Marine Corps Advisor Companies - Marine Corps Association

and sized security force element. Thus,while the MSCTs assume most of theadvisor burden of the SFA mission, significant augmentation may be requiredfrom more traditional units.Positive Operational ImpactThis MCAC MSCT contributionwill provide SFA capability and capacityfor much of the current and envisionedoperational needs. The established SFAunits will greatly reduce the need forOperating Force units to contributecritical commanders and staffs to filladvisor billets in an ad hoc fashion, mitigating personnel suitability risk andconserving valuable Operating Forcecapacity and capability. Fielding theMSCTs offers a “win-win”; it meetsthe our intent of a professionalizedSFA capability while alleviating ourtraditional ad hoc approach to sourcingadvisors.MSCTs and the Economy of ForceMSCTs provide key capabilitiesto the total force that enhance theMAGTF and the joint force across therange of military operations. Moreover,MSCTs provide the Marine Corps witha profound economy of force conduitto achieve our mission objectives inresource-constrained environments.First, they signal to our partners ourpolitical and military commitment toour common fight by having our personnel on the ground. Second, they provide manifest warfighting mentoringand coaching to our partners, fosteringthe human domain of warfare by forging bonds between partners. Third, ourteams, when augmented by C2 personnel and assets, are capable of providingdirect C2 tie-in to our partner nationsand thereby bring combined arms,combat support, and combat servicesupport to our partners—enabling themto decisively engage the enemy as partof a better integrated multinational orcombined force.The Full Value of the MSCTs ExceedsTactical EmploymentBut does the TFSW employment scenario capture the full value of MSCTs?Our MCAC A mission analysis indicates that the value of the MSCT conMarine Corps Gazette September 2019cept far exceeds the current TFSWadvisor or similar tactical missions.The value also extends beyond the irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, andSFA operations we have seen in U.S.Central Command. Indeed, the valueof the MSCTs extends throughout thecontinuum of conflict in both time andscale with the potential for decisive political and institutional advantages overmore traditional Marine Corps unitswhen employed in specific mannersthroughout the geographic combatantcommand areas of responsibility.“You cannot surgetrust.”—USSOCOM2020 Vision Statementdecisively engage the enemy alone or aspart of a coalition.Moreover, as detailed in the Joint Operational Access Concept (Washington,DC: Joint Staff, January 2012), we canno longer take access for granted. Wemust develop innovative methods to ensure access for U.S. force entry into ourpartners’ countries before the openingof hostilities. Through enduring partnering operations, we can mitigate theneed to overcome certain aspects of ourcompetitors’ strengths, such as the developing long-range anti-access threatsin East Asia and the Baltic Sea region.This is increasingly important as theexisting time-phased force deploymentdata calculations may no longer provevalid in a more contested environment.Our adversaries have written extensivelyon the perils of allowing U.S. forcessufficient operational access to createlodgments. Our adversaries intend toemploy a full spectrum of capabilitiesto prevent U.S. entry. By establishingand maintaining robust SFA relationships with partners, we can significantlyimprove the preconditions needed forthe mission.Additionally, with sufficient forethought and an enduring commitmentto partner nations, we can expect todevelop a robust body of linguisticand cultural experience, along with anunderstanding of the partner nations’organization that can greatly enhanceour interoperability. These will help todeter conflict or, if conflict arises, helpdefeat our common foes.In most cases, the value will be substantial if not decisive. By developinga presence in their countries and establishing relationships, we signal toour partners the Marine Corps’ commitment—we have our personnel onthe ground and they see U.S. forcesinvesting in their future. Further, ourpresence enables us to mentor and coachour partners, develop mutual trust andinteroperability, and integrate them intoour robust enablers and C2. We therebyempower them to more effectively address their security challenges, defendtheir interests, and—when necessary—Military Benefit Achieved with Minimal Political RiskWe then need to ask if our partnersare willing to accept our presence there.What about our U.S. Country Team?How will regional threat actors respond?How