THE QUESTION OF GOD - Religious Studies

xviP R E FA C EFor the most part this book incorporates a series of lectures first given at theUniversity of Bristol some years ago as part of an introductory course on thePhilosophy of Religion, which makes this the second set of my Bristol lecturesthat Routledge has published. As with Freud and Jung on Religion (1997), theexperience of publication has been a problem-free pleasure, and for that I haveto thank four people: my commissioning editor Roger Thorp, my productioneditor Ruth Bourne, and my copy editor Pauline Marsh. I owe a particulardebt of gratitude, however, to Moira Taylor, my development editor, who withlimitless patience and good humour has been a constant source of constructiveideas and enthusiastic support.This book has been read in its entirety by Professor John Heywood Thomas,and I have deeply valued his many criticisms and suggestions. It is affectionatelydedicated to him as my friend and teacher for over thirty years.Michael Palmer

USING THE INTERNETOne of the extracts used in this book – Martin’s ‘Atheism, Christian Theismand Rape’ – comes from the Internet. The Internet is now an indispensableresource for academic study, providing students with a wealth of material,including primary sources, lectures, book reviews, and much else besides. Theeasiest introduction is to use one of the many search engines available, and totype in your request, whether it be a specific philosopher (for example, Anselm)or a specific area of interest (for example, Existentialism). In all probabilitythere will then follow an almost limitless list of web-sites for you to surf. Thereare, however, some specific web-sites, which are worth mentioning here andwhich I have found particularly useful.1. There are three on-line encyclopedias of philosophy: the RoutledgeEncylopedia of Philosophy (www.rep.routledge.com), The Stanford Encyclopediaof Philosophy (www.plato.standford.edu) and the Internet Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy (www.utm.edu:80/research/iep/. Equally useful is The Dictionaryof Philosophical Terms and Names (www.people.delphi.com/gkemerling/dy/)and the research facility at erraticimpact.com. (See Appendix on page 348for instructions on searching the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy forinformation relating to The Question of God.)2. Some web-sites are excellent for providing links to other sites.EpistemeLincs.com includes thousands of sorted links to other philosophyresources, as does About.com Guide to Philosophy and Philosophy in Cyberspace.The Philosophy Department at Glasgow University (www.gla.ac.uk/Acad/Philosophy/links.html) is a model of its kind, and includes information aboutother philosophy departments, primary texts, and the job market.3. Most interesting of all are the dedicated web-sites, providing informationon individual philosophers. Again, the various search engines will help here. Ihave found the following to be particularly intriguing: the sites on Aquinas(www.aquinasonline.com), Hume (www.utm.edu/research/hume/hume.html)and Kant (www.hkbu.edu.hk/ ppp/Kant.html).

chapter 1COMMENTARYTHE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTIntroduction: a priori and a posteriori arguments2Anselm’s argument: stage 14Anselm’s argument: stage 27Descartes’ ontological argument9The two stages of the argument: a summaryKant’s criticism of the ontological argument (first stage)11Kant’s criticism of the ontological argument (second stage)16The ontological argument revisited: Findlay and Malcolm19Karl Barth: a theological interpretation25Conclusion30QUESTIONSSOURCES11301 Anselm: The ontological argument312 Haight: An ontological argument for the Devil333 Descartes: The supremely perfect being354 Kant: The impossibility of an ontological proof365 Findlay: Disproof of God’s existence386 Malcolm: Anselm’s second ontological proof407 Hick: Necessary being42KEY TEXTS45BIBLIOGRAPHY45

