The Anxious Landscape: Abstract. In The Idea Of A Town, Joseph

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The Anxious Landscape:the role of hysteria in perception andportrayal of the landscapeDonald KunzeIntegrative Arts / ArchitectureThe Pennsylvania State UniversityUniversity Park Pennsylvania USALeonardo da Vinci, “John the Baptist” (1513-16)This paper is an extended version of the presentation prepared for the Symposium on theTerrain of Landscape & Architecture, sponsored by the School of Architecture, Planningand Landscape, University of Newcastle UponTyne and the Landscape Research Group,Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK. The symposium,organized by Nathanial Coleman and others,was held September 23-26, 2004.Abstract. In The Idea of a Town, JosephRykwert contrasted Freudʼs accounts of an “anxiouslandscape,” the scene of hysteria, with a paradigm ofthe town as a place of memorious health and healing.Rykwertʼs reconnection of contemporary urbanmentality with the violent origins of urban foundationrites nonetheless leads to the vision of the town as “atotal mnemonic symbol a structured complex ofsymbols; in which the citizen identifies himselfwith his town, with its past and its founders” (p.189). The healing model allows Rykwert to developa dichotomy between historical approaches to townplanning. On one side is the “pattern” associated withthe templum, the quadrated relation of microcosm tomacrocosm established through ritual and renewedwith annual observances. On the other is theinstrumental city design, such as those promoted byBaron Von Haussmann, transforming the urban sceneinto a “great consumerʼs market, a workshop, anarena for ambitions.”There seems no way to reconcile, in these terms,the need for collective memory with those forces ofmodernism that we know all too well and, rightly orwrongly, identify with psychosis. Yet, this dichotomycuts off any useful discussion of the real relation ofplace to thought, where the latter is “externalized”as a material landscape and the formerʼs coincidenceof chance and teleology provides the mind with itsmost comprehensive model. I propose to pursue amodel that recognizes, on one hand, the “unspeakablescandal” lying at the center of all urban foundations;and, on the other, the personal psychologicalneed to find, in the external landscape, a suitablycomplex place to play out the dynamic dramas ofpsychic symptoms. My main resources will comefrom Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze (Cinema),Giambattista Vico (The New Science), and Hitchcock(North by Northwest, Vertigo, Rear Window, Shadowof a Doubt, Strangers on a Train, and other films).

pointingThe complexity/perversity of human thought andaction is condensed in the simple gesture of pointing.The “indicative gesture” frames a scene, outlines aplan of action, establishes a context and back-generates a history and dynamic while, at the same time,making both the finger and the pointer “invisible” andinculpable in this action-at-a-distance. Dogs and otherpets do not understand pointing. They sniff at the finger, look at the pointer, and wonder what is wanted.Even the hunting dog whose specialty is pointingknows only to attenuate his run towards the fallen prey,to freeze in the act of pursuing. Such is one theory behind the pointing finger: that it is an attenuation of theact of grasping. Not being able to grasp an object, thehand “holds back” by retracting all fingers except one,the one that establishes a trajectory of desire, a spaceto be crossed, an interval that will absolve the archerfrom the arrow even while the victim falls dead.Pointing seems innocent enough, in fact, untilwe acknowledge the wide range of paraphernalia thatdo the pointing job. The frame embellishes the edgeof painting — the four sides that are already lines ina spectral twin of the literal view — and takes up therole of narrativeʼs “once upon a time.” The threshold,gate, or window can provide much the same servicesas the painterly frame. Indicative landscapes andspaces have a point of view built into them. That pointis generally outside, behind a screen that serves asa place of representation where the visibility of theworld beyond rushes to present itself for the subject, tothe subject.In the psychological theory of sign language, two formsof gesture are usually distinguished, the indicative andthe imitative; these classes can be clearly delimited bothas to content and psychological genesis. The indicativegesture is derived biologically and genetically from themovement of grasping And this seemingly so simplestep toward the independence of gesture, constitutes oneof the most important stages in the development fromthe animal to the specifically human. For no animalprogresses to the characteristic transformation of thegrasping movement into the indicative gesture. Evenamong the most highly developed animals, “clutching atthe distance,” as pointing with the hand has been called,has never gone beyond the first, incomplete beginnings.This simple genetic fact suggests that “clutching at thedistance” involves a factor of general spiritual significance. It is one of the first steps by which the perceivingand desiring I removes a perceived and desired contentfrom himself and so forms it into an “object,” an “objective” content.—Ernst Cassirer. The Philosophy of Symbolic Form, Volume 1: Language, trans. R. Manheim (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1955), pp . 180-81.Hysteria is about the memory of complex experiences. Where the memory of sexual coitus repressesthe memory of pain, leaving a recollection primarilyof pleasure, hysteria generally does the opposite. Painis remembered — and externalized in the form ofsymptoms and complaints that are not contrived but2