concerned will the host nationbe if a MEU or larger Marine Corpsunit establishes a presence during noncombat operations? Will the presenceof such unit potentially complicate theinternational security interests of thehost nation and the United States?Here is where an understanding ofour geopolitical relations and the national interests of our partners meet.Although the specifics may remainFull AdvantagesThe best way to envision these advantages is to ask a few questions. First,which geographic combatant commanders face the most severe threatsto our vital interests? Based on ourNational Defense Strategy, the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, andother documents, the answer is U.S.Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and U.S. European Command(USEUCOM). If this is so, we shouldask: How valuable would it to be to havea well-defined and developed recurringengagement with partners in likely theaters of operation?www.mca-marines.org/gazetteWE19

Ideas & Issues (Special Operations)unknown, they are usually derived ina manner in concert with Figure 3.Through its contributions and enhancement of host-nation confidenceand interoperability with U.S. forces,this graphic demonstrates that a MSCTcan provide a high degree of militarybenefit with minimal political risk to thepartner nation, with a far greater chancefor acceptance by our country team orregional rivals because of its small sizeand other potential mitigating factors(e.g., low profile, no uniforms, etc.).Small Presence, Large ImpactA MSCT is a powerful, flexible deterrent option. To the casual observer, aMSCT with some key C2 enabler personnel is only about the size of a largesquad or platoon.2 It is therefore unlikely to draw much attention. Indeed,for the purposes of signature reduction,it may be desirable for the MSCT todeploy in civilian attire; this would enable the MSCT to operate within previously restricted host nations duringthe “Competition Space” or “Phase 0”segments of the continuous spectrum ofwarfare. Conversely, our presence can bea signal of support to both our partner’sdomestic population and their rivals,potentially de-escalating situationsand certainly preparing our partnersand ourselves for victory should armedconflict arise (see Figure 4 on the nextpage).Low Political Risk, High MilitaryBenefitThe hypothetical deployment of aten- to thirty-person MSCT is less likelyto be perceived as provocative behavior and result in concomitant politicalrisk. However, the MSCT’s ability toharness a large portion of the MarineCorps’ enablers still provides the partner nation with the ability to leveragemilitary power far in excess of the merenumber of Marines deployed. Throughthe economy of force employment of aMSCT, we have provided our partnerwith a significant warfighting enhancement.Enhanced Motivation and the Willof PartnersIf we are to fully capitalize on ourWE20 www.mca-marines.org/gazette“In today’s information age, we must recognize thatthe essential ‘key terrain’ is the will of a host nation’spopulation . [This] permits us to gain the trust of skeptical populations, thus frustrating the enemy’s effortsand suffocating their ideology.”—Gen J.N. MattisForeword to Operational Culture for the Warfighter:Principles and the ApplicationsLow Military alPolitical PlatoonRiskHigh Military BenefitMEBMEFMEUSPMAGTFMarine SecurityCooperation TeamFigure 3. Political risk and military benefit (scale is conceptual). (Figure by author.)partners’ strength and leverage theeconomy of force benefits inherent inSFA, we need to be able to understandthe motivations and will of our partners.In accordance with the Joint Concept forHuman Aspects of Military Operations(Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff,October 2016), the future joint forcemust focus on a critical and enduringchallenge in warfare: the need to understand relevant actors’ motivationsand the underpinnings of their will.MSCTs help us do this. Mutual understanding is best developed by establishing bonds of trust and respect overtime in a preplanned, predictable, anditerative manner. Through enduringengagement with select partners, wewill foster this understanding and trust.Composed of ProfessionalsFurther, a quick review of theMSCT’s table of organization indicatesthat the Marine Corps has made a con-scious decision to assign experiencedofficers and SNCOs to the advisorunits. We can thereby demonstrate toour partners, many of whom do nothave a strong legacy of imbuing greatresponsibility upon NCOs and juniorofficers, that Marines at every level aretrained to function as key members ofthe battle staff and make key decisions.This message is a fundamental lessonto militaries that wish to operate in amanner similar to the Marine Corpsand is essential to their transformationefforts.Thus, when such an elite team arrives, the partner nation will be assured that we have sent experienced,prescreened professionals capable ofdeveloping close, professional relationsthroughout the senior officer and enlisted ranks.The Benefits of MSCT EmploymentWe previously noted that at relativelyMarine Corps Gazette September 2019

