Technical Study On Smart Borders - Statewatch
Technical Study on SmartBordersFinal ReportWritten by PwCOctober – 2014
EUROPEAN COMMISSIONDirectorate-General for Home AffairsDirectorate C— SchengenUnit C.3 — Transeuropean Networks for Freedom and Security and Relations with eu-LISAContact: Marc SULONE-mail: HOME-SMART-BORDERS@ec.europa.euEuropean CommissionB-1049 Brussels
EUROPEAN COMMISSIONTechnical Study on SmartBordersFinal ReportDirectorate-General for Home Affairs2014EUREN
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answersto your questions about the European Union.Freephone number (*):00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11(*)The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phoneboxes or hotels may charge you).LEGAL NOTICEThis document has been prepared for the European Commission however it reflects the views only of the authors, and theCommission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://www.europa.eu).Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014ISBNdoi: European Union, 2014Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
RevisionsDate–ReleaseNotes15/04/2014v.3.0 Snapshot reportThe very first version of the report.30/04/2014v.5.1Enhanced version of Snapshot report.15/05/2014v.8.0 Inception reportThe first version of Inception report.05/06/2014v.9.0 Inception reportThe second version of Inception report.10/06/2014Chapters 3 and 4Enhanced version of chapters 3 and 4 to MSreview.16/06/2014v.9.5 Snapshot reportThe main amendments of this version are providedin the processes, architecture and statisticschapters. The assessments of legislative proposalcompliance have been added to the processes,biometrics and data chapters.20/06/2014v.10.0 Inception reportThe third (final) version of Inception report. Thisversion contains the results of investigations onthe Thematic Files 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14,and addresses the comments received on theprevious versions (8.0 and 9.0).30/06/2014v.11.0 Draft final reportThe first version of Draft final report. It addressesall the Thematic Files.15/07/2014v.12.2 Draft final reportThe second version of Draft final report whichaddresses the comments received on the version11.0.17/07/2014v.12.3 Draft final reportThe update of v.12.2.12/08/2014v.13.0 Draft final reportThe third version of Draft final report whichaddresses the comments received on the version12.3.15/08/2014v.14.0 Final reportThe first version of Final report.15/09/2014v.15.0 Final reportThe second version of Final report.19/09/2014v.16.0 Final reportThe update of v.15.010/10/2014v.17.0 Final reportThe third version of the Final report.5
Table of ContentsExecutive SummaryError! Bookmark not defined.1. Introduction131.1Objective261.2Scope272. Methodological approach292.1. Overall approach292.2. Analysis criteria302.3. Options analysis312.4. Basic assumptions322.5. Relevant sources of law363. EES and RTP - Border Control Processes383.1. Context393.1.1. Border processes today3.2. The EES process (TF4.1, TF6.1, TF6.2 and TF8.1)40413.2.1. Overview of EES423.2.2. Process description433.3. The RTP process (TF4.1, TF7.1, TF7.2, TF8.2)573.3.1. Overview of RTP573.3.2. Process description for application/enrolment process593.3.3. Process description at entry and exit663.3.4. Consultation of the RTP database (TF 7.3)703.3.5. Alternative options to the token (TF10)713.3.6. Identification of the possible interactions between EES and RTP (TF7.4)743.3.7. Consulting the EES in the VIS application process753.4. Impact of EES and RTP3.4.1. Impact on Border Crossing Points crossing time, security and complexity (TF5)75763.4.2. Impact on average border crossing time for TCNs and general impact on queues at entry and exit(TF 5.3 and TF 5.4)853.4.3. Impact on the resources of Border Crossing Points (TF 5.5)883.4.4. Impact in relation to Local Border Traffic (TF 4.4)893.4.5. Impact in relation to residence permits in EES and RTP (TF4.3)933.4.6. Variations for air, land and sea borders (TF4.2/TF8.3)953.5. Process accelerators–1067
3.5.1. Decreasing the average crossing time (TF9.1)1063.5.2. Organisation of Border Crossing Points (TF9.2)1133.5.3. Minimising the number of documents used (TF9.3)1153.5.4. Process automation (TF8.4)1163.5.5. Using iris as an accelerator1173.5.6. Process Accelerators – summary1183.6. The RTP process – alternative proposal1193.6.1. Overview of the RTP (alternative)1193.6.2. Consequences for the report1223.7. Smart borders: EES and RTP summary of options1233.7.1. EES1243.7.2. RTP (entry –exit)1373.7.3. Main general recommendations for successful implementation of EES and RTP (processes)1393.8. Compliance with the EES legislative proposal and with other legal instruments1413.9. Compliance with the RTP legislative proposal and with other legal instruments1464. Use of biometric characteristics1494.1. Objectives, approach and structure of this chapter1494.1.1. Objectives1494.1.2. Approach1494.1.3. Structure1504.2. Context1504.2.1. Biometric characteristics related to the EES and RTP1504.2.2. Sources