The overall scheme in which the increase of Chinese visitorsand private exchanges contributed to a more favorable impression of China among the Japanese wasthe same as last year.Among the Chinese, the most popular reason for their “favorable” impression of Japan was, in linewith last year’s trend, the “remarkable growth of Japan’s economy and its high standards of living,”at 53.1%. Over 40% also cited reasons such as “Japan’s beautiful environments, scenic landscapesand many sights, including hot springs” (49.7%), “high quality of Japanese products” (49.4%), and“Japanese politeness, good manners and high cultural standards” (44.6%), showing a diverse set ofreasons for the favorable impression, from tourism and Japanese products to national character.On the other hand, the greatest factor contributing to the “unfavorable” impression of China amongthe Japanese was “continuing territorial issues over Senkaku Islands and Japanese waters/airspace,”at 51.4%. This percentage, however, has decreased from last year’s 58.6%. While most factorsshowed a decrease from last year’s results, uneasiness over China’s “different political system(one-party rule of the Communist Party)” rose 6 points from 37% last year to 43% this year,constituting the second most popular reason for the “unfavorable” impression of China among theJapanese public.Among the Chinese public, two reasons stood out as contributing to the unfavorable impression ofJapan, following last year’s trend – “Japan’s lack of a proper apology and remorse over its history ofinvasion into China” and “Japan’s nationalization of Diaoyu Islands” at approximately 60% each.4Copyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.
【Reasons for Favorable Impression】【Japanese public opinion】19.3%18.3%0%2.0% 3.1%No responseNo responseNo particular reasonCopyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.No particular reasonOtherJapan's long-term operation ofOverseas Development Assistance(ODA)Stability of Japanese society & welldeveloped infrastracture and legalsystemsAttractiveness of Japanese cultureAdvanced Japanese technologiesJapan's beautiful environments, sceniclandscapes and many sights, includinghot springsHigh quality of Japanese productsJapanese politeness, good mannersand high cultural standardsEarnest and hardworking character ofthe Japanese peopleRemarkable growth of Japan'seconomy and its high standards of living50.3% 0.0%0.0%0.2%0%0.0%0.0%2.9%5.7%OtherInexpensive cost and attractiveness ofChinese products2018 (N 653)45.3%1.3%0.0%4.7%9.9%6.7% 7.6%12.2%8.7%16.0%14.0%Large scale of the Chinese people'swords and actionsEarnest and hardworking character ofthe Chinese people25.0%19.0%11.8%14.9% 14.2%20%Interest in Chinese sights and natureInterest in Chinese cuisine, recentChinese music and literatureInterest in traditional Chinese cultureand historyIncreased familiarity due to increase inChinese visitors and exchangesAmicable bilateral relations & positiveattitude towards bettering relationsImproved living standards in China dueto significant economic developmentChina has begun to act as a greatinternational power35.2%36.6% 38.0%40%2019 (N 733)49.7%49.4%44.0%49.2%44.6%53.1% % 24.4%20.0%18.0%20%2019 (N 150)60%2018 (N 131)【Chinese public opinion】
