Airpower And The Cult Of The Offensive
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COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE,RESEARCH, AND EDUCATIONAIR UNIVERSITYAirpower and the Cultof the OffensiveJOHN R. CARTERMajor, USAFCADRE PaperAir University PressMaxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6610October 1998
DisclaimerOpinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of theauthor, and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force,the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release:distribution unlimited.ii
CADRE PapersCADRE Papers are occasional publications sponsored by theAirpower Research Institute of Air University’s College ofAerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE). Dedicated to promoting understanding of air and space powertheory and application, these studies are published by the AirUniversity Press and broadly distributed to the US Air Force, theDepartment of Defense and other governmental organizations,leading scholars, selected institutions of higher learning, publicpolicy institutes, and the media.All military members and civilian employees assigned to AirUniversity are invited to contribute unclassified manuscripts.Manuscripts should deal with air and/or space power history,theory, doctrine or strategy, or with joint or combined servicematters bearing on the application of air and/or space power.Authors should submit three copies of a double-spaced, type dmanuscript along with a brief (200-word maximum) abstractof their studies to CADRE/AR, Building 1400, 401 ChennaultCircle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. We also ask for anelectronic version of the manuscript on 3.5-inch or 5.25-inchfloppy disks in a format compatible with DOS or Windows. AUPress currently uses Word for Windows 6.0 as its standardword-processing program.Please send inquiries or comments to:Dean of ResearchAirpower Research InstituteCADRE401 Chennault CircleMaxwell AFB AL 36112-6428Tel: (334) 953-6875DSN 493-6875Fax: (334) 953-6739Internet: james.titus@cadre.maxwell.af.miliii
ContentsPageDISCLAIMER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iiFOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .viiABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ixINTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1THE NATURE OF OFFENSE ANDDEFENSE FOR AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5AIRPOWER AND THE IDEOLOGYOF THE OFFENSIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18ROYAL AIR FORCE, 1918–38. . . . . . . . . . . . . .31ISRAELI AIR FORCE, 1967–73 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, 1953–6565. . . . . . . . .IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107PhotographsLord Hugh M. Trenchard andMaj Gen William E. Kepner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32Giulio Douhet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34Lord Hugh M. Trenchard and Maj Gen Ira C. Eaker36. . .Caproni Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38Handley Page Bomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40Hugh M. Trenchard and Col Edward J. Timberlake48v. . .
PageB-47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65Brig Gen Haywood S. Hansell Jr.67. . . . . . . . . . . .Generals Hoyt S. Vandenberg,Matthew B. Ridgway, and Lauris NorstadMaj Gen Nathan F. Twining. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6971B-52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73B-36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75First Launch of the MinutemanSolid-Propellant Missile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . .79Maj Gen Frank M. Andrews81. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Gen Curtis E. LeMay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Polaris Submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vi84–8589
ForewordDogmatic belief in the dominance of the land offensiveinfluenced decisions that resulted in years of futile bloodletting on the Western Front in World War I. Termed the cult ofthe offensive by scholars of the Great War, faith in the offensebecame so unshakable in pre-1914 Europe that militaryorganizations dismissed as irrelevant numerous indications ofits waning power in the face of technological developmentsfavoring the defense. As we know, the belief that airpower isinherently offensive is a recurrent theme in airpower historyand doctrine. Given the predilections of airmen for offensiveoperations, could a cult of the offensive perniciously trapairpower doctrine and lead to similarly disastrousconsequences?By drawing on selected historical experiences of the airforces of Great Britain, Israel, and the United States, MajJohn R. Carter Jr. employs a comparative perspective andrigorous case study methodology to offer a detailed examinat ionof that question. He begins by establishing the theoreticalbackground necessary for case study analysis. Airpowerdefense is defined as those operations conducted to denyanother force’s air operations