Case Studies In Insurgency And Revolutionary Warfare Fostering .
Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent StrategiesCASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY ANDREVOLUTIONARY WARFARE—FOSTERING EFFECTIVE COUNTERUNCONVENTIONALWARFARE/OCCUPATIONUnited States Army Special Operations Command
Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Fostering Effective Counter Unconventional Warfare/Occupation is a work of the United States Government inaccordance with Title 17, United States Code, sections 101 and105.Published by the United States Army Special OperationsCommandFort Bragg, North CarolinaCopyright 2019 by the United States Army SpecialOperations Command.First EditionISBN (print): ###ISBN (e-book): ###doi/CIP data?Printed in the United States of America by the GovernmentPrinting OfficeCite me as:Leonhard, Robert, et al. Case Studies in Insurgency andRevolutionary Warfare—Fostering Effective CounterUnconventional Warfare/Occupation. Fort Bragg: USArmy Special Operations Command, 2019.
Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent StrategiesCASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY ANDREVOLUTIONARY WARFARE—FOSTERING EFFECTIVE COUNTERUNCONVENTIONALWARFARE/OCCUPATIONRobert Leonhard, AuthorJohns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory(JHU/APL)United States Army Special Operations Command
Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purposeof the United States government. Nonmateriel research onspecial warfare is performed in support of the requirementsstated by the United States Army Special Operations Command,Department of the Army. This research is accomplished at theJohns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory by theNational Security Analysis Department, a nongovernmentalagency operating under the supervision of the USASOCSensitive Activities Division, Department of the Army.The analysis and the opinions expressed within thisdocument are solely those of the authors and do not necessarilyreflect the positions of the US Army or the Johns HopkinsUniversity Applied Physics Laboratory.Comments correcting errors of fact and opinion, filling orindicating gaps of information, and suggesting other changesthat may be appropriate should be addressed to:United States Army Special Operations CommandG-3X, Sensitive Activities Division2929 Desert Storm DriveFort Bragg, NC 28310All ARIS products are available from USASOC atwww.soc.mil under the ARIS link.
ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY ANDINSURGENT STRATEGIESThe Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS)series consists of a set of case studies and research conducted for theUS Army Special Operations Command by the National SecurityAnalysis Department of the Johns Hopkins University Applied PhysicsLaboratory.The purpose of the ARIS series is to produce a collection ofacademically rigorous yet operationally relevant research materials todevelop and illustrate a common understanding of insurgency andrevolution. This research, intended to form a bedrock body ofknowledge for members of the Special Forces, will allow users to distillvast amounts of material from a wide array of campaigns and extractrelevant lessons, thereby enabling the development of future doctrine,professional education, and training.From its inception, ARIS has been focused on exploring historicaland current revolutions and insurgencies for the purpose of identifyingemerging trends in operational designs and patterns. ARISencompasses research and studies on the general characteristics ofrevolutionary movements and insurgencies and examines uniqueadaptations by specific organizations or groups to overcome variousenvironmental and contextual challenges.The ARIS series follows in the tradition of research conducted bythe Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of AmericanUniversity in the 1950s and 1960s, by adding new research to that bodyof work and in several instances releasing updated editions of originalSORO studies.RECENT VOLUMES IN THE ARIS SERIESCasebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Volume I: 1927-1962 (2013)Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Volume II: 1962-2009 (2012)Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (2013)Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (2013)Understanding States of Resistance (2019)Legal Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance (2015)Threshold of Violence (2019)“Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare,Ukraine 2013-2014 (2015)Science of Resistance (forthcoming)
LETTER OF INTRODUCTIONLetter content, typically a page.Author of lettervi
