C Av, ) R I -J L-e.d7 Congressional Voters
c av, ) C(J S(!YV )R I , , o ""-J E l-e.d7 .:S()v\fCongressional VotersVirtually every issue raised in the previous two chapters was examinedfrom the perspective of some implicit notions about how congressional.voters operate. Discussions of the sources of the incumbency advantage,the importance of campaign money, and House-Senate electoral differences, tomention a few examples, were grounded in particular assumptions about votingbehavior in congressional elections. So, too, are the campaign and career strategiesof congressional candidates. Their activities are guided by beliefs about what swaysvoters and, at the same time, help to define what voters' decisions are supposed tobe about. An adequate understanding of voting behavior in congressional electionsis important to congressional scholars and politicians alike.Neither political scientists nor candidates have reason to be fully satisfied; voterscontinue to surprise them both. Studies over the past three decades have produced agreat deal of fresh information about congressional voters, however, and we knowmuch more about them than we once did. This chapter examines voting behavior incongressional elections and how it relates to the other phenomena of congressionalelection politics. It begins with a discussion of voter turnout and then turns to thefundamental question of how voters come to prefer one candidate over another.TURNOUT IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONSVoting requires not only a choice among candidates but also a decision to vote inthe first place. A majority of adult Americans do not, in fact, vote in congressionalelections (see Figure 5-1). Obviously, participation in congressional elections isstrongly influenced by whether there is a presidential contest to attract voters tothe polls; turnout drops by an average of 12 percentage points when there is not.Even in presidential election years, House voting is about 5 percentage points lowerthan presidential voting. Turnout declined noticeably between 1960 and 2000; sincethen it has undergone a modest revival. The question of why turnout had declinedfor several decades has been the subject of intensive investigation but politicalscientists have yet to agree on a definitive answer. 1 The mystery grows all the deeper1 Michael P. McDonald and Samuel Popkin, "The Myth of the Vanishing Voter," American PoliticalScience Review 95 (2001): 963-974; Eric R. A. N. Smith and Michael Dolny, "The Mystery of DecliningTurnout in American National Elections" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the WesternPolitical Science Association, Salt Lake Ciry, March 30-April1, 1989); Ruy Teixeira, The DisappearingAmerican Voter (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992); and Warren E. Miller and J. MerrillShanks, The New American Voter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Universiry Press, 1996), pp. 509-514.120
Who Votes?302010-Presidential Elections-House ElectionsYearFIGURE 5-1Voter Turnout in Presidential and Midterm Election Years, 1932-2010Source: Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress 2008 (Washington, DC:Brookings Institution Press, 20081, Table 2-1. Data for 2008 and 2010 are from Michael P. McDonald, reported athttp://elections.gmu.edu/V AP V E P.htm.because the single demographic factor most strongly linked to participationlevel of education-was increasing in the population at the same time that votingparticipation was dropping. The most thorough examination of the question to date,undertaken by Steven Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, places most of the blameon a decline in grassroots efforts by parties and other organizations (e.g., unions,social movements, and others) to get voters to the polls.2 By implication, the extensivevoter-mobilization work of parties and allied groups in recent elections explains theuptick in participation. A full review of the question would take us too far afield; itis enough for our purposes to recognize that members of Congress are elected byan unimpressive proportion of eligible voters. In midterm elections, little more than40 percent of the eligible population now shows up at the polls.WHO VOTES?The low level of voting in congressional elections raises a second question: Who votesand who does not? This question is important because politicians wanting to getinto Congress or to remain there will be most responsive to the concerns of peoplethey expect to vote. If voters and nonvoters have noticeably different needs orpreferences, the former are likely to be served and the latter slighted.2Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy inAmerica (New York: Macmillan, 1993), p. 215.121
122CHAPTER5Congressional VotersRaymond Wolfinger and Stephen Rosenstone have moststudied the question of who votes and who does not. They report thatis most strongly related to education; the more years of formal education onehas, the more likely one is to vote. Voting also increases with income andoccupational status, but these are themselves strongly related to educationand have only a modest relationship with turnout once education is taken intoaccount. 3 Voting also increases with age, and some occupational groupsnotably farmers and government workers-show distinctly higher levels ofparticipation than their other demographic characteristics would lead us to expect.Other things being equal, turnout is about 6 percentage points lower among peopleliving in the South, a residue of the era when one-party rule was fortified by formaland informal practices that kept AfCican Americans and poor whites from the polls. 