in a designated airspace.Airpower offense consists of those operations in the airspacedefended by another, or operations conducted outside of one’sown actively defended airspace. Major Carter dissects therelationship between offense and defense to discover thatairpower defense enjoys neither an advantage of position norof time. He thus concludes that traditional Clausewitzianviews relative to the power of the defense do not apply toairpower. The author next describes those factors that mayinject or reinforce a preferential bias for offense into airpowerstrategy and doctrine. Major Carter defines a cult of theoffensive as an organizational belief in the power of the offenseso compelling that a military organization no longer evaluatesits offensive doctrine objectively, which leads to hisexamination of the ramifications postulated to result from anoffensive ideology.Drawing on the histories of three services—Great Britain’sRoyal Air Force from 1918 to 1938, the Israeli Air Force fromvii
1967 to 1973, and the United States Air Force from 1953 to1965—Major Carter offers three case studies to determine ifthe cult of the offensive applies to air forces. He concludesthat cults of the offensive have indeed influenced airpowerdoctrine in the past, and that detailed offensive planning anda critical evaluation of capabilities provide two methods foravoiding this potential trap.Originally prepared as a thesis for Air University’s School ofAdvanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), Airpower and the Cult ofthe Offensive was subsequently selected by the Air ForceHistorical Foundation as the best SAAS thesis for academicyear 1996–97. Major Carter’s work represents a significantcontribution to the growing body of scholarly literature onmilitary aviation, and we are pleased to make it available to awider audience of airpower thinkers and practitioners.JAMES R. W. TITUSDean of ResearchAir Universityviii
About the AuthorMaj John R. Carter Jr. (BS, Duke University; MAS, Embry–Riddle Aeronautical University), a senior pilot with 2,700hours in O-2 and A-10 aircraft, is director, Commander’sAction Group, Headquarters Air Combat Command at LangleyAir Force Base (AFB), Virginia. A distinguished graduate of theReserve Officer Training Corps program, he was commissioneda second lieutenant in the Air Force in May 1982. Aftercompleting undergraduate pilot training at Laughlin AFB,Texas, he was assigned to Shaw AFB, South Carolina, as anO-2 pilot and forward air controller. In 1986 he wasreassigned to the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), MyrtleBeach AFB, South Carolina, as an A-10 pilot. He graduatedfrom the USAF Fighter Weapons School in 1990 and returnedto the 354th TFW as a squadron weapons officer. Afterdeploying to Operation Desert Shield, he was reassigned to the10th TFW, Royal Air Force Alconbury, United Kingdom. Hereturned to Operation Desert Shield as his squadron’sweapons officer and subsequently led 41 combat missionsduring Operation Desert Storm. He was assigned to NellisAFB, Nevada, in 1991 as an instructor pilot in the A-10Division of the USAF Weapons School, where he completed histour in 1995 as the operations officer.Major Carter is a graduate of the USAF Weapon School(where he received the Robbie Risner Award), Air Commandand Staff College, and in 1997 the School of AdvancedAirpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He is married to theformer Melissa Kline, and they have two children, Robert andHannah.ix
IntroductionI am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whateverdoctrine the armed forces are working on now, they havegot it wrong. . . . Still it is the task of military science in anage of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badlywrong.—Sir Michael HowardChesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture3 October 1973Since a complete understanding of the conditions of futureconflict lies beyond the horizon of any strategist, those calledupon in the future to execute doctrine formulated today willlikely find it lacking. The degree to which doctrine fails toanticipate the actual conditions of combat may spell thedifference between victory and defeat. That militaryorganizations entrusted with the preservation of nationalsecurity will strive to develop usable doctrine appearsself-evident, as does the assertion that future conflict will holdsome surprises despite the best efforts of planners, especiallyif a nation enters an unexpected conflict. It is surprising thatdoctrine sometimes turns out to be thoroughly inappropriatefor even an anticipated, foreseen conflict. Obviously noorganization sets out to develop a flawed doctrine, but despitethe best of intentions, some doctrines lead to tragedy for thearmed forces employing them. To help avert such futuretragedies, Airpower and the Cult of the Offensive offersinsights about how to avoid one possible cause of “badlywrong” doctrine.The military doctrines of the European powers in 1914erred terribly by underestimating the power of the defense.Several authors, notably Stephen Van Evera and Jack Snyder,have examined the antebellum characteristics of the majorEuropean powers’ World War I military organizations. Theylabel the myriad causes and effects of their extreme faith inoffense over defense in spite of contrary evidence “the cult (orideology) of the offensive.” 1 The experience of World War I1