TABLE OF CONTENTSCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY . 1Introduction . 2Methodology . 2Terms . 3The Nature of the Threat . 3Non-military actions . 6Military actions . 9CHAPTER 2. THE THREAT OF RUSSIAN MILITARYOCCUPATION – HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES . 12Introduction . 13Soviet and German Occupation, 1939-1991 . 14Other Cases of Russian Aggression During and After the Cold War . 16Lithuania, 1991 . 16Transnistria, 1990-92 . 17Serbian Krajina, 1991-95 . 18Chechnya, 1994-96 . 18Dagestan and the Second Chechen War, 1999-2009 . 19Georgia, 2008 . 19The Color Revolutions . 21CHAPTER 3. GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS AND LATVIA’SRESISTANCE AGAINST THE SOVIETS AND RUSSIANFEDERATION . 23Latvia’s Quest for Independence, 1917-1920 . 24Latvia’s Democratic Experiment, 1918-1934 . 28The End of Democracy, 1934-39 . 31First Soviet Occupation, 1939-41 . 33Latvian Resistance . 37German Invasion and Occupation, 1941-44 . 38Latvian Resistance to the Nazi Occupation . 40Strategic Miscalculation. 42vii
Soviet Reoccupation, 1944-56 . 44The Latvian Resistance . 45CHAPTER 4. POPULIST MOVEMENTS AND POLAND’SRESISTANCE AGAINST THE SOVIETS AND COMMUNISTREGIME . 50Introduction . 51Polish Populist Uprisings—the KOR and Solidarity . 53The Worker’s Defense Committee (KOR) . 56The Solidarity Movement . 59Karol Wojtyla. 61Lech Walesa . 62Solidarnosc. 62Conclusion . 64CHAPTER 5. OTHER CASES OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSIONDURING AND AFTER THE COLD WAR . 67Lithuania, 1991 . 68Transnistria, 1990-92 . 68Serbian Krajina, 1991-95 . 69Chechnya, 1994-96 . 69Dagestan and the Second Chechen War, 1999-2009 . 70Georgia, 2008 . 71The Color Revolutions . 72CHAPTER 6. OPERATION “GLADIO” AND THE RISK OF STAYBEHIND NETWORKS . 75CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION. 79Conclusion and Findings. 80Potential Russian Aggression . 81Fostering Effective Counter-UW . 84APPENDIX . 87THE REPUBLIC OF NORTHARIA . 88Description . 88Fostering Effective Defense in the Republic of Northaria. 88BIBLIOGRAPHY . 133viii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONSFigure 1: Soviet Occupation of Eastern Europe, 1939 . 15Figure 2: Karlis Ulmanis After the Coup of 1934 . 31Figure 3: Soviet Invasion and Occupation, June 1940 . 35Figure A-4: Protests over Language Discrimination3 . 114Figure A-5: Soldiers of Odin Participating in Anti-Migrant Protest4 . 117Figure A-6: Fence Separating the Northarian and Russian Border toPrevent Entrance of Refugees5 . 118Figure A-7: Commemoration of Legionnaires as Veterans Lay Flowers atthe Foot of the Liberation Statue . 118Figure A-8: Typical Unpaved Rural Road in Northaria. . 122Figure A-9: Diagram of Northaria's Electric Grid Infrastructure . 124ix
LIST OF TABLESTable A-1: Parties in the Majvendi and the European Parliament1 . 94x
CHAPTER 1.INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY1
Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Fostering Effective C-UWINTRODUCTIONThe objective of this study is to explore how to effectively prepare forand oppose unconventional warfare (UW) and/or military occupation inorder to inform strategy formulation within vulnerable countries. The focusis on actual and potential aggression by the Russian Federation in Europe,and especially in Eastern Europe. The study looks at what measures acountry can take to identify and resist both military and nonmilitaryaggression. The latter can take many forms—from televised propaganda tocoercive economic policies to the use of organized crime to the funding ofpolitical parties. With regard to military occupation, the study examineswhat actions a potential target state could take in the areas of logistics,communications, command, organization, intelligence, sabotage,subversion, and guerrilla operations so that if an aggressor invades andoccupies the country, the population can begin to resist immediately.The objective of this effort is therefore to examine two different butrelated problems. The first problem looks at resisting UW-- bestdemonstrated by Russia's campaign in Ukraine, 2013-present. Russianoperations there featured the use of non-kinetic as well as kinetic operationsto coerce the Kyiv government, foster and organize resistance, and annexCrimea. This type of aggression can include military operations, includingincursions, raids, attacks, and defenses, etc., i.e., military operations shortof a full-scale, deliberate invasion. The second problem is that of outrightmilitary occupation, such as occurred throughout Eastern Europe before,during, and after World War Two.MethodologyThis study will begin by examining the extensive historical record ofresistance against Soviet and Russian aggression from World War Twothrough the present. The goal of this first part is not to restate the history,but to draw from it to derive key insights and lessons learned. The secondpart of the study then takes those lessons and applies them to a fictional EastEuropean country named “The Republic of Northaria.” The authors choseto use a notional country in order to avoid fixation on one particular country2
