UNCLASSIFIED ACTION MEMO FOR: PRINCIPA DEPUTL Y

2y ago
15 Views
2 Downloads
1.92 MB
69 Pages
Last View : 19d ago
Last Download : 3m ago
Upload by : Matteo Vollmer
Transcription

UNCLASSIFIEDACTION MEMOFOR: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)FROM: RobeitWpacbeny, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense(SO/LIC&ICV J SUBJECT: Interim Policy Concerning Intelligence Authorities in DoD 5240.1-R"Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components That AffectUnited States Persons."SO/LIC was tasked toreviewa proposalfromthe Assistant to the Secretary ofDefense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD-IO) (TAB A)- They are seeking DcpSecDef approval for an interim change to DoD regulation5240.1-R (TAB B). This change wouldremovethe USD(P) from the review andoversight process for the conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities (red tabs). Although we agree that the regulation and the associated DoD Directive (5240.1, atTAB C) are in need of revision, we do not coneur as written.- Instead, we recommend implementing an interim policy followed by a completerevision of both the regulation and directive top more deliberately reflect the rolesand responsibilities of the USD and USD(P) as they relate to policy oversight ofDoD Intelligence Activities.RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memorandum at TAB D, recommending to ATSD-IOthey pursue an interim ehangeto the regulatiaa'fSnhwed by a complete revision of DoDRegulation 5240.1 -R and DoD Directive 524 I m/j g qq?Approve:Disapprove:V ACOORDINATION;Other: Attachments: as stated A VIfiÉS ÎtiflUlVPrepared By; Garry Reid, SOl/LIC&tC SOCj (b)(2)UNCLAS0 7/ 0 0 6 4EFF1179

UNCLASSIFIEDGoodroe, Michael E Mr OSD ATSD-10From;Sent:To:Cc:Subject:Reld, Garry. CIV, 0SD-P0L1CYTuesday, July 10, 2007 12:30 PMGoodroe. Michael E Mr OSD ATSD-IO; (bK6)1(b)(6) CTR OSD POLICYRE; DoD 5240.1-R (U)CIV OSD POLICYUNCLASSIFIEDMike - Sorry fcir making you wait on Policy. I've been out far several weeks and saw this action yesterday but was toldthat you had been supplied with our input. Evidently thai was not correct.BUt, Under Secretary for Policy, concurs with your proposed revision. TheShort answer Ryan Henry, the Principal Deputyattachment you have (included In (b)(6) emall below) indicates Mr. Henry's approvalLonger answer: Our office recommended that Policy non-concur, and request that your revised regulation retain an aspectof Policy oversight and Involvement in this actions related to the 5240-1R. Mr. Henry non-concurred with ourrecommendation, and wrote "/ concur with DSD, these activities should be transferred to USD(I)." Mr. Henry's pointis clearly that the USD(I) now has the primary responsibility for implementation of the regulation. However, we ask thatwhen you revise the regulation you do not completely remove the Under Secretary for Policy from the information toop.One solution could be to include language that provides an outlet for the USD(P)'s situational awareness, such as "theUSD(I) will notify the USD(P)", or "the USD(I)-.in coordination with the USD(P)".,etc. We think such language would beuseful and necessary to retain Integration and unity of effort between USD(I) and USD(P) on matters pertaining to thesubject regulationPlease let me know if there's anything else you need from us on this action.Thanks,Garry ReidGarry ReidDirector» Spceiai Operations PolicyOASD S O / U C(b)(2)from:Sent;To:CGSubjectGoodroe, Michael E Mr DSD AT5CH0Tuesday. July 10, 2007 9:30 AM(b)(6)CIV OSD POliCYCTR 05D POLICY; Reld, Garry, a v , OSD-POLICY(b)(6)RE: DoD SMQ.l-R (U)UNCLASSIFIED(b)(6)Any updatBon this action?Mike GoodroeJcrv Q5D POLICYFrom:1(b)(6)To:Cc:Subject:Monday, July 02,2007 10:26 ANReid, Garry, CIV, OSD-POUCYGoodroe, Michael E Mr OSD ATSO-iO; (b)(6)DoD 5240.1-R (l )Sent:j CTR OSD POUCYUNCLASSIFIEDEFF1180