Gilles Deleuze, Cinema, 1 (The Movement-Image), 2 (The TimeImage), trans. G. Thomlinson and B. Habberjam (Minneapolis:University of Minnesota, 1986-1989).Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. M. Lester (New York:Columbia University Press, 1990).Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. A. Mitchell (NewYork: Henry Holt and Company, 1911), pp. 304-329.Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S.Palmer (London, George Allen & Unwin, LTD, 1911).Slavoj Zizek, Organs without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences (New York and London: Routledge, 2004).Alice and Through the Looking-Glassinvolve a category of very special things:events, pure events. When I say “Alice becomes larger,” I mean that she becomes largerthan she was. By the same token, however,she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at thesame time. She is larger now; she was smallerbefore. But it is at the same moment that onebecomes larger than one was and smaller thanone becomes. This is the simultaneity of abecoming whose characteristic is to elude thepresent. Insofar as it eludes the present, becoming does not tolerate the separation or thedistinction of before and after, or of past andfuture. It pertains to the essence of becoming to move and to pull in both directions atonce: Alice does not grow without shrinking,and vice versa. Good sense affirms that in allthings there is a determinable sense or direction (sens); but paradox is the affirmation ofboth senses or directions at the same time.Plato invites us to distinguish between twodimensions: (1) that of limited and measured things, of fixed qualities, permanent ortemporary which always presuppose pausesand rests and (2) a pure becoming withoutmeasure, a veritable becoming-mad, whichnever rests.—Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 1-2truly felt. Pleasure, related to the Real of desire ratherthan the “reality” of symptoms, is repressed. Becauseindication is what is externalized, made visible andobvious, afforded by something made invisible, thelogic that regulates pointing also regulates hysteria.This points, hah hah, to hysteriaʼs division ofpleasure and pain. Pain, here, plays the part of thefinite, dividable substrate. Pleasure, secrete pleasure,which must always be suppressed in hysteria, is counterpart to the elusive, invisible durée, the hand behind the finger, the frame, sill, portal, or boundary. InBergsonʼs terms, the divisible framed representationowes its existence to the indivisible frame, the ectoplasmic substances that, while supposed to be invisible, nonetheless mask their shadowy appearances.Indivisibility, what? In Deleuzeʼs Logic of Sense,“becoming” is the non-categorical category. It eludesboth classification and division, and is the model forthe Greek idea of apieron, unbounded. What doescome to mind is the idea of the “plenum,” a spacethat continues without topological breaks, in and outof “ordinary space,” but remains invisible, continuous, and in motion.There is already a name for this space, but it isapplied to a specific condition that, significantly, alsointerested Bergson and Deleuze in their expeditionsinto time. This is the Ø (phi) phenomenon. In his twopart study of cinema, Gilles Deleuze revisits HenriBergsonʼs often inconsistent views on the subject oftime. Bergson compares time to the case of cinema,where static photographs are “interpolated” throughthe phi function (Ø) to produce the experience ofcontinuous motion. This analogy helps decipher theancient paradoxes of Zeno: arrows that donʼt reachtheir target, runners who cannot overtake tortoises,etc. The problem, Bergson argues, is that what is indivisible (motion) cannot be mapped against what isdivisible. Time, as dynamic, cannot be gauged by the3