4Wolfinger and Rosenstone's demonstration that turnout varies most stronglywith education comes as no surprise because every other study of Americanvoting behavior has found this to be the case. Although the direct causal effectsof education have been questioned,S the common interpretation is that educationimparts knowledge about politics and increases one's capacity to deal with complexand· abstract matters such as those found in the political world. 6 People with therequisite cognitive skills and political knowledge find the cost of processing andacting on political information lower and the satisfaction greater. Politics is lessthreatening and more interesting. Similarly, learning outside of formal educationcan facilitate participation. People whose occupations put them in close touchwith politics or whose livelihoods depend on governmental policy-governmentworkers and farmers, for example-vote more consistently, as do people who areolder and simply have longer experience as adults.Better educated, wealthier, higher-status, and older people are clearlyoverrepresented in the electorate. When their preferences and concerns substantiallydiffer from those of nonvoters, governmental policy will be biased in their favor.Wolfinger and Rosenstone, citing survey data from the 1970s, argued that theviews of voters were not very different from those of the population as a whole,so differential participation did not impart any special bias. 7 In the 1980s and1990s, policy issues that divided people according to economic status became moreprominent and the underrepresented groups suffered. Cuts in government spendingto reduce federal budget deficits hit welfare recipients far harder than they hitsenior citizens or business corporations. Some evidence suggests that legislators areE. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, Who Votes? (New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1980), pp. 24-26.3Raymond4 Ibid.,p. 94.5 0nerecent study found that people who shared the cognitive and personality characteristics typicalof college attendees but for some reason did not attend college participated in politics at the samelevel as those who did; thus, higher education is an indicator rather than cause of a propensity toparticipate. See Cindy D. Kam and CarlL. Parker, "Reconsidering the Effects of Education onPolitical Participation," journal of Politics 70 Uuly 2008): 621-{;31.6Wolfingerand Rosenstone, Who Votes? p. 18.7Wolfinger and Rosenstone, Who Votes? pp. 104-114; see also Stephen D. Shaffer, "Policy DifferencesBetween Voters and Non-Voters in American Elections," Western Political Quarterly 35 (1982): 496-510.
Who le,ldngmore attuned ideologically to voters than to nonvoters. 8 Yet, research continuesto show that the policy preferences of voters and nonvoters are not very differentand that few, if any, election results would change if every eligible person voted. 9Another question posed by the turnout data is whether congressionalelectorates differ between presidential and midterm election years. Do the millionsof citizens who vote for congressional candidates only because they happen to beon the same ballot with presidential candidates change the electoral environmentin politically consequential ways? One prominent study, based on surveys of voterstaken in the 1950s, concluded that they did. The electorate in presidential years wasfound to be composed of a larger proportion of voters weakly attached to eitherpolitical party and subject to greater influence by political phenomena peculiarto the specific election, notably their feelings about the presidential candidates.At the midterm, with such voters making up a much smaller proportion of theelectorate, partisanship prevailed. This resulted in a pattern of "surge and decline,"in which the winning presidential candidate's party picked up congressional seats(the surge), many of which were subsequently lost at the next midterm electionwhen the pull of the presidential candidate was no longer operating (the decline).The theory of surge and decline explained why, in every midterm election between1934 and 1998, the president's party lost seats in the House. 10Aggregate shifts in congressional seats and votes from one election to the nextwill be examined at length in Chapter 6. At this point, suffice it to say that theview of electorates underlying this theory has not been supported by subsequentevidence. More recent research suggests that midterm voters are no more or lesspartisan than those voting in presidential years and that the two electorates aredemographically alike, except that the midterm electorate tends to be older.UThe addition or subtraction of voters drawn out by a residential contest does not. routinely produce significantly different electorates, 1 although the change from2008 (unusually high turnout among younger and minority voters) to 2010 (moretypically lower turnout among the same groups) was certainly an exception.These observations about turnout refer to the electorate as a whole, butcongressional candidates are, of course, much more concerned about the particularelectorates in their states and districts. As noted in Chapter 2, turnout is by no meansthe same across constituencies; it varies enormously. One obvious source of variationlit8JohnD. Griffin and Brian Newman, "Are Voters Better Represented?" Journal of Politics 67 (2005):1206-1227.9-reixeira, Disappearing Voter, pp. 86-101; and Benjamin Highton and Raymond E. Wolfinger,"The Political Implications of Higher Turnout," British Journal of Political Science 31 (2001): 179-223.10 Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," in Elections and the PoliticalOrder, ed. Angus Campbell eta!. (New York: John Wiley, 1966), pp. 40-62.11 See Raymond E. Wolfinger, Steven J. Rosenstone, and Richard A. Mcintosh, "Presidential andCongressional Voters Compared," American Politics Quarterly 9 (1981): 245-255; see also Albert D.Cover, "Surge and Decline Revisited" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American PoliticalScience Association, Chicago, September 1-4, 1983), pp. 15-17; and James E. Campbell, The Presidential Pulse of Congressional Elections (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1993), pp. 44-62.12This does not mean that presidential elections do not affect congressional elections in other ways, ofcourse; that issue is taken up in Chapter 6.123