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIEDMr. Reid, did you (or someone else in SOC) ever return this non-concur to anyone in ATSD-IO? They re-sent the requesttor coordination to us, saying they never received our reply. Last I have, SOLIC forwarded the completed package to SOC.Just trying to avoid double-tasking this.Thanks a lot.(b)(2),(b)(6)« File: notes5.tif»UNCLASSIFIED2EFF1181

NOEASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFEN! it :7200 DEFENSE PENTAGONWASHINGTON. DC 20301-7200MAY 5(2002Chairman, Intelligence Oversight BoardOld Executive Office Building, Room 494Washington, DC 20500Dear Mr. Chairman:(U) The Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Report for the ;riod Julythrough September 200lis attached.Daniel J. Dell'OrtoPrincipal Deputy General Counsel.George B.ATSD(IO)Attachment:As statedDERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM123-2DATED: 24 FEB 98Declassify on: X ITHIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACH* El IT

Department of Defense Intelligence OversightJuly - September 2001 ŒproO) Significant Intelligence Oversight issues warranting Iattention for this period: None.* (Ep4ro) No significant Intelligence Oversight violations durinj ; his period,TvTSD(IO) monitored 21cases; none require SECDEF/IOB attentic natfiiistime.(b){1)(b)(3)- P.L. 86-36(b)(3) - P.L. 86-36. ) ATSPITQ) Fqliçy çmww TO ft* impact of the ÜSA ATRIOT Act of01 on DoD intelligence Activities and Intelligence Oversight Pfoyemfreri SfilfllL2001: The ATSD(IO), in coordination with the DoD Deputy Gene Counsel forIntelligence, issued a message ón November 15,2001, which provi ddi policyguidance to commanders, supporting DoD intelligence organizatioi is, and intelligenceprofessionals on how the USA PATRIOT Act of2001 impacted th s¿onduct of DoD.intelligence activities and Intelligence Oversight- A copy of the m !s¡age is at TAB A. ( E l ) Intelligence Oversight Inspections: The Office of théA rfiD(IO) conductsmteliigerieliigence Oversight inspections of and staff assistance visits to I o D unitsEF 1183

worldwide. These inspections complement and are in addition to t itse performed byDefense Intelligence Agencies, Combatant Commands, and the Se vces. In addition,they provide insight into the effectiveness of Intelligence Oversighttraining programsthroughout the DoD,. (EPDO) Joint TMMFTTW flTD- ElT w y Very thorwigh, four prongedprogram designed to ensure appropriate familiarity with Intelligent eOversightregulations and to prevent unintentional violations. The inspectorsn.'et with local FBIand DEA senior officials and die military Reservists who had beenas!igned to theirrespective organizations. Military personnel are detailed for 6 moijtlj:s to provideanalysis and analytical training—they are prohibitedfromparticipai gin lawenforcement activities, The inspection team also visited the EI PasbintelligenceCenter, Operation Alliance, and the Border Patrol Special Coord»it 0 1n Cent»:, andtoured U.S. Mexico border and observed U.S. Customs operations aPasotDel NorteEF1184

mport of entry. Texas Army and Air National Guard, under Title 32a ithority anddirection of the Governor, wore observed assisting in customs insje tìons.r(Eprfjü)o) Georgia National Guard ÌGANGY. Atlanta. Georgia: jj flth Ept ArmyReserve¡¿serve Intelligence Support Center fSEARISAO and Joint I e erve IntelligenceSupport Element fJRISE . Fort Gillem. Georgia. GANG Intel! g snce Oversightprogram had improved dramatically duetotwo events: a 1999 vieIs tiion, whichpointed up the need for oversight and was turned into a teaching tc ,andappointment of an Intelligence Oversight officer in May 2000. SBABRISC and JRISEIntelligence Oversight programs were adequate., 2)(b)(2)TO) Intelligence Oversight Trainino at the Western Hemiiofreye Ins,tifateI5r Security Cooperation fWHINSEO. Fort Bearing. Georgia \TSD(IO) andstaff members presented the Intelligence Oversight training courseto 60 LatinAmerican and U.S. students attending the Command and General )i Beers Course atthe WHINSEC. This program providesfiitureLatin American lea rs keen insightsinto how military and civilian leaders in the U.S. balance national eb airity needs withconstitutionally guaranteedrightsof U.S. persons. Feedback fromti e students waspositive; they were most impressed that our instruction admittedip;si mistakes cut thepart of the U.S. Intelligence Community and that the IntelligenceCpvlersight programproactively sought to avoid such incidents in the future.(b)(1)(b)(3) - P.L, 86-36(b)(1)EF 1185

