Converting Disaster Experience Into A Safer Built Environment
BUILDING REGULATION FOR RESILIENCEConverting Disaster Experience into aSafer Built Environment:The Case of Japan
n 61.12Japan’s approach to building safety has been repeatedly tested—and proven effective61.2 Japan’s incremental, context-specific approach is relevant for developing countries101.3 Japan’s unique path to improved building safety can be emulated121.4 Japan’s experience offers key takeaways for developing countries13Legal and Institutional Framework for Building Regulation142.1 Overview of the Current Legal Framework 142.2 Stakeholders and Stakeholder Roles162.3 How Laws Developed to Meet Changing Needs 173Incremental Enhancement of Building Standards 223.1 Natural Disasters as Triggers for Integrating Resilience into Building Regulation233.2 Collaboration among Government, Academia, and Industry in Technological Research263.3 Concept of Seismic Design in the Building Standard Law283.4 Consultation Process for Updating Building Standards 334Quality Assurance Mechanism for Building Safety: Planning, Design, and Construction344.1 Planning Stage: Land Use and Area Planning 354.2 Design Stage: Qualification Systems for Building Practitioners374.3 Construction Stage: A Multi-step Process 394.4 Private Sector Involvement in Building Quality Assurance 425Quality Assurance Mechanism for Building Safety: Maintenance, Seismic Retrofit,and Efforts to Improve Building Quality 465.1 Policy Instruments to Promote Seismic Retrofit 475.2 Advanced Quality Enhancement through Financial Incentives and Voluntary Programs652Lessons Learned 58
Annexes62Annex 2A Japan’s Building Quality Assurance System: Stakeholder Mapping62Annex 2B Japan’s Building Quality Assurance System: Stakeholder’s Major Roles63Annex 3A Major Construction Types for Residential Buildings in Japan64Annex 4A Scope of Activity and Training Programs for Kenchikushi (architect-engineers)65Annex 4B Penalties for Misconduct by Kenchikushi (architect-engineers)68Annex 4C Quality Assurance Mechanism for Building Materials and Construction Management70Annex 4D Government Responsible for Administration of Building Quality Assurance,71by Area Population and Building SizeAnnex 4E Capacity Development and Training Programs for Building Administration72Annex 4F Impacts of Private Sector Participation in the Building Quality Assurance System75Annex 5A Local Policies and Programs to Promote Seismic Retrofit77Annex 5B Statistical Information on Housing in Japan80Annex 5C How Japan Met Goals for Housing Quantity81Annex 5D Voluntary Systems for Improving Housing Quality81Sources and References84Chapter 184Chapter 284Chapter 385Chapter 486Chapter 586Annex 3A86Annex 4A86Annex 4B86Annex 4C86Annex 4E87Annex 4F87Annex 5A87Annex 5D87
Abbreviations4APSRBAct on Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting of BuildingsBSLBuilding Standard LawCISMIDCenter for Earthquake Engineering and Disaster MitigationCLITTCollege of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and TourismCPACity Planning ActFARfloor area ratioGFDRRGlobal Facility for Disaster Reduction and RecoveryGHLCGovernment Housing Loan CorporationISOInternational Organization for StandardizationJASJapanese Agricultural StandardsJASSJapanese Architectural Standard SpecificationsJESJJapanese Engineering StandardsJHFJapan Housing Finance AgencyJICAJapan International Cooperation AgencyJISJapanese Industrial StandardsJMAJapan Meteorological AgencyMEPmechanical, electrical, and plumbingMEXTMinistry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and TechnologyMLITMinistry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and TourismRCreinforced concrete
AcknowledgmentsThe development of this report was led by Thomas Moullier,Finance Agency; Satoshi Kato, Manager, Japan HousingSenior Urban Specialist, and Keiko Sakoda, Disaster RiskFinance Agency; Shoichiro Konishi, Director, Japan HousingManagement Specialist, World Bank, as part of the BuildingFinance Agency; Tokiwa Terakawa, General Manager,Regulation for Resilience Program under the Global FacilityBuilding Center of Japan; Yukinari Hosokawa, Actingfor Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR¹), withDirector, JICA; Noriaki Saito, Professor, Kwansei Gakuinsupport from the Disaster Risk Management Hub, Tokyo.University; and Norio Maki, Professor, Kyoto University.The background work and documentation was carried outby a team from Oriental Consultants Global Co., Ltd., led bySeveral