Range of Military OperationsPeaceConflict ContinuumWarMajor Operations and CampaignsRange ofMilitaryOperationsCrisis Response and Limited Contingency OperationsMilitary Engagement, Security Cooperation, and DeterrenceOpportunities to introduce MSCTs intoareas of (potential) conflictOptimal timing to introduce MSCT to(1) Maximize time to develop continuing relations, transfer skills, andintegrate partner into USMC Warfighting TTP and(2) Take full advantage of the limited political risk of early entryFigure 4. Introducing MSCTs into areas of conflict.(Source: The range of military operations as depicted in JP 3-0, Joint Operations.)Global Concept of Employment (Examples)EUCOMNORTHCOMSecurity Cooperation TeamMEXMAR EngagementINDOPACOMPartnered Exercises (Agile Spirit,NATO, Mission RehersalExercises)Partnered Exercises (Japan,Korea, Thailand)Enduring SC Engagements toBuild Strategic Advantage(Ukraine, Sweden, Baltics)Enduring SC Engagements toBuild Strategic Relation (FirstIsland Chain)CENTCOMTask Force SouthwestSOUTHCOMAfrican LionSPMAGTF SCSPMAGTF AfricaExercises / Partnered EngagementsAfrica Partnerships SC Teams / SPMAGTFsTask Force Spartan IraqAFRICOMSecurity Cooperation Team MARCENT SecurityCooperation TeamSPMAGTF-CRUnited Arab Emirates Kingdom of Saudi ArabiaFMS Advisor Teams Advisor Teams / Partnered OperationsFigure 5. Response options. (Source:Marine Corps Gazette September 2019 Mobilization to enable coalitionMCAC A Mission Analysis.)low political risk, we can employ MSCTsto gain entry to a partner nation, signalour will to support our partners, defendagainst regional threats, establish professional relationships through enduringengagements, foster a relationship oftrust and mutual interoperability andrespect, and establish a liaison conduitto facilitate the optimal employmentof operational enablers to gain decisiveadvantage in combat operations.In USINDOPACOM, the MarineCorps should evaluate whether to establish a permanent MSCT presence withthe Republic of Korea Marine Corps,the new Japanese Amphibious RapidDeployment Brigade, or other countriesin the area with their own marine corpsor naval infantry capacity. Alternatively,in USEUCOM, the Swedish Amphibious Corps, the Ukrainian Naval Infantry, the Finnish Coastal Jaegers, andthe Baltic states represent partners withwhom we should endeavor to be moreinteroperable.The geo-political strategic impactcould be decisive and significantlyundercut our adversaries’ efforts toundermine our alliance and treaty relationships. By inspiring our partnersto fight as we do, we signal our mutualcommitment and our ability to establishand maintain our relations before theonset of hostilities. Ultimately, we seekto prevent armed conflict by signalingour will, commitment, and readinessto defeating our adversaries’ aggression.Such a flexible deterrent option is a hugeasset for our Nation. (See Figure 5.)MSCT Employment CostsHere, we must ask two more questions. First, could the Marine Corpsafford the operational impact of having MSCT personnel deployed to a keypartner? Second, what financial impactwould this have?Marine Corps Manpower Cost. Theanswer to the first question is foundin the balance between MSCTs andrequirements. It is likely that the Marine Corps has a continuous need todeploy MSCTs to TFSW for the foreseeable future. We anticipate that sixteen MSCTs could maintain this support at a one-per-four-year deploymentcycle, with each MSCT covering twowww.mca-marines.org/gazetteWE21

Ideas & Issues (Special Operations)brigades and taking into account thefact that 4th Brigade, 215th Corps Afghanistan National Army probably hasa less sizeable need for advisors becauseof its smaller size as well as allowingfor some key Corps-level augmentationfrom a Marine Corps general officer,his select staff, and the headquarterselements of the MCAC units.This TFSW commitment, assuming it continues at steady state, leavesa surplus of eight MSCTs. If used forone-year “boots on the ground” deployments, these teams could deploy onceevery four years. This means that two(if a full-sized MSCT is deployed) tofour (if half-sized MSCTs are deployed)other continuous engagements could besupported with the envisioned MSCTforce structure.Therefore, we could