2C O M M E N TA RYC O M M E N TA RYINTRODUCTION: A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORIARGUMENTSA priori propositionsThe ontological argument has had a long but chequered career. Mostfamously presented in the eleventh century by St Anselm, abbot of Bec andlater Archbishop of Canterbury, it was later rejected by St Thomas Aquinasin the twelfth century, then revived in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuriesby Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. In the eighteenth century, however,the criticisms made by Kant proved almost fatal, and as a result it was largelyignored for over a century and a half. In our own time, however, interest hasbeen rekindled by the work of philosophers and theologians such as Karl Barth(1931), Charles Hartshorne (1941), Norman Malcolm (1960), Alvin Plantinga(1974) and Carl Kordig (1981).1Certainly it is not difficult to see its fascination. Marked by an extremeformal elegance, it is unique among the arguments for God’s existence. This isso because it alone may be classified as an a priori argument, with all otherarguments for God’s existence being classified as a posteriori arguments. Whatdo these terms mean?The terms ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori’ distinguish between two typesof proposition: a proposition that is not dependent on experience and aproposition that is dependent on experience. So the statement ‘I cannot besimultaneously in the room and out of it’ is an a priori true proposition, whereasthe statement ‘This ball is square and round’ is an a priori false proposition.They are what philosophers call necessarily true and necessarily false, and noamount of experience or observation will render them otherwise. In one sense,of course, to say that a priori propositions make no appeal to experience ismisleading. After all, how can we say this of the two statements just cited whenthey include words like ‘room’ and ‘ball’? Surely without some experienceof, say, being in rooms and playing with balls, these terms would have nomeaning at all. The point is that, once we know what these terms mean,no experiential evidence is then required to determine the truth or falsity ofthe a priori statements in which they appear. Take the proposition ‘All bachelorsare unmarried men’. While it is certainly true that one requires some experience1. See Barth, Fides Quaerens Intellectum, Munich, Chr. Kaiser, 1931. English translation by IanRobertson, London, SCM Press, and Richmond, Va., John Knox Press, 1960; Hartshorne, Man’sVision of God (1941), reprinted Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, 1964; Anselm’s Discovery, LaSalle, Ill., Open Court, 1965, and The Logic of Perfection, La Salle, Ill., Open Court, 1962;Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1974, and God, Freedom, and Evil,New York, Harper & Row, 1974; and Carl Kordig, ‘A Deontic Argument for God’s Existence’,Noûs, 15, 1981, pp. 207–228. According to Graham Oppy’s taxonomy there are no fewer thanseven major types of ontological argument. See Oppy, Ontological Arguments and Belief in God,New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

3T H E O N TO L O G I C A L A R G U M E N Tof the world to talk of bachelors in the first place, the truth of this propositiondoes not depend on this experience but on the definition of the term: being abachelor simply means being an unmarried man. In this sense it is a priori true:it provides its own verification and may be regarded as true in itself.The same, however, cannot be said of a posteriori propositions, like ‘Thesun is shining’ or ‘My cat is brown’. Whether these statements are true orfalse can only be decided by observation, by direct confrontation with theevidence. They are what we call contingently true or contingently false becausetheir truth or falsity is dependent (or contingent) on the circumstances, onwhat the world happens to be like. Unlike a priori propositions, therefore,a posteriori propositions are not universally and unconditionally true orfalse, nor do they provide their own corroboration, but are justified only tothe extent that they are verified or falsified by our experience. So we mustdistinguish between the statement ‘A bachelor is an unmarried man’ and thestatement ‘Mr Jones is a bachelor’. The first is a necessarily true proposition,proceeding from the definition of the term; and the second is a contingentproposition, which subsequent evidence may show to be either true or false.Which of the following statements are a priori true or false or aposteriori true or false?Triangles have three sides.The sun will rise tomorrow.Reagan was President of the UnitedStates.If A knows B, and if B knows C, thenA knows C.If A precedes B, and if B precedes C,then A precedes C.A posteriori propositionsEXERCISE 1.1No object can be completely redand green all over.A man cannot walk on water.Every man has a mother.I am reading this sentence.A straight line is the shortestdistance between two points.With this distinction between a priori and a posteriori behind us, we cannow appreciate why the ontological argument for God’s existence is unique.All the other arguments we shall look at – for example, the causal argument,the argument from design, the argument from miracles, and so on – base theircase on what is the most plausible explanation for various experiences wehave of the world. They do not argue that a particular explanation is bydefinition the only possible explanation but rather that, on the evidencebefore them, it is the only likely explanation. To this extent they have the formof a posteriori arguments. The ontological argument, on the other hand, isalone in maintaining that God’s existence can be established without recourseto empirical evidence – that is, evidence drawn from experience – and thussolely on the basis of an analysis of the concept of God. It is not, then, that ourWhy the ontologicalargument is unique