used for the TF analysis1534.3. TF analysis1544.3.1. Evaluation factors that contribute to the TF analysis1544.3.2. Observations related to these factors1564.4. Biometric characteristics in the EES (TF1)1594.4.1. Number of fingerprints to be used (TF1.1)1594.4.2. EES and RTP biometric options capturing fingerprints (TF1.2)1634.4.3. Synergies with other systems (VIS, RTP) (TF1.3)1664.4.4. Impact of the use of the biometric identifier on the border control process as well as on enrolmenttime (incl. degraded mode) (TF1.4)1674.4.5. Use of facial recognition in combination with the use of fingerprints (TF1.5)1694.4.6. Facial image/fingerprints possibly captured from the travel document (TF1.6)1704.5. Biometric characteristics in RTP (TF2)1724.5.1. Biometric identifier(s) to be used for RTP (TF2.1)1724.5.2. Impact of the use of biometric identifier(s) on the border control process (TF2.2)1764.5.3. How and when to capture them? (TF2.3)1764.5.4. Synergies with other systems recording biometrics, Visa information System (VIS) and EES (TF2.4)1764.5.5. Impact of the use of biometric identifiers on the border control process including the degraded mode(TF2.5)177
4.6. Transition period (TF3)1784.6.1. Broad analysis of possible options1784.6.2. Advantages and disadvantages of an alphanumeric-only EES transition period (TF3.1)1824.6.3. Consequences of having an EES transition process without biometric identifiers (TF3.2)1834.6.4. Advantages and disadvantages of a phased approach (TF3.3)1844.7. Data protection considerations1854.7.1. Extension of the use of biometric characteristics for identification purposes to all TCNs1854.7.2. Main options analysed1864.7.3. Use of fingerprints only, for both EES and RTP1914.7.4. Use of facial images only1914.7.5. Combined use of fingerprints and facial images, for both EES and RTP1924.8. Impact of the different options on legislative proposals and relevant legislation in force1935. Data1965.1. Context1965.2. Minimum dataset required to fulfil the EES and RTP objectives (TF11.1)1965.2.1. Dataset foreseen by the EES legislative proposal1985.2.2. Proposal of a data model for EES and RTP1985.2.3. EES minimum dataset2005.2.4. Analysis of the candidate data sources for EES2045.2.5. Dataset outlined in the RTP legislative proposal2065.2.6. EES and RTP data management2075.2.7. Identification of the biometric identifier(s)2115.3. Retention period (TF12)2145.3.1. RTP and EES data retention as per the legislative proposals2145.3.2. Alternative options in case of EES and RTP as separate systems2185.3.3. Considerations regarding data retention in the case of a single system2245.3.4. Considerations regarding coherence with VIS data retention2265.4. Law Enforcement Access (TF13)2285.4.1. Analysis of statistics concerning LEA to VIS (TF 13.1)2285.4.2.Definition of the data required for LEA to the EES (TF 13.3)2305.4.3.Technical consequences of LEA (TF 13.2, 13.5)2345.4.4.Impact of LEA on the border control process (TF 13.4)2375.5. Output of EES and RTP systems (TF14)2375.5.1. EES/RTP System outputs – information to be provided to the border guards2385.5.2. EES/RTP System outputs – information to be provided to the travellers2385.5.3. EES and RTP system(s) outputs – information to be provided to the carriers243–9
5.6. Data protection considerations on the options brought forward by the Study2455.6.1. Minimum dataset2455.6.2. Further processing of data2465.6.3. Balance between system integration and data protection2465.6.4. Law enforcement access2475.7. Impact on legislative proposals and relevant legislation in force2475.8. Summary2506. Architecture2546.1. Context2556.1.1. Expectations, needs and capabilities2556.1.2. Link to the EES and RTP processes2576.1.3. Broader issues to be taken into account2656.1.4. High-level requirements2656.1.5. Architecture building blocks2676.2. General architecture2706.3. EES and RTP: single or separate systems (TF11.2, TF15)2736.3.1.Comparison of EES and RTP data sets (TF11.2)2736.3.2.Option 1: two separate systems (TF15.1.1)2766.3.3.Option 2: a single system (TF15.1.2)2796.3.4.Comparison of the two options (TF15.2)2826.4. EES, RTP and VIS: independent or integrated (TF 16)2826.4.1.Comparison and synergies of EES, RTP and VIS (TF16.1, TF16.2)2826.4.2.Option 1: EES and RTP independent from VIS2846.4.3.Option 2: EES and RTP integrated with VIS2876.4.4.Option 3: Progressive approach: re-using VIS artefacts allowing further synergies2926.4.5.Common SOA-based BMS (TF16.4)2956.4.6.Comparison of the options2976.5. Interaction with other IT systems (TF17)2976.5.1.Other IT systems used for the Border Control Processes (TF17.1)2976.5.2.Potential interaction and dependencies between the systems (TF17.2, TF17.3)2996.5.4.Consultation mechanism between authorities (TF17.4)3056.6. Re-use and integration of existing national systems (TF18)3056.6.2.Possibilities to re-use or integrate the existing systems with EES and RTP (TF18.1, TF18.3)3066.6.3.Data aggregation (TF18.4)3076.6.4.Definition of the common interface (TF18.2)3087. Statistics and forecasts3227.1. Statistics on visas issued3237.2. Data collection from the MS in 20143247.2.1. Overview of data collection exercise3247.2.2. Outcome of the one-week data collection325