people contributed valuable information throughRyoji Takahashi and Katsu Kato and generously supportedinterviews, including Hiroshi Fukuyama, Director, Housingby the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport andDepartment, National Institute for Land and InfrastructureTourism (MLIT), Japan. The team appreciates the guidanceManagement; Naomi Honda, Managing Director, Associationof Yukiyasu Kamemura, former Director for Internationalof Living Amenity; Haruki Kasai, Manager for ArchitecturalBuilding Analysis, and Hideaki Sato, Director for BuildingPlanning Coordination, Yokohama City; and the followingTechnology Policy Analysis, MLIT. Valuable inputs onindividuals from the Building Center of Japan: Noriakiimplementation experience and lessons learned wereOtsuka, General Manager; Toshiyuki Takei, formerprovided by the following MLIT retirees and associatedGeneral Manager; Mayumi Akamaru, Manager; Hirokopersonnel: Yoshitaka Sugiyama, Katsunori Inoue, andOkamoto, Manager; Nanako Sasaki, Assistant ProjectWataru Gojo. The report also includes data from buildingManager; Sami Taguchi, Assistant Project Manager.damage analysis after the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake, kindlyprovided by Fumio Yamazaki, Professor, Chiba University.Lastly, the team appreciates feedback and commentsprovided by Benito M. Pacheco, Professor, UniversityThe team appreciates feedback and advice received from anof the Philippines; Ko Takeuchi, Senior Disaster Riskadvisory group of Japanese experts that included TatsuoManagement Specialist; Artessa Saldivar-Sali, SeniorNarafu, Senior Advisor, Japan International CooperationMunicipal Engineer; and Aris Molfetas-Lygkiaris, Consultant,Agency (JICA); Shoichi Ando, Professor, Kinki University;World Bank. The report was edited by Anne Himmelfarb.Masahiro Kobayashi, Director General, Japan Housing¹ www.gfdrr.org5
1Introduction1.1 Japan’s approach to building safety has been repeatedly tested—and proven effectiveOn January 17, 1995, the devastating Great Hanshin-Awajisupported this trend: the severe damage declined significantlyEarthquake struck southern Hyogo Prefecture, causing 6,437as the construction year became more recent (figure 1.2).deaths and the collapse of about 100,000 houses. WhenThis pattern was highly significant because it demonstratedthe post-disaster damage analysis was complete, it showedthe effectiveness of Japan’s seismic design standards andsomething remarkable: the large majority of collapsedtheir continuous improvement. The standard had majorbuildings—76 percent—had been constructed before 1971.revisions in 1971 and again in 1981. Buildings constructed toA much smaller share—21 percent—had been constructedthe 1971 standard performed far better than those built to anbetween 1971 and 1981. Buildings built after 1981 accounted forearlier standard; and buildings constructed to the 1981just 3 percent of the collapsed buildings (figure 1.1). A detailedstandard performed best of all, with only a very small sharesurvey of damaged wooden houses and reinforced concretesuffering collapse.(RC) buildings in two areas affected by the earthquakeFigure 1.1 Buildings Damaged in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, by Year of Construction1971–8121%Before 197176%Source: Ranghieri and Ishiwatari 2014 using data from MLIT.6After 19813%
Figure 1.2 Damage to Building Structures in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake,by Period of Constructiona. Wooden Housesin Nishinomiya City(n 67,992)b. Reinforced Concrete Buildingsin Nishinomiya City(n 10,998)Damagedhouses (%)Damagedhouses —713,8351,8721972—811982—94807Damagedhouses 9620096Damagedhouses (%)1003,2563,5001,218801,52360402,709d. Reinforced Concrete Buildingsin Nada Ward(n 3,814)c. Wooden Housesin Nada Ward(n —711972—81Minor/No damage9061,2564054207662001982—94Moderate Severe damageSource: Nagao, Yamazaki, and Inoguchi 2010; Yamaguchi and Yamazaki 2000a, 2000b; Yamazaki and Murao 2000.7
Figure 1.3 Damage to Kashiwazaki City Building Structures in the Niigata-Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake,by Period of Constructiona. Wooden Houses(n 28,253)b. Reinforced Concrete andSteel Reinforced Concrete Buildings(n 768)Damagedhouses (%)Damagedhouses 651972—81Minor/No damage9213388314924207Moderate damage3411371901982—2007Source: Nagao, Yamazaki, and Inoguchi �2007Significant damageSevere damage