continuouslyhave two to four select militaries engaged in preconflict phase or “competitive space” maneuver. Thus, for acost of 80 deployed Marines per annum—admittedly highly experiencedMarines—we can fulfill much or mostof the TFSW advisor mission and potentially achieve decisive leverage withkey partners in Eastern Europe or theFar East where they face our regionalcompetitors.3Financial Cost. As to the financialimpact, our analysis at MCAC A indicates that we could mobilize a MSCTfor eighteen months for a twelve-monthboots-on-the-ground deployment forapproximately four million dollars.Therefore, for an additional margin costof approximately sixteen million dollars,the Marine Corps could continuouslydeploy four MSCTs per annum andthereby assume most or much of theTFSW advisor mission and simultaneously develop potentially decisive relationships with partners such as Japan,South Korea, and other countries in thesame area that share security concernsin the face of a resurgent China—orsimilarly in Europe where they faceRussia.The Risk of Not Employing MSCTsThus far, we have focused on theadvantages of employing MSCTs. Wenow turn to the risks of not employing MSCTs. We first must examineWE22 www.mca-marines.org/gazettethe more traditional realm of TFSWbefore exploring the lost opportunityif we do not engage our partners inUSINDOPACOM or USEUCOM,who face threats from major regionalcompetitors.First, regarding the TFSW mission,if we do not establish a cadre of SFAprofessionals, we will underperform inthe advising mission and continue todegrade our overall Operating Forcecapability by creating ad hoc advisorteams at the expense of those Marines’parent commands. Certainly, we willsend excellent Marines to conduct theSFA mission, as we have done for thepast decade or more. But we will failto establish the consistency and perfor-We now have an opportunity to establishaccess and develop therelationships .mance inherent in a professional cadreof Marine advisors; we will continue tounderperform as we have with repeatedad hoc deployments.4 Such Marines willnot have the dedicated time to focus ontheir mission, attend the proper schools,and learn local languages and customs,and they will not have the institutionalinvestment and championship neededto reward their own professional investments in SFA. Additionally, it isinevitable that there will be a numberof Marines who prove unsuitable forthe mission because of insufficient prescreening.Further, by not having regionallydedicated MSCTs, we will not immerseourselves in the highly advantageous(but time and resource consuming)study of local languages and culture.Lacking such exposure and educationin our teams misses the opportunityto send a profound message of respectand appreciation to our partners. Bynot adopting the MSCT concept, weare forgoing not only the opportunityto have a dedicated cadre of professionaladvisors but also the opportunity to es-tablish bonds of trust and dedication socritical for lasting success in the humandomain of warfare.Second, regarding our MSCT deployments to USEUCOM and USINDOPACOM, if we forgo the employment of MSCTs early in the conflictcontinuum, we forfeit our opportunityto engage in early competitive-space orphase-zero maneuver and later will haveto confront anti-access/area denial systems to get our key forces ashore. Wewould surrender our opportunity to takeadvantage of scarce pre-conflict time toestablish bonds of trust and professionalrapport with our partners. Without suchbonds, integrating their forces into ourscheme of maneuver or our enablers insupport of their efforts will be significantly more challenging. We now havean opportunity to establish access anddevelop the relationships key to deterring and, if necessary, winning regionalconflicts. We need to capitalize on thistime now.Optimization of the MSCTsAlthough the MSCT is a valuabletool, it can be improved. First, we canimprove the educational and trainingpackages of its personnel. Second, wecan orient MSCTs toward specific geographic areas to prepare personnel fortheir anticipated areas of operation.Regarding the former, there is a current requirement that all Marines in aMSCT have the 0570/0571 AdvisorMOS. The current curriculum for the0570 MOS at the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, Fort Story, VA,is designed for advising at the lower tactical (e

ghan National Army's 215th Corps or 505th Police Zone. After achieving fully operationally capable status, each of the four MCACs could provide one MSCT rotation every other year for a yearlong boots-on-the-ground de-ployment to the four brigades of the 215th Corps and either supplement or assume much of the Corps-level advisor