A S S I S T A N T T O THE S E C R E T A R Y O F DEFENSf7 2 0 0 DEFENSE PENTAGONWASHINGTON, DC 20301-7200«JUL9mChairman, Intelligence Oversight BoardOld Executive Office Buildings Room 494Washington, DC 20500Dear Mr. Chairman:The Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Report fortu periodOctober through December 2001 is attached.Daniel J. Dell'OrtoPrincipal Deputy General CounselorgelTSD(IO)Attachment:As statedTHIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS A l f ) PHYSICALREMOVAL OF CODEWORDS AND CAVEATSEF r 1190

Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight ReportOctober - December 2001* J 2 0 Ú U ) Significant Intelligence Oversight issues warranting iil' 5CDBF/ÏOBAttention fpr this period: None.( s i g n i f i c a n t Intelligence Oversight violations du rid this period,ATSD(IO) monitored 20 cases; none require SBCDEF/IOB attenten atthisfime.(b)(1)ŒÉKÏÔ) Intelligence Oversight Inspections: The Office of the A TSD(K ) conduct*telligehce Oversight inspections of and staff assistance visits to oDunits ntelligeiuworldwide. Hie inspections complement and are in addition totha« performed bythe Defense Intelligence Agencies, Combatant Commands, and tileServices. Inaddition, they provide insight'into the effectiveness of IntelligenceOversight trainingprograms throughout the DoD.PoP MffgfflM Qréápftatiw?toPwim fferpianv:' io AlJ (b)(i),(b)(2),(b)(3):i o sinducted an Intelligence Oversight inspe tim aFOSI, and the USAREUR Liaison Office,Bonn, öennany,on November2,2001. All organizations inspected displayed accsptablIjLfeimjiarity.with Intelligence Oversieht concents and had acceptable programjsTheisdivided b e t w e e n j j ' lpresenting significant butmanSadministrative and pr prtblems. (We reported on tfag Hlb, iöffice in the1previous quarter.) pX ).(b)(2).(b)(3):i o u s e §424(b)(1).(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC§424This problem has existed at the last fou :[ )(1).u r n /. we haveinspected; we have identified it to thelFKll' Tland will continue (jo¡heck (b)(1),(b)(¡(b)(1),(b)(2),(bX3):10 USC §424future inspections.5) PpP IntftHigync?flreanfcattonsin Korea-. u.S.Forces Koreaieadquartets; Special Operations Command, Korea; 501st MilitaryIntelligencegâtionsBrigade units; 7 Air Force units; Air Force Office of Special Inv atliSbecialU.S.Detachments; Naval Criminal Investigative Service units; and th:Liaison Advisor, Korea all had satisfactory Intelligence Oversigl tI rograms. Wefound several units whose Intelligence Oversight programs bad ecined because theDERIVED PROM NSA/CSSMDATED: 24 FEB 98'DECLASSIFY" ON; XISE'EF191