Figure 1.4 Damage to Building Structures in the Kumamoto Earthquake, by Period of ConstructionDamagedhouses (%)10039179801963736053740201332148576BeforeJune 1981June 1981— May2000No damage104127June 2000and afterSlight damageSevere damageCollapseSource: Kumamoto Earthquake Building Damage Investigation Committee.But this damage pattern demonstrates more than thesafety by gradually amending building laws in response toeffectiveness of the 1981 seismic standard. More broadly,successive earthquakes and socioeconomic and demographicit demonstrates the effectiveness of the Japanese approachchanges. Today, in spite of its high exposure to earthquakes andto building quality assurance and to achieving a high level ofother hazards such as tsunamis, tropical cyclones (typhoons),success in the implementation, support to compliance andand flooding, Japan has a built environment that is among theenforcement of building regulation. Over the course of asafest and most disaster resilient in the world.century, Japan has worked incrementally to improve building9
1.2 Japan’s incremental, context-specific approach is relevant for developing countriesThis report describes Japan’s incremental approach toNotably, Japan’s approach is aligned with that of the Sendaideveloping, implementing, and facilitating compliance withFramework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, whichbuilding regulation over many decades. It explains Japan’sis now guiding signatory countries in disaster reductionunique path to developing a policy and legal frameworkapproaches.3 The disproportionate impact of disasters onas well as compliance mechanisms that grow out of thisdeveloping countries is well documented. As the 2015 Globalframework and that function within Japan’s risk profile andAssessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR)climate, culture, and construction practices. Although Japanindicates: “Between 1980 and 2012, 42 million life years wereis well known for its advanced engineering knowledge and forlost in internationally reported disasters each year. Over 80 peremploying engineering solutions in disaster risk management,cent of the total life years lost in disasters are spread across lowit also relies on nontechnical approaches and has created aand middle-income countries, representing a serious setback tolegal and quality management ecosystem for buildings withinsocial and economic development” (UNISDR 2015a).which those technical solutions can be successful.This report focuses on seismic risk in part because earthquakesThe lessons this report highlights are relevant for policyhave been important in driving Japan’s building safety regime,makers, building governance practitioners, and projectbut also because there are rich data on the impact of, responsemanagers in developing countries who are interested into, and increasing resilience to earthquakes. The report doescreating a safer built environment.2 The lessons grow out ofnot address Japan’s efforts to improve resilience to fire, tropicalJapan’s incremental, context-specific approach to buildingcyclone (typhoon), and other hazards and should therefore notsafety—an approach that is driven by and responds to Japan’sbe considered exhaustive.specific hazard profile, geophysical characteristics, climate,culture, construction practices, and legal system. CountriesThe abundant earthquake data—shown in table 1.1 forfacing different hazards, using different construction practicesselect damaging earthquakes from 1999 to the present—and materials, and operating under different laws canmake strikingly clear that Japan suffers far less loss of lifenonetheless apply the experience-based, step-by-step approachand property than developing countries in earthquakes ofto their own context.comparable magnitude.² For a discussion of efforts to create safer schools in particular, see another case study of Japan, World Bank and GFDRR (2016).³ The Sendai Framework’s priorities include strengthening disaster risk governance (Priority 2) and investing in disaster risk reduction forresilience (Priority 3). See UNISDR (2015b).10