infinitely divisible substrate of space. The cinemaʼsstatic “snapshots,” run at a mechanical 20-30 framesper second, result in the illusion of movement.Abduction is C. S. Peirceʼs original contribution to the development of symbolic logic. Unlikededuction, which leads directly from premises toconclusion, or induction, which involves inferencebut is not allowed to stray from its presuppositions, abduction looks for new or hidden contextsthat make a surprising or perplexing situationunderstandable. Abduction is the dominant modeof the Ø phenomenon because it is the context thatmakes the fragmentary data reaching the senses,“make the most sense.” A striking use of abduction,negatively, took place during the widely publicizedtrial of police accused of beating a black suspect,Rodney King, in Los Angeles. The defense teamreplayed the famous videotape of the beatingframe by frame, asking the jury to consider, foreach frame, if a crime were being committed. Inno case could a specific significant departure fromlegal policy be found, and the deductive “addition” of these conclusions forced the jury to acquitthe accused, although the abductive reality of thevideotape clearly showed the victim being abused.Ø was the context that made the singular fragmentsunderstandable, but the defense teamʼs strategywas to make the fragments not understandable inany public sense in order to focus them on specificpoints of law.The analogy is not simple, however. In ordinarynon-cinematic experience, perceptual “snapshots”stabilize the flux of sense encounters. In turn, these“fixes” create their own Ø space — the invisible, unreached spaces, the unlived moments, and the hiddensides of things are held in hypothetical readiness. Weneed not walk around all sides of objects in the environment to be convinced that they are full, three-dimensional things. Fragments are glued together withØ-stuff, logically “abduced” rather than deduced. Øremains the “indivisible” in whatever context it appears. In cinema form, it is motion; in experience, itis the world that is supposed to be solid and three-dimensional.This is where the function of representation expands beyond its accustomed role copying a “priorreality.” Cinemaʼs representation is the static photograph mechanized and calibrated in process ofconstruction and presentation. Ordinary experienceconstructs something like snapshots, even if thesesnapshots barely correspond with actual sensualexperience. Like the iconic drawings of young children, experienceʼs representations combine belief,experience, and re-arranged sequences. Ø, on theother hand, is strangely a-temporal and a-spatial. Itworks like the mystical fourth dimension of the turnof the century, a medium of time travel and spatialmetamorphosis. “Inserted” between the constructedprecipitates of dynamic environmental interaction, Øis like the “lamella” of the human body — the boundary between living and dead skin. Its anthropologicalcounterpart is the ritual period of mourning to assistthe deceased soulʼs transition from life to death. Neither fully dead or alive, the soul is “between the twodeaths.” The popular images of various forms of ec4

toplasm fill out the biography of this in-between state.The lore of ectoplasm grew rapidly with the popularity of photography, where double exposures couldfake the presence of the dead in the space of livingsubjects. Another form of ectoplasm was anamorphous glop extruded from the nose, mouth, or ear.Hans Holbein, The Ambassadors (1533)This is hysteriaʼs most scandalous, disgustingform, where the externalization of interior realityrefuses any possible symbolic diagnosis. But, it doeshighlight the Øʼs relation to the space and time thatconstitute the network of symbolic relations we call“reality.” A hybrid form of ectoplasm, a smoky butcohesive cloud with the ability to form recognizableimages and, at the same time, slip through restrictedopenings such as keyholes or the space beneath doors,represents Øʼs bi-polar nature. Like the representation, Ø retains an element of minimal mimesis. Likethe amorphous interior of the body, Ø is what Lacanwould call “the Real” — a substance beyond any possible symbolic representation and, hence, in contactwith the magical substances of desire and fear. Ø infact bridges the perceptual and the Real, showingitself to be the substrate for anamorphosis, the ability of ordinary images to accommodate content thatare visible only from special viewpoints or, moregenerally, from some “impossible-Real” viewpoint.Such is the “hysterical” blur in Holbeinʼs famousdouble portrait of 1533: a skull that implicates, byits directionality, a triangle connecting the horizon, acrucifix, the precise date of April 11, 1533, and theangle of 27º (the height of the sun above the horizonon Good Friday, in London, in 1533). 1533 was agood time to be hysterical. Everyone thought 1533(500 500 500 33) was the date of the Apocalypse,and the coincidence of the sun angle (3x3x3) at 4 p.m.on Good Friday, April 11, added to the evidence.Overdetermination is another trait of hysteria.Overdetermination makes the external world into a5