Chapter 1. Introduction and Summaryand instead demonstrate pragmatic steps that any country could take toreduce its vulnerability.The sources used come from a wide spectrum of articles, case studies,and books. The authors have taken care not to overestimate the threat or tofall victim to polemic. Root causes of conflict run deep, and what mayappear as nefarious plans hatched in the Kremlin can in fact derive from amultitude of factors. Nevertheless, Russian aggression is real, and itpresents an enduring problem—indeed, for some countries, the mostsignificant security problem—in modern Europe.When discussing the Republic of Northaria, the goal will be to describethe optimal preparation that the country’s government and people could taketo deter and resist Russian aggression. The intent is that real-worldstrategists can use the notional case of Northaria as a basis for strategicformulation in vulnerable countries.TermsThe term “unconventional warfare” is used in this study in a generalsense to describe irregular warfare (specifically Russia's New GenerationWarfare), including political, diplomatic, military, economic, financial,cultural, social, religious, cyber, and information warfare.The Nature of the ThreatThis study considers how European countries can best preparethemselves to successfully defend against Russian aggression—either thehybrid warfare recently called “New Generation Warfare,” or outrightmilitary invasion and occupation. 1 This presupposes that Russia indeedintends to wage such aggression, so it is logical to begin by discussing thegeneral nature of the Russian regime and the threat it poses or could pose tonations abroad.Since 1999, Vladimir Putin has ruled the Russian Federation, first asprime minister, then as president, then as prime minister again (nominallyunder President Medvedev), and then again as president from 2012. He hasvoiced his intention to run again for president in 2018, which, assuming heagain takes office, could put him in power through 2026. During his reign,3
Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Fostering Effective C-UWmost observers agree that his government has become increasinglyauthoritarian, corrupt, and aggressive. The main elements of national powerreside in three tightly interwoven pillars—government bureaucracy, bigbusiness (either state-owned or run by Putin’s oligarch allies), and themassive network of intelligence agencies. Some observers would addorganized crime as an unofficial fourth pillar. The so-called siloviki (or‘strong-men’), consisting of Putin’s closest associates, many of whom hadbackgrounds in the KGB and its successor, the Federal Security Service(FSB), dominate the entire structure. It is common practice for superwealthy oligarchs to simultaneously control major corporations and serveas key ministers in the government while maintaining shadowy connectionsto organized crime. Dissent is discouraged—often forcefully—andchallenges to the regime are thwarted through dismissal, coercion,manipulation of political processes, judicial persecution, and occasionalassassination.Sergey Markedonov, an associate professor at Russian State University,explained in a recent interview that, despite Western perspectives imagininga grand, nefarious Russian plan for expansion, most of Vladimir Putin’sforeign policy moves have been reactive, not proactive. Crises arise—eitherfrom Western provocation or from local uprisings—and the Kremlin isforced to respond. Likewise, scholars from The Johns Hopkins UniversityApplied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) concluded that Russia employs a“modality” rather than a strategic plan—i.e., its foreign policy has clearobjectives in mind, but it pursues those vectors when crises arise and forcethe Kremlin to respond. Events that would trigger significant response fromRussia come in three major varieties: (1) provocation from the West; (2)spontaneous local uprisings; and (3) domestic pressure from within Russia.An objective assessment of Putin’s foreign policy since 1999 wouldpoint to its reactive nature. His first war in Chechnya was sparked by theMuslim invasion of Dagestan and the string of terror attacks that followed.The Russian move against Georgia came about in the wake of Tbilisi’smilitary move to restore its sovereignty over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.The Ukraine crisis of 2014 erupted as a local revolt against ViktorYanukovych and his sudden volte-face in rejecting further ties to the EU. Ineach of these cases, Russia responded militarily, and Western critics4