CADRE PAPERappears to demonstrate that one way to get doctrine badlywrong is to overestimate the power of the offense.The relationship between offense and defense has longintrigued military theorists. Antoine Henri Jomini and Carlvon Clausewitz addressed the relative strengths and weaknesses of offense and defense in their major works. 2 One ofthe first airpower theorists, Giulio Douhet, claimed that nodefense against aircraft was possible. 3 While acknowledgingthe possibility of defense, both Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-2,United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, the US Air Force’s(USAF) first doctrine publication, and Air Force DoctrineDocument (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, its current versionof its basic doctrine, assert that airpower is inherentlyoffensive.4 Can the cult of the offensive perniciously trapairpower doctrine, and, if so, what are the identifiable symptomsthat an offensive bias may have skewed one’s airpower doctrine?Answering that question is central to this study. This thesisprovides a theoretical background and examines three cases totest the hypothesis that the ideology of the offensive can trapairpower doctrine. After examining the nature of offense anddefense as they apply to airpower, the author offers reasonsmilitary organizations may prefer offensive doctrines. Heidentifies the elements and implications of the cult of theoffensive and investigates a historical case to determine if theairpower doctrine under study was trapped by the cult of theoffensive. The author infers from the case study data symptomsstrategists may use as indicators that their doctrine properly, orimproperly, estimates the effectiveness of the offense. He reviewsthe empirical findings and discusses the implications.The use of evocative words such as trap and cult requiressome additional explanation, lest the reader be misled by thechoice of terminology. This thesis discusses some implicationsof organizational theory for military organizations, inparticular the influence organizational forces can exert on theformulation of military doctrine. For comprehensible, logicallyjustifiable reasons military organizations usually preferoffensive doctrines, and such natural attraction to offense isnot what is meant by a cult of the offensive. Where exactly onedraws the line between the customary, militarily useful appealof the offense and a cult of the offensive are necessarily vague.2
CARTERHowever, the difference is important. The use of cult ismeant to describe, not indict. When doctrine depends onimmediate offense for success either without regard toobservable improvements which have significantlystrengthened the defense, or when known political limitationsprevent the use of the offense, one perceives a criticaldiscontinuity between offensive doctrine and reality. It is thisdiscontinuity, which occurs when offensive preferencecontinues, or even strengthens, in the face of knownlimitations or obstacles to offensive action, that isinvestigated as being possibly attributable to a cult of theoffensive. A cultic belief in the success of the chosenoffense, despite readily available evidence to the contrary,characterizes such instances.Similarly, the use of trap indicates that preference foroffense could make one’s doctrine susceptible to a cult of theoffensive. As demonstrated in 1914, belief in the efficacy ofoffense can become so compelling that defensiveimprovements are ignored as irrelevant, and the ability andrequirement to conduct a successful offensive are no longerquestioned. This dynamic becomes self-reinforcing, and onceacting a powerful offensive preference begets more offense. Itis in this sense that a cult of the offensive can trap doctrine.Robert Jervis asserts that it is possible to ameliorate theeffects of the security dilemma by first recognizing that itexists.5 The author likewise asserts that one may avoid thepotential trap of a cult of the offensive by acknowledgingthe spiraling tendency of offensive doctrines, then remainingalert for symptoms which indicate that such a spiral maybe occurring.The proper use of evidence is critical to drawing any usefulconclusions. One should not fault planners for underestimatin gthe power of the defense when defensive improvements occursecretly or result from an unanticipated technologicalimprovement. For example, Luftwaffe planners did not fullycomprehend how the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) fighter directionnet incorporated radar to increase the power of the defense inthe Battle of Britain. While their intelligence methods maymerit criticism, the Germans did not ignore the influence of3