124CHAPTER 5Congressional Votersis the demographic makeup of the district: average level of education, income,occupational status, age distribution, and so on. These factors are, at least in the shortrun, fairly constant in any individual state or district but turnout also varies in thesame constituency from election to election (quite apart from the presidential yearmidterm difference )-and these variations are, for our purposes, the most interesting.The generally low level of voting in congressional elections means that a largemeasure of the fundamental electoral currency-votes-lies untapped. This affectscampaign strategy in several ways. Even incumbents who have been winning byhealthy margins recognize that many citizens did not vote for them (even if they didnot vote against them) and that they could be in for trouble if an opponent whocan mobilize the abstainers comes along. This is not an idle worry. Generally, thehigher the turnout, the closer the election; the lower the turnout, the more easily. the incumbent is reelected. 13 Successful challengers evidently draw to the pollspeople who normally do not bother to vote. The wisdom of defusing the oppositionand discouraging strong challenges is again apparent. Experienced campaignersknow that getting one's supporters to the polls is as important as winning theirsupport in the first place; as we saw in Chapter 4, well-organized campaignstypically devote a major share of their work to getting out the vote.The effort to get out the vote presupposes that there is a vote to be gotten out,that people brought to the polls will indeed support the candidate. After all, whatfinally matters is what voters do in the voting booth. And this raises a question offundamental interest to politicians and political scientists alike: What determineshow people vote for congressional candidates? What moves voters to support onecandidate rather than the other? The entire structure of congressional electionpolitics hinges on the way voters reach this decision.PARTISANSHIP IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONSThe first modern survey studies of congressional elections identified partisanshipas the single most important influence on individuals' voting decisions, and itremained so even through the period of weakened party influence in the 1960sand 1970s. The pioneering survey studies of voting behavior in both presidentialand congressional elections conducted in the t950s found that a large majority ofvoters thought of themselves as Democrats or Republicans and voted accordingly.Particular candidates or issues might, on occasion, persuade a person to vote forsomeone of the other party but the defection was likely to be temporary and didnot dissolve the partisan attachment. 1413Gregory A. Caldeira, Samuel C. Patterson, and Gregory A. Markko, "The Mobilization of Voters inCongressional Elections," Journal of Politics 47 (1985): 490-509; Franklin D. Gilliam Jr., "Influenceson Voter Turnout for U.S. House Elections in Non-Presidential Years," Legislative Studies Quarterly10 (1985): 339-352; and Robert A. Jackson, "A Reassessment of Voter Mobilization," PoliticalResearch Quarterly 49 (1996): 331-349. The anticipation of a close election itself increases turnout;see Stephen P. Nicholson and Ross A. Miller, "Prior Beliefs and Voter Turnout in the 1986 and 1988Congressional Elections," Political Research Quarterly 50 (1997): 199-213.Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The AmericanVoter (New York: John Wiley, 1960), Chapter 6.14See
Partisanship in Congressional ElectionsAlternative Interpretations of Party IdentificationThe leading interpretation of these findings was that voters who were willing tolabel themselves Democrats or Republicans identified with the party in the same waythey might identify with a region or an ethnic or religious group: "I'm a Bostonian,a Catholic, and a Democrat." The psychological attachment to a party was rootedin powerful personal experiences (best exemplified by the millions who becameDemocrats during the Depression) or was learned, along with similar attachments,from the family. In either case, identification with a party was thought to establishan enduring orientation toward the political world. The result, in aggregate, was astable pattern of partisanship across the entire electorate. Thus, from the New Dealonward, the Democrats enjoyed consistent national majorities. Individual states orcongressional districts were, in many cases, "safe" for candidates of one party orthe other.This did not mean that the same party won every election, of course. Somevoters did not think of themselves as belonging to a party, and even those who didwould defect if their reactions to particular candidates, issues, or recent events rancontrary to their party identification strongly enough. But once these short-termforces were no longer present, the long-term influence