Report On Distributed Generation Penetration Study

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August 2003 NREL/SR-560-34715Report on DistributedGeneration Penetration StudyN. MillerGE Power SystemsSchenectady, New YorkZ. YeGE Global Research CenterNiskayuna, New YorkNational Renewable Energy Laboratory1617 Cole BoulevardGolden, Colorado 80401-3393NREL is a U.S. Department of Energy LaboratoryOperated by Midwest Research Institute Battelle BechtelContract No. DE-AC36-99-GO10337

August 2003 NREL/SR-560-34715Report on DistributedGeneration Penetration StudyN. MillerGE Power SystemsSchenectady, New YorkZ. YeGE Global Research CenterNiskayuna, New YorkNREL Technical Monitor: B. KroposkiPrepared under Subcontract No. NAD-1-30605-01National Renewable Energy Laboratory1617 Cole BoulevardGolden, Colorado 80401-3393NREL is a U.S. Department of Energy LaboratoryOperated by Midwest Research Institute Battelle BechtelContract No. DE-AC36-99-GO10337

NOTICEThis report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United Statesgovernment. Neither the United States government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees,makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy,completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or representsthat its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercialproduct, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarilyconstitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States government or anyagency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflectthose of the United States government or any agency thereof.Available electronically at http://www.osti.gov/bridgeAvailable for a processing fee to U.S. Department of Energyand its contractors, in paper, from:U.S. Department of EnergyOffice of Scientific and Technical InformationP.O. Box 62Oak Ridge, TN 37831-0062phone: 865.576.8401fax: 865.576.5728email: reports@adonis.osti.govAvailable for sale to the public, in paper, from:U.S. Department of CommerceNational Technical Information Service5285 Port Royal RoadSpringfield, VA 22161phone: 800.553.6847fax: 703.605.6900email: orders@ntis.fedworld.govonline ordering: http://www.ntis.gov/ordering.htmPrinted on paper containing at least 50% wastepaper, including 20% postconsumer waste

List of tributed energy resource(s)distributed generationdistributed resource(s)electric power systemFederal Energy Regulatory CommissionInstitute of Electrical and Electronics EngineersNotice of Proposed Rulemakingpoint of common coupling, point of common connectionPositive Sequence Load Flowuniversal interconnectWestern Energy Coordinating CouncilWestern Systems Coordinating Counciliii

Executive SummaryIn the future, power distribution systems now controlled by large power generators will beenhanced with more distributed energy resource (DER) architectures in which the demarcationsbetween providers and users of power are less restrictive. Industry is concerned about howexisting electric power systems (EPSs) can accommodate these changes because they will affectthe economics and performance of power delivery. One key area of concern is the technicaldetails of interconnecting distributed generation (DG) with the EPS.This report documents part of a multiyear research program dedicated to the development ofrequirements to support the definition, design, and demonstration of a DG-EPS interconnectioninterface concept. The interconnection must allow DG sources to be interconnected with the EPSin a manner that provides value to the end user without compromising reliability or performance.The report focuses on the dynamic behavior of power systems when a significant portion of thetotal energy resource is DG. The work documented here results from the second year of studyand builds extensively on the first-year results [1].In the first-year effort, a virtual test bed was developed to explore how distributed generatorsinteract with the EPS and with one another under a range of realistic conditions. That effortexamined response to events such as short circuits on power lines, line switching operations, andload fluctuations. The effects on systems from local distribution feeders to entire multi-gigawattinterconnected power systems were considered. Those explorations focused on a long-term visionof the future in which the majority of DER relies on power electronic inverters for connection tothe power system. That work showed that as the penetration of DG increases, the performancerequirements for the DG become broader. The ability to achieve the desired performance with anautonomous local interconnect becomes limited, and penalties for undesirable behavior, such asover-aggressive DG tripping, become greater.The effort reported here is focused on a nearer-term reality in which the majority of new DG isof a more conventional type that relies on rotating synchronous generators for energy conversion.The characteristics of synchronous machines (termed “rotating DG” in this work for simplicity)are substantially different from those of inverter-based DG and have the potential to substantiallyaffect system performance. Actual data and projections of new DG deployments of a US utilityare included to provide context to the technical examination. The study further examines theconcepts of microgrids and focuses on a near-term reality of single-owner systems (termed“facility microgrids” in this work). A discussion and update of the latest regulatory and standardstrends are provided in the report.The results of explorations reported here reinforce the preliminary findings of the first-year effort.Of particular interest is the reinforcement of the observations that a high penetration of DER doeshave the potential to significantly affect bulk power system performance and that penalties forundesirable behavior, such as overaggressive DG tripping, become greater. The study furtherreinforced the concept that the behavior of microgrids can be made beneficial to both themicrogrid and the host bulk power system. The report identifies areas for further investigation.iv