【Reasons for Unfavorable Impression】【Japanese public opinion】80%0%No responseNo responseNo particular reasonCopyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.OtherMilitaristic trends seen in a certain section ofJapanese societyDifference in political systemsJapan's arrogance and its attitude ofsuperiority over ChinaJapan's unfaithful attitude towards bilateralrelations, focusing only on economic profitsThe Japanese people's entrenchednationalismAdvertisement of Chinese threat by theJapanese mediaJapan's negative attitude towards the OneChina PrincipleInappropriate remarks made by certainpoliticiansJapan's nationalization of the Diaoyu Islandswhich has triggered conflictsJapan's attempt to encircle China on military,economic, ideological, etc. with the USJapan's lack of a proper apology andremorse over the invasion into China6No particular reason0%1.7%0.1%0.0% 0.0%0.4%0.0%6.1%4.2%5.5%5.3%Other2019 (N hed nationalism of the ChinesepeopleRepeated anti-Japan broadcasts by theChinese mediaActions that go against internationalrulesContinuing territorial issues overSenkaku and Japanese waters/airspaceAggressive acts by the Chinese as aworld power in international societyNotable military reinforcement and nontransparency29.0%28.9%24.1%17.1%17.3% 16.5% 19.6%19.4% 16.9%13.4%20%Incomprehensible patriotic actions andideasCriticism of Japan over historical issuesMilitary conflict in the pastChinese towards US-China tension(new option for 2019)Different political system (one-party ruleof the Communist Party)44.1%41.5%37.7%37.4%40%2018 (N 6%33.5% 32.3%29.0%34.2%43.0%37.0%40%12.2%20%2018 (N 863)41.8%2019 (N 847)48.0%42.7%51.4%58.6%60%【Chinese public opinion】
Changes in Public Sentiment from Last YearAmong the Japanese, 65.4% responded that public sentiment towards China has not changed overthe past year. Approximately 20%, however, say that it has worsened (percentage includes“relatively worsened”).Half of the Chinese (53.7%) also responded that there has been no particular change in publicsentiment towards Japan over the past year. However, contrary to Japanese responses, the opinionthat it has improved (including “relatively improved”) constituted nearly 30% of all responses (at29.6%).【Changes in Public Sentiment Among Both Countries Nationals Since Last Year】【Japanese public opinion】2019 (N 1000)G AF5.9% 0.0% 1.2%B4.7%E7.0%【Chinese public opinion】A ImprovedB Relatively improvedCD15.8%GEF0.1% 2.9%D1.3%12.5%A6.6%No changeB23.0%D Relatively worsenedE WorsenedC65.4%C53.7%F Not sureG2019 (N 1597)No response7Copyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.
2. Current and Future Japan-China RelationsCurrent and Future Japan-China RelationsWhile last year’s survey results showed the percentage of Japanese who view current Japan-Chinarelations as bad falling to under 40% for the first time in 8 years, this year showed a worsening ofviews. Up 6 points from last year, 44.8% of the Japanese view current Japan-China relations as bad.On the other hand, Chinese who view bilateral relations as bad decreased again, falling below 40%(35.6%) for the first time in 8 years. At the same time, over 30% (34.3%) of the Chinese see currentrelations as good.In terms of changes in bilateral relations over the past year, most of both countries’ respondents(around 50% of both) replied that there has not been any change. The view that relations haveworsened, however, increased 13 points among the Japanese to 31.8%, while for the Chinese, itdropped slightly from last year, showing differing understandings among the two countries’ peoples.【Current Japan-China 7%46.1%41.2%40%20%10.5% 10.4%0% 2.1%200564.2%44.9% 45.1% 44.8%41.0%28.7%20.5%13.1%6.5% 13.0%71.9%51.7%42.9%36.9%24.9%24.7%71.9%67.2% 67.2%54.5% 53.7%53.1% 54.3%54.9%78.2%74.5%15.0%39.0% 35.6%30.3%34.3%32.3%22.8%22.0%18.6%15.0%8.8% 7.4%5.9%1.3%12.0%14.0%2.4%6.7% 7.2% 8.5%1.9%3.7%2.4%2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019Japanese public opinion: good/ relatively goodJapanese public opinion: bad/ relatively badChinese public opinion: good/ relatively goodChinese public opinion: bad/ relatively bad8Copyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.