of party identification wouldreassert itself and they would return to their partisan moorings. For most citizens,only quite powerful and unusual experiences could inspire permanent shifts ofparty allegiance.This interpretation of party identification has been undermined from at leasttwo directions since it was developed. First, the electoral influence of partisanshipdiminished steadily throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Fewer voters were willingto consider themselves partisans; the party attachments of those who did werelikely to be weaker. The percentage of people declaring themselves to be strongpartisans fell from 36 in 1952 to 23 in 1978; the percentage declaring themselvesto be weak or strong partisans fell from 75 to 60 over the same period. Even thosewho still admitted to partisan attachments were a good deal more likely to defectto candidates of the other party than they had been earlier. 15Although no definitive explanation for the period of decline in electoralpartisanship has been developed, it is no doubt related to political events ofthe 1960s and 1970s. Each party brought disaster upon itself by nominatinga presidential candidate preferred only by its more extreme ideologues-theRepublicans with Goldwater in 1964, and the Democrats with McGovern in 1972.In 1968, the Vietnam War and the civil rights issue split the Democrats badly andfostered the strongest third-party showing since 1924. Republicans suffered in turn,as the Watergate revelations forced their disgraced president from office. JimmyCarter's inept handling of the economy and troubles with Iran laid the Democratslow in 1980. More generally, the political alliances formed in the battle over theNew Deal were fractured along multiple lines as new problems and issues-mostnotably social issues concerning abortion, crime, and sexuality-forced their wayonto the political stage.15WarrenE. Miller and Santa A; Traugott, American National Election Studies Data Sourcebook1952-1986 (Cambridge, MA: HarVard University Press, 1989), p. 81; see also Figure 5-2.125
126CHAPTER 5Congressional VotersVoters responded to these political phenomena as they were expected to respondto short-term forces, defecting when their party preferences were contradictedstrongly enough. As defections become more widespread and partisanship, ingeneral, continued to decline, an interpretation of party identification that, amongother things, more easily accommodated change gained plausibility. The alternativeinterpretation emphasizes the practical rather than psychological aspects of partyidentification. It has been presented most fully by Morris P. Fiorina, who arguesthat people attach themselves to a party because they have found, through pastexperience, that its candidates are more likely than those of the other party toproduce the kinds of results they prefer.Because it costs time and energy to determine the full range of information onall candidates who run for office, voters quite reasonably use the shorthand cue ofparty to simplify the voting decision. Past experience is a more useful criterion thanfuture promises or expectations because it is more certain. Party cues are recognizedas imperfect, to be sure, and people who are persuaded that a candidate of the otherparty would deal more effectively with their concerns vote for him or her. Moreimportant, if cumulative experience suggests that candidates of the preferred partyare no longer predictably superior in this respect, the party preference naturallydecays. 16 Party ties are subject to modification, depending on the answer to theproverbial voters' question, "What have you done for me lately?" 17The virtue of this alternative interpretation is that it can account for boththe observed short-run stability and the long-run lability of party identificationevident in individuals and the electorate. For example, it offers a plausibleexplanation for the evidence of a significant shift in party identification awayfrom the Democrats and toward the Republicans during the 1980s. According toNational Election Studies (NES) data, the 52-33 advantage in percentage shareof party identifiers held by Democrats in 1980 had, by 1994, shrunk to 47-42. 18The biggest change took place in the South, where the proportion of white votersidentifying themselves as Republicans grew from less than 30 percent in 1980 to43 percent in 1994 (on the way up to 59 percent a decade later). 19 Moreover,self-described Republicans turned out to vote in higher proportions than didDemocrats in 1994, so that for the first time in the forty-two-year history ofthe National Election Studies, Republicans enjoyed a lead in party identificationamong voters, 48-46.16Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven, Cf: YaleUniversity Press, 1981).17Samuel L. Popkin, john W. Gorman, Charles Philips, and Jeffrey A. Smith, "Comment: What HaveYou Done for Me Lately? Toward an Investment Theory of Voting," American Political ScienceReview 70 (1976): 779-805.1S,Ohis figure includes independents who lean toward one party or the other as partisans; excludingleaners, the Democratic advantage falls from 41-23 to 35-31 from 1980 to 1994.19Thischange was the extension of a long-term trend that has seen the Republicans grow fromless than 20 percent of the southern electorate in the 1950s to a majority after 1998; see Gary C.jacobson, "Party Polarization in National Politics: The Electoral Connection," in Polarized Politics:Congress and the President in a Partisan Era, ed. jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher (Washington, DC:Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000), p. 16.
