Country Reports On Terrorism 2014
Country Reports onTerrorism 2014June 2015United States Department of State PublicationBureau of CounterterrorismReleased June 2015Country Reports on Terrorism 2014 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United StatesCode, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congressa full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting thecriteria of the Act.1
COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2014Table of ContentsChapter 1. Strategic AssessmentChapter 2. Country ReportsAfricaOverviewTrans-Sahara Counterterrorism PartnershipThe Partnership for East African Regional CounterterrorismBurkina aMaliMauritaniaNigerNigeriaSenegalSomaliaSouth AfricaTanzaniaUgandaEast Asia and PacificOverviewChina (Hong Kong and Macau)IndonesiaDemocratic People’s Republic of KoreaRepublic of rviewAlbaniaAustriaAzerbaijanBelgiumBosnia and Herzegovina2
landItalyKosovoMacedoniaThe ed KingdomMiddle East and North AfricaOverviewAlgeriaBahrainEgyptIraqIsrael, the West Bank and Gaza, and audi ArabiaTunisiaUnited Arab EmiratesYemenSouth and Central rgyzstanMaldivesNepalPakistanSri LankaTajikistan3
TurkmenistanUzbekistanWestern icoPanamaParaguayPeruVenezuelaChapter 3. State Sponsors of TerrorismCubaIranSudanSyriaChapter 4. The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear(CBRN) TerrorismChapter 5. Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report)Terrorist Safe HavensCountering Terrorism on the Economic FrontMultilateral Efforts to Counter Terrorism; International Conventions and ProtocolsLong-Term Programs and Initiatives Designed to Counter Terrorist Safe Havens-Countering Violent Extremism-Capacity Building-Regional Strategic InitiativeSupport for PakistanCounterterrorism Coordination with Saudi ArabiaBroadcasting Board of Governors Initiatives: Outreach to Foreign Muslim AudiencesChapter 6. Terrorist OrganizationsAbdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)Ansar al-Dine (AAD)Ansar al-Islam (AAI)Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi (AAS-B)Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah (AAS-D)Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T)Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM)Army of Islam (AOI)Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)4
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)Boko Haram (BH)Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG)HamasHaqqani Network (HQN)Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM)HizballahIndian Mujahedeen (IM)Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru)Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)Jemaah Islamiya (JI)JundallahKahane ChaiKata’ib Hizballah (KH)Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)Lashkar e-TayyibaLashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC)Al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB)National Liberation Army (ELN)Palestine Islamic Jihad – Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ)Palestine Liberation Front – Abu Abbas Faction (PLF)Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)Al-Nusrah Front (ANF)Al-Qa’ida (AQ)Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)Real IRA (RIRA)Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N)Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)Revolutionary Struggle (RS)Al-Shabaab (AS)Shining Path (SL)Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)Chapter 7. Legislative Requirements and Key Terms5
Annexes:National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism:Annex of Statistical InformationTerrorism Deaths, Injuries, and Kidnappings of Private U.S. Citizens Overseas in20146
CHAPTER 1STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTMajor trends in global terrorism in 2014 included the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’s(ISIL’s) unprecedented seizure of territory in Iraq and Syria, the continued flow of foreignterrorist fighters worldwide to join ISIL, and the rise of lone offender violent extremists in theWest. Despite the fragmentation of al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, weak or failed governancecontinued to provide an enabling environment for the emergence of extremist radicalism andviolence, notably in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Nigeria, and Iraq. Continuing a trend noted in lastyear’s report, terrorist groups employed more aggressive tactics in their attacks. In ISIL’s case,this included brutal repression of communities under its control and the use of ruthless methodsof violence such as beheadings and crucifixions intended to terrify opponents. Boko Haram –operating in the Lake Chad Basin region of northern Nigeria, northern Cameroon, and southeastNiger – shared with ISIL a penchant for the use of brutal tactics, which included stonings,indiscriminate mass casualty attacks, and kidnapping children for enslavement. ISIL targetedreligious minorities such as Christians and Yazidis in particular, but also Shia Muslims andSunni tribesmen who defied its rule. The 2014 calendar year also witnessed a powerful regionaland international mobilization to counter ISIL that halted the group’s initial advances in Iraq.The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2178 in September constituted a significantstep forward in international efforts to cooperate in preventing the flow of foreign terroristfighters to and from conflict zones.