Global Insurgency Strategy And The Salafi Jihad Movement

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Global Insurgency Strategyand theSalafi Jihad MovementRichard H. ShultzINSS OCCASIONAL PAPERAPRIL 200866US AIR FORCE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIESUSAF ACADEMY, COLORADO

Shultz—Global Insurgency StrategyGlobal Insurgency Strategyand theSalafi Jihad MovementRichard H. ShultzINSS Occasional Paper 66April 2008USAF Institute for National Security StudiesUSAF Academy, Coloradoi

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Shultz—Global Insurgency StrategyThe views expressed in this paper are those of the author anddo not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of theDepartment of the Air Force, the Department of the Army, theDepartment of Defense, or the US Government. The paper isapproved for public release; distribution is unlimited. RichardH. Shultz, Jr. holds copyright to this paper; it is published withhis permission.*******ABOUT THE AUTHOR:Richard H. Shultz, Jr, PhD, is Director of the InternationalSecurity Studies Program and Professor of InternationalPolitics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, TuftsUniversity.Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forwardto:Director, USAF Institute for National Security StudiesHQ USAFA/DFES2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27USAF Academy, CO 80840phone: 719 333 2717fax: 719 333 2716email: inss@usafa.eduVisit the Institute for National Security Studieshome page athttp://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inssiii

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Shultz—Global Insurgency StrategyTABLE OF CONTENTSForewordA New Type of War?vii1Insurgency: Concepts and FrameworksDefining InsurgencyTypes of InsurgencyDistinctions Between Insurgency and TerrorismInsurgency and High Risk Social MovementsThe Role of IdeologyIdeology and Organization35713151719Revolutionary Insurgency and Its Transnational EvolutionBackgroundCore Elements of StrategyThe Incipient Stage and the Revolutionary InsurgentTrinityPhase I—MobilizationPhase II—IntegrationPhase III—MaintenanceThe Case of the Viet CongThe Protracted War StageThe Role of External Assistance and InfluenceThe Transnational Evolution of National LevelInsurgency202326Requirements for a Global Salafi Insurgency42A Global Salafi Jihad Insurgency: Myth or Reality?Emergence of Salafi Islamism and the MuslimBrotherhoodThe Origins of Salafi Jihad IdeologyThe Soviet Afghan WarAfter Afghanistan: Deciding on the Next Area ofOperationsAfghanistan Again: The Foundations for GlobalInsurgency47Global Insurgency in the Aftermath of 9/11?Virtual Sanctuary1) Propagating the Salafi Ideology of Jihad2) Inspiring and Mobilizing the Ummah to87899127282929293435385459646975v

Shultz—Global Insurgency StrategyJoin the Jihad3) Psychological Warfare to Demoralize Enemies4) Networking the Global Salafi Jihad Insurgency5) Operational Information Sharing—Manualsand Handbooks6) Operational Information Sharing—TrainingVideos and Courses7) Collection TargetingSanctuaries in Ungoverned TerritoryThe Iraqi Central FrontFostering the Global Salafi Jihad MovementNotes939699101104106107111113120vi