Partisanship in Congressional ElectionsThe Republicans' gains in party identification were not fully sustained,however. The Democrats' advantage expanded to 52-38 in 1996 and to 53-37 in1998, as House Republicans' missteps on the budget in 1995 and the unpopularattempt to impeach and convict Bill Clinton in 1998 cost their party publicsupport (see Chapter 6). Republicans closed the gap slightly in 2000 (50-38Democratic advantage) and even more so in 2004 (50-41), before slipping backin 2008 (51-37). The Democrats still hold a lead, but it is narrower than it wasbefore the Reagan administration; because Republican identifiers tend to turnout at higher levels and to vote more loyally for their party, the national partisandivision remains closely balanced.20 These swings show that party identificationcan change in response to political experiences far less earthshaking than the GreatDepression, and partisanship appears to be rather more sensitive to short-terminfluences than the psychological model would predict. 21Partisanship and VotingThe issue of which interpretation makes more empirical sense (or which combinationof the two views-they are by no means irreconcilable) will not be settled here.What matters most for our purposes is that however party identification is interpreted,it remains an important influence on congressional voters, although that iitfluencehas varied in strength over time. Figures 5-2 and 5-3 display the trends in partisanvoting in House and Senate elections since 1956. Note that despite the commonperception that voters have become increasingly detached from parties, the shareof the electorate composed of voters who label themselves as pure independents,leaning toward neither party, has not grown. What did grow for a time was theproportion of voters who voted contrary to their expressed party affiliation. By theend of the 1970s, defections in House elections were typically twice as common asthey had been in the 1950s. Since the 1970s, party loyalty has recovered all of thelost ground. In recent elections, about 80 percent of House voters have been loyalpartisans, about 13 percent, partisan defectors. The trends for Senate electorateshave been similar, with a visible increase in party loyalty over the past three decades;the proportion of loyal partisans in the Senate electorates since 2002 has reached ·levels not seen since the 1950s. (Readers should note that the data in Figures 5-2through 5-5 for 2006 and 2010 are from the Cooperative Congressional ElectionStudy (CCES) rather than the NES, which did conduct a midterm study in 2006;thus, they may not be strictly comparable to data from other years.22)I. Abramowitz, "The End of the Democratic Era? 1994 and the Future of Congressional ElectionResearch," Political Research Quarterly 48 (1995): 873-889; and Gary C. Jacobson, "Terror, Terrain, andTurnout: Explaining the 2002 Midterm Elections," Political Science Quarterly 118 (Spring 2003): 12-16.21 The sensitivity of aggregate distribution of party identification to political conditions is shown clearly inMichael B. MacKuen, RobertS. Erikson, and James A. Stimson, "Macropartisanship," American Political Science Review 83 (1989): 1125-1142; see also Gary C. Jacobson, "The Effects of the George W.Bush Presidency on Partisan Attitudes," Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 Uune 2009), pp. 172-209.22 Stephen Ansolabehere, 2006, "CCES Common Content, 2006", r9EdyZvaqQWw V3 [Version]; "CCES Common Content, 2008", http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14003 UNF:5:H21NRIZ9XfEbfYaJRQkvtQ V3 [Version]; the 2010 data are notyet publicly available.20Alan127
