Marxism And The Dialectical Method: A Critique Of G.A. Cohen

the relations in which they stand. In general, things - or'terms' in Cohen's language - are not affected by theirrelations or context. In other words, relations are externalto, and independent of, the things or terms related: 'theterms bound by relations do not belong to the structurethese relations constitute' (p.35). One is reminded ofLocke's view that relation is 'not contained in the realexistence of things, but (is) something extraneous andsuperinduced' (4-).Things are what they are; they have their beingpurely in themselves and quite independently of the contextof their relations. 'Everything is what it is and not anotherthing' - Bishop Butler's slogan (5) admirably sums up thelogic of this sort of analytical approach.This logic is rejected by dialectical philosophy.Dialectics insists that in order to understand the concretenature of things it is vital to see them in the context oftheir inter-connections with other things within a widerwhole. For dialectics, concrete and particular things arealways and essentially related, connected to and interacting with other things within a larger totality. This contextof relations is internal and essential to the nature ofthings, not external and accidental. By contrast, the analytical approach, with its logic of external relations, hasthe effect of removing things from their context and producing an abstract account of them. It has the effect offragmenting the world into a disconnected series of atomicparticulars and, thereby, producing a mechanical account ofreality. To substantiate and illustrate these points let usnow turn to Marx's theory of history and Cohen's accountof it.2 Forces and Relations of ProductionCohen's account of Marxism is very closely based onMarx's 1859 'Preface'. In part, this reads as follows:In the social production of their life, men enterinto definite relations that are indispensable andindependent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage ofdevelopment of their material productive forces.The sum total of these relations of productionconstitutes the economic structure of society,the real basis, on which arises a legal and political superstructure, and to which corresponddefini te forms of social consciousness. The modeof production of material life conditions thesocial, political and intellectual life process ingeneral. It is not the consciousness of men thatdetermines their being, but, on the contrary,their social being that determines theirconsciousness.(6)An important and valuable part of Cohen's work consists in the careful and detailed accounts he gives of thevarious theoretical terms that Marx here uses. However,although Cohen's analyses of the meanings of particularterms are often very helpful and instructive, the generalpicture that emerges of Marx's theory is more questionable.For example, Cohen's discussion of the notion of theproductive forces is full, useful and important. The productive forces of a society are composed mainly of themeans of production (i.e. instruments of production and rawmaterials) and labour power (i.e. 'the productive facultiesof producing agents: strength, skill, knowledge, inventiveness etc.' (p.32». The relations of production are theeconomic relations of society. The set of economic relations prevailing in a particular society constitutes itseconomic structure, its economic basis. So far so good.However, Cohen insists that forces of production and relations of production be regarded as entirely distinct andseparate from each other. The productive forces are onething, the relations of production another: 'productiveforces are not part of the economic structure' (p.28); 'production relations alone and not productive forces constitutethe economic structure' (p.29).The separation of the different elements and aspectsof society is certainly an essential part of any scientificaccount of it. Analysis - the distinction of different things- is without doubt an indispensable feature of all understanding and all knowledge. Dialectics does not deny this.Indeed, dialectics goes further and insists that analysisshould not be regarded as a merely intellectual and mentalprocess, as a purely conceptual and logical activity, thework of thought alone. For in the concrete historical process itself, different aspects and features separate themselves. The division and conflict between forces and relations of production, for example, is a real historical distinction, a part of the process of actual economic development; and only subsequently does it come to be grasped andreflected accurately in economic thought. Nothing iscloudier and less helpful than the attempt to merge all distinctions together and insist that, in reality, 'all is one'.'As though', in Marx's words, 'this separation had forcedits way from the textbook into real life and not, on thecontrary, from real life into the textbooks' (7).Dialectics does not deny the reality of distinctions,nor the need for them in thought. But it does insist that inconcrete reality different and opposed things are also inunity. It rejects the exclusive, rigid, absolute, either/ordistinctions of analytical thought. In particular, forces ofproduction and relations of production are different andconflicting aspects of a single process: the productive activity of people in society. These different aspects exist inunity. Their unity as well as their difference must berecognised if their nature is to be properly understood.Thus productive forces are productive forces only inthe context of certain relations of production. A machine,for example, requires people to build, operate and maintainit - only given these is it a productive force. A machine isa productive force only in the context of certain relationsof production in which it is employable productively. Nodoubt it is possible to remove a machine entirely from itssurrounding social relations and consider it purely abstractly and in isolation. This is what Cohen dcresin his accountof productive forces. But then one is no longer consideringit as a productive force, but merely in its abstract materialaspect, as a physical object. A machine is regarded in thisway by the physicist or the engineer. This is perfectlyvalid and legitimate, if your interest is confined to its material properties, since a machine is indeed a physical object- a certain configuration of metal and other materials and remains so, whatever the social context in which it isplaced. The historian, however, is interested in the machinenot merely as a physical object, but as an instrument ofsocial production, as a productive force. And a machinebecomes a productive force only in certain social contexts,only in certain relations of production. These relations areessential - that is to say, internal and not merely external- to its being as a productive force (8).Similar remarks apply to labour power, the othermajor constituent of the productive forces. Labour power 'the productive faculties of producing agents' (p.32) - can-5