The results show that the development of a universal interconnect should follow a naturalprogression of functionality, as proposed. Ultimately, higher levels of functionality benefit bothsystem reliability and the economics of DG. The functionality of the universal interconnect mustmeet the basic requirements imposed by the various interconnection standards, most notably IEEE1547, while providing a foundation on which higher levels of functionality can be built.v

vi

Table of ContentsTable of Figures . viiiTable of Tables . ix1.Introduction. 11.1 Background Discussion .11.2 Regulatory Perspectives.11.3 Economic and Equipment Perspectives .31.4 Overview of Technical Approach .42.Penetration and Market Trends. 62.1 Discussion .62.2 Case Study .63.Dynamics of Bulk Power Systems With High DG Penetration . 103.1 Control and Protection of Rotating DG .103.2 System Modeling .123.3 WECC Results .204.Microgrids . 334.1 Introduction.334.2 Facility Microgrid Model.344.3 Microgrid Dynamics .365Summary . 455.1 Study Results Summary.455.2 Implications for Universal Interconnect .475.3 Implications for Standards .475.4 Further Research Needs .476References . 49Appendix A. WECC System Information (Trip Malin to Round Mountain Line Circuit #2) 1 . 50Appendix B. WECC System Information (Trip Malin to Round Mountain Line Circuit #2) 2 . 58Appendix C. WECC System Information (Trip 3 Palo Verte Generators) 1 . 65Appendix D. WECC System Information (Trip 3 Palo Verte Generators) 2 . 73Appendix E. WECC System Information (Trip 3 Palo Verte Generators) 3 . 81Appendix F. WECC System Information (Trip 3 Palo Verte Generators) 4 . 89vii

Table of FiguresFigure 2.1.Figure 2.2.Figure 2.3.Figure 2.4.Figure 3.1.Figure 3.2.Figure 3.3.Figure 3.4.Figure 3.5.Figure 3.6.Figure 3.7.Figure 3.8.Figure 3.9.Figure 3.10.Figure 3.11.Figure 3.12.Figure 4.1.Figure 4.2.Figure 4.3.Figure 4.4.Figure 4.5.Figure 4.6.Figure 4.7.Figure 4.8.Figure 4.9.Figure 4.10.Figure 4.11.Declining contract resources (studied utility) . 6Pareto of known scheduled DG additions (studied utility). 7Units less than 2 MW – Pareto of known scheduled DG additions(studied utility). 8Units more than 2 MW and less than 20 MW – FERC Level 2 Pareto ofknown scheduled DG additions (studied utility) . 9Generic rotating synchronous distributed generator model . 14Generic rotating synchronous DG exciter model. 15Generic rotating synchronous DG governor model . 16Positive sequence DG inverter-based model with anti-islanding paths. 17Major transmission in WECC. 18Power flows around the California-Oregon border (Malin station) in WECC. 19Major transmission fault in WECC – comparison with basic controls. 22Major transmission fault in WECC – comparison of various rotating DGcontrols. 24Major generation loss event in WECC – comparison with basic controls . 26Major generation loss event in WECC – comparison of various rotating DGcontrols. 28Major generation loss event in WECC – effect of under frequency tripping . 30Major generation loss event in WECC – effect of active anti-islanding . 32One-line of facility – active and reactive power flows . 35One-line of facility – resistance and reactance of network elements. 36Microgrid load bus voltage – following grid disturbance. 38Active power into microgrid – following grid disturbance . 38Microgrid load motor speeds – following grid disturbance. 39Microgrid load currents – following grid disturbance . 39Microgrid load voltages – following grid disturbance and trip to island. 41Microgrid main bus voltages – grid disturbance and trip to island. 41Microgrid DG reactive power outputs – grid disturbance and trip to island . 42Microgrid DG active power outputs – grid disturbance and trip to island . 42Microgrid DG currents – grid disturbance and trip to island. 43viii

Table of TablesTable 3.1.Table 3.2.Table 3.3.Generator Model Parameters .15Exciter Model Parameters.16Governor Model Parameters .17ix