128CHAPTER 5Congressional Voters·100%90%80%70%60%50%40%30%20%10%0% · mm Year Loyal Partisans Defectors Pure IndependentsFIGURE 5-2Party-Line Voters, Defectors, and Independents in House Elections, 1956-2010Sources: 1956-2004, 2008: National Election Studies; 2006, 2010: Cooperative Congressional Election Study.100%80%UUU I! 60%1---40%1-- 20%0% 0lt'lOlCX)lt'lOl 0 0OlN 0Ol.,. 0Ol 0 CX) 0Ol01'-OlN1'Ol.,.1'Ol 01'-OlCX)1'-Ol 0N.,.CX)CX)OlOlOl CX) 0CX)CX)CX)OlOl0OlOlNOlOl.,.OlOl Ol CXlOlOl0Year Loyal Partisans DefectorsN8N 8Ng NCX)8N Pure IndependentsFIGURE 5-3Party-Line Voters, Defectors, and Independents in Senate Elections, 1956-2010Sources: 1956-2004, 2008: National Election Studies; 2006, 2010: Cooperative Congressional Election Study.00N
Partisanship in Congressional Elections100-90 Defecting to Incumbents80 Defecting to ChallengersC 70 :u 60Q)ClQ)C Q)e 504030200coco"' "' "' I()CXl0 I() co CXl 01' C\11'- 1'-co1'-CXl1'-"' "' "' "' 0CXl co0C\1 8"' "' "' "' "'"' "'"' "'"' "' "'"' 0C\1CXlCXlCXl CXl C\100C\1CXl0C\10C\1888C\1C\1YearFIGURE 5-4Partisan Voters Defecting to Incumbents and Challengers in House Elections,1958-2010Sources: 1956-2004, 2008, National Election Studies; 2006, 2010: Cooperative Congressional Election Study.The decline of party loyalty had important consequences for House elections,because, as Figures 5-4 and 5-5 show us, the growth in defections was entirely at theexpense of challengers. The crucial evidence is from the 1956-1976 surveys; from1978 to 1998, the vote question was asked in a way that exaggerates the reportedvote for the incumbent (typically by about 8 percentage points). The actual rateof defections to incumbents has thus been lower-and has almost certainly fallenfurther since the mid-1970s-than the figure suggest (the problem is apparentlysmaller in the CCES). 23 Voters sharing the incumbent's party have been loyalall along. House voters of the challenger's party grew much less faithful (evendiscounting for exaggeration) between the 1950s and 1970s and continued to defectat high rates until quite recently. Defections also dearly favor Senate incumbentsbut by a considerably narrower and, since 1990, generally decreasing margin.Figures 5-4 and 5-5 display, at the level of individual voters, the change inthe vote advantage of House incumbents that was evident in the aggregate figuresdiscussed in Chapter 3. They also reiterate the familiar House-Senate differ23 RobertB. Eubank, "Incumbent Effects on Individual Level Voting Behavior in CongressionalElections: A Decade of Exaggeration," Journal of Politics 47 (1985): 964-966; Gary C. Jacobson andDouglas Rivers, "Explaining the Overreport of Votes for Incumbents in National Election Studies"(Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Pasadena,California, March 18-20, 1993); and Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Gary C. Jacobson, and J. Tobin Grant,"Question Wording and the House Vote Choice: Some Experimental Evidence," Public OpinionQuarterly 64 (Fall2000): 257-270.129
130CHAPTER 5Congressional Voters10090 Defecting to Incumbents Defecting to Challengers80C)70c: Gic60&50eCD400.30!!c:CD201001978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010YearFIGURE 5-5Partisan Voters Defecting to Incumbents and Challengers in Senate Elections,1978-2010Sources: 1956-2004, 2008, National Election Studies; 2006, 2010: Cooperative Congressional Election Study.ences in this regard. However, they do not explain either phenomenon. As AlbertCover has pointed out, there is no logical reason weaker
much more about them than we once did. This chapter examines voting behavior in congressional elections and how it relates to the other phenomena of congressional election politics. It begins with a discussion of voter turnout and then turns to the fundamental question of how v
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