*****The ongoing civil war in Syria was a significant factor in driving worldwide terrorism events in2014. The rate of foreign terrorist fighter travel to Syria – totaling more than 16,000 foreignterrorist fighters from more than 90 countries as of late December – exceeded the rate of foreignterrorist fighters who traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, or Somalia at any pointin the last 20 years. Many of the foreign terrorist fighters joined ISIL, which, throughintimidation and exploitation of political grievances, a weak security environment in Iraq, andthe conflict in Syria, secured sufficient support to conduct complex military operations in aneffort to seize contiguous territory in western Iraq and eastern Syria for a self-declared Islamiccaliphate. ISIL routinely and indiscriminately targeted defenseless civilians, including religiouspilgrims, while engaging in violent repression of local inhabitants.ISIL showed a particular capability in the use of media and online products to address a widespectrum of potential audiences: local Sunni Arab populations, potential recruits, andgovernments of coalition members and other populations around the world, including Englishspeaking audiences. ISIL has been adroit at using the most popular social and new mediaplatforms (YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter) to disseminate its messages broadly, with nearinstantaneous reposting and the generation of follow-on links and translations into additionallanguages following ISIL’s initial publication of online propaganda. Content included brutalimages, such as hostage beheadings and boasts of slave markets of Yazidi girls and women. In2014, ISIL expanded its messaging tactics to include content that purported to show an idealizedversion of life under its rule and progress in building the institutions of an orderly state. ISIL’suse of social and new media also facilitated its efforts to attract new recruits to the battlefields in7
Syria and Iraq, as ISIL facilitators answered in real time would-be members’ questions abouthow to travel to join the group. Individuals drawn to the conflict in Syria and Iraq were diversein their socioeconomic and geographic backgrounds, highlighting the need for comprehensivecounter-messaging and early engagement with a variety of communities to dissuade vulnerableindividuals from traveling to join the conflict.In 2014, ISIL began to foster relationships with potential affiliates beyond Iraq and Syria. Ansaral-Shari’a in Darnah pledged allegiance to ISIL in October 2014, and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis,operating primarily out of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, officially declared allegiance to ISIL inNovember. Questions remained, however, about the meaning of such affiliates – whetherrepresentative of a command relationship, commonality of strategic goals, or merelyopportunistic relationships.The prominence of the threat once posed by core al-Qa’ida (AQ) diminished in 2014, largely as aresult of continued leadership losses suffered by the AQ core in Pakistan and Afghanistan. AQleadership also appeared to lose momentum as the self-styled leader of a global movement in theface of ISIL’s rapid expansion and proclamation of a Caliphate.Though AQ central leadership was weakened, the organization continued to serve as a focalpoint of “inspiration” for a worldwide network of affiliated groups, including al-Qa’ida in theArabian Peninsula – a long-standing threat to Yemen, the region, and the United States; alQa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb; al-Nusrah Front; and al-Shabaab. Other violent Sunni Islamistextremist groups associated with AQ included the Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkar i Jhangvi,Harakat ul-Mujahadin, and Jemaah Islamiya. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban,and the Haqqani Network, which operated in Pakistan and Afghanistan, also have ties to AQ.Additionally, supporters and associates worldwide “inspired” by the group’s ideology may haveoperated without direction from AQ central leadership, making it difficult to estimate theirnumbers.Adherents of ISIL and AQ conducted terrorist attacks in the West in 2014 in so-called "loneoffender attacks" including Quebec and Ottawa , Canada (October 20 and October 22,respectively) and Sydney, Australia (December 15-16). In many cases it was difficult to assesswhether attacks were directed or inspired by ISIL or by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates. These attacksmay presage a new era in which centralized leadership of a terrorist organization matters less;group identity is more fluid; and violent extremist narratives focus on a wider range of allegedgrievances and enemies with which lone actors may identify and seek to carry out self-directedattacks. Enhanced border security measures among Western states that have increased thedifficulty for known or suspected terrorists to travel internationally likely encouraged groups likeAQ and ISIL to inspire and rely on lone actors already resident in the West to carry out attacksand thereby realize their goal of terrorizing Western populations.ISIL and AQ were far from the only serious threat that confronted the United States and its allies.Iran continued to sponsor terrorist groups around the world, principally through its IslamicRevolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). These groups included LebaneseHizballah, several Iraqi Shia militant groups, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad. Iran,Hizballah, and other Shia militia continued to provide support to the Asad regime, dramatically8