Chapter 1. Introduction and Summarysummoned up the ghosts of Russia’s tsarist and Cold War past to explainthe sudden moves.The goals of the regime include short-term objectives that are often hardto discern, and longer-term objectives that are fairly stable. Among the latterare (1) stability within the Russian Federation; (2) protection of the Putinregime; (3) strengthening Russia’s prestige and respect abroad; and,tangential to this, (4) thwarting continued expansion of NATO and theEuropean Union (EU).Since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the SovietUnion, both NATO and the EU have marched eastward. From the Kremlin’sperspective, this relentless drive to Russia’s strategic periphery isvindictive, provocative, and intolerable. Russia has been forced to acquiesceas NATO reached out to embrace a unified Germany, Poland, Bulgaria,Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the Baltic States. However, asits economy emerged from chaos and began to gain strength in Putin’s earlyyears, the Kremlin tried to deter further expansion of both NATO and theEU. Rather than backing down and recognizing Russia’s great powerinterests in its periphery, NATO leaders continue to flirt with Georgia,Moldova, and Ukraine. Jens Stoltenberg, NATO secretary-general, recentlycelebrated the opening of a training base in Georgia, noting that it was apreliminary move toward accepting the country into the alliance. Likewise,Moldova has, since 1992, been edging toward a bid for membership—amove that will certainly spark a Russian reaction regarding the frozenconflict in Transnistria. Ideologues championing Putin embrace andinculcate a worldview that places Russia in the center of a Eurasiancivilization built on Russian Orthodoxy and Russian culture. Theydemonize the West (and the United States in particular), believing (orclaiming to believe) that the American CIA heads up a broad conspiracydesigned to keep Russia weak and to advance Western culture and influenceeastward. The regime tends toward reactionary conservatism and beratesdegenerate Western culture as self-destructive and unjust.Pursuant to this worldview, the Kremlin seeks ways to increase its reach,decrease American control, promote disunity within the EU and NATO, andsecure its rightful sphere of influence, especially in Eastern Europe and theCaucasus. In line with the long-term objective of keeping both the countryand the Putin regime secure, Russian strategy is aimed at avoiding outright5
Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Fostering Effective C-UWmajor war with the West, while at the same time striving to accomplish itsobjectives through aggression that will not spark a major military response.Because the regime desires to rule over the countries along its borders, ittypically seeks to repress, deny, or disrupt non-Russian national autonomyideals. The techniques used to advance the Kremlin’s agenda are many andvaried.Non-military actionsThere is a broad range of legal, explicit, and ethical, political, andeconomic activities that a nation-state can use to pursue foreign policygoals. Such methods fall under the category of routine peacetimecompetition. At the other end of the spectrum of conflict lies war. Betweenthese two endpoints lie a wide range of legal, quasi-legal, and illegalactivities; clandestine and covert endeavors; ethical and unethical actions.Likewise, relations between two powers most often transcend merely peaceor war, and instead are characterized by various gradations of conflict. Inshort, modern strategy must embrace the “gray zone”—complex, ofteninscrutable, forms of conflict that exists between states and non-stategroups. Beyond the legal and conventional methods that a great power likeRussia can employ, there are a number of non-military actions available togovernments and their agents and proxies.Working with criminal elements abroad. Russian organized crimeoperates an extensive network throughout Russian society whose operationsinclude extortion, fraud, cargo theft, prostitution, drug- and armstrafficking, and other activities. The crime syndicates have controllinginterests in both private and state-run businesses within Russia, and theirreach extends throughout the former Soviet Union. Russian mafia elementsand gangs likewise operate throughout Western Europe, North America,Latin America, and the Caribbean. A unique feature of Russian organizedcrime, however, is that there is no clear distinction between criminalenterprises and the government. Criminal organizations and their leadershipoften have direct ties to oligarchs and others in positions of power. In orderto conduct business in Russia, companies often find that dealings with thegovernment lead directly to exposure to extortion from Russian criminalnetworks. WikiLeaks documents exposed in the summer of 2010 accused6