FORONLYe-yearmonitor had departed; wefindthis occurs regularly in short tour (01ny because of thisassignment) areas. We inspect short tour areas like Korea frequentproblem. We also encourage commanders to use transition booksm l othermanagement initiatives so that their Intelligence Oversight prograrrjsdon't declinedue to high rotation rates.',Robins AFB. Georgia and Fort McPherson. Georgia: arner-RobinsLogistics Center, 93rd Air Control Wing (JOINT STARS), and herAir Force. Minorunits at Robins AFB had satisfactory Intelligence Oversight prpgrai ni.suggestions for program clarity were madeand accepted. U.S. Fori «! CommandHeadquarters and U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson,Geoi rgia,hadsatisfactory Intelligence Oversight programs.J Ê 0 P 0 Î Outreach Program in Intelligence Oversight in a Pem »« ratic Society ateorge C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Gai n isch, Germany:TÖ2 -iemiergmgThe purpose of the Outreach Program is to ensure future leaders ofdemocracies understand the concepts, importance, and applicabitttj f IntelligenceOversight as they develop their own democratic institutions. Durir gthis quarter, theATSD(I0) and staff members taught this elective at the Marshall C itere to studente! »lovenia, andfrom Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Russiaj,Uzbekistan.Seminars on Intelligence Oversight at National Defero eUniversity. FortIcNair. DC: In October and again in November 2001, the ATSDtt)) presentedseminars ohlntelligence Oversight to two groups of U.S. and forei pa studentsattending the National Defense University at Fort McNair. The sei liiarsthe principles oflntelligence Oversight and emphasized the importfnjce and need forsuch a system to these future senior leaders.ntemet Based Intelligence Oversight Training Proer m i UnderTJevelopmdevelopment: We have proposed and are working appropriate coiiti tactualdocuments to develop an Internet, web-based, learning module thatv ill provide anoverview oflntelligence Oversight, its history, goals, requirementstnd procedures,The initial module will be interactive; available both on the Intone:j nd on CD/ROM;and contain videos, vignettes, and questions to reinforce Intelligent Oversighteknowledge. Upon completion of this initial training module, tailoiir » modules onSignals Intelligence and Human Intelligence will be developed incollaboration withNSA and DIA.ssp&hFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYEF r 1192

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY O F D E F E N S E7 2 0 0 DEFENSE PENTAGONWASHINGTON, DC 20301-7200APR2003Chairman, Intelligence Oversight BoardOld Executive Office Building, Room 494Washington, DC 20500Dear Mr. Chairman:The Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Report for th period:»April - June 2002 is attached There were no significant Intellig nOversight issues warranting IOB attentionforthis period and no i »nificantIntelligence Oversight violations.Daniel J. Dell'OrtoPrincipal Deputy General CounselGeorgeATSD0O)Attachment:As statedTHIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHME2 fT3 A N DPHYSICAL REMOVAL OF CODEWORDS AND CAVEATSEF r 1198

Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Rejpf ;April-June2002 ÛpfOO) Significant Intelligence Oversight Issues warradtii g SECDEF/IOBattention for this period: None. Œ 0 U ) N o significant Intelligence Oversight violations duH:: ig this period. T S D ( I O ) monitored 27 cases; nonerequireSECDEF/IOB attjei tion at thistime.(b)(1)CBßtiftj) Third International- Intelligence Review Agencies Conference: The T S D ( I O ) attended the Third International Intelligence Review \r. AgenciesConference in London, England, on May 13 and 14,2002. Pre vi aus meetingswere in Canberra, Australia (1997) and Ottawa, Canada (1999'. Thisconference was tohave been in Washington in 2001, shortly alte: September11; however, following the terrorist attacks, the United Kingdc m Intelligenceand Security Committee of Parliament offered to host it. The tier U.S.attendees were from CIA,NRO, DIA, NSA, NIMA, and the D P IG. Othercountries represented were Canada, Belgium, New Zealand, Ai is ralia, andSouth Africa. Poland and Slovakia attended for the first time, T ie conferenceagenda reviewed the oversight functions, how they are accomplIii hed in theseveral countries, arid common challenges. Two themes surfac ed throughoutthe discussions. One was the difference between the major cht 1I ¡nges facingthe new democracies who are in the process of developing effe ;t ve oversightmechanisms, and the relatively minor problems in that regüd c f he others withwell-established oversight structures. The second (heme was t e impact of theterrorist attacks of September 11 which kick-started legal deve! opmentsinseveral countries. This brought focus and extensive discussion o " the increasedpowers of intelligence agencies under new anti-terrorism legisl at on and theibersbalance between national security requiremiDerived From NSA/CSSMDated: 24 FEB 98Declassify On: X IST dÊl