bolstering its capabilities, prolonging the civil war in Syria, and worsening the human rights andrefugee crisis there. Iran supplied quantities of arms to Syria and continued to send arms to Syriathrough Iraqi airspace in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions. Finally, Iran used IraqiShia militants and high profile appearances by Qods Force officials on the front lines of Iraq toclaim credit for military successes against ISIL and to belittle coalition airstrikes and U.S.contributions to the Government of Iraq’s ongoing fight against ISIL.ISIL and AQ affiliates, including al-Nusrah Front, continued to use kidnapping for ransomoperations and other criminal activities to raise funds for operational purposes. Much of ISIL’sfunding, unlike that of AQ and AQ-type organizations, did not come from external donations butwas internally gathered in Iraq and Syria. ISIL earned up to several million dollars per monththrough its various extortion networks and criminal activity in the territory where it operated,including through oil smuggling. Some progress was made in 2014 in constraining ISIL’s abilityto earn money from the sale of smuggled oil as a result of anti-ISIL Coalition airstrikes that wereconducted on ISIL-operated oil refineries.*****President Obama has repeatedly stressed that the fight against terrorism is not one the UnitedStates can or should pursue alone. We have been working to shift our counterterrorism strategyto more effectively partner with countries where terrorist networks seek a foothold.Accordingly, we have built an effective Global Coalition to Counter ISIL; more than sixtypartners are contributing to this multifaceted effort to stop ISIL’s advances on the ground,combat the flow of foreign fighters, disrupt ISIL’s financial resources, counteract ISIL’smessaging, and undermine its appeal.The shared foreign terrorist fighter threat has prompted even closer cooperation among U.S.federal agencies and our international partners, particularly in Europe. In September, PresidentObama chaired a UN Security Council (UNSC) session on the foreign terrorist fighter threat, andthe UNSC subsequently adopted Resolution 2178. We have seen increased international focuson this problem and the development of more effective counterterrorism laws overseas, as wellas enhanced border security efforts and a greater willingness to share threat information amongpartner nations.Partners in North Africa and Asia also took steps in 2014 to strengthen their counterterrorismcapabilities through new laws and the development of other means to identify, interdict, andprosecute foreign terrorist fighters and those who support them. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates have all enacted legislation or regulations in 2014to address the foreign terrorist fighter issue.In West Africa, the countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger mobilized forces in 2014 to helpNigeria contain the growing threat posed by Boko Haram. With the authorization of the AfricanUnion (AU), these countries announced the launch of a new Multinational Joint Task Force tocoordinate operations against Boko Haram. In Somalia, AU troops from Burundi, Djibouti,Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda continued to push al-Shabaab from towns, thus supporting thepeople and government of Somalia’s efforts to build security and stability.9
While countries worldwide worked to enact legislation and developed and implementedprograms to address violent extremism, we remain concerned about counterproductive actionssome governments have taken in the name of addressing terrorism – actions such as politicalrepression and human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, which could heightenpolitical grievances and exacerbate the terrorist threat. These actions could become conditionsthat terrorists themselves exploit for recruitment – for example, banning political parties orsuppressing freedom of speech by imprisoning bloggers and journalists. Multilateral andregional institutions can provide the appropriate framework to address these challenges.10
CHAPTER 2COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISMAFRICAAfrica experienced significant levels of terrorist activity in 2014. In East Africa, the Somaliabased terrorist group al-Shabaab remained the primary terrorist threat despite a series ofsignificant setbacks. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces were able to supplantal-Shabaab control of several urban areas inside Somalia in 2014, forcing al-Shabaab out oflucrative port cities and further into the countryside. In addition to the group’s decliningrevenues, al-Shabaab lost three critical members of its leadership circle to airstrikes – the group’sleader, the head of intelligence, and the chief of external operations and planning. The loss ofterritory, revenue, and leadership hampered al-Shabaab’s operational capabilities for a time, butthe organization regrouped in new safe havens to continue planning and launching attacks andsuicide bombings in Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti. In Somalia, al-Shabaab conducted acomplex assault against the Mogadishu International Airport on December 25, killing threecontractors – one American, one Kenyan, and one Ugandan - and eight Ugandan AMISOMsoldiers. Djibouti suffered its first bombing in May when two suicide operatives detonated theirexplosive devices at a French restaurant in the capital. One Turkish citizen was killed along withthe two suicide bombers. Al-Shabaab launched mass-casualty attacks in several Kenyan townsand villages along the porous border with Somalia that resulted in over 200 deaths, Kenya’sdeadliest year against al-Shabaab to date. While still focused on striking targets outside Somalia,particularly within countries contributing troops to AMISOM, al-Shabaab attempted todelegitimize the