John North, The Ambassadorsʼ Secret: Holbein andthe World of the Renaissance (New York: Hambledon and London, 2002).phrenological diagrams ofthe human skullcrystal prison, a landscape of anxious symptoms thatmirror of the subjectʼs turmoil. But, is not ectoplasmprecisely the substance of overdetermination? As asubstance “between the two deaths,” isnʼt it a fractallike materialization of the idea of self-reference that,by folding opposite terms into one another, resemblesnothing more closely than the architectural labyrinth?Golgotha, the “place of the skull,” is quite literally a place, a 63º vertex of an isosceles triangle thatimplicates the beginning and end of history. Whatis behind the ability of Golgotha to signify withoutbeing symbolic? As Slavoj Zizek has pointed out,the skull is an anti-signifier, a hole, an inescapablyattractive visual element that, placed in almost anycontext, can structure anamorphic content. The skullis the scandal of Christianity, just as Hegel (as wellas Holbein) argued. Is it not the case that the crucifixion is the decisive moment when God proves to bepowerless, utterly unable or unwilling to help his ownhuman manifestation? Hegel extended this theological scandal to the case of phrenology, the pseudo-science of determining psychology from the shape of theskull. Hegelʼs aim was not solely to condemn materialistic reductionism, but to point to an irreducibleend-point of consciousness. Golgotha is the hingeof the final raptures of the Phenomenology, whereHegel compares the skull to a chalice “of this realmof spirits,” foaming forth to God “His own Infinitude.”As emblem of Absolute Knowledge, the skull is anironic anti-symbol, a negative viewpoint (literally!)of defeat and humiliation. Jean Hyppolite obliginglydescribes the terminus of Hegelʼs monumental projectin terms of hysteria: “Knowledge alienates itself fromitself and this alienation is termed ʻnatureʼ and ʻhistory.ʼ In nature, spirit alienated itself from self by becoming a being dispersed in space; it is spirit that haslost itself, and nature is nothing other than this eternalalienation of its own subsistence and the movementthat restores the subject.” What better picture could6

we have of Bergsonʼs contrast of the divisible andthe indivisible, and what better way to return, via thescandalous lore of ectoplasm, to the Ø phenomenonof cinema?In the role of filmic glue, the Ø phenomenon isthe indivisible ectoplasmic stuff of extra-dimensionality that “exists but doesnʼt exist.” It is neither inferred nor deduced, but “abduced” to save the appearance of the jagged dance of static snapshots. It “tricksus out into the open,” meaning that the imaginationwillfully follows the pointing finger in the directionof the illusion. “Out there,” the mindʼs innerness becomes an outward form of narrative and visual art.But, is the clinical idea of hysteria still at issue?For hysterics, the situation is opposite that of sex.Pain is remembered, pleasure is repressed. Pleasureadditionally relates to the incomplete structure ofdesire, the gap that prevents the arrow from meetingits target or the taste of Coke from being anythingmore than “it.” The suppression of pleasure is farmore pleasurable in the sense that pleasure is not allowed to enter the realm of symbolic relationshipsand representations that would allow language tostrangle it in its cradle. Deleuze contrasts cinemaʼssemiotics in just these terms. By creating illusions outof the “nothing” of the Ø factor, something like thepsychologist J. J. Gibsonʼs “affordance” comes about.Potentiality is present but suspended, indefinite, virtual. Delueze argues that, whereas cinema beforeWorld War II was based on motion-image illusion(generated by static “sections” of the visual field),cinema after the war tended to structure time itself.Citing Hitchcock as hinge between classical and thenew style of films that came after World War II, Deleuze points to the use of the “demark” — an objecttaken out of its “natural series” (the windmill turningbackwards in Foreign Correspondent, the cigarettelighter in Strangers on a Train, the key to the wineAccording to Gibson (1977, 1979), theenvironment not only serves as thesurfaces that separate substances from themedium in which the animals live, butalso affords animals in terms of terrain,shelters, water, fire, objects, tools, animals,human displays, etc.; and there is not onlyinformation in light for the perception ofthe environment, but also information forthe perception of what the environmentaffords. He proposed a radical hypothesis:the composition and layout of the surfacesin the environment constitute whatthey afford. Gibson’s affordance has thefollowing properties: Affordances provided by theenvironment are what it offers, what itprovides, what it furnishes, and whatit invites. The environment includes themedium, the substances, the surfacesand their layouts, the objects, places andhiding places, other persons and animals,and so on. The “values” and “meanings” of thingsin the environment can be directlyperceived. “Values” and “meanings” areexternal to the perceiver. Affordances are relative to animals. Theycan only be measured in ecology, but notin physics. An affordance is an invariant. Affordances are holistic. What weperceive when we look at objects are theiraffordances, not their dimensions andproperties. An affordance implies complementarityof the perceiver and the environment.It is neither an objective property nor asubjective property, and at the same timeit is both. It cuts across the dichotomy ofsubjective-objective. Affordances onlymake sense from a system point of view.—Jiajie Zhang,“Categorization of ses/hi6301/affordance.html7