tOFjand staff of the United States Congressional intelligence comi litees wereinvited to the conference but did not attend. The next confew ate-will be in theU.S. in 2004 and co-sponsored by the CIA Inspector General fsj,d theATSD(IO). fEpiJu) Intelligence Oversight Inspections and Staff Vistj The Office ofstaff h e ATSD(IO) conducts Intelligence Oversight inspectionsplementand areassistance visits to DoD units worldwide. The inspectionsD, Combatantin addition to those performed by the intelligence agenciesintotheCommands, and the Services. In addition, they provide insijighoutthe DoD.effectiveness of Intelligence Oversight training programsJons and staffJ S P & U ) During this quarter, this office conducted 42 —stateside and in isits of intelligence and counter-intelligence units locatedcomplianceEurope, to include the Balkans. All organizations demons*the Mowingwith DoD and Service Intelligence Oversight regulationsthree exceptions:a NATOThe U.S. intelligence portion of a combined unitCommand lacked an Intelligence Oversight program. The ufrit was under theerroneous perception that NATO regulations superseded n onal laws and nai laws andregulations; whereas in reality, NATO regulations state na i regulations take precedence in ali cases. The unit now has activeIntelligence Oversight program in place.fA Defense Attachi Office was under the imprcsi k n that only U.S.j B Q U & m a t i o n that MLdermEtoryjn nature should be re ported inH Ij T h e D I A I G W f c f i e d o f t h i sconfusion in thefieldtoi conre ve action.(bj(TJ"——ffcBTST]" 1200

SEßftSljNOFpfitl&l(b)(1)(b){1)(b)(3)-P.L 86-36-I¡Isoj&rtfmi 3:EFI 1201:

(b)(1){b)(3)-P.L. 86-36(U) IntelligenceOversightTraining andAwareness: DoDora a dzati«ons"o — uao.»n«I« l«iH M W Wtonfimi» 1tr .i .t . ,0 exhibit active[TOtT*ktelligenee Oversight programs, e.g;, I A trained overl ( b K 3 ) ' i employees, contractors, and students during this period. Uite results of theseprograms are reffeoted in inspection nmnrtojlifi low mimfar nf «itivie IntelligenceOversight cases, (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36EFF 202

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY O F DEFENCE7 2 0 0 DEFENSE PENTAGONWASHINGTON, DC 2 0 3 0 1 - 7 2 0 0 -JUN 3 ! 2103MTCUJCENCCOVER »CHTChairman, Intelligence Oversight BoardOld Executive Office Building, Room 494Washington, DC 20500Dear Mr. Chairman:(U) The Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Report for thepanod JulySeptember 2002 is attached. There were no significant Intelligence Ov'farbight issueswarranting IOB attention for this period and no significant IntelligenceOversightviolations.Daniel J. Dell'OrtoPrincipal Deputy General Counselt A M11ßeorgeB. LotzHtATSD(IO)OAttachment;As statedTHIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS A W PHYSICALREMOVAL OF CODEWORDS AND CAVEATSa EF1203

S j E TDepartment of Defense Intelligence Oversight R jjortJuly - September 2002 ffi TO) Significant Intelligence Oversight issues warrant SECDEF/lOBAttention for this period: None.significant Intelligence Oversight violations diii :ng this period. TSD(IO) monitored 27 cases; nohefè uire SECDEF/lOB at elation atthistime.(b)(1) Intelligence Oversight Inspections and Staff Visits A total of 158Intelligence units received Intelligence Oversight inspect ic ns or steffassistance visits (SAVs) during this quarter. These worldwideinspections/S AVs. were conducted by èfia ÀTSD(IO) and the ii s\ wction arms ofthe intelligence agencies of DoD, the Combatant Commands, i n i the MilitaryDepartments. Although minor administrative issues were iden i ied andcorrected during these inspections/SAjp/rio violations of Intel li »eneeOversight guidance were identified*; results provide insi »1 t into thèeffectiveness of Intelligence Oversight#àining programs throi gJ(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36Production:i(b)(3)-P-L. 86-36(b)(3)-P.L, 86-36Derived From NSA/CSSMDated: 24 FEB 98Declassify On: XIIntegrafi« in An