Federal Government of Somalia through assassinations, suicide bombings, andother asymmetric attacks within the country.The United States continued to support counterterrorism capacity building throughout the Hornof Africa, including bolstering of AMISOM’s operational efficacy, contributing to thedevelopment and professionalization of Somalia’s security sector, and improving regionalcritical incident response capabilities. In the wake of the 2013 Westgate mall attack in Nairobi,various East African countries increased their efforts to detect, deter, disrupt, investigate, andprosecute terrorist incidents. In October, Kenyan Defense Forces interdicted a vehicle with fivesuspected al-Shabaab operatives, several suicide vests, and other explosive materiel at theMoyale border crossing between Kenya and Ethiopia. Border security initiatives remained highon the list of national security and counterterrorism priorities in East Africa.In West Africa, conflict in Nigeria continued throughout the northeast, with Boko Haram andrelated actors committing hundreds of attacks, resulting in over 5,000 casualties in 2014. Thisviolence spilled over into neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The kidnapping of 276female students from a secondary school in Chibok, Borno State, brought global attention to theconflict and highlighted Boko Haram’s deliberate targeting of non-combatants, includingchildren.France’s Operation BARKHANE, an operation focused on countering terrorists operating in theSahel, continued and was supported by important contributions of the UN peacekeeping mission11
in Mali to bolster and restore that country’s stability. Peace accord discussions, hosted byAlgeria, continued through year’s end in northern Mali.TRANS-SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIPEstablished in 2005, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a U.S.-fundedand implemented, multi-faceted, multi-year effort designed to build the capacity and cooperationof military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across North and West Africa to counterterrorism. Areas of support include:(1) enabling and enhancing the capacity of North and West African militaries to conductcounterterrorism operations;(2) integrating the ability of North and West African militaries, and other supportingpartners, to operate regionally and collaboratively on counterterrorism efforts;(3) enhancing border security capacity to monitor, restrain, and interdict terrorist movements;(4) strengthening the rule of law, including access to justice, and law enforcement’s ability todetect, disrupt, respond to, investigate, and prosecute terrorist activity;(5) monitoring and countering the financing of terrorism (such as that related to kidnappingfor ran
Chapter 3. State Sponsors of Terrorism Cuba Iran Sudan Syria Chapter 4. The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Chapter 5. Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report) Terrorist Safe Havens Countering Terrorism on the Economic Front
Terrorism Steele, New Craft of Intelligence - Terrorists & Terrorism in the Contemporary World, Future Forms of Terrorism - Merari, Terrorism as a Strategy of Struggle: Past and Present - HASC, Report on Future of Terrorism Week One Forum Discussion 2 History of Terrorism: 1 st Wave CO 1, 4-5 - Rapoport, Four Waves of Modern Terrorism (pp.
externalities of terrorism: terrorism fatalities, terrorism incidents, terrorism injuries and terrorism-related property damages. The inquiry is positioned as an applied research study because the intuition for assessing the nexus between social media and terrorism is sound, given that information
From the Table of Free Voices: Terrorism, Liberty, Security, Profit PART TWO: GROUP AND INDIVIDUAL TERRORISM - NON-STATE ACTORS Defining Individual and Group Terrorism The Colonial Roots of Terrorism and the Fallacy of Nation-Building Revolutionary Violence, Civil War and Terrorism The People's Mojahedin of Iran - Case Study of a Flawed .
CHAPTER 11 Homeland Security 298 CHAPTER 12 America’s Vulnerability to Terrorism 334 CHAPTER 13 Emergency Management 355 PART IV Combatting Terrorism and the Future CHAPTER 14 Combatting Terrorism 387 CHAPTER 15 Terrorism, Intelligence, and Homeland Security: The Future 423 A01_TAYL8146_02_SE_FM.indd 6 02/12/17 1:12 AM
terrorist fighters, transport-related terrorism offences, CBRN terrorism and respect for human rights while countering terrorism. Furthermore, UNODC/TPB co-organized three side events, i.e. on the alternatives to pre-trial detention in terrorism cases, jointly with the United States, on the nexus between terrorism and TOC in
The Four Horsemen of Terrorism – It’s not Waves, it’s Strains David Rapoport’s concept of four waves of terrorism, from anarchist terrorism in the 1880s, through nationalist and Marxist waves in the early and mid‐ Twentieth Century, to the present religious wave, is one of the most influential concepts in terrorism studies.
ISS 23343745 165 Jun 2021 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 15, Issue 3 Sinai, Joshua (in press): Bibliography of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. Abingdon: Routledge. [ca. 2,000 Titles] Tinnes, Judith (2017, August): Bibliography: Root Causes of Terrorism.
Anatomi Antebrachii a. Tulang ulna Menurut Hartanto (2013) ulna adalah tulang stabilisator pada lengan bawah, terletak medial dan merupakan tulang yang lebih panjang dari dua tulang lengan bawah. Ulna adalah tulang medial antebrachium. Ujung proksimal ulna besar dan disebut olecranon, struktur ini membentuk tonjolan siku. Corpus ulna mengecil dari atas ke bawah. 8 Gambar 2.1 Anatomi os Ulna .