Hitchcock introduces the mental image into cinema.That is, he makes relation itself the object of an image,which is not merely added to the perception, actionand affection images, but frames and transforms them.With Hitchcock, a new kind of ʻfiguresʼ appear whichare figures of thoughts. In fact, the mental image itselfrequires particular signs which are not the same asthose of the action-image. It has often been noticedthat the detective only has a mediocre and secondaryrole (except when he enters fully into the relation, as inBlackmail); and that indices have little importance. Onthe other hand, Hitchcock produced original signs, inaccordance with [C. S. Peirceʼs] two types of relations,natural and abstract. In accordance with the natural relation, a term refers back to other terms in a customaryseries such that each can be ʻinterpretedʼ by the others:these are marks; but it is always possible for one ofthese terms to leap outside the web and suddenly appear in conditions which take it out of its series, or setit in contradiction with it, which we will refer to as thedemark. It is therefore very important the terms shouldbe completely ordinary, in order that one of them, firstof all, can detach itself from the series: as Hitchcocksays, The Birds must be ordinary birds. Certain ofHitchcockʼs demarks are famous, like the windmill inForeign Correspondent whose sails turn in the opposite direction to the wind, or the crop-spraying plane inNorth by Northwest which appears where there are nocrops to spray. Similarly, the glass of milk made suspect by its internal luminosity in Suspicion, or the keywhich does not fit the lock in Dial M for Murder.—Gilles Deleuze, Cinema, 1 (The MovementImage), p. 203.cellar in Notorious, the crop-duster spraying wherethere are no crops in North by Northwest). This usesnot only Peirceʼs distinction of natural and abstractsigns, it again engages the idea of abduction becausewhat is changed is context. The clever indicativemotion of the sign-out-of-place crystallizes an evil,anxious landscape. In Notorious (1946) Alicia realizes her husband will discover the missing wine cellarkey — the key they need to discover the Nazisʼ secret — as soon as the party champaign runs out. Thecamera then focuses on the bubbly not with the usualindulgence of delight but in horror as this “tickingclock” threatens to run down to zero.The “demark” is, in the hystericʼs terms, a sourceand object of delight. The more pain it ostensiblyengages, the more pleasure the hysteric experienceswith the recrystalization of context around it. In tightening spirals, such as those literally enacted in RearWindowʼs pans and scenic displacements around theurban residential courtyard, “key scenes” point towards an inevitable center, a labyrinth that implicatesa Minotaur — quite literally enacted in the final sceneof Rear Window when Jeff fends off the murdererThorwald by setting off his cameraʼs flash bulbs.In this shift from movement image to time image,Hitchcock developed a cinema of relation. Deleuzeargues that cinema, no less than art, architecture andeven music, is capable of revealing philosophicaltruths. To this claim I would add that Hitchcock, ifanything, reveals the structure of relations as a condition of “anamorphosis.” When the “demark” is displaced from the natural order and made into a negativity, the order of the world, especially its order ofcenter and periphery, inside and outside, are inverted.This, if anything can be, is the casebook for hysteria. What is the key proof of this assertion? —TheØ phenomenonʼs transition from a sign of virtuality(movement perceived as an illusion brought about by8

a sequence of mechanized snapshots) to a “time image” that dominates movement metaphorically, a kindof template or rhetorical device that sets the tone foraction but undermines classical interpretation. This inshort is the biography of Ø as an ectoplasm that is, itself, “between the two deaths”: the first death, that ofmotion in the psueudo-mapping of indivisible motionon to divisible space; the second death, a collapse oftime and space into a psychotic spheroid such as thatcreated by James Joyce in Finnegans Wake. This example is not selected at random. Joyceʼs understanding of the precocious cultural philosophy of Giambattista Vico underscores the mystery of why Vico isnot at the deconstructionistsʼ or cultural criticsʼ table.Not French, not Heideggarian, not phenomenological,Vico is always on the margins. But, there is no philosophical project that is more consonant with Lacanʼsradical restructuring of the nature of the subject. Nophilosopher better used images to destroy image, textto destroy text, to arrive at a structural and historicalaccount of negativity in service of culture. Joyceʼsinitiation of Finnegans Wake with a clap of thundercorrectly spelled the inner gap of language — between sense and sound — that requires us to go “outside language,” in a manner of speaking, to cinema,landscape, architecture, and art to “find out what hasbeen happening.” Joyceʼs perverse text is both insideand outside language. Letʼs use the explanation ofhow this is so to introduce the role of Ø in establishing a “hysterical” model of landscape.Vicoʼs theory of how thunder awakened the firsthuman consciousness must be brutally condensedhere. In his major work, The New Science, Vico argues that the first human were incapable of abstractthinking but, instead projected their own nature onto substances and events in nature. That did this informally and naturally at first, as exploitation of theenvironment led to a close relationship with plants,animals, and landscapes in general. A system of ver-The frontispiece for Vicoʼs major work, TheNew Science (1744), known as the “dipintura.”Giambattista Vico, The New Science of GiambattistaVico, trans. T. Bergin and M. Fisch (Ithaca: CornellUniversity, 1968).9

