Patchwork Democracy - LANIC
PatchworkDemocracyNicaraguan Politics Ten YearsAfter the FallbyDavid R. Dyewith Jack Spence and George VickersNovember 2000
Copyright 2000 Hemisphere InitiativesThe report may be quoted at length if attributed. Itmay not be reproduced in whole or in part withoutthe permission of Hemisphere Initiatives, Inc.David R. Dye, a Managua based research journalisthas resided in and provided political and economicanalysis on Central America for eighteen years. Hetook principal responsibility for research and writingthis report.Jack Spence is President of Hemisphere Initiativesand is Associate Professor of Political Science at theUniversity of Massachusetts Boston. Spence coordinated the research, made two field trips to Nicaragua,and edited all sections of the report.George Vickers is Executive Director of theWashington Office on Latin America (WOLA) andTreasurer of Hemisphere Initiatives. He edited all sections of the report, made two field trips to Nicaraguaincluding during the November 5th elections, and,along with Spence, wrote the analysis of the results ofthe election and the performance of the SupremeElectoral Council during the weeks leading up to theelection.We would like to thank all those who granted us timefor interviews. They are mentioned in the endnotes. Inaddition Claudia Ferreira Talero not only has translated the report into Spanish but also provided help inmaking arrangements for printing and delivery of thereports. Nick Thorkelson of Thorkelson Graphics,Somerville, Massachusetts (www.nickthorkelson.com)did the graphic design and layout. Diane Chomsky,Guillermo Fernandez, and Kathy Sevilla providedCONTENTSPrologue1Basic Political Trends: 1990-20002The Pact7Who Benefits?12The Pact’s Impacts18Conclusions35Endnotes40timely and able help in making arrangements forprinting and mailing. Carlos Fernando Chamorroprovided helpful information on printing and graphicsand he along with Nobel León helped point towardelection data. Rachel Farley of WOLA ably handledlogistics for printing and delivery. In Managua Y madeimplemented arrangements for printing and delivery.We gratefully acknowledge a grant from PRODECAthat made this report possible and covered almost allof the expenses. WOLA covered travel expenses forVickers and a portion of administrative costs. A portion of Spence’s travel expenses was covered by aresearch grant from the John W. McCormackInstitute at the University of Massachusetts Boston.Final editorial content is the responsibility of Spenceand Vickers and Hemisphere Initiatives. Additionalcopies of this report and other Hemisphere Initiativesreports (listed on the inside back cover) can beobtained fromHemisphere .brOr at the Hemisphere Initiatives web site athttp://www.geocities.com/hem init/Or fromWashington Office on Latin America1630 Connecticut Avenue NWWashington, DC 20009202 797-2171wola@wola.org
Patchwork DemocracyNicaraguan Politics Ten YearsAfter the FallPROLOGUEOver the past fifteen years, most countries of Latin America have passed fromauthoritarian dictatorship to havingdemocratically elected governments. In theseprocedural democracies, as some political scientistscall them, officials are elected in a free and fairmanner, and there is inclusive suffrage, freedomof expression and organization, and associational autonomy.1It is proving more difficult, however, formany of these countries to move beyond theelectoral trappings of democracy to constructeffective democratic institutions capable of providing justice, protecting rights, and deliveringboth security and economic betterment.According to one cogent appraisal, “electoralprocedures are being institutionalized in anumber of countries, to be sure, but all toooften these co-exist with pervasive clientelism,imbedded injustice, massive corruption, flagrant impunity and reserved domains beyondthe authority of government and the rule oflaw.”2 While such practices are found to varying degrees in established democracies as well,in the context of recent transition in LatinAmerica they are eroding faith in the democratic option.Now neglected by foreign academics andnews media, Nicaragua has not been one of thecountries prompting special concern. In spite ofpolitical vicissitudes and the recent disaster ofHurricane Mitch, it has appeared to make fitfulprogress toward the general goals of democraticdevelopment. Since Violeta Chamorro’s defeatof the revolutionary Sandinista government inFebruary 1990, the country passed through asecond peaceful election for national and localauthorities in October 1996. The army haskept itself aloof from the political fray since areform of civil-military relations in 1994. Andin recent years, the vigorous efforts of a crusading comptroller-general offered promise of acleanup of the nation’s endemic corruption.Ten years after local and internationalupheavals thrust Nicaragua on the path towardliberal democracy, however, a closer look suggests that democratic rule and governability inNicaragua remain fragile. During theChamorro