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1Introduction1.1 Background DiscussionTraditional nonutility-generated power sources, such as emergency and standby power systems,have minimal interaction with the electric power system (EPS). As distributed generation (DG)hardware becomes more reliable and economically feasible, there is an increasing trend tointerconnect those DG units with existing utilities to meet various energy needs and offer moreservice possibilities to customers and the host EPS. Among these possibilities are: Standby/backup power to improve the availability and reliability of electric powerPeak load shavingCombined heat and powerSales of power back to utilities or other usersRenewable energyPower quality, such as reactive power compensation and voltage supportDynamic stability support.This trend is fueled and accelerated by utility deregulation.Safe and reliable operation of the power system will increasingly be influenced by distributedenergy resources (DER). Penetration is a measure of the amount of DER compared with the totalgeneration resource on a power system. In the broadest sense, this applies to the entireinterconnected grid. However, the concept of local penetration is valuable, as well. A fewmegawatts of generation can represent a substantial penetration on a small system or the localportion of a large system. Further, penetration is not a static measure. A relatively small amountof installed DG might represent a high level of penetration when the system is at light load.A broad vision of DER includes widespread deployment of a range of new technologies. In thatlong-term view, the majority of attractive emerging DER technologies relies on power electronicinverters for connection to the power system. These technologies include fuel cells,photovoltaics, and microturbines. The first year of effort examining penetration focused on thosetechnologies.In the nearer term, the reality is that most (on a total kilowatt basis) of the DER being built andplanned are more conventional, synchronous machine-based generation. The investigationreported here focused mainly on this nearer-term reality but with the same objectives ofidentifying system performance issues, quantifying functional requirements for the successfulinterconnection of DG, maximizing benefits and minimizing risks, and adding to the growingbody of engineering knowledge required for the successful evolution of power systems.1.2 Regulatory PerspectivesThe current thrust of distributed resource-related regulatory initiatives is on the removal ofobstacles to the interconnection of distributed resources (DR) and the promotion of DR as aplayer in the energy market.1

In the past, the Area EPS operator has been the sole arbiter deciding the requirements for anacceptable interconnection of DR to the Area EPS. These requirements have often become acontentious issue, with DR proponents claiming obstructionism on the part of Area EPSoperators. In some cases, the requirements are justified and necessary when judged from thetraditionally conservative engineering standpoint characteristically applied to utility powersystems. In other cases, the Area EPS is taking a risk-averse posture by concentrating on thenegative aspects of the DR interconnection and the potential risks and liabilities to which theymight expose the Area EPS. And, in still other cases, the requirements do present the clearimpression of intentional obstructionism.1.2.1 Standardized Interconnection Technical RequirementsIn general, regulatory bodies and standards groups are attempting to settle the contention byestablishing uniform interconnection requirements for DR. This process began with the Instituteof Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 929, which focused on smallphotovoltaic DR. Several states followed, and the scopes of their interconnection requirementswere expanded to a wider range of DR. To a great extent, the technical provisions of IEEE 929influenced state standards.For the DR manufacturer, the need to design DR and interconnect hardware to meet the disparateinterconnection requirements of each of the states is itself an impediment. In 1998, IEEEinitiated development of a new standard, 1547, to develop uniform interconnect requirements forall types of DR rated 10 MW and less. When this report was written, IEEE 1547 had beensuccessfully balloted and was on its way to publication. It is anticipated that most states willadopt and codify this standard with minimum modification.The development of 1547, and its future application, is complicated by the large variations indistribution system configurations and situations into which DR may be connected and thewidely differing performance characteristics of DR technologies. To achieve a consensus, andbecause of the virtual impossibility of considering every possible system situation, 1547 sets aminimum standard to which additional requirements may need to be added.The scope of 1547 is limited to requirements that can be met at the point of common coupling(PCC) between the DR owner’s facility (Local EPS) and the Area EPS. Effects on the Area EPSare not fully addressed. Also, the standard does not impose any limitation or additionalrequirements on the basis of DR penetration.Inherent to the development of 1547 was the assumption of a relatively low DR penetration inthe Area EPS. There is an inherent compromise between DR interconnection requirements forthe avoidance of islanding and the security of the EPS when there is significant penetration onthe particular distribution circuit or on the larger interconnected grid [2]. Because the provisionsof 1547 were drafted in the context of today’s low DR penetration, the balance between theconflicting goals was heavily weighted towa

Penetration is a measure of the amount of DER compared with the total generation resource on a power system. In the broadest sense, this applies to the entire interconnected grid. However, the concept of local penetration is valuable, as well. A few megawatts of generation can represent a substantial

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