Obstacles to Building Japan-China RelationsWhile the majority most common answer choice of the respondents from both countries continues tobe “territorial issues,” which they thought as the greatest obstacle to building Japan-China relations,but this percentage has dropped from last year for both countries. For the Chinese, it continues to befollowed by “economic frictions,” “disputes over marine resources” and “lack of trust,” both“between governments” as well as “between nationals.” The percentage of those who selected“nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment,” however, rose 15 points from last year’s 5.4% to 20.4%.Among the Japanese, those who cite the “lack of trust between governments” rose to over 40%.Additionally, the responses “economic frictions” and “China’s reinforcement of military forces” alsoshowed increases from last year. Meanwhile, the percentage of Japanese who cite the “lack of trustbetween nationals” fell to under 30%, down 8 points from last year.【Obstacles to Building Japan-China Relations】【Chinese public opinion】【Japanese public opinion】60%40%20%28.0%36.1%Disputes over marine resources (gasfield development in East China Sea)Territorial issues over Senkaku/ DiaoyuIslands54.4%61.1%17.8%14.4%16.0%13.9%China's reinforcement of military forcesJapanese nationalism & anti-Chinesesentiment3.3%3.4%Chinese nationalism & anti-Japanesesentiment15.9%17.9%Perception of history and education inJapan5.6%5.0%Perception of history and education inChina18.5%18.7%1.8%1.0%Anti-China broadcasts by Japanesemedia4.8%5.2%Anti-Japan broadcasts by Chinesemedia15.0%15.3%2018 (N 1000)Inappropriate remarks on China madeby Japanese politiciansInappropriate remarks on Japan madeby Chinese politicians7.9%4.0%2.4%0.9%Other1.6%2.3%No response24.9%27.5%Disputes over marine resources (gasfield development in East China Sea)Territorial issues over Diaoyu/ US alliance & Japan'sreinforcement of military forcesUS-Japan alliance & Japan'sreinforcement of military forces910.0%Future of the US-China trade warChina's reinforcement of military forces5.1%8.8%Japanese nationalism & anti-Chinesesentiment6.4%9.0%Chinese nationalism & anti-Japanesesentiment5.4%Perception of history and education inJapanPerception of history and education inChinaInappropriate remarks on China madeby Japanese politiciansInappropriate remarks on Japan madeby Chinese Anti-China broadcasts by Japanesemedia2.6%4.3%Anti-Japan broadcasts by Chinesemedia0.4%0.6%Other0.0%0.0%No response0.4%0.3%Copyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.60%22.2%24.2%Economic frictionsEconomic frictions4.8%5.2%40%24.7%27.6%Lack of trust between governmentsLack of trust between governments32.4%32.6%20%Lack of trust between nationalsLack of trust between nationals43.6%39.6%2019 (N 1000)0%0%2019 (N 1597)2018 (N 1548)
3. Developing a New Cooperative RelationshipEffective Measures for Improving Bilateral RelationsAn outstanding 43.6% of the Japanese feel that “strengthen[ing] trust between the two governments”is the most effective measure for improving bilateral relations. Adding the percentage of those whoselected “increase[ing] interaction between the two countries’ leaders,” 60% of the Japanese hope forstrengthening relations on a governmental level.The same trend can be seen in China, where the sum of these two items is 61.6%. Expectationstowards “strengthen[ed] trust between the two governments” have especially grown, up 13 pointsfrom last year.【Effective Measures for Improving Bilateral Relations】【Japanese public opinion】2019 (N 1000)43.6%2018 (N %11.6%4.9%4.4%4.1%7.8% 8.8%8.4%7.7%12.6%11.2%10.2%10.1%1.6% 1.8%1.5%0.6%0.0% 0.0%No responseCopyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.1.8%0.6%Not sure10OtherBuild a peaceful environment throughout EastAsiaPromote further private interaction between thetwo countries' peoplesStrengthen economic cooperation in trade &investment, including FTA and free trade zonesCooperate on issues that Asia facesForm free trade zones in East Asia and promotea global free trade systemCooperate towards resolving international issueslike the promotion of global free trade andmultilateral cooperationEstablish peace and order in Northeast AsiaCooperate towards resolving North Koreannuclear issueResolve territorial issues with the Senkaku/Diaoyu IslandsCooperate on crisis management andcommunication mechanisms in the East ChinaSeaResolve historical perception issueStrengthen trust between the two governmentsIncrease interaction between the two countries'leaders0%7.7%6.7% 10.7%
【Chinese public opinion】38.7%40%2018 (N 1548)32.7%30.6%31.1%26.0%22.9%2019 (N 2.2%5.0%8.4%7.5%5.0% 3.4%4.6%1.9%0.0%1.4% 0.2%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0%No responseNot sureOtherBuild a peaceful environment throughout EastAsiaPromote further private interaction between thetwo countries' peoplesStrengthen economic cooperation in trade &investment, including FTA and free trade zonesCooperate on issues that Asia facesForm free trade zones in East Asia and promote aglobal free trade systemCooperate towards resolving international issueslike the promotion of global free trade andmultilateral cooperationEstablish peace and order in Northeast AsiaCooperate towards resolving North Koreannuclear issueResolve territorial issues with the Diaoyu/Senkaku IslandsCooperate on crisis management andcommunication mechanisms in the East ChinaSeaResolve historical perception issuesStrengthen trust between the two governmentsIncrease interaction between the two countries'leadersEstablishing a New Cooperating Relationship for the Stable Development of theGlobal Economy and Peace in East Asia50% of the Japanese and 60% of the Chinese believe that a new, stronger cooperating relationshipshould be established in order to realize peace in East Asia and for the stable development of theglobal economy.【Should a New Cooperating Relationship be Established for Stable, Peaceful Order】【Japanese public opinion】2018(N 1000)【Chinese public opinion】2019(N 1000)0%2018(N 1548)2019(N 1597)A63.5%A62.2%B12.4%B12.0%0%A Yes20%A53.5%A52.5%40%60%B 4.7%B 4.6%C26.3%C25.7%D14.6%D16.1%E 1.1%80%100% E 0.9%B NoCNeitherDNot sure20%40%E No response60%80%C17.1%D100% E 0.1%6.9%11Copyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.C18.6%D6.4%E 0.8%