administration, Nicaragua’s NationalAssembly passed important constitutionalreforms and timid institutional reforms began.The advances achieved during the Chamorroadministration were a kind of crazy quiltstitched together by ad hoc, unstable compromises following political battles over fundamental issues of governance and economic function. Foreign aid has helped hold the patchestogether. But key problems of governance arelikely to continue until the country begins tograpple more seriously with its central politicalproblem — the consolidation of the rule of law,or as a noted scholar of politics has called it, thedemocratic state of law.3Although there were variations of degree, formost of the last century Nicaraguan politicalleaders looked upon government as a fount ofenrichment and a cornucopia of resources withwhich to pay off friends and build political
2Patchwork Democracyempires. To protect this corruption they haveneeded impunity: pliant legislators, venalcourts, auditors who could be easily bribed.Though constitutional facelifts have been frequent, the political will necessary to seriouslyreform “intermediate” institutions of the democratic state such as courts and systems of control has been notoriously weak.The most recent political reform in Nicaraguawas a pact signed in January 2000 by the country’s two principal political forces. The signers— the ruling Liberal Constitutionalist Party(PLC) of president Arnoldo Aleman and theSandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)headed by Daniel Ortega — argue that theiraccord will strengthen democratic institutionsand bolster governability. Critics of the agreement insist that it will do just the opposite.This report raises strong doubts aboutwhether the new rules for political competitionand institutional functioning legislated thisyear are laying the groundwork for furtherprogress toward fortifying the rule of law or forNicaragua’s democratic progress more generally. These rules may be fomenting a stable system of deal making among a few players in anatmosphere marked by public cynicism andapathy. But they also may be creating conditions for a new political crisis that will thrustNicaragua once again into the arena of hemispheric concern.Nicaragua cannot be content with a “patchwork democracy.” The country’s history suggests that a political system based on exclusionand that allows injustice and corruption to fester, is likely to generate growing discontent tothe point where a breakdown of democraticorder becomes thinkable. We recognize thatconsolidation of democracy is a long-termproblem — only a short interval has elapsedsince 1990. But vigilance in the Nicaraguancase is warranted. The country does not possessmany of the normal requisites for democraticstability. Poverty is rife and inequality glaring.And the political culture remains permeated bythe legacy of authoritarianism and violence thathas marked the country’s history.Eleven years after Hemisphere Initiatives’first report on political transition in Nicaragua,this report examines the nature, the roots andthe likely consequences of the LiberalSandinista pact. The document that followssketches a portrait of recent Nicaraguan politics, details the content and origins of the newpolitical accord, and assesses the impacts of theagreement after six months in the areas of institution-building and functioning, and politicalparty competitionThe body of this report was written beforethe November 5th elections. The Conclusioncontains a brief analysis of the elections.BASIC POLITICAL TRENDS: 1990–2000Over the last two decades, Nicaragua hasundergone extraordinary and wrenching changes of a magnitude and intensity matched by few other countries. In 1979,it passed abruptly from 46 years of unbrokendespotic rule by the Somoza family into a convulsive period of economic and political changeas the revolutionary Sandinista NationalLiberation Front (FSLN) took power andattempted to remake Nicaraguan society undernovel quasi-socialist rules.4 Hostile relationswith the U.S. and copious US assistance toNicaragua’s contra rebels led to a highlydestructive war. That and failure of the revolution’s economic project set the stage for theelection of Violeta Chamorro as president.5In the early 1990s, presidency ministerAntonio Lacayo, the chief decision-maker inthe Chamorro government, took to referring tothe upheavals then under way as a “triple transition.” After 1990, Nicaragua passed militarily from war to peace, politically from revolu-