not be understood if it is abstracted and isolated from thesocial relations in which it is exercised. Man is an essentially social creature, and his powers and capacities areessentially social. In particular, to consider labour power inits abstract and isolated individual form is to blind oneselfto one of the most significant means for its development:social cooperation. Cooperative production - that is,socially coordinated, as opposed to mere individual, production - not only increases the labour power of the individualin a variety of ways, but also brings a 'new power' intobeing: 'the social productive power of labour or theproductive power of social labour' (9). As Marx says,Not only have we here an increase in the productive power of the individual, by means ofcooperation, but the creation of a new power,namely the collective power of the masses.(10)This new collective power is something more than the sumof its parts. An observation by Napoleon, cited by Engels,well illustrates this. The French cavalry were poor riders,but well organised and disciplined; the Mamelukes, on theother hand, were excellent horsemen, but undisciplined. Theresult, according to Napoleon, was thatTwo Mamelukes were undoubtedly more than amatch for three Frenchmen; 100 Mamelukeswere equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300 Frenchmencould generally beat 300 Mamelukes, and 1000Frenchmen invariably defeated 1500 Mamelukes.(11)Labour power cannot be defined in isolation fromsocial relations, since social cooperation itself is a powerful productive force. Modern labour, in particular, is essentially social labour. In engaging in it, man develops hispowers and capaci ties as social powers and capacities, for'when the labourer cooperates systematically with othershe strips off the fetters of his individuality, and developsthe capabilities of his species' (12). So, here too, the conclusion is that productive forces and relations of production cannot be entirely separated and abstracted fro.m eachother. The productive forces are what they are only in thecontext of the appropriate relations of production. Theserelations are thus internal and essential to them, not purelyexternal and distinct.3 Nature and SocietyCohen supports his account of the forces and relations ofproduction with a very interesting discussion of the distinction between nature and society. According to Cohen,The distinction between forces and relationsof production is, in Marx, one of a set of contrasts between nature and society The matteror content of society is nature, whose form isthe social form.(p.98)Cohen's account of these contrasts is among the most valuable and illuminating parts of his book. However, hereagain, there is the same analytic tendency to make absolute and rigid distinctions between these opposites where arecognition of their essential relation and unity is alsoneeded. Cohen, in fact, sees that in concrete circumstancessociety and nature always exist in unity. However, hismethod and logic preclude him from incorporating this insight into his theory; and he insists that these aspects arelogically or 'conceptually' distinct and must, in thought, beheld apart.Viewed physically, production appears strippedof its social form. Production in its asocialaspect is 'material production'; this being thecontent . of production. And that content maybe described in illuminating abstraction from theform with which it is integrated. So if welook through the social form we discern something conceptually separate from it: materialproduction.(pp.98-99)6It is certainly vital to make a distinction between thematerial and the social. Moreover, Cohen is right to stressthat Marxism, as a form of materialism, sees the materiallevel as basic and as the primary determinant of historicaldevelopment.But Cohen makes it an either/or matter.Society and nature, form and content, are portrayed asexclusive opposites, with the social form made entirelyexternal to and logically independent of the material content. The dialectical view, by contrast, is that these opposites, as well as being different and opposed, interact andinterpenetrate; and it rejects any rigid antitheses here, 'asthough', in Marx's words, 'these were two separate "things"and man did not always have before him an historicalnature and a natural history' (13).At times Cohen himself sees this. For example, hesays,The material description captures a society'sunderlying nature. In this sense of 'nature',nature is of course a product of history, changing in and as a result of social forms. Humanityin social organisation thrusts itself against itsenvironment, altering it and its own humannature, for it develops its own powers and needsin the course of the encounter.(p.96)But at other times (and these are the more characteristicones), he ignores this interaction and describes history as aprocess of 'adjustment to nature' (p.285), as though naturewere a purely external and immutable constraint to whichsociety had to conform.This is not a satisfactory way in which to interpretMarxism. Nature and society are not purely external toeach other; on the contrary, they interpenetrate and mutually transform each other. Society not only adapts itselfto nature, but also, and on an ever-increasing scale, society adapts and transforms nature to its needs. The rigid,analytic separation of the natural from the social tends toblind Cohen to these facts. Like Feuerbach, he tends notto see 'how the sensuous world around him is,. not a thinggiven direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, butthe product of industry and the state of society' (14).These problems come out clearly in Cohen's attemptto assimilate Marx's theory to that of the Sophists. Hewrites,Social arrangements cannot alter physical necessities, but social arrangements can be altered.When they are confused with the necessitiesthey arrange, they appear to partake of theimmutability of the latter. The Sophist's distinction between nature and convention is thefoundation of all social criticism and Marx's distinction is a development of it.(p.l07)Physical necessities - if by that is meant the laws ofnature - cannot be altered. That is true. But nature can bealtered by human activity - it is not 'immutable'. The development of human productive power enables man tocontrol nature and to overcome the constraints of hisenvironment; not by transcending or abolishing the laws ofnature, but by using them. Freedom, in the Marxist view, isbased upon 'the recognition of necessity' (15).For Marx, social revolution is not just a matter ofchanging the social form on the basis of an unaltered andunalterable nature. The Sophists indeed said: nature isfixed, but human conventions and social forms are alterable. But Marx is profounder than this. He maintains thatsocial forms are not merely 'conventional' and not changeable just at will. Definite material conditions of productionimpose definite social forms, and it is through the development of material conditions t

Marxism and the Dialectical Method: A Critique of G.A. Cohen Sean Savers . on Hegel's philosophy remain among the most controversial . 'terms' in Cohen's language - are not affected by their relations or context. In other words, relations are external