7.3. Extrapolations and forecasts3297.3.1. Extrapolation from one-week values to yearly values3297.3.2. Estimation of growth rate for the forecasts3317.3.3. Outcome and summary of key forecasts for 2020/20253337.3.4. Estimation of the number of individual files3357.3.5. RTP demand estimation3388. Conclusions3418.1. Introduction3418.2. EES TOMs A, B and C3488.2.1. Overview3498.2.2. Estimated durations, security and complexity by each TOMs3508.2.3. Evaluation of the TOMs for the EES (A, B and C)3558.3. RTP TOMs M and N3588.3.1. Overview3588.3.2. Simulations results related to RTP3608.3.3. Summary of the TOMs for the RTP (M and N)3609. Options for the Pilot363Appendix A. - List of abbreviations369Appendix B. - Glossary372Appendix C. - Reference documents375Appendix D. - Biometrics overview378D.1. Introduction to biometrics378D.2. Introduction to electronic passports381D.3. Security features to protect biometric data in e-Passports381D.3.1. Summary of e-passport logical security mechanisms381D.3.2. Logical security mechanisms of e-passports384D.4. Security analysis389D.4.1. Security390D.5. Role of biometrics in existing systems397D.6. NIST biometric evaluations398D.6.1. Fingerprint398D.6.2. Face398D.6.3. Iris398D.6.4. Multiple Biometrics398D.7. Further references399Appendix E. - Case Law400–11
Appendix F. - Exceptions402F.1. Handling exceptions at entry and exit402F.1.1. EES Check402F.1.2. EES Entry-exit404F.2. Handling exceptions – RTP enrolmentF.2.1. RTP entry-exit406408Appendix G. - Assessment tables for the technical options for the Pilot410Technical options for the use of data and biometrics410Appendix H. - Overview of the relevant existing systems412H.1.1. Visa Information System (VIS)412H.1.2. Schengen Information System (SIS II)414H.1.3. National border control initiatives415Appendix I. - Thematic Files417Appendix J. - Simulations border control processes421J.1. Simulation of air borders423J.1.2. Summary of the results – air bordersJ.2. Simulation of land borders427432J.2.2. Summary of the results – land borders432J.2.3. Summary of the results – RTP436Appendix K. - Topics for further studies440
Executive SummaryThe “Smart Borders Package” was proposed by the Commission in February 2013. It followsthe European Commission (EC) Communication of February 2008 suggesting the establishmentof an Entry/Exit System (EES) and a Registered Traveller Programme (RTP). The SmartBorders Package is constituted of three legislative proposals. It aims to improve themanagement of the external borders of the Schengen Member States (MS), fight againstirregular immigration and provide information on overstayers, as well as facilitate bordercrossings for pre-vetted frequent third country national (TCN) travellers.During the first examination of the Smart Borders Package, which was completed in February2014, the Council and the European Parliament (EP) voiced technical, operational and costconcerns, mainly related to the overall feasibility of the proposed new systems and of someof their features. Concerns related especially to the impact on the actual border control process,the RTP token, the data retention period in the EES, the choice of biometric identifiers, the extentto which national Entry/Exit Systems could be integrated and/or reused, the need for enhancedsynergies and/or interoperability with existing border control systems, and the possibility for lawenforcement authorities to access the EES.In order to further assess the technical, organisational and financial impacts of the various possibleways to address these issues, the Commission subsequently initiated – with the support of bothco-legislators – a proof of concept exercise aimed at identifying options for implementing theSmart Borders package. This exercise consists of two stages:1. A Commission-led Technical Study (this report) aimed at identifying and assessing themost suitable and promising options and solutions. Based on this Study, the options andsolutions to be tested through a pilot project should be identified by the end of 2014.2. A Pilot project to be entrusted to the Agency for the Operational Management of large-scale ITSystems in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA), aimed at verifying thefeasibility of the options identified in the Technical Study and validating the selected conceptsfor both automated and manual border controls.This Study addressed a series of questions raised in 20 Thematic Files (TFs) that were jointlyagreed between the EC’s Directorate General for Home Affairs (DG HOME), the MS and EPrepresentatives in February 2014. These questions focused on six domains:1. Statistics2. Biometrics3. Border control processes4. Data5. Architecture6. Costs1.The Study’s methodological approach was primarily based on stakeholders’ consultations throughworkshops, phone interviews and feedback from MS on the draft deliverables. The stakeholdersconsulted included MS, the EP, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), DG HOME, DGJustice (DG JUST), DG Taxation and Customs Union (DG TAXUD), eu-LISA, Frontex andrepresentatives from industry.The Study also built upon extensive desk research, literature review and various on-site visits. Inaddition, a specific data collection survey was carried out at the external borders of the SchengenArea by the MS at the end of May 2014. This survey allowed collecting up-to-date quantitativedata concerning border crossings, including their number and type (air, land and sea), and the1The cost analyses are presented in separate report.Technical study on Smart Borders – Final Report13