Shultz—Global Insurgency StrategyFOREWORDWe are pleased to publish this sixty sixth volume in the OccasionalPaper series of the United States Air Force Institute for NationalSecurity Studies (INSS). While this research was not sponsored byINSS, it is both compatible with our efforts and objectives, and it ispublished here to support the education of national securityprofessionals across the government.Dick Shultz led the preparation of an earlier INSS OccasionalPaper, Armed Groups: A Tier One Security Priority (with DouglasFarah and Itamara Lochard), where he defined, characterized, anddifferentiated insurgents, terrorists, militias, and organized criminalgroups. In this current paper, he focuses on terrorists and insurgents,differentiates and characterizes these two categories in more explicitdetail, and conducts a detailed conceptual and historical analysis ofinsurgency and its current manifestation on a global scale by the SalafiJihad movement. This is important work, laying out the case that asterrorism and insurgency differ, recognizing that the current “long war”is actually being fought by the other side as an insurgency must lead usto amend and adapt our strategy to one of global counterinsurgency,beyond a global war on terrorism alone.Dick Shultz is using these papers as texts in his program to“educate the educators” of military officers, intelligence analysts, andother members of the government national security bureaucracy. We atINSS support that effort, and we are pleased to present this OccasionalPaper to further that cause.About the InstituteINSS is primarily sponsored by the Strategic Plans and PolicyDivision, Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/A5XP), and the Deanof the Faculty, USAF Academy. Other sponsors and partners includethe Secretary of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); theDefense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and ConceptsOffice (DTRA/ASCO); the Air Force Information Warfare Center(AFIWC); The Army Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO); theArmy Environmental Policy Institute (AEPI); the United StatesNorthern Command/North American Aerospace Defense Command(NORTHCOM/NORAD); and the United States Military AcademyCombating Terrorism Center (CTC). The mission of the Institute is “topromote national security research for the Department of Defensewithin the military academic community, to foster the development ofstrategic perspective within the United States Armed Forces, and tosupport national security discourse through outreach and education.”Its research focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our sponsors:vii

Shultz—Global Insurgency Strategystrategic security and controlling and combating weapons of massdestruction; homeland defense, combating terrorism, and asymmetricalwarfare; regional and emerging national security issues; and air, space,and cyber issues and planning.INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in variousdisciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas fordefense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics,selects researchers from within the military academic community, andadministers sponsored research. It reaches out to and partners witheducation and research organizations across and beyond the militaryacademic community to bring broad focus to issues of national securityinterest. And it hosts workshops and facilitates the dissemination ofinformation to a wide range of private and government organizations.In these ways, INSS facilitates valuable, cost effective research to meetthe needs of our sponsors. We appreciate your continued interest inINSS and our research products.JAMES M. SMITHDirectorviii

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GLOBAL INSURGENCY STRATEGY AND THESALAFI JIHAD MOVEMENTRichard H. ShultzA NEW TYPE OF WAR?In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attack on strategictargets inside the United States by al Qaeda, scholars, analysts, andpolicy specialists began to interpret and frame those events within thelarger context of war. But was it war? And if it was, what kind of warwas it? Al Qaeda was not a state but a non state actor. Many labeled alQaeda a transnational terrorist organization. Could such a non statearmed group go to war with a major state actor? What kind of warcould it carry out? There were no easily decipherable answers to thesequestions, for al Qaeda did not reflect or emulate the conduct of war asit was known and practiced in the past.Within a short period of time the US government began to describethe post 9/11 conflict environment—one in which America found itselfengaged in a fight against unconventional and asymmetrical enemieswho could pose major, even strategic, security threats—as a global waron terrorism. This generated a great deal of discussion and differencesof opinion. Was this an accurate portrayal of the post 9/11 securityenvironment or did such a characterization lack strategic clarity?By the summer of 2005 senior Bush administration officialsexpressed serious doubts about this terminology and recast how theydescribed the fight against al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other terroristgroups. Illustrative of this was Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Atnews conferences and in public addresses he began to speak of a globalstruggle against violent extremism—“the long war”—rather than a

Shultz—Global Insurgency Strategyglobal war on terrorism. Other senior military leaders, to include theJoint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, followed suit.But this begged the question, how should we understand thoseconducting “the long war?” Who are they and what kind of battle arethey fighting? What are their objectives and what kind of strategy andtactics do they employ in this fight to achieve them? One possibleanswer that has been suggested is that the United States and its alliesare now confronted by a global Salafi Jihad insurgency.Those taking this position argue that a more precise description ofthe post 9/11 conflict against the Salafi Jihad movement, which will bediscussed in detail later, would be to frame it as a global insurgency;one that challenges the Western dominated state system. Within thiscontext, al Qaeda and loosely associated groups and movements aresaid to comprise an evolving form of networked non state actors whooperate locally, regionally, and globally. If this is the case—that aglobal insurgency is under way—then the implications for how tocounter it are significant and will require important changes in USpolicy and strategy.But how do we know that a global Salafi Jihad insurgency isunderway? To determine whether this is the case, this study poses thefollowing core research questions:· Is a diverse confederation of armed groups, linked togetherby a common ideology (or narrative) and strengthened by newpower enhancers, conducting a global insurgency against theUnited States and its allies?· Is this global insurgency being carried out by a radicalSalafi Jihad movement (and its al Qaeda vanguard) and does ithave as its goals a) to foster regime change locally in apostateMuslim states and b) international system transformationglobally?2

