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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGEGUIDE TO STRATEGYEdited byJoseph R. CeramiJames F. Holcomb, Jr.February 2001

Form SF298 Citation DataReport Date("DD MON YYYY")00FEB2001Report TypeN/ATitle and SubtitleU.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE GUIDE TO STRATEGYDates Covered (from. to)("DD MON YYYY")Contract or Grant NumberProgram Element NumberAuthorsJoseph R. Cerami James F. Holcomb, Jr.Project NumberTask NumberWork Unit NumberPerforming Organization Name(s) and Address(es)Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U S Army War College, 122Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244Performing OrganizationNumber(s)Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)Monitoring Agency AcronymMonitoring Agency ReportNumber(s)Distribution/Availability StatementApproved for public release, distribution unlimitedSupplementary NotesISBN 1-58487-033-8AbstractFor more than 3 decades, the Army War College Department of National Security and Strategy has facedthe challenge of educating future strategic leaders on the subject of national security, or grand strategy.Fitting at the top of an officer’s or government official’s career-long, professional development program,this challenge has been to design a course on strategy that incorporates its many facets in a short period oftime, all within the 1-year, senior service college curriculum. To do this, a conceptual approach hasprovided the framework to think about strategy formulation. The purpose of this volume is to present theArmy War College’s strategy formulation model to students and practitioners. This book serves as a guideto one method for the formulation, analysis, and study of strategy--an approach which we have found tobe useful in providing generations of strategists with the conceptual tools to think systematically,strategically, critically, creatively, and big. Balancing what is described in the chapters as ends, ways, andmeans remains at the core of the Army War College’s approach to national security and military strategyand strategy formulation.Subject Terms

Document ClassificationunclassifiedClassification of SF298unclassifiedClassification of AbstractunclassifiedLimitation of AbstractunlimitedNumber of Pages282

*****The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflectthe official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, orthe U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.Many thanks are extended to Ms. Christine Hockensmith for the difficult and tedious taskof copy-editing the work of the numerous authors herein. Her dedication is recognized andappreciated.ISBN 1-58487-033-8ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS1. IntroductionJoseph R. Cerami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12. A Primer in Strategy DevelopmentRobert H. Dorff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113. Ethical Issues in War: An OverviewMartin L. Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194. Some Basic Concepts and Approaches to theStudy of International PoliticsRobert H. Dorff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315. The Persistence of Credibility: Interests,Threats and Planning for the Use of American Military PowerDavid Jablonsky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436. National Interest: From Abstraction to StrategyMichael G. Roskin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557. Regional Studies and Global StrategyR. Craig Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 698. National PowerDavid Jablonsky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879. National Security and the Interagency Process: Forward into the21st CenturyGabriel Marcella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10710. The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic VisionDon M. Snider and John A. Nagl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12711. Why is Strategy Difficult?David Jablonsky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14312. Force Planning and U.S. Defense PolicyJohn F. Troxell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15713. Toward An Understanding of Military StrategyArthur F. Lykke, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179iii

14. Strategic RiskJames F. Holcomb, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18715. Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century LeadersRichard A. Chilcoat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203Appendix I. Guidelines for Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221Appendix II. U.S. National Security and Strategy:A BibliographyJane Gibish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229iv

FIGURESChapter 1Figure 1. Strategy Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Chapter 6Figure 1. The Realists’ Taxonomy of National Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59Chapter 9Figure 1.Figure 2.Figure 3.Figure 4.Figure 5.National Security Council System . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Security Council Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Ideal Foreign Policy Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Policy in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Comparing Military Officers and Foreign Service Officers.110111113114121Chapter 11Figure 1.Figure 2.Figure 3.Figure 4.Figure 5.Figure 6.The Policy Continuum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Remarkable Trinity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Impact of Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Continuum of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Strategy: The Horizontal Plane . . . . . . . .National Strategy and the Vertical Continuum of War .144146146150151152Chapter 12Figure 1.Figure 2.Figure 3.Figure 4.Force Planning MethodologiesCold War Force Planning . . .Base Force . . . . . . . . . . .Force Planning . . . . . . . .159161163172.Chapter 13Figure 1. A Model for Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182Figure 2. Unbalanced Military Objectives, Concepts and ResourcesMay Jeopardize National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183Chapter 15Figure 1.Figure 2.Figure 3.Figure 4.National Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Strategic and Operational Art . . . . . . . . . . . .Strategic Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Roles and Skills of the Master of the Strategic Art. .v.204206208208

CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTIONJoseph R. CeramiThe dominant trend within universities and think tanks is toward ever-narrowing specialization: a higher premium is placed on functioning deeply within a single field than broadly acrossseveral. And yet without some awareness of the whole—without some sense of how means converge to accomplish or to frustrate ends—there can be no strategy. And without strategy there isonly drift.Paul Kennedy andJohn Lewis GaddisYale UniversityAdvice to strategists comes in many forms. Kennedy and Gaddis’s thoughts expressedabove are representative of most scholars, statesmen, and generals—strategy is a criticalsubject for senior leaders. George Marshall expressed concerns, late in his distinguishedcareer, that as a statesman he had to learn a “whole new set of skills.” Theater strategists, likeField Marshall Slim, have written that senior leaders must learn how to “think big.”Important books on the subject stress an in depth knowledge of history, economics, politics,geography, culture, and so on. For a concept that remains hard to define, the study of strategyremains a complex subject of lifelong learning for scholars, statesmen, and soldiers alike.For more than three decades the Army War College (AWC) Department of NationalSecurity and Strategy has faced the challenge of educating future strategic leaders on thesubject of National Security, or Grand Strategy. Fitting at the top of an officer’s orgovernment official's career-long, professional development program, the challenge has beento design a course on strategy that incorporates its many facets, in a short period of time, allwithin the one-year, senior service college curriculum. To do this, a conceptual approach hasprovided the framework to think about strategy formulation. The purpose of this volume is topresent the Army War College’s strategy formulation model to students and practitioners.This book serves as a guide to one method for the formulation, analysis and study ofstrategy—an approach which we have found to be useful in providing generations ofstrategists with the conceptual tools to think systematically, strategically, critically,creatively and big. Balancing what is described in the following chapters as ends, ways, andmeans—remains at the core of the Army War College’s approach to national security andmilitary strategy and strategy formulation.Each of the following chapters highlights a major concept used in our strategy formulationmodel. All of the authors have been on the faculty at one of the nation’s armed forces, seniorservice colleges. They have structured their essays to focus on concepts that have beendeveloped, debated, and tested for use in small group seminars, in an adult learningenvironment. The majority of these chapters have been used effectively as required readings1