Prologuetionary authoritarianism to liberal democracy,and economically from quasi-socialism to amarket-driven system. Each passage wasattended by trauma.In the political sphere, president Chamorrohad to grapple with constraints on her freedomfor maneuver deriving from the 1987Sandinista constitution and from the de factosituation of dual power which prevailed in theaftermath of the National Opposition Union(UNO)’s election victory on February 25, 1990.The Sandinistas retained control of the armedforces under Gen. Humberto Ortega as well asof the police, and had nominated a majority ofloyal Supreme Court justices shortly beforeleaving power. The FSLN also held 42% (36 of92) National Assembly seats, making constitutional amendments, which require 60% majorities in two successive legislative years, a distantprospect.However, the strongly presidentialist cast ofthe 1987 charter gave the executive wide powers to act without the need to seek legislativeapproval for economic and tax measures. Thispower proved crucial to the government’s ability both to ram through harsh stabilization andadjustment measures and to negotiate compromises with its Sandinista adversaries. But italso ended up generating strong objections,both from Sandinistas and from much of thecoalition that had brought Chamorro to office.6Until late 1993, politics during Chamorro’sterm were dominated by raw political combatunder rules that were themselves one of thechief objects of struggle. Violent clashes overproperty rights and stabilization policies combined with the rearmament of former contraand Sandinista combatants to keep Nicaraguain episodic turmoil. When the conflicts reachedthe point of crisis, some originally in Mrs.Chamorro’s camp were seeking her ouster frompower.7Between late 1993 and early 1996, splits inthe principal political camps (UNO and FSLN)ushered in a period of compromise that averteda deepening of the crisis. Striving to forge amodus vivendi, reform-minded elements in the3two camps negotiated major changes to the1987 Sandinista constitution, reordering thebalance of powers in the state and promotingthe autonomy and development of key democratic institutions. The reforms preventedincumbent presidents from running for a second term, and gave the legislature much morepower. This phase, which enjoyed the supportof powerful external players but sidelined bothAntonio Lacayo and Daniel Ortega, reachedfruition in constitutional reforms passed inJune 1995.The 1995 reforms to the constitution offeredsome hope for change in institutions. In anoverly presidential system, they augmented thepowers of the National Assembly in matters ofeconomic and tax legislation. They alsochanged the rules for electing magistrates tothe Supreme Court (CSJ) and Comptroller(CGR), forcing the president to share the control of these nominations with the Assemblyand with civil society. In theory, this affordedthe institutions a measure of independencefrom executive control. The Supreme ElectoralCouncil (CSE) had already established a reputation for honesty and professionalism duringelections in 1984 and 1990.Once the new magistrates took office, moreover, Nicaragua seemed to be taking tentativesteps toward consolidating the rule of law. As isanalyzed below, timid reforms began the arduous process of cleansing the court system. Forthe first time, the country also witnessed thenovelty of a Comptroller General activelyengaged in attempts to root out corruption.The aggressive performance of Agustin JarquinAnaya in office was not only unprecedented inNicaragua, but had few parallels elsewhere inLatin America.However, when it came time in 1995 toselect new authorities to the CSJ and CGR, thepolitical interests of the small parties that hadcrafted the reforms prevailed. In successiveelections in 1995 and 1996, a hodgepodge ofminor parties placed loyal followers on theSupreme Court, while a Christian Democratsecured the Comptroller’s job. This outcome
4left today’s dominant parties with little directrepresentation at the upper reaches of theseinstitutions. For both the FSLN and the PLC,this trend was problematic.The election of Arnoldo Aleman as Presidenton October 20, 1996 initiated a period of institutional tensions and strains. The new president quickly displayed strong caudillo-like tendencies that ran counter to the efforts at institutional consolidation emanating from the1995 amendments.8 Unlike Mrs. Chamorro,who could not count on solid backing from theincoherent UNO coalition, Aleman initiallyenjoyed the support of a tightly controlledLiberal Alliance bench of 42 deputies. Evenwith this majority, however, the Aleman government was unable to overcome fundamentalweaknesses in the Nicaraguan political system.Among the most important were the following: Weak governmental effectiveness and legitimacy. Nicaragua’s macroeconomy has grownat an annual rate of 4.5% per year since1994, not high enough or long enough tomend much of the previous 16 years of deterioration. Adjustment, privatization andother policies generated a strongly regressivetrend in income distribution as owners fromthe Somoza era recovered properties, exilesreturned from the United States, and a newmiddle class sprouted.9 Though they havedeclined in recent years, unemployment andunderemployment also remain severe.10 Realincome per capita is less than 500 per year.Nor has growth since 1994 clearly demonstrated an impact on entrenched poverty,estimated by some measures to afflict 75% ofthe population.11 Though declining, confusion about property rights has impeded amore vigorous recovery.For