. ' i\ ht:- -(U) Intelligence Oversight Confereitee: United States Force s Çorea hosted aPehinsula-fadde Intelligence Oversigi aSonference with the oqB e of theATSD(IO) in early September. Theiionjference was followed by staffassistance visits to almost every U.S. intelligence and counterfoil elligence unitin theater. The central theme of the conference and the assist* m.ce visits was theapplication of Intelligence Oversight guidance regarding both f crce protectionand the global war on terrorism. Conference participants, ove 0, includedcommanders, Intelligence Oversight officers, legal advisors, ape Inspectorst * General.(U) The ATSDÇtO) and staff coniinue to make Intelligence O s i g h tpresentations to intelligence related -differences, e.g., Combat in:tCommandattaché conferences.-i i'C 1if(¡ ¡00) Discussions on Intelligence Oversight with Romaijtfn andCroatian Defense Officials:J E B f J f Background. The ATSD(IQ) sponsors an Intelligent Oversight lective at the George C. Marshall European Center for Securi y Studies ittGarmisch, Germany. The focus of the elective is to assist fiitufemilitaiy andtee ofcivilian leaders of emerging democracies to understand the imKrtaniiIntelligence Oversight Feedbackfi-Qm heprogram has led to requests for .additional information on developing program similar to Dolj)' ih a numberof countries*Romania. Under the aegis of the Marshall Center, ft aATSD(IO) metin Bucharest, Romania, on July 15 and 16,2002, with the Befe (tèe Minister,Presidential National Security Advisor, and Chief of the Militab Intelligenceand theand Foreign Representation Directorate. The (b)(3):10 USC §424Embassy's Politico-Military Officer were also present. The 0 0 ease Ministerwas interested in exploring the applicability of the DoD Intellij ;c nee Oversightprogram to Romania as part of their democratization/nile-of-laj process andestablishing their democratic bona fi for NATO membershi . TheATSD(IO). discussed the DoD Intelligence Oversight program detail andoffered to .assist Romania in developing rules, regulations and Mining onIntelligence Oversight. The Director General of Defense Intel! enee wasunavailable and subsequently visitedwith the ATSD(IO) in Ws S wngton inSeptember 2002. Note: A number of Romanian military and c h ilians havea EF1205

SEJNOFtaken the elective course in Intelligence:Oversight taught by tjb OATSD(IO) at:the Marshall Center. ¿ P i f ? Croatia. TheATSD(IO) met; with and briefed the ( riatian Ministryof Defense Inspector General and members of his staff in Wa* h ington on July24,2002, on Intelligence Oversight aftd the inspection activiti si of our ofBce.The Croatian Inspector General had recently been assigned th j nissionof ,exercising oversight of Croatian defense intelligence organiza i ns and wantedto understand the operations of the ATSD(IO) to serve as a fo nidation for theevolution of his own pro grana. The ATSD(IO) volunteered to assist theCroatians in the development of their own Intelligence Oversi »lit program forthe Ministry of Defense. . %, 1Intelligence Overeight Training Initiative: The O:i; tee.ofNavalIntelligence (QNI) is producing an Intelligence Oversight: trail in:ig videofocusing on Intelligence Oversight issues likely to arise in mail;tfunesettings This tailored training will complement earlier Intelligence O v lightitrainingaids produced by ONI,; nit.

'j P S E S r jNOFQßdfi/XlTO THE S E CCRRCETTAAl fFT TOOFF D E FFEENNiS. 7 2 0 0 DEFENSE PENTAGONWASHINGTON, DC 2 0 3 0 1 - 7 2 0 0K isTTAmJUN 25 2QÜ3INTEUKENCEOVM9WXTChairman, Intelligence Oversight BoardNew Executive Office Building, Room 5020Washington, DC 20500Dear Mr, Chairman:The Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Report for th periodOctober - December 2002 is attached. There were no significantIntelligence Oversight issues warranting IOB attention for thisp(dod andno significant Intelligence Oversight violations.t ü t r -Daniel J.TJell'OrtoPrincipal Deputy General Counsel/5eorgeB.LotzILi. ATSD(I0)\JAttachment:As statedUNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMEfl S A N DPHYSICAL R p i O V A j O F CODEWORDS A I C A m A T SSECJ ETSI-0036-03EF 1207a

Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight RjepjortOctober-December 2002 Significant Intelligence Oversight issues warrant; ni ; SECDEF/IOBattention for this period; None.(EjiTO) No significant Intelligence Oversight violations di r ng this period.7VTSD(I0) is monitoring 27 cases; none require SBCDEMOl \i sttention at thistime. (b)(1)Allegations of Threat of Torture by U.S. Intelligenc s Personnel: InOctober 2002, individuals assigned top)(i)M3):iousc §424. were alleged to have threatened a Bosnian Muslim detainee wi torture i f hedid. not cooperate during questionings The allegation stated n torture tookplace. The interrogation team included al b (3 :1 u s c § 424assigned tothel(b)(3):10 USC §424and aj(b)(i)The case is current 3 open and withthe U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command. In addition, lie Defense(b)(3):10 USCIntelligence Agency IG is monitoring the investigation since th üiüMis also a career ¡S-m [civilian employee.(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36Ij(b)(1)(b)?3)-50 USC 403,18 USC 798, P.L. 86-36 (b)(1)(b)(3}-50 USC 403,18 USC 798. P.L. 86-36Derived From NSA/CSSMDtted: 24 FEB 98Declassify On: XISECRET;