categories of travellers (i.e. EU/EEA/CH - abbreviated as EU-citizens, third country nationals eithervisa-exempt (TCNVE) or visa holders (TCNVH)).The Study explored numerous options in relation to biometrics, border control processes, data,architecture and costs, to cover all aspects of the 20 TFs and find the optimal design for theEES and RTP. In order to present feasible combinations of the activities (e.g. enrolment for EESindividual file, EES biometric verification, identification) and the choices to be made to effectivelyoperate the EES and RTP, the concept of potential Target Operating Model (TOM) wasintroduced. Each TOM is unique and corresponds to a possible hypothetical scenario (assembly ofsystem components into a consistent set) for the implementation of the future systems.An overview of each domain addressed in the TFs is provided below. A summary of the suggestedTOMs and options for the Pilot are presented at the end of this Executive Summary.BiometricsThe Study analysed in detail the use of biometric characteristics as a means to enhance andstrengthen identity checks at external borders, and the overall security of border controls.The advantages, drawbacks and specificities derived from the use of biometric characteristics forthe EES and RTP were looked at.The Study evaluated the number of fingerprints (FPs) to be used, the different options to captureFPs and possible synergies with other systems. In addition, it explored the use of facial image(FI) recognition either as standalone biometric or in combination with FPs. The use of iris was alsoconsidered.Concerning the number of FPs to be used for verification and identification, the Studyobserved that 1 FP alone can be used for verification. A higher number of FPs enrolled leads to abetter performance in terms of accuracy (for both identification and verification) and processingtime. Yet, it may lead to problems at certain borders. In particular, taking into account thedifficulty of capturing more than 4 FPs at land borders where limitations in enrolment quality andtime may rise regarding the travellers in vehicle and use of hand-held equipment2. The Studyconsiders the use of 4 FPs for EES and RTP as an approach that will facilitate synergies with theVisa Information System (VIS). The Study also suggests adding the enrolment of 4 and 8fingerprints to the Pilot as one of the test cases involving ABC gates, hand-held equipment andself-service kiosks.The Study also highlighted that if FI would be used in combination with FPs, then it has abeneficial impact on both verification and identification in terms of speed and securityleading to lower false rejection rate and reduction in number of FPs enrolled.Concerning the introduction of FI as a biometric characteristic, the Study concludes that the use ofFI alone is an option to be considered for EES and RTP.The inclusion of FI as a biometric identifier should also be seen in the light of the current ABCgates that mostly handle FI recognition.While the FI can be taken from the electronic machine readable travel document (e-MRTD3)relatively easily, the FPs are impossible to access as long as there is no efficient and constrainingmechanism for distributing the secret cryptographic keys used (so-called Extended Access Controlfor Terminal Access) at an international level (To this end, a shared certificate masterlist atEuropean or Schengen level for exchange of certificates for cryptographic processing isrecommended). For this reason and also because the inclusion of only two FPs in the electronicpassport is optional, the Study suggests not relying solely on FPs taken from the e-MRTD.For the RTP, the Study assessed the possible use of FI only to facilitate border crossings forfrequent travellers. Three possible options were investigated:1. use of FI only;23In any case, all FP-capturing devices should satisfy international security standards (FBI, LivDet and ISO15408) for anti-spoofing purposes., i.e. ‘chip passport’
3.4.1. Impact on Border Crossing Points crossing time, security and complexity (TF5) 76 3.4.2. Impact on average border crossing time for TCNs and general impact on queues at entry and exit (TF 5.3 and TF 5.4) 85 3.4.3. Impact on the resources of Border Crossing Points (TF 5.5) 88 3.4.4. Impact in relation to Local Border Traffic (TF 4.4) 89 3.4.5.
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