the ordinary Nicaraguan, then, democracy has not yet paid off. In addition, the credibility of government has been underminedby intense public suspicion about corruptionin the ordinary exercise of power and in theprivatization of state assets. During theChamorro period, doubts swirled around thesale of 350 state enterprises in operationsPatchwork Democracyconducted without the benefit of legislativeauthorization. Under Aleman, the privatization of a bank and the attempted sale of thepublic telephone system excited speculationabout further irregularities, while the presshas uncovered extensive purchases of ruralproperties by the president and evidence ofmisdeeds by his cronies. Persistent property clashes. For a decade,the leitmotives of Nicaraguan politics havebeen clash and combat between Sandinistaand anti-Sandinista forces around issues ofproperty and economic adjustment. Somozaera elites have tried to regain control of holdings they lost during the Sandinista revolution. Sandinistas have defended their property gains. Violent clashes were common, particularly in the early 1990s as former contrasand some military veterans rearmed. Due tothe balance of political forces, both post1990 governments have been forced to compromise with the Sandinista opposition inorder to be able to govern, making outright“counterrevolution” impossible. However,the result of the compromises has been toleave the property problem, after ten years,still partly unresolved. Inadequate Representation. One of the overriding problems in Nicaragua’s politicalsetup is the use of the party list system ofproportional representation (PR) in choosingthe people’s representatives. Voting for aparty list rather than individual candidates isnot in itself undemocratic and occurs inmany countries. But in Nicaragua, where theprincipal parties are now dominated by oneleader, such a system produces cohorts ofAssembly deputies who are politicallybeholden to, and subservient to, the caudillosleading the parties rather than being responsive to the needs of their electors. The domination by the major party leaders of theirrespective party blocs also undermines theAssembly’s independence. A feature in PRsystems that provides a corrective to this situation is the relative ease with which newparties can gain a presence in the legislature.
PrologueBut when this avenue is closed off by restrictive rules, a crisis in representation mayresult. Fragile Institutions. Over the years, progressin devising and building democratic institutions has been sporadic, and reformers havenot enjoyed sufficient political backing topush their efforts to fruition. Nor havereformers convinced the public of their handiwork — polls regularly show the faith ofNicaraguans in the basic institutions of constitutional democracy to be abysmally low.12In reality, the consolidation of democraticgovernment is at best in its early stages.Separation among the powers of state is particularly inadequate. Dominance of the legislature by authoritarian party leaders favorsthe politicized selection of the magistrateswho preside over the other powers of stateand organs of control — the Supreme Court,the Supreme Electoral Council and theComptroller General. This makes their political independence from the executive questionable.The Nicaraguan Army and NationalPolice, bodies created during the Sandinistarevolution which continue to be staffed byholdovers from that era, have too much independence, creating problems for the execution of governmental and judicial orders.Both bodies are more professional now, andFSLN party control has disappeared. Statutespassed during the Chamorro administrationhave also regularized procedures for turnoverin the army and police leadership. But neither of the recently elected governments hasbeen willing to risk exerting real civiliansupremacy over the armed institutions bystrengthening the civilian ministries towhich they are formally subordinated. Thescarcity of civilians trained to deal withquestions of national defense and citizensecurity contributes to this inertia.13Finally, power is excessively centralized.The ethnically diverse and historically separate regions of the Atlantic Coast are in theory governed by an autonomy statute, pro-5mulgated in 1987. The 151 municipalitiesare also guaranteed autonomy by a 1988 law.However, in neither case is the principle ofautonomous exercise of power matched byeffective rights to raise the revenue necessaryto give subnational units of government genuine financial clout and hence political independence from the central government. 