Table 1.1 Japan’s Resilience to Earthquakes versus Experience of Selected Countrieswith Recent Large-Scale Injured(no.)Buildingsdamaged(no.)d1995 (Hyogo-ken Nanbu) X7.36,43743,792249,1802004 (Niigata-ken Chuetu) X6.8684,80516,9852011 (Great East Japan)e X9.022,0106,220400,3052016 (Kumamoto) 578,000China2008XI7.987,587374,177no hquakeSources: Data for Japan are from the JMA (Japan Meteorological Agency) website at ew.html; data for deaths in Nepal are from Government of Nepal (2015); data for deaths in countries other than Japan and Nepal are from theU.S. Geological Survey, “Earthquake Statistics,” https://earthquakeusgs.gov/earthquakes/world/world death.php; data on building damage inIran are from UN OCHA (2004); data on building damage in Turkey are from NOAA (2000).a. Japan measures earthquake intensity on a JMA intensity scale (roman numerals), as explained at http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/enActivities/ inttable.html. The table here provides MMI (Modified Mercalli Intensity) values (arabic numerals) for ease of comparison,though there is no exact correspondence between the scales. See Kunugi (2000, figure 4) for a chart that helps to clarify thecomplex correspondence.b. Magnitude and intensity measure different characteristics of earthquakes; the U.S. Geological Survey website (https://earthquake.usgs.gov/learn/topics/mag vs int.php) has a good explanation. Since intensity has direct impacts on building damages, this report usesintensity as the seismic scale. It converts the JMA intensity to MMI based on the correspondence chart presented by Kunugi (2000, figure 4),and on scientific studies on specific events when available (e.g., Sokejima et al. [2004]).c. Deaths also include numbers of missing individuals.d. Damaged buildings include those with partial as well as total damage.e. Most of the deaths and damage caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake were the result of the associated tsunami.It is estimated that about 800 deaths were caused by building damage.11
1.3 Japan’s unique path to improved building safety can be emulatedFollowing upon the GFDRR’s (2016) flagship report Buildingfor the convenience of architects, engineers and small andRegulation for Resilience⁴, this report offers an in-depth casemedium builders. Japan continues to amend its code, basedstudy on the experience of Japan. It is structured aroundon accumulated knowledge gained from analyzing buildingthe three key components laid out in the flagship reportdamage after each disaster, and over time it has achieved aas forming the framework for the Building Regulation forhighly resilient built environment. Chapter 3 describes thisResilience Program : namely (1) national level legislation andincremental approach to improving building safety. It looksinstitutions; (2) building code development and maintenance;at the contents and development of Japan’s code, includingand (3) local level institutions and implementation. It sharesefforts to ensure a reasonable and resilient enough seismicJapan’s historical experience in building code regulation,performance, the code’s inclusion of non-engineered structuresincluding the development of policy, establishment of(conventional wooden houses), and the consultation processenabling enforcement mechanisms, building of capacity acrossused in updating building standards, which solicits input frompublic and private sectors, and advancement of engineeringthe private sector and the general public.knowledge.⁵ Japan took unique steps to develop buildingregulations and building quality assurance mechanisms thatQuality assurance mechanisms. Japan employs qualitycater to the specific Japanese context, as highlighted below.assurance mechanisms across all phases of a building’s lifeAt the same time, the philosophy behind the policies, andcycle, including (1) planning, (2) design, (3) constructionlessons learned from implementing the policies, provideof new buildings, and (4) maintenance or retrofit ofrelevant insights for countries facing similar challenges.existing buildings. Chapter 4 describes mechanisms forthe first three phases. It looks specifically at oversight ofLegal framework. Japan has uniform national buildingand requirements for Kenchikushi, the Japanese buildingstandards that are implemented by both the nationalprofessionals who combine the knowledge of architectsgovernment and local governments. Unlike many developedand engineers. It also explains Japan’s building approvalcountries, which separate regulations from the laws thatprocess, which involves “confirmation” that the buildingrequire them, Japan comprehensively defines its buildingdesign complies with technical requirements, and whichstandards under the Building Standard Law (BSL). Chapter 2gives individual inspectors far less discretion than systemsdescribes the legal framework, along with the background tothat depend on “permission.” Finally, it explains the privateand process for developing this law.sector’s involvement in building inspection as well as therole played by financial institutions in assuring buildingBuilding code. Japan’s building code is recognized as aquality. Chapter 5 addresses quality assurance mechanismsminimum standard. Originally prescriptive, the code wasfor the fourth phase of the building life cycle, maintenanceamended to performance-based in principle in 1998 (enforcedand retrofit. It also looks more broadly at Japanese policyin 2000), but some specific provisions remain as prescriptiveinstruments designed to improve housing quality voluntarily.