Chapter 1. Introduction and SummaryRussian intelligence of criminal activity including arms trafficking andworking with organized crime in Spain. The alleged relationship featuresRussian agents offering support—money, intelligence, etc.—to criminalelements who in turn perform tasks for their patrons, thus keeping Russianagents clear of allegations of illegality. 2 Likewise, Interpol found that avariety of Russian criminal organizations, including Poldolskaya,Tambovskaya, Mazukinskaya, and Izamailovskaya, have moved intoMexico, operating through multiple small cells and engaging in a widevariety of criminal enterprises. Such criminal enterprises often have links toand support from the Russian government. The problem of Russian crimeorganizations is particularly severe in former Soviet states. The Russiancriminal networks, however, also pose a potential threat to Vladimir Putin’sregime, because they operate according to their own objectives, which may(and often do) conflict with Putin’s domestic and foreign objectives.Funding opposition (often extremist) political parties in Europe. As partof Russia’s attempts to discredit those who criticize the Putin regime, theKremlin seeks to forge links with political parties within the EU that opposeincumbent governments. Unlike political meddling during the Cold War,this new effort is not based in ideology. Indeed, Russia has supported bothleft-wing and right-wing populist parties. 3 Russian influence operationshave targeted France, the Netherlands, Hungary, Austria, and the CzechRepublic, among others. Right-wing extremist parties like Jobbik inHungary, Golden Dawn in Greece, the Northern League in Italy, and theFront National in France are benefitting from loans originating in Russianbanks. 4 Influence operations continue along a spectrum from illegal andclandestine to legal propaganda and within the “gray zones” between. InGreat Britain, for example, Russia Today has broadcast programs in supportof the election of Jeremy Corbyn to head the British Labour Party,championing Corbyn’s resistance to economic ties with Ukraine and hisopposition to Western military intervention in Eastern Europe. RussiaToday likewise criticized the results of a Scottish referendum on Britain’sTrident base at Faslane, suggesting the results were rigged.5Economic coercion. In the early phases of the Ukraine conflict, the RussianFederation attempted to both blackmail and cajole the Kyiv government intocooperation using economic and financial power. In an attempt topopularize and prop up its political ally, Viktor Yanukovych (who had7
Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Fostering Effective C-UWgained the presidency of Ukraine in 2010) by offering reduced prices fornatural gas. In November 2013, Yanukovych, who had been pursuing closerties with the European Union, bowed to Russian pressure and reversedcourse, deciding to abandon European integration in favor of closer ties toMoscow. This decision led to the Euromaidan crisis and the president’seventual ouster, but in the face of the initial popular uprising, Putin andYanukovych signed the Ukrainian-Russian Action Plan treaty, whichdiscounted Ukraine’s natural gas purchases by a third and provided forRussia to buy up 15 billion in Ukrainian government bonds to alleviate thedebt crisis. The ploy did not work, but it served as an example of how Putinwould not hesitate to use his control of the Russian economy to influenceevents in the near abroad.White, gray, and black propaganda. The Putin regime has demonstratedstrong interest in and mastery of so-called “white propaganda”—i.e., thelegal, overt use of various media to persuade targeted populations towardpro-Russian agendas. Gray propaganda originates from unclear sources.Black propaganda emanates from the opposite side that it claims to comefrom. Closely associated with such efforts is the practice of civil agitationto encourage opposition to the government in general or against a specificpolicy.Espionage. Russian intelligence agencies include the Foreign IntelligenceService (SVR), the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), and the FSB.These successor agencies of the Soviet-era intelligence apparatus are activeinside and outside of Russia and constitute a major pillar of the Russiangovernment. They routinely deploy agents clandestinely to gatherintelligence, particularly against states that threaten Russia, or states inwhich the Russian government has a foreign policy interest. Intelligenceefforts include gathering information that give the Kremlin diplomaticleverage over a prospective target country, as well as spreadingdisinformation to sow civil discord.Fifth columns. Russia has also demonstrated the capacity to recruit,develop, support, and control insurgent groups within target states that,during peacetime, agitate in favor of the Kremlin’s policy objectives. In awar, these groups can evolve into military proxies in support of Russianmilitary intervention.8