4. Importance of Japan-China RelationsHow the Importance of Japan-China Relations is ViewedNearly 70% of both countries’ respondents consider Japan-China relations to be “important.”However, there was a 7 point decrease this year in the percentage of Chinese respondents whoconsider the relationship “important.”As for reasons why the relationship is “important,” a 56.8% majority of Japanese respondentsreplied “because China is an important trade partner.” However, while the “necessity of Japan-Chinacooperation towards peace and development in Asia” was selected by 53.8% of the Japanese, thispercentage fell below 30% for the Chinese (at 27.2%).【Importance of Current Japan-China 1%74.0%81.5%80.3%76.5%74.4% 70.8%74.1%72.7%72.6%73.8%70.6%77.6% 78.4%71.8%71.2%72.3%71.4%70.1% 70.4%68.7%67.2%67.0%65.0%40%24.0%20%4.2%8.1% 10.3%4.2%0%200520064.2%200714.8% 15.8%3.2% 5.1% 2.5% 4.3%2.3% 2.9%0.5%2008 2009 2010 8%20155.8%2016Japanese public opinion: Important/ relatively importantJapanese public opinion: Unimportant/ relatively unimportantChinese public opinion: Important/ relatively importantChinese public opinion: Unimportant/ relatively unimportant12Copyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.4.6%201715.4%9.3%3.5%3.3%2018 2019
Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with the US / Sense of AffinityTowards the Respective CountriesWhen comparing Japan-China relations to relations with the US, 48.2% of the Japanese and 39.2% ofthe Chinese replied that “both are equally important,” constituting the majority response for both.However, for the Chinese, “relations with the US are more important” also constituted 35.8% ofresponses, up from last year’s 31.5% and almost on par with the percentage of those who feel that“both are equally important.” Meanwhile, the response that “Japan-China relations are more important”constituted a mere 4.2% of Japanese and 15.7% of Chinese public opinion, showing no major changefrom last year’s results.Comparing the sense of affinity felt towards one another as opposed to the US, nearly half (49.7%) ofthe Japanese feel “more affinity towards the US,” while nearly half of the Chinese feel “no affinitytowards either.” Among the Japanese, 4.8% feel “more affinity towards China.” While this percentagerose for the Chinese as compared to last year, only 12.3% of the Chinese feel “more affinity towardsJapan.”【Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with the US】【Japanese public opinion】0%20%2018(N 1000)A4.5%2019(N 1000)A4.2%B30.9%B34.8%【Chinese public opinion】A Japan-China relations aremore important than relations20%with the USB Relations with the US are40%more important hina relations80%C Both is equally importantD E12.2%0.6%0%2018(N 1548)2019(N 1597)A14.2%A15.7%B31.5%C46.6%DE6.9%100% 0.7%D Not sureE No response13Copyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.B35.8%C39.4%D E8.1%0.9%
【Sense of Affinity Felt Towards One Another’s Countries as Opposed to the US】【Chinese public opinion】【Japanese public opinion】0%20%2018(N 1000)A4.6%80%A More affinity towards the othercountryBB46.9%40%60%2019(N 1000)A4.8%C12.4%D21.5%EF14.3%100% 0.3%B49.7%C13.8%D19.7%E F11.7%0.3%More affinity towards the USC Equal sense of affinity towardsbothDNo affinity towards eitherENot sureFNo response0%20%40%60%80%100%2018(N 1548)2019(N 8%F E0.5% 6.5%E F7.0%0.8%Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with South Korea / Sense ofAffinity Towards the Respective CountriesWhen comparing the importance of Japan-China relations to that with South Korea, the majority ofboth countries’ respondents replied that “both are equally important.” This percentage, however, hasfallen for both countries, down 10 points for the Japanese and approximately 6 points for theChinese. Among the Japanese, there has been an increase in those who consider Japan-Chinarelations as more important than Japan-South Korea relations over the past year. Those who considerJapan-China relations as more important increased 8 points from last year to 31%. For the Chinese,the perceived importance of Japan-China and Japan-South Korea relations were equal at around 20%for each.In terms of the sense of affinity towards the respective countries, an approximately 40% majority ofboth countries’ respondents replied that they feel “no affinity towards either.” However, among theJapanese, there has been a worsening of sentiments towards South Korea, with an 8 point decrease inthose who feel “more affinity towards South Korea,” at 17.1% this year. At the same time, thosewho feel “more affinity towards China” increased close to twofold from last year to 13.2%.14Copyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.
【Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with South Korea】【Japanese public opinion】2018(N 1000)【Chinese public opinion】2019(N 1000)A Japan-China relations are0%A23.2%B6.2%20%40%more important than relationsA31.0%with South KoreaB6.9%B Relations with South Koreaare more important thanC53.3%60%C43.3%Japan-China relationsC80%E100% 2.1%D15.2%D17.6% E1.2%DBoth are equally important2018(N 1548)2019(N E100% 0.5% 9.1%Not sureB22.7%D9.7% E0.6%E No response【Sense of Affinity Felt Towards One Another’s Countries as Opposed to South Korea】【Japanese public opinion】0%2018(N 1000)A6.9%20%B25.8%40%C15.4%60%2019(N 1000)A13.2%B17.1%C14.1%A More affinity towards the othercountry0%B More affinity towards SouthKorea20%C Equal sense of affinity towardsboth40%D36.2%D41.9%D No sense of affinity towardseitherE14.5%E12.9% F0.8%ENot sureFNo response80%F100% 1.2%【Chinese public opinion】2018(N 1548)A9.8%2019(N 0% 0.3% 6.7%15Copyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.D39.8%E F8.0%0.9%
Most Important Foreign RelationIn terms of the most important foreign relation considering the future of their own country, astrikingly large proportion of Japanese respondents replied the “United States,” at over 60%. For theChinese, the percentage of those that selected the “United States” slightly surpassed that for“Russia,” last year’s majority response. Meanwhile, only 6.8% of the Japanese selected “China” and14.7% of the Chinese selected “Japan,” both coming in third among the options presented, in linewith last year’s trend.【Most Important Foreign Relation】【Japanese public opinion】【Chinese public hinaSouth KoreaUnited StatesUnited StatesRussia0.3%0.8%United Kingdom0.2%0.2%Germany2019 (N 1000)0.1%0.1%France2018 (N 1000)0.8%1.4%EU4.1%7.2%17.1%18.2%ASEAN countries28.9%23.3%26.6%30.9%United Kingdom1.6%2.6%Germany1.6%2.2%0.6%2.3%EUASEAN dle East0.2%South America0.4%0.2%OtherMiddle EastSouth AmericaOtherNot sureNot sure60%2.6%2.1%RussiaFrance40%14.7%18.2%JapanSouth .4%0.0%0.0%4.8%5.8%16Copyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.2019 (N 1597)2018 (N 1548)
5. Basic Understanding of One Another’s CountriesPerceptions of the Social/Political Systems of the Other CountryA 52% majority of Japanese respondents continue to view China as a “socialist/communist” country,followed by 34.1% who see it as “totalitarian (one-party rule).” Both responses have increasedslightly from last year.Among the Chinese, a 32.3% majority recognize Japan as a “capitalist” country, however, thispercentage has dropped 17 points from last year’s results. Additionally, the understanding of Japanas “militaristic” rose 6 points to 32% this year, on par with the view of Japan as “capitalist.”Meanwhile, views of Japan as “hegemonistic” and displaying “favorism towards great powers” werechosen by 18.5% (39.5% last year) and 5.8% (12.1% last year) of the Chinese respectively, bothshowing a large decrease from last year. On the other hand, there has been a 15 point increase in thepercentage of those who view Japan as “nationalist,” up to 23.6% this year.【Perceptions of the Social/ Political Systems of the Other Country】【Japanese public opinion】60%40%20%【Chinese public opinion】0%52.0%49.4%0%Communist/ SocialistCommunist/ Socialist9.7%7.2%Totalitarian (One-party 2.1%2.6%Internationally cooperativeFavorism towards greatpowersFavorism towards ternationally cooperative2019 (N 1000) 8 (N istNationalistStatistStatistOtherOtherNot sureNo responseNo response60%32.3%Totalitarian (One-party 3%0.1%17Copyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.2019 (N 1597)2018 (N 1548)