CADRE PAPERnew technology for the defense; they simply did not haveadequate information to judge its importance. 6It also becomes much easier to find signs that accuratelypredicted the nature of a conflict in hindsight. The historicalrecord may preserve the prognostications of those whocorrectly anticipated how a conflict would unfold, while notpreserving other guesses which, though just as powerful atthe time, turned out to be as wrong as the preferred doctrine.This phenomenon could lead one to conclude, erroneously,that strategists made a clear choice to reject the correctdoctrine for the incorrect one. To demonstrate both the powerand the danger of the ideology of the offensive, the evidencemust show that the potential deficiencies of the offensivedoctrine were apparent, that the organization under study hadthe opportunity to consider the data portending theineffectiveness of its planned offense, and that the militaryorganization nevertheless rejected doctrinal reform in favor ofcontinued emphasis on the offense.The case studies considered here, the doctrines of theRAF in the interwar period through 1938, of the Israeli AirForce (IAF) from 1967 to 1973, and of the USAF from 1953to 1965, are specifically bounded to test the hypothesis.Changing the boundaries could lead to differentconclusions. For instance, the Israeli case begins after theremarkable success of 1967, the British case does notinclude World War II, and the US case examines only theperiod before extensive bombing began in Vietnam. Thecases were selected for this study because they haveimportant similarities. In each case, the airpower doctrinewas offensive. During the time periods under study,airpower employment conditions changed, which leads oneto question the appropriateness of the offensive doctrine bythe end of the period. Each case considers a relatively large,well-funded military organization that had sufficientflexibility to alter its doctrine, if leaders had decided thatdoctrinal reform was necessary. Finally, the lessons gleanedappear to have applicability to today’s airpower doctrinaldevelopment.4
CARTERThe Nature of Offenseand Defense for AirpowerIn summary, the speed, range and flexibility of air powergrant it ubiquity, and this in turn imbues it with an offensivecapability. Because success in war is generally attainedwhile on the offensive, the adage, “the best defense is agood offense,” is almost always true in air war.—Col Phillip S. Meilinger10 Propositions Regarding Air PowerTo analyze the potential influence of offensive ideologies onthe development of airpower doctrines, it is first necessary toclarify the definitions of offense and defense as they apply toairpower. Once the definitions are established, an accuratedescription of the relationship between offense and defense forairpower is possible.Traditional Definitions of Offense and DefenseInterest in the relationship between offense and defense hasincreased with the growing importance of offense-defensetheory in international security studies. 7 Because someelements of this theory are useful for explaining therelationship of offense and defense in airpower, portions merita brief review in this study. Offense-defense theory definesoffense and defense traditionally in terms of the ability to takeor protect territory. 8 The offensive-defensive balance isexpressed as the relative cost of offense and defense. Whileseveral variations of the definition of balance are in use, thekey idea is that the offense has an advantage when itconsumes fewer resources to take territory than to defend it.The theory expresses offense-defense balance as the ratio ofthe investment required in offense to offset an opponent’sinvestment in defense.9 For example, if it requires a 3investment in offense to offset a 1 investment in defense,then the offense-defense balance is expressed as 3:1. Thelarger this ratio, the greater the balance favors the defense.Defense has more of an advantage in a system, like the onecited above as an example, with a balance ratio of 3:1 than inanother system where a 1 investment in defense can be5
CADRE PAPERoffset by a 2 investment in offense, giving a balance ratio of2:1. Still, in both of these systems, the defense has anadvantage. The idea of defense-dominance or offensedominance used to describe ratios other than 1:1 should bemore accurately expressed as advantage. The ability tocompare two systems with different balance ratios and identifymovement of the ratio along a continuum provides more utilitythan making an absolute binary determination. 10 Thisdefinition of offense-defense balance avoids the contentiousclassification of weapons as inherently offensive
completing undergraduate pilot training at Laughlin AFB, Texas, he was assigned to Shaw AFB, South Carolina, as an O-2 pilot and forward air controller. In 1986 he was reassigned to the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina, as an A-10 pilot. He graduated from the USAF Fighter Weapons School in 1990 and returned
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