Shultz—Global Insurgency Strategy· Is the strategy adopted by the Salafi Jihad movement ahybrid or an adaptation of the insurgency strategy thatrevolutionary movements employed against states during thelatter half of the 20th century? If so, what does it have incommon with them and how does it differ?To answer these core research questions, a series of corollary issueswill first be examined as a prelude to conceptualizing a set ofrequirements or model of a hypothetical global insurgency.These requirements will then be tested against existing open sourceinformation on the actions, activities, and operations of the Salafi Jihadmovement and its al Qaeda vanguard. The objective will be todetermine whether preliminary evidence supports the proposition thatthose actions, activities, and operations, when seen through the lens ofthe proposed requirements, can be described, at minimum, as a globalinsurgency in its incipient stage of development. While these findingscan only serve as preliminary indicators, the study will provide thebasis for further analysis.INSURGENCY: CONCEPTS AND FRAMEWORKSThe starting point for conceptualizing a hypothetical model or setof requirements for a global insurgency is a review of the followingconcepts and frameworks: 1) definitions and classifications ofinsurgency; 2) distinctions between insurgency and terrorism; and 3)relationship between insurgency and social movements. Below are thesummary points from this review, followed by the text from which theyare deduced.Summary Points· Four types of non state armed groups—insurgents, terrorists,militias, criminal organizations—today pose major threats (to includestrategic ones) to nation states including the United States.· Important differences exist among these armed groups,particularly between insurgent movements and terrorist organizations.3

Shultz—Global Insurgency StrategyAn appreciation of those differences is essential to combat each ofthese types of armed groups.· Strategies employed by insurgent groups, both organizationallyand operationally, are more multifaceted and diverse than those of itsarmed group counterparts.· Insurgencies are protracted forms of unconventional warfare thatseek to accomplish their goals and objectives through the employmentof irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.· The instruments of violence and influence employed byinsurgents range from guerrilla operations, terrorism, and sabotage topolitical mobilization, political action, psychological operations andintelligence activities.· Insurgencies are struggles for power and legitimacy. Insurgentsseek to destroy the power and legitimacy of the government they arechallenging, while enhancing the power and legitimacy of theirmovement.· There is no one type of insurgency. A useful way to categorizethem is based on their aspirations or objectives. Of the seven insurgentvariations identified, the goals of revolutionary and millenarianinsurgent movements are the most far reaching. Each envisions amajor transformation of the political and social system. The formerseeks to advance to an idealized future, the latter to return to a goldenpast.· An important lens through which to understand the nature ofrevolutionary and millenarian insurgencies is social movement theory.Indeed, these two forms of insurgency have several characters incommon with high risk social movements.· Social movements represent groups on the margins of state andsociety that seek to reform or transform the political system. To do sothey develop complex political strategies, given their politicalmarginality.· The more far reaching the change sought by a social movement,the more multi faceted the tasks the movement’s organization has toaccomplish. The same is true of revolutionary and millenarianinsurgencies.· To accomplish far reaching change, radical social movementsengage in high risk activism. Like revolutionary and millenarianinsurgencies, this necessitates development of a mass base ofdedicated supporters who must be motivated to take action.4