for the core strategy course. Several have been written especially for this book, to fill in someof the gaps for explaining the strategy making process. The authors are drawn from severalacademic fields, including international relations, government, public policy and, of course,history. Several have also had high-level experience working as strategists at the WhiteHouse, in the Pentagon, and in joint and multinational, theater headquarters. The combinedeffect is a book that is academic in its focus on concepts and theoretical approaches, yetpractical in the sense of being intended as a working guide for strategists. Each chapter alsoserves as material to guide seminar discussion, to focus debate, and to define what we believeare the key concepts in the study and formulation of strategy. While the strategicenvironment is dynamic and complex, our experience has been that these concepts are a mostuseful foundation for practitioners and scholars of national security strategy and defensepolicy.CHAPTER 2: A PRIMER IN STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT—ROBERT H. DORFF.In this chapter, Robert Dorff presents the core of the strategy formulation model, what wecall the “ends, ways, and means” of strategy. Grand strategy and national security strategyare defined. Key concepts for the study of strategy are introduced, including brief discussionsof foundation concepts, such as, values, interests, threats, challenges, national securitystrategy and risk assessments. The chapter ends with a comparison of current, alternativeapproaches for U.S. national security strategy. The concepts and themes introduced inChapter 2 are developed in greater depth in the remainder of the book.CHAPTER 3: ETHICAL ISSUES IN WAR: AN OVERVIEW—MARTIN L. COOK.Martin Cook’s essay provides background on the limits, constraints, and criteria that haveevolved regarding the use of violence by states and societies. Chapter 3 includes a review ofjust war thinking and the general history of Western legal and ethical thought. Cook notes theopen questions regarding cultural diversity, especially in what many call the age ofglobalization. How Western thought converges and diverges from other cultural and ethicaltraditions, customs and laws should be an important area for seminar discussions and futureresearch. This Chapter includes the just war framework and criteria, and highlights theimportance of developing a strategist’s understanding of the moral structure of just decisionsin going to war, as well as just conduct in war.CHAPTER 4: SOME BASIC CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES TO THESTUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS—ROBERT H. DORFF.In Chapter 4, Robert Dorff introduces the essential concepts used by internationalrelations scholars to help understand, analyze and explain state behavior. His primary focus2

is on the nation-state and how perceptions of values and interests influence their behavior inthe international environment. The chapter’s main focus is on describing and expandingWaltz’s three levels of analysis—the system, the state, and the individual. The reader also isintroduced to realist and idealist worldviews, and related concepts involving neorealism,anarchy, the security dilemma, balance of power, Wilsonianism, and internationalinstitutionalism. Other key foundation concepts the chapter addresses include, sovereignty,nationalism, and inter and nongovernmental organizations. Dorff stresses the importance ofintegrating the levels of analysis in strategic thinking. He also emphasizes the importance ofunderstanding the competing views and assumptions used when explaining nation statebehavior. The notion of how the concept of national interest serves to shape internationalrelations and security is introduced in Chapter 4, and expanded in much greater depth inChapters 5 and 6.CHAPTER 5: THE PERSISTENCE OF CREDIBILITY: INTERESTS,THREATS AND PLANNING FOR THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARYPOWER—DAVID JABLONSKY.David Jablonsky presents the first of two chapters on the concept of national interest.Jablonsky’s realist perspective emphasizes the link between interests and credibility, whichhe defines as a combination of both influence and will. This chapter introduces a frameworkfor analyzing national interests in terms of two dimensions—categories and intensity.Categories of national interests include physical security, economic prosperity, values, andworld order. He subdivides the concept of intensity of national interests into vital, importantand peripheral. Jablonsky illustrates how using these two dimensions assists strategists inanalyzing the national interest and developing national priorities. Chapter 5 also reviews theconnections between national interest and the use of force. The Weinberger Doctrine ispresented and compared with the succeeding debates about gray area challenges, as well ashumanitarian values and interests. Jablonsky views the national interest as the key conceptfor prioritizing national security policy and maintaining long term consistency and clarity.Chapter 6 presents a different view.CHAPTER 6: NATIONAL INTEREST: FROM ABSTRACTION TOSTRATEGY—MICHAEL G. ROSKIN.In Chapter 6, Michael Roskin stresses the difficulty of turning national interest into aworking strategy. He writes of the strategist’s problems for using national interest to achievean undistorted clarity, or provide the ability to anticipate the 2d and 3d order effects of policyoptions and decisions. Instead, Roskin sees national interest as a conceptual device mostuseful for defining arguments limiting the number of crusades a nation should engage in.Roskin reviews the concept in terms of the philosophies of Machiavelli and Clausewitz. Hethen briefly traces the American interpretations, starting with George Washington and thefounding fathers, through Woodrow Wilson’s legal-idealistic approach. He then writes of theshift in thinking among international relations experts in the 1930s, with the introduction of3