Name Recognition of the Other Country’s PoliticiansThe most well-known Chinese politician continues to be “Mao Zedong,” recognized by nearly 90%of the Japanese (87.8%). “Xi Jinping” was on par with Zedong at 84.9%, both significantlysurpassing the remaining responses. Only a tenth recognize “Li Keqiang.” Over 70% of the Chineserecognize “Shinzo Abe.”【Politicians Recognized From the Other Country】【Japanese public opinion】100%80%60%40%20%【Chinese public opinion】0%0%84.9%82.0%Li Keqiang52.7%55.5%Hu Jintao23.7%18.4%Yasuo Fukuda25.0%17.6%Yasuhiro Naka
Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2019 In Cooperation With: Japan: Public Opinion Research Center China: Horizon Research Consultancy Group October, 2019 . intellectuals from the Horizon Research Consultancy Group's database, consisting of 45,000 people including business leaders, government officials, journalists, experts and public .
May 02, 2018 · D. Program Evaluation ͟The organization has provided a description of the framework for how each program will be evaluated. The framework should include all the elements below: ͟The evaluation methods are cost-effective for the organization ͟Quantitative and qualitative data is being collected (at Basics tier, data collection must have begun)
Silat is a combative art of self-defense and survival rooted from Matay archipelago. It was traced at thé early of Langkasuka Kingdom (2nd century CE) till thé reign of Melaka (Malaysia) Sultanate era (13th century). Silat has now evolved to become part of social culture and tradition with thé appearance of a fine physical and spiritual .
On an exceptional basis, Member States may request UNESCO to provide thé candidates with access to thé platform so they can complète thé form by themselves. Thèse requests must be addressed to esd rize unesco. or by 15 A ril 2021 UNESCO will provide thé nomineewith accessto thé platform via their émail address.
̶The leading indicator of employee engagement is based on the quality of the relationship between employee and supervisor Empower your managers! ̶Help them understand the impact on the organization ̶Share important changes, plan options, tasks, and deadlines ̶Provide key messages and talking points ̶Prepare them to answer employee questions
Dr. Sunita Bharatwal** Dr. Pawan Garga*** Abstract Customer satisfaction is derived from thè functionalities and values, a product or Service can provide. The current study aims to segregate thè dimensions of ordine Service quality and gather insights on its impact on web shopping. The trends of purchases have
Chính Văn.- Còn đức Thế tôn thì tuệ giác cực kỳ trong sạch 8: hiện hành bất nhị 9, đạt đến vô tướng 10, đứng vào chỗ đứng của các đức Thế tôn 11, thể hiện tính bình đẳng của các Ngài, đến chỗ không còn chướng ngại 12, giáo pháp không thể khuynh đảo, tâm thức không bị cản trở, cái được
Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2020 In Cooperation With: Japan: Public Opinion Research Center China: The China International Publishing Group (CIPG), Horizon Research Consultancy Group November, 2020 The Genron NPO . The Genron NPO 2020 THE 16TH JAPAN-CHINA PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2
Denki Kagaku Kogyo Japan Denki Kagaku Kogyo Japan Denki Kagaku Kogyo Japan Denso Corporation Japan Denso Corporation Japan Denso Corporation Design engineer Japan Denso Corporation Engineer Japan Denso Corporation Engineer Japan Deutsche Accumotive GmbH & Co. KG Engineer Germany DuPont K.K. Development Supervisor - HEV/EV segment Japan