Shultz—Global Insurgency Strategy· For high risk social movements, ideology performs a number ofvital functions. To build a mass base, ideology plays a central role inthe recruitment process that attracts new members; shapes the loyaltyof these new members to retain them; and serves as a tool for wagingthe struggle.· High risk social movement ideology constitutes a series of framesthat must come to resonate with the target audience. It is through themovement’s organization that it comes to do so. Ideology andorganization are symbiotically connected to one another.Defining InsurgencyInsurgency is a strategy of unconventional and asymmetric warfareexecuted by one of four different types of non state armed groups thattoday pose complicated analytic and significant operational challengesto those states that are confronted by them. Over the last two decadeseach of these armed groups, who carry out their activities both withinand across state boundaries, have increasingly threatened statesupremacy. In doing so, they present non traditional challenges to theintelligence and security services of governments that are unlike theconventional ones posed by states.Armed groups can be divided into a four part typology—insurgents, terrorists, militias, and organized crime.1 While it is the casethat these non state actors have several characteristics in common,2they also have important differences that distinguish one from theother. It is important for governments to understand why and howinsurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal organizations varyconceptually from one another and to categorize and respond to them assuch. Failure to do so can result in serious policy and combatmisfortune.Insurgency, from an organizational and operational perspective, isthe most intricate of the four types of activities carried out by armedgroups. As will be discussed, this can be seen when insurgentmovements are juxtaposed with terrorist organizations. It is likewise5

Shultz—Global Insurgency Strategythe case when they are put side by side with militias and criminalgroups. Insurgents can attack the state with an array of political andparamilitary instruments because of how they organize and operate.Numerous authors have proposed definitions of insurgency as canbe observed in the literature on political violence. Bard O’Neill, authorof Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, isone of the most frequently cited. He describes insurgents as armedgroups that “consciously use political resources and violence todestroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or moreaspects of politics [within a state].”3 Variations of O’Neill’s definitionabound.4Consider the statement put forward in the CIA’s mid 1980s Guideto the Analysis of Insurgency—“Insurgency is a protracted political military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling theresources of a country through the use of irregular military forces andillegal political organizations.” 5 In doing so, insurgents seek to weakenand/or destroy the power and legitimacy of a ruling government. Theyalso simultaneously aim at increasing their own power and legitimacy.To this end, an insurgent movement, depending on its goals andstrategy, will draw on and employ a range of operational instrumentsincluding guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and sabotage, as well as politicalmobilization, political action, intelligence/counterintelligence activities,and propaganda/psychological warfare.Insurgents can adopt different organizational forms ranging fromthose based on political and paramilitary dimensions to more narrowlystructured conspiratorial ones. The classic or revolutionary insurgentmodel from the Cold War era was designed to recruit, indoctrinate, andmobilize supporters to establish an alternative political authority to theexisting government, while employing intelligence and military means6

Shultz—Global Insurgency Strategyto attack and weaken that government through escalating violence. Aconspiratorial variation, by way of contrast, focuses more exclusivelyon using violence to undermine the will of a government or occupyingpower to sustain losses and stay in the fight. It pays much less attentionto controlling a particular territory, mass mobilization or building aparallel political apparatus.Also affecting the approach taken by insurgents is the area orterrain where they carry out their activities. They can take place in anurban and/or rural environment, as well as transnationally. Each ofthese locations will have an impact on how the insurgents approacheach of the characteristics or elements of this strategy.On the basis of the above considerations, the following are theessential characteristics of insurgency as it will be approached in thisstudy:· Insurgency is a protracted political and military set ofactivities directed toward partially or completely gaining controlover the territory of a country.· Insurgents seek to accomplish these objectives through the useof irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.· Insurgents employ instruments ranging from guerrillaoperations, terrorism, and sabotage to political mobilization,political action, psychological operations andintelligence/counterintelligence activities.· Each of these instruments is designed to weaken and/ordestroy the power and legitimacy of a ruling government, while atthe same time increasing the power and legitimacy of the insurgentgroup.Types of InsurgenciesThere was little agreement among specialists during the Cold Warover how to categorize different types of insurgency. And this remainedtrue in its aftermath in the 1990s. Various experts were animated bydifferent aspects of this type of armed group. Consequently, they7