14This in turn inhibits meaningful participation at the local level. Caudillism and Clientelism. Politics inNicaragua operates within a matrix of political culture that foments caudillism, clientelism and corruption.15 Postwar polarizationhas aggravated the tendency for the principalpolitical parties to be dominated by leaderswho demand blind loyalty and brook littledissent. At all levels of the system, one of theprincipal motives of those seeking politicaloffice is to use it for their private economicgain. Many of those seeking higher office tryto recruit clienteles to whom they promisethe spoils of lower office. Daily politicalcombat is marked by tendencies toward violence and political chicanery not excludingcrude blackmail.Among the elite, an authoritarian politicalethos prevails marked by disregard for institutional rules, a tendency toward violent resolution of conflicts, and a zero-sum notion ofpolitics. Many ordinary Nicaraguans alsomanifest a belief in the need for strong political leaders and parties to achieve stability,and lack the interpersonal trust necessary tosocial and political cooperation. Despitethese cultural features, the citizenry displaysrelatively strong support for the democraticsystem as such as well as tolerance for thepolitical rights of others.16 This somewhatpuzzling pattern may be partly explained bythe “postwar syndrome”— the tiredness ofNicaraguans with the violent confrontationof the revolution and immediate post-revolutionary years.17 Sandinista-Anti-Sandinista Polarization. Tenyears after the Sandinista revolution, thebasic cleavage in Nicaraguan politics is still
6between Sandinistas and anti-Sandinistas.Polls of the electorate normally show thateach major party, the LiberalConstitutionalist Party (PLC) and theSandinista National Liberation Front(FSLN), enjoys a solid core of 20–25% ofpotential voters. In addition, as a result ofthe revolution and contra war, strong political hatreds persist in segments of the population that, while small, nonetheless form thebackbone of the two major parties’ electoralsupport.18 Potential for political polarizationis thus constant. Tenuous Governability. As a consequence ofall the above, Nicaragua is plagued by chronic low-level instability. This instability is notstrong enough to reach the point of crisis butis not clearly receding. Symptoms ofungovernability may be seen in the frequentand opportunistic rearmament of former military personnel seeking to extract resourcesfrom government, in strikes and violentdemonstrations by social groups, and in disruptions in the work of the NationalAssembly by the political parties.19 Foreigngovernments and donors, in particular theUSA, have had to exercise occasional political tutelage to prevent crisis. This behaviorreinforces the country’s deep economicdependence; ten years after the fall,Nicaragua is one of the world’s highest percapita recipients of foreign aid.Despite this litany of problems, someprogress has been made in basic democraticpractices. Voter turnout in elections has beensurprisingly high — far higher than in twoother post-war Central American countriesafter many events that could and did contributeto cynicism. In one expert opinion, decentlyrun elections and foundations for non-electoralparticipation laid down in earlier years underpin this behavior.20 In addition, after its jarring11-year revolutionary experience, Nicaragua isno longer a country in which a traditional,clientelistic reading of political culture whollyPatchwork Democracyapplies.21 The salience of corruption as the keyissue of public debate over the last three yearscasts doubt on the contention that mostNicaraguans passively accept self-seekingbehavior from public officials.Nevertheless, in the face of the weaknessesjust reviewed, even the most sincerely democratic government would face difficulty in gettingitself re-elected. In fact, as a result of theirpolitical compromises and of short-term economic policy outcomes, both governmentssince 1990 have suffered more or less rapid erosion in popular support. This failure has nothelped other political parties. However adiverse array of political groups opposed toboth the PLC and the FSLN have not been ableto unite or to mobilize popular dissatisfaction.No other political force yet receives more than10% of the vote. Despite electoral rules favoring small parties, the two big parties capturedall but 15 of 93 seats in the Assembly in 1996.And those 15 seats were divided among nineparties, most of which had nothing to do withthe constitutional reforms.Neither Aleman nor the Sandinistas havetaken much comfort from their dominance. Inthe final weeks of the 1996 campaign, DanielOrtega watched as supposedly neutral politicalforces such as the Church and the United Statesweighed in against his candidacy.22 In subsequent elections, he concluded, the new tworound system for presidential voting would leadto second rounds in which all the other partiesganged up on the FSLN. Moreover, followinghis 1996 defeat, he continuously blamed theSupreme Electoral Council for the irregularitieshe claimed had prevented his victory.23Given these antecedents, it is perhaps notsurprising that leaders of the PLC and FSLNdecided to turn the tables on their minor partyadversaries by ejecting them from positions ofinstitutional power. Those who had shaped thereforms were not well positioned to defendthem. In the next section we examine the extraordinary pact signed last January by Ortegaand Aleman.