Chapter 1. Introduction and SummaryCyberwarfare. The Russian government has demonstrated increasinglysophisticated capability and willingness to launch cyberattacks on statesthat resist Russia. Following a dispute over the fate of the Soviet war statuein Tallinn in April 2007, Estonia suffered a devastating and sustainedcyberattack that targeted government websites, banks and other financialinstitutions, the parliament, newspapers and broadcasters. The distributeddenial-of-service (DDOS) attacks lasted for three weeks and then suddenlystopped. Although never legally attributed to the Russian government, mostexperts agree that the attacks were directed or at least coordinated with theKremlin. In 2008, before and during the Russo-Georgian War, Moscowdirected a wide-ranging cyberattack against Georgian government and newsmedia computers, effectively rerouting the news servers to servers inRussia. The result included Russia’s increased ability to manipulate thenews reports of the war. Likewise, starting in 2014, Russia launched acyberwarfare campaign against Ukraine, targeting government websites,communications centers, and other critical infrastructure. In 2016, theUnited States accused Russia of conducting cyberwarfare during theAmerican presidential election campaigns, and of working with the criminalorganization WikiLeaks to hack into the email accounts of Americanpoliticians and their staffs. Because current technology makes it difficult totrace the origins of cyberattacks, Russia and other countries continue todevelop this line of attack against opposing states.Military actionsUse of SPETSNAZ. Russian aggression in Crimea and Eastern Ukrainefeatured the widespread use of SPETSNAZ from a variety of organizations,both military and intelligence. Russia recruits SPETSNAZ domestically aswell as from among populations on the strategic periphery. In the Ukraineconflict, SPETSNAZ showed up in nondescript but professional uniformsdevoid of insignia, earning them the nickname “Little Green Men.” Theintent was to rapidly seize key installations and avoid armed conflictthrough preemption and intimidation.Use of paramilitary organizations. The conflict in Ukraine also featuredRussia’s delivery of paramilitary organizations to bolster Russian strength9
Case Studies in Insurgency and Revo
professional education, and training. From its inception, ARIS has been focused on exploring historical . The term "unconventional warfare" is used in this study in a general sense to describe irregular warfare (specifically Russia's New Generation Warfare), including political, diplomatic, military, economic, financial, .
Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka (1976–2009) Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II (pub. 1961) Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953–1959 (pub. 1963)
insurgency and its current manifestation on a global scale by the Salafi Jihad movement. This is important work, laying out the case that as terrorism and insurgency differ, recognizing that the current "long war" is actually being fought by the other side as an insurgency must lead us
series b, 580c. case farm tractor manuals - tractor repair, service and case 530 ck backhoe & loader only case 530 ck, case 530 forklift attachment only, const king case 531 ag case 535 ag case 540 case 540 ag case 540, 540c ag case 540c ag case 541 case 541 ag case 541c ag case 545 ag case 570 case 570 ag case 570 agas, case
THE SRI LANKAN INSURGENCY: A REBALANCING OF THE ORTHODOX POSITION A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Peter Stafford Roberts Department of Politics and History, Brunel University April 2016 . 2 Abstract The insurgency in Sri Lanka between the early 1980s and 2009 is the topic of this
The consequences for Sri Lankan society have been both marked and severe, and their legacy will almost certainly be felt for many years to come. - 3 - . insurgency in the south and the ongoing conflict in the north and east. Insurgency groups too have been responsible for thousands of abductions, disappearances and murders. .
! ! 1!!Master!Thesis! pproach!to! CSRManagement?”!!!!! ;Management,&Politics&and
The protracted insurgency in Sri Lanka is a vicious by-product of prolonged ethnic conflict between Sri Lanka’s majority Sinhala Community and the minority Tamil Community. The current wave of violence can be traced back to the early 1970s, when a group of Sri Lankan
case 721e z bar 132,5 r10 r10 - - case 721 bxt 133,2 r10 r10 - - case 721 cxt 136,5 r10 r10 - - case 721 f xr tier 3 138,8 r10 r10 - - case 721 f xr tier 4 138,8 r10 r10 - - case 721 f xr interim tier 4 138,9 r10 r10 - - case 721 f tier 4 139,5 r10 r10 - - case 721 f tier 3 139,6 r10 r10 - - case 721 d 139,8 r10 r10 - - case 721 e 139,8 r10 r10 - - case 721 f wh xr 145,6 r10 r10 - - case 821 b .