(b)(1)(b)(3)-50 USC 403718 USC 798, P.L. 86-36(b)(1)(b)(3)-P.L 86-36I Î D ) Intelligence Oversight Inspections and Staff Visits Fhe limiteddumber of Intelligence Oversight relafcdxases we are monitorin ; and the fiveincident highlighted above reflect ¿d fectiveness of IntelligOversighttraining programs throughout DoD. JWhen inappropriate activijti is take place,whether intentional or unintentional, over intelligence professioi s know whatto do. This point was reiterated during Intelligence Oversight ipections orStaff Assistance Visits (SAVs) to approximately 100 organizat Oil!s during thisquarter. These worldwide inspections/SAVs were conducted bjy theOATSD(IO) and the inspection arms.qf the intelligence agenci ;s of DoD, theCombatant Commands, and the Military Departments. Althduj ¡i minoradministrative issues were identified.ajid corrected during thes !inspections/SAVs, no violations ofj t&Ujgence Oversight guid a ce wereidentified. Most importantly, these ijrtfeJHgence professionals k ai6w where to gowhen they have questions and/or to rçport questionable activiti ssj j f i P T D A R P A ' s Total Information Awareness (TIA) ProAram: The vTSD(IO) and staff are involved in an ?n-goingreviewof DAI'l A ' s T T Aprogram. To date, this review, which.was initiated prior to the j mgressionallydirected DoD IG investigation and tfte DoD internal and extern d TIA ReviewSECRET/ÌNOFORN/X f1209

*«mßpdlxBoards, has revealed nothing that raises concerns in relation t Executive Order12333. Visits to organizations working with TIA, such as the á amy'sIntelligence and Security Command and the DoD Counter hit ;ifigence FieldActivity, are being accomplished on a reoccuiring basis. In ad dition,ithis officeand a representative of the DoD GC are working with DARP/. personnel tofacilitate their understanding of the Executive Order and appli c;ibleDoDregulations and guidance. This is a key point, since the TIA p n igram isprimarily in the conceptual phase at this time.tiMfdo) Tailored Training for USMC: The Marine Corps « acing increasedon-base training in civilian environments. In response to que ;t onsfromthefield, the Marine Corps' Inspector General has developed a pian-ling aid forcommanders titled, "Considerations for Conducting Training 4n i Exercises inan Off-Base Civilian Environment" to enhance their preparatit n. A keycomponent of the aid is Intelligence Oversight This is just oin i bf a number ofrecent examples of how the Marine Corps is proactively integr it ing IntelligenceOversight into operational planning. .(U) ATSD(IO) Outreach Program;(U) Intelligence Oversight Conference: The Geneva Centre folr theDemocratic Control of Armed Forces conducted a two day woi k shop on"Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence Servi o ¡sH in October2002. The objectives of the program were to identify the struc u :es andprocesses of democratic and parliamentary oversight of intellig e; ice services inemerging, as well as, mature democracies; to assess their effect la eness; toexamine the role of parliaments within the oversight process; a id to identifyconcrete recommendations for strengthening intelligence overs g tit A paper onthe DoD Intelligence Oversight system was presented by an Al "S D(IO)representative, the sole U.S. presenter. Workshop participants, v ho includedseveral parliamentarians, werefromEastern Europe, as well as pie UK,Belgium, Switzerland, Canada and theJU.S.Intelligence Oversight Courses at the George C. M i rphallTCuropean Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany In Octoberand November 2002, the office of the ATSD(IO) conducted tw ] ntelligencéOversight courses. The first course was for the "Leaders for th ; 1st Century"program, which consisted of middle grade military officers and vilians fromBulgaria, Estonia, Serbia, Georgia, Poland, Romania, Hungary,abng with threeU.S. officers. The second course was for the "Executive Pro:jgratn in1210