The gap between word and thing is precisely language,although the gap is difficult to characterize and/or locatewithin any philosophy of language. In Platoʼs Cratylus, forexample, the issue of the conventionality of the sign/signified relationship gives way to a modified appreciation of onomatopoeia, although the argument runs muchdeeper. The gap is also the line, as Lacan has pointedout, between the signifier-signified in the classic semioticformulation S/s (sign over signified). Following Lacanʼshumorous essay on this subject (“On the Role of the Letterin the Unconscious”) argues that signifiers, on account ofthe line separating them “arbitrarily” from the signified,are constantly sliding, not simply from disagreements ofconvention but because of psychologically motivated usesof this very gap.It would be hard to find a more compelling case for thecontinuing importance of the metaphor of the Tower of Babel, where sliding originated and is connected in interestingways to the line dividing the material-finite world belowto the realm of pure forms and Adamic language above.When, in images of the mons delectus described in thefamous story of “The Table of Cebes,” the line coincideswith the top of a ziggurat, and literalizes the original Babelas “Bab-El” — the “Gate of God” — the implication of autopian return to a golden age of myth is complicated by aJoycean-Vichian insistence on retaining the Hebrew conflation of the ziggurat with the division of languages. The lineneeds to be placed not at the edge of linguistic development but in the center, as a permanently disruptive sourceof sliding, misprision, and loss of meaning.bal signage was probably long in use before humanconsciousness used signs “as language” — as dynamic, self-regulating, and transformative. Vico suggeststhat the impression of fear led the first humans tobecome conscious of the thunder as “the first word.”Only then could the hysterical projection of humannature on to the external world become intelligible asa consciousness with hegemonic intentions. From thefolkloric demonology of plants and animals emergeda theology of sky and underworld — one not so different from the “pre-human” use of signs except inthe pivotal feature of a “hinge” or disconnect betweensound and meaning that created a gap between wordand object. This gap was to prove crucial, for it created a void inside language that, impossible to fill, wasrelatable to both fear and desire (the word “sacred”retains this ambiguity).The principal advantage of this hinge was thatthe Ø phenomenon was now able to “move” from ageneral category of inferential “infill” to a role thatwould use its prior incarnation in a metaphoric, symbolic way and itself evolve a new dynamic of time.Surprisingly, Bergson presents the various stages ofthe Øʼs evolution in his several analogies of time. Inthe first example of mechanical-illusory time, whichcorresponds to the earliest philosophical accountby Zeno, the incompatibility of “indivisible motion”with “infinitely divisible space” creates both paradoxand a illusory form of time (cinema). When, insteadof the “snapshot” mechanically reproduced at thesame rate as it was recorded, we have the characteristic images of time, as a “movement image” in naturalperception, the situation is different. Instead of “immobile sections” (snapshots), the sections are mobile.The movement image became an issue in the evolution of cinema, too. As the camera was freed from itsstationary locked position, directors such as Eisenstein realized the potential of montage — of tellinga story using editing; a creation of time that “did not10

exist” before a certain sequencing of scenes. “Privileged instants” such as screams or poses could serveas “mobile sections.” The Ø phenomenon aspired t

Terrain of Landscape & Architecture, spon-sored by the School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne and the Landscape Research Group, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK. The symposium, organized by Nathanial Coleman and others, was held September 23-26, 2004. Leonardo da Vinci, "John the Baptist" (1513-16)

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