⁴ .pdf⁵ The terms regulation, code, and standard (all used in this report) are related but not interchangeable. Regulation refers broadly to rules andrule-making; a code is set of rules that a government adopts and enforces; and a standard is a specific technical specification for a materialor process.12
1.4 Japan’s experience offers key takeaways for developing countriesJapan’s incremental, context-specific approach to improving building safety includes robust implementation and enforcement ofbuilding regulations. The resulting high level of compliance has helped reduce disaster risks and created a high degree of seismicresilience. The lessons learned in Japan over the course of a century are widely applicable. They are discussed in chapter 6 andsummarized here:1.Regulation
40 20 0 2,462 436 302 2,709 430 247 3,996 293 96 100 80 60 40 20 0 1951—71 1972—81 1982—94 3,256 3,500 10,517 1,218 764 1,006 1,523 542 384 N C 992 N 221 R C B N C 1998 R C B N 814 in e ee e eee e Damaged houses (%) Damaged houses (%) Damaged houses (%) Damaged houses (%) Source: Nagao, Yamazaki, and Inoguchi 2010; Yamaguchi and Yamazaki .
Strategy for Disaster Reduction. An alignment of the terminology used in disaster risk reduction in Africa with the internationally acceptable concepts is logical. 2.1 Disaster Although the focus of disaster reduction is not on any actual disaster event itself, disaster remains the main focus. Thus our efforts must be geared towards the
namely Disaster and its classification, Disaster risk and Disaster Risk Reduction, Mainstreaming gender for Disaster Risk Reduction. IV. DISASTER AND ITS CLASSIFICATION Disaster is a phenomenon which can identify from the history of human civilization and it can be simply defined as an event
There are three important phases in hospital emergency disaster management plan 1) Pre-disaster phase 2) Disaster Phase 3) Post Disaster Phase Pre-Disaster Phase a) Planning: Most of the assessment and planning is done in the pre-disaster phase, the hospital plans are formulated and then discussed in a suitable forum for approval. b) Preparation
1. Post-Disaster Recovery and Disaster Risk Reduction require support from community participation in improving the quality and objectives of Disaster Management; 2. Community-based Disaster Risk Reduction is a key factor in participatory disaster management, including in post-disaster recovery, as indicated by best practices in Yogyakarta and .
Disaster management can be defined as the body of policy and administrative decisions and operational activities which pertain to the various stages of a disaster at all levels. Broadly disaster management can be divided into pre-disaster and post-disaster contexts. There are three key stages of activity that are taken up within disaster .
NATIONAL DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT ACT Passed in 2015 reflect new thinking and relating to disaster risk reduction in context of sustainable national development Intended to provide the legal framework upon which disaster risk reduction and disaster response operations OFFICE OF DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Keywords: Disaster knowledge; Disaster risk; Disaster risk reduction; Nepal Background Disaster risk is expressed in terms of potential loss of lives, deterioration of health status and livelihoods, and potential damage to assets and services due to impact of existing natural hazard. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is a systematic approach to .
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP) 2011-2028. Asian Disaster Preparedness Center. (2001). Community Based Disaster Management Course Paricipants Workbook , Partnership for Disaster Reduction South East Asia Program Bautista, Rostum J, et.al. (2011). "National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (NDRRM) Planning