THE PACTArnoldo Aleman and Daniel Ortega arepolitical enemies of long standing. At thebeginning of their revolution, theSandinistas briefly threw Aleman in jail and laterstripped him of certain properties. From his postas mayor of Managua (1990–95), the Liberalleader rode to the presidency largely by bashingthe Sandinistas and castigating Violeta Chamorrofor compromising with them. The two men’sparties were bitter rivals in the 1996 campaign.In April 1997, shortly after Aleman took office,pro-Sandinista forces confronted the new government with a violent protest movement seeking toforce it into an early compromise over Aleman’seconomic policies. The historical irony in theJanuary 2000 pact is thus strong.The pact negotiations, only semi-secret,occupied the front pages of Nicaraguan newspapers intermittently for a year and a halfbefore the deal was finally struck in December1999. From the beginning, news filtering outfrom the bargaining table made clear that theLiberal and Sandinista negotiators were strivingto do at least two main things: establish jointparty control of three key institutions of state—the Comptroller-General’s Office (CGR), theSupreme Court of Justice (CSJ) and theSupreme Electoral Council (CSE) — dividingthat control between them according to theirrespective political weights; and truncate political competition through changes in the electoral law. The press dubbed this a drive forbipartisan dominance.The public portions of the Liberal-Sandinistapact consist of changes to the constitution, tothe electoral law, and to ordinary legislation.24Each of the changes benefit the interests of thesigners to the exclusion of other actors.CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGESThe constitutional reforms completed in January2000 restructure the three key institutions mentioned above. They create a collegial, five-personComptroller-General’s Office whose membersare elected by the National Assembly for six-yearterms and who then choose a comptroller andvice-comptroller from their own ranks. Theyexpand the Supreme Court from 12 to 16 justices, and augment the Supreme ElectoralCouncil from five to seven magistrates whileshortening their terms from six to five years.In each body, the number of top leadershipposts was increased in order to facilitate a political balance between the PLC and the FSLN.Subsequent elections have packed the threeinstitutions with Liberal and Sandinista representatives, displacing most other forces. In thecase of the CGR and CSE, the elections left thedominant PLC with a majority and the FSLN asubstantial minority of the top spots. In theSupreme Court, neither party as yet prevails,though elections to replace retiring magistratesin coming years may well produce the samebalance of positions.The changes also afforded the party leadersrevenge against their respective nemeses. ForAleman, the reform was plainly devised towrest the Comptroller’s office from the grip ofAgustin Jarquin, the president’s most bothersome opponent. For Daniel Ortega, the reformwas a prelude to summarily removing CSEpresident Rosa Marina Zelaya, whom Ortegahas long blamed publicly for the FSLN’s 1996election loss.The reforms also provide the Liberal andSandinista leaders with impunity. The amendments made it significantly more difficult forthe National Assembly to sanction a sittingpresident by raising the percentage of votesneeded to strip him of his immunity, from 50%plus one to two-thirds. The reforms also createda future Assembly post for Arnoldo Aleman, bystipulating that an outgoing president automatically becomes an member of the legislatureafter his term of office. These changes likewisefavor Ortega; the second place finisher in apresidential race also receives an Assemblyseat.25 Deputies are immune from prosecution,a point of concern to Aleman due to charges of
8corruption and to Ortega owing to accusationsof child abuse by his stepdaughter ZoilamericaNarvaez.Still another amendment changes the criteriafor winning a presidential election. It lowers to40% the majority needed to win outright onthe first round of the two round system, and to35% in case the gap between the first and second place finishers exceeds 5%. This change isregarded by most observers as a key concessionby Aleman to Daniel Ortega, as it facilitateswinning an election on the first ballot, therebyobviating a second round in which other contenders would unite against the FSLN. Ortegawon 41% of the vote in 1990 and 38% in 1996.Another change reinstated the right to run forpublic office to Nicaraguans who at any time inthe past have relinquished their citizenship.However, such aspirants must renounce theiralternate citizenship
Patchwork Democracy Nicaraguan Politics Ten Years After the Fall O ver the past fifteen years, most coun-tries of Latin America have passed from authoritarian dictatorship to having democratically elected governments. In these procedural democracies, as some p
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in European democracy’.1 And so today reflection on democracy is called for more than ever. The future of our united Europe looks uncertain. The nature of its democracy has become contested. So this series of interventions is the beginning of a new dialogue on the state, and future, of European democracy. Its publication is part
The third challenge of deepening of democracy is faced by every democracy in one form or another. This involves strengthening of the institutions and practices of democracy. This should happen in such a way that people can realise their expectations of democracy. But ordinary people have different expectation
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