srojpiiS/xInternational and Security Affairs" program, which consisted òf senior levelmilitary officers and civilians from Albania, Bulgaria, Kazakjrstan, Mongolia,Romania, and Russia.(U) Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS), Nati [ ; ml DefenseUniversity: The Center's mission is to develop academic pro p ams foreducating primarily civilians in defense and security planning management; tofamiliarize civilians with the military profession and military lijfairs; and for. studying the defense policy making process in general. This W ishington basedcourse consists of students from North, Central, and South An ierica as well asthe Caribbean. It consists of studentsfromnational and city g»' 'ernments,industry, the press, and the military.(U) In November, the office of the ATSD(IO) presented a pro;griun on Don'sIntelligence Oversight program to students from 19 countries, 11 many of thesecountries "intelligence" organizations/activities have only der gitoryconnotations. The students, especially the press and judicial n jppsentatives,were interested in the Intelligence Oversight program, includii g the role of

Feb 26, 2010 · Support Element fJRISE . Fort Gillem. Georgia. GANG Intel! program had improved dramatically due to tw o events: a 1999 vie pointed up the need for oversight and was turned into a teaching tc appointment of an Intelligence Oversight officer in May 2000. SBAB Intelligence Oversight programs were adequate., 2) ce Oversight

Related Documents:

Bruksanvisning för bilstereo . Bruksanvisning for bilstereo . Instrukcja obsługi samochodowego odtwarzacza stereo . Operating Instructions for Car Stereo . 610-104 . SV . Bruksanvisning i original

10 tips och tricks för att lyckas med ert sap-projekt 20 SAPSANYTT 2/2015 De flesta projektledare känner säkert till Cobb’s paradox. Martin Cobb verkade som CIO för sekretariatet för Treasury Board of Canada 1995 då han ställde frågan

service i Norge och Finland drivs inom ramen för ett enskilt företag (NRK. 1 och Yleisradio), fin ns det i Sverige tre: Ett för tv (Sveriges Television , SVT ), ett för radio (Sveriges Radio , SR ) och ett för utbildnings program (Sveriges Utbildningsradio, UR, vilket till följd av sin begränsade storlek inte återfinns bland de 25 största

Hotell För hotell anges de tre klasserna A/B, C och D. Det betyder att den "normala" standarden C är acceptabel men att motiven för en högre standard är starka. Ljudklass C motsvarar de tidigare normkraven för hotell, ljudklass A/B motsvarar kraven för moderna hotell med hög standard och ljudklass D kan användas vid

LÄS NOGGRANT FÖLJANDE VILLKOR FÖR APPLE DEVELOPER PROGRAM LICENCE . Apple Developer Program License Agreement Syfte Du vill använda Apple-mjukvara (enligt definitionen nedan) för att utveckla en eller flera Applikationer (enligt definitionen nedan) för Apple-märkta produkter. . Applikationer som utvecklas för iOS-produkter, Apple .

Past exam papers from June 2019 GRADE 8 1. Afrikaans P2 Exam and Memo 2. Afrikaans P3 Exam 3. Creative Arts - Drama Exam 4. Creative Arts - Visual Arts Exam 5. English P1 Exam 6. English P3 Exam 7. EMS P1 Exam and Memo 8. EMS P2 Exam and Memo 9. Life Orientation Exam 10. Math P1 Exam 11. Social Science P1 Exam and Memo 12.

52 19 12/4/1970 Memo From Harry Dent to John Brown RE: Action Memo P1061. 1pg. Set 2/3. White House Staff 52 19 12/2/1970 Memo From John R. Brown III to Harry Dent RE: Gordon Wade. 1pg. Set 3/3. White House Staff 52 19 12/1/1970 Memo Action Memorandum from Staff Secretary to H. Klein RE: Television plan for Tricia, Julie and David. 1pg. Set 1/3 .

Foundations "NSSO develop a National PNT Architecture" "NPCO will initiate an effort with NSSO" "RITA will lead effort on behalf of DOT for the civil community" ASD/NII Memo 23-Jan-2006 ASD/NII Memo 23-Jan-2006 NPEC Action Items 26-Jan-2006 NPEC Action Items 26-Jan-2006 DOT/RITA Memo 14-Mar-2006 DOT/RITA Memo 14-Mar-2006 PNT .