Shultz—Global Insurgency Strategycreated idiosyncratic orderings or typologies of insurgency. Somefocused on the organizational and operational dimensions of insurgentmovements to classify them. Others concentrated on their aspirations.The following examples are illustrative of these two approaches.The afore cited Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency sets out fourbroad variations of insurgency in its typology—politically zedExtensive,complex politicalstructuredeveloped beforemilitaryoperations dstructure ofarmed insurgentsserving as acatalyst formobilizingoppositionagainst anexisting Shadowgovernmentcreated toundermineauthority litaryconsolidationof contestedareas.Vulnerable toconcentratedeffort aimed atneutralizing theinfrastructureand establishingadministrativecontrol incontested evolutionaryzeal.Insurgentgroups hopeto form focusfor disaffectedpopulation;destruction ofregimelegitimacy iticalconsolidationof contestedVulnerable toaggressivemilitary actionduring earlystages ofrebellion becauseof logistics andcommunicationsnetworks amonglocalpopulations.Hope todemoralizeregime andattain powerwithoutextensiveconventionalwarfare.8

Shultz—Global Insurgency Strategyareas.TraditionallyorganizedExisting tribal Cellular structurein urbanenvironment.No uniquestrategycommon toall; will adoptstrategy ofone of theother types.Limited capacityfor absorbingeconomic andmilitarypunishment;leadershipconflicts arecommon; leadersoften lacksufficientmotivation,experience asinsurgents, andpoliticaldiscipline.Recruitment onbasis of ethnicexclusivity.Threatenregimelegitimacythrough urbandisruption.Restricted tosmall area andmust hide withinpopulation;attrition resultingfrommilitary/policepressure and thepsychologicalstress ofclandestinity.Often insupport ofwiderinsurgencywaged in ruralareas.militarily organized, traditionally organized, and urban organized.Below is a brief synopsis of what each entails:6As can be seen, in this categorization there are two key or definingvariables, the organizational structure and operational strategyemployed to achieve intermediate and long term insurgent objectives.Other characteristics receive consideration in the text accompanyingthis delineation—ideology, motivation, leadership, cadre background—but organizational structure and operational strategy are the key9

Shultz—Global Insurgency Strategyvariables used to differentiate the political, military, traditional, andurban variations. A similar approach can be seen in ChristopherClapham’s categorization of insurgencies in Africa in the 1990s.7Bard O’Neill, on the other had, concentrates on insurgentaspirations. In Insurgency and Terrorism he identifies several types ofinsurgency movements. For each, their principle goal or objective is thecentral variables. He notes that by doing so “important distinctionsemerge.” Moreover, “If we fail to see the fundamental differences withrespect to goals, we make a major mistake because differentiatingamong goals has not only academic value but some very vital practicalimplications for those involved in [countering] insurgents.” 8 Forinstance, this would be true in terms of whether an insurgent movementor elements within it are open to negotiation and political compromise.Based on aspirations, O’Neill singles out seven types of insurgentmovements—anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist,secessionist, reformist, and preservationist. Each of these prototypesfocuses their activities and operations principally at the national ornation state level. However, at least in the case of two of them, theinsurgents may see their movement as part of a larger international onebased on a transnational ideology.The first type—anarchist—has far reaching but unrealistic goals.They seek to “eliminate all institutionalized political arrangementsbecause they view the superordinate subordinate authority relationshipsassociated with them as unnecessary and illegitimate.” 9 To accomplishthese goals, anarchist cells tend to rely on what has been called“propaganda of the deed”—violent strikes against the authority figuresof the regime. While prevalent at the turn of the 20th century, in theaftermath of WWII examples of this variant are scant.10