the Realist School, spearheaded by Hans Morgenthau. Roskin provides a taxonomy forcategorizing national interests in terms of importance, duration, specificity andcompatibility. For Roskin, the primary challenge for strategists is in finding where differentnations’ interests are in competition and where they are complementary. Roskin also pointsout what he calls the warping effects on using national interest for strategy formulation. Heincludes ideology, global systemic effects, public and elite convictions, mass media, andbureaucratic policy inertia. These barriers, or constraints, are significant when attemptinginnovative and radical approaches. Finally, Roskin concludes that the concept of nationalinterest is most useful for training analysts in asking good questions. Questions that arenecessary for strategists to focus on the use and limits of power, the true intensity of interests,the will to use power, as well as the flexibility for maneuver and compromise. The comparisonof the Jablonsky and Roskin essays should provide ample room for seminar discussions aboutthe utility and problems of using the concept of national interest in strategy formulation.CHAPTER 7: REGIONAL STUDIES AND GLOBAL STRATEGY—R. CRAIG NATION.Craig Nation writes of the importance of the New Regionalism in strategic studies. InChapter 7, Nation argues that the emergence of regional issues have redefined the securityenvironment of the 21st Century. This new configuration of global power requires strategistswho have a more sophisticated understanding of regional and national political, social, andcultural processes. The challenge for strategists is to integrate regional perspectives, with asensitivity to regional and national dynamics; including geographic, social, cultural andreligious, as well as military dimensions. Nation describes the ways that regional affairscondition the global security agenda and channel and constrain U.S. priorities that affect thecontours of world order. Four reasons he cites include regional sources of instability andconflict; geopolitics; cultural dimensions of warfare; and regional alliances and associations.Chapter 7 discusses Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis, and the writings ongeopolitics by Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman. Regarding the military dimension ofstrategy, Nation writes about the issues surrounding rogue and failed states, civil wars, andcomplex and small-scale contingencies. Chapter 7 emphasizes the significance of the ArmyWar College’s core course on Regional Strategic Appraisals, and the importance of a NewRegionalism in balancing a global approach to international strategic studies.CHAPTER 8: NATIONAL POWER—DAVID JABLONSKY.Strategist’s understanding of the elements and instruments of national power are key tostrategy formulation. David Jablonsky’s chapter takes the reader back to Thomas Hobbesand the Realist’s School of international relations—the primacy of self-help in an anarchicinternational system. Key to Jablonsky’s treatment is an appreciation for themultidimensional nature of the elements of power. In this chapter the author emphasizes thedynamic, situational and relational aspects of power with respect to the interactions of stateand nonstate actors. Jablonsky discusses both the natural and social determinants of power.Natural determinants include geography, resources and population. The social determinants4

include the states’ economic, political, military, psychosocial, and information systems. Hediscusses emerging trends and their potential impact for U.S. defense and foreign policyregarding the growing complexity of power relations among nation-states and internationalactors. The author is careful to point out that strategy formulation remains more art thanscience and he highlights the importance of qualitative factors in strategy formulation. Theseinclude the importance of subjective perceptions of national power, purpose, and will.Jablonsky also provides a framework for gain and risk assessments. Focusing on the elementsand instruments of national power provides a conceptual tool for linking means, ways andends—an essential link in the strategy formulation process. In sum, national power is theconcept that helps define the instruments used by a variety of government organizations toachieve the national interest, as derived from national values. Jablonsky concludes by notinghow a deep understanding of the complexity of nat

Grand strategy and national security strategy are defined. Key concepts for the study of strategy are introduced, including brief discussions of foundation concepts, such as, values, interests, threats, challenges, national security strategy and risk assessments. T

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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE CARLISLE BARRACKS. PENNSYLVANIA 17013-5050 ""--"o .i 15 FEB 1985 AWCSS SUBJECT: Report of Group Study Project: Revision of AR 220-1 The views expressed in this paper are'those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the Commandant Views of the Department of Defense or any of US Army War College its agencies.

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