Shultz—Global Insurgency StrategyThe same is not the case for egalitarian or what more accuratelyshould be termed revolutionary insurgent movements. In this approach,the insurgents seek to impose a new political and social order on thestate based on a value system that calls for distributional equality. Todo so, the insurgent leadership creates a centrally controlled apparatusor organization that mobilizes the people to radically transform thesocial structure within the existing political community.10In the aftermath of WWII a number of communist revolutionarymovements in different parts of the developing world adopted thisapproach. Perhaps the most illustrative example of these Cold Warrevolutionary insurgencies was that in Vietnam. It was able, insuccession, to force first the French and then the United States tonegotiate their withdrawal from the conflict. And as will be discussedlater, the National Liberation Front or Viet Cong (VC), which theUnited States fought, established a highly developed version of thisinsurgent organization. While focused on seizing power at the local ornation state level, nevertheless, the Vietnamese and other likemindedinsurgencies saw themselves as part of a larger communist internationalmovement.11A traditional insurgency also has as its goal fundamental change ofthe political and social order. However, what such movements plan toreplace the existing system with is one that seeks to return to andrestore a regime that existed in either the recent or distant past. In thecase of the latter, the ancien régime is rooted in ancestral ties andreligion. O’Neill refers to this subtype as reactionary. A moreanalytically precise and objective characterization is to describe themas Millenarian.Millenarian movements are ones in which religious, social, andpolitical groupings envision a coming major transformation of society11

Shultz—Global Insurgency Strategyand a return to an idealized past. Such movements typically claim thatthe current regime and its rulers are irreparably corrupted, unjust, andotherwise irredeemable. Moreover, such movements often believe in asupernatural power and predetermined victory through the interventionof God or other metaphysical forces.Millenarian movements, generally, see the world throughManichaean lenses—a holy war between the forces of good and evil.And they are transnational in scope as well. Revolutionary andmillenarian insurgent movements have much in common with respectto a dogmatic commitment to an ideology based on a perception of thatideology as reflecting absolute truth.Post WWII millenarianism is most often identified with certainconceptions of radical Islamism. In the 1950s, the MuslimBrotherhood, founded by Hassan al Banna in 1928 as a religious,political, and social/revolutionary movement, was the most active. Theglobal Salafi Jihad movement is its foremost offspring today.The final insurgent variant which seeks a revolutionarytransformation of the political system—Pluralist—is the only one thatis not authoritarian in orientation. Their goal “is to establish a system inwhich the values of individual freedom, liberty, and compromise areemphasized and in which political structures are differentiated andautonomous.” O’Neill notes that “While the history of Westerncivilization is marked by a number of such uprisings [armedinsurgencies] in recent times there have been few of any we couldclassify as pluralist.” 12 While this is true of armed movements, thereare a number of examples of movements employing nonviolentstrategies that have the same pluralist political objectives.13The fifth type of insurgency—Secessionist—seeks to break awayfrom the state to which it is formally a part and establish an12

Shultz—Global Insurgency Strategyindependent political community. In the latter half of the 20th century,secessionist insurgent movements burgeoned. But there was nouniformity in the type of political system they sought to establish.Some opted for a system that reflected their ethnic and religioustraditions, while others planned for more modern forms of government.None are transnational, seeing themselves as part of a larger or globalmovement.The final two types of insurgency—Reformist andPreservationist—are less ambitious in terms of their aspirations. Theformer seeks a more equitable distribution of the political andeconomic goods of the system, not a radical reordering of it. The laterseeks even less. It seeks to maintain the status quo, because of therelative advantages it derives from it.Distinctions Between Insurgency and TerrorismScrutiny reveals important differences between insurgentmovements and terrorist organizations. Understanding thesedissimilarities is not only an academic’s prerogative. Such anappreciation is essential for those governments faced with having tocombat each of these types of armed groups. Terrorism and thosearmed groups whose operational activities are limited to this form ofpolitical violence have been defined in a myriad of ways. Moreover,beginning in the 1960s “terrorism” came to be used pejoratively todiscredit and de legitimize various types of armed groups.The moniker terrorist was employed by governments forpropaganda and political warfare purposes against insurgent orresistance movements. The objective in doing so was to debase thereputation of the movement, render its

insurgency and its current manifestation on a global scale by the Salafi Jihad movement. This is important work, laying out the case that as terrorism and insurgency differ, recognizing that the current "long war" is actually being fought by the other side as an insurgency must lead us

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