4C O M M E N TA RYexperience justifies the conclusion that God exists. It is rather that the very ideaof God implies that God exists, in much the same way as, say, the idea of atriangle implies a three-sided figure of 180 degrees. The proof of God lies, asit were, in the logic of ‘God’, in the logical implications of what we must sayabout him. To speak of God and to deny his existence is, as we shall now see,a contradiction in terms.St Anselm (c. 1033–1109)(left), Our lady of Bec(centre), Lanfranc (right)Born in Aosta, Italy, Anselm entered the monastery at Bec in Normandyas a novice in 1060, succeeding Lanfranc as prior in 1063, and becomingabbot in 1078. Under his direction Bec became a great intellectual centre,celebrated throughout Europe. It was during this period that Anselm wrotehis Monologium (1076) and Proslogium (1077–1078), the latter containinghis famous ontological argument. Anselm continued his ecclesiastical careerin England; it culminated in his appointment as the second NormanArchbishop of Canterbury in 1093. Generally recognized as the greatesttheologian of his day, he emphasized the priority of faith over reason,maintaining that truth was obtained only through fides quaerens intellectumor ‘faith seeking understanding’. Anselm’s tomb at Canterbury became anobject of veneration and pilgrimage and he was canonized in 1494.ANSELM’S ARGUMENT: STAGE 1Anselm’s definition of GodThe ontological argument was first presented by St Anselm in his Proslogium(chs 2–4) and in his Responsio to a contemporary critic, the monk Gaunilo(SOURCE 1: PP. 31–33).2 Many present-day commentators argue thatProslogium 2 and 4 present a different argument from Proslogium 3 and theResponsio. Whether this is so is a matter of some debate. What we can say,however, is that the second phase is structurally dependent on the first, andthat in the first phase Anselm is concerned to establish the fact of God’sexistence and in the second the nature of that existence.Anselm’s Proslogium 2 begins with a famous definition of God: ‘God issomething than which nothing greater can be conceived’ (‘aliquid quo nihilmaius cogitari possit’). The word ‘greater’ is admittedly ambiguous; but it soonbecomes clear that Anselm does not mean greater in size but greater in value– indeed, in the Proslogium, maius (‘greater’) is sometimes replaced bymelius (‘better’). Nor does Anselm make any attempt to fill in the details ofGod’s greatness or superiority. Nothing is said, for instance, of the attributestraditionally ascribed to him: his omnipotence, omniscience, immutability,2. Extracts are taken from Anselm: Basic Writings (Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilo’s On Behalfof the Fool, Cur Deus Homo?) trans by S. N. Deane, with an Introduction by Charles Hartshorne,La Salle, Ill., Open Court, 1962.

5T H E O N TO L O G I C A L A R G U M E N Timpassibility, etc. Such descriptions of God’s qualities are rendered irrelevantby the very generality of Anselm’s definition. For whatever the qualitiesattributed to God (love, mercy), this definition means that God must possessthem to an absolute and ultimate degree (the most loving, the most merciful).Hence it is not just that God is the greatest conceivable being but rather that,being this being, he must possess all conceivable qualities to the greatestconceivable extent.Having set up this definition, Anselm proceeds to the second phase ofhis argument. Some people, of course, will deny that God exists. Such a oneis ‘the fool’ of Psalm 14:1, who ‘hath said in his heart: “There is no God.”’But what are we to make of this fool? The first thing to say is that, though hemay deny God’s actual existence in reality (in re), he does not, and cannot,deny God’s existence in his mind or understanding (in intellectu). This is sobecause to deny the existence of anything must presuppose the existence ofthat thing as an idea, i.e., as a thing existing in the mind. For example, if Ideny that unicorns exist, I must have an idea in my mind of what a unicornis like (i.e., a horse with a horn in its forehead). If I did not have this priorconcept of what a unicorn is, I could not then deny that such a thing exists.I would indeed have no idea of what I am denying. Now Anselm arguesthat the same holds for atheists. To deny God’s existence must presuppose aconcept of God in the mind. If they have no such concept, no such denial canbe made.Anselm next asks an apparently innocuous question. Which is greater,something that exists in the mind or something that also exists in reality? Firstconsider the following:Of the following choices, which would you prefer? Are they allappropriate examples of Anselm’s argument? What conclusionsdo you draw from your answers?1 To be shot by an imaginary bulletor by a real one?4 To fall in love with a real personor a fictional person?2 To be given an imaginary milliondollars or a real million dollars?5 To combat a real threat or animaginary threat?3 To fight an actual war or animaginary one?Anselm’s conclusion is that a thing is more valuable or more terrible, orindeed more anything, if it exists in reality than if it exists in the mind only.And from this he draws another conclusion: that the notion of the greatestconceivable being cannot be conceived in thought alone but must actually exist;that, in other words, any being that exists in reality will be greater than anybeing that is merely conceived of; and that consequently the greatestconceivable being, God, must exist.EXERCISE 1.2

6C O M M E N TA RYDistinction betweenintentional and formalexistenceIn order to clarify this, let us formulate Anselm’s argument in a slightlydifferent way. In differentiating between two kinds of existence – existence-inthe-mind and existence-in-reality – Anselm is presupposing an importantdistinction between what later philosophers have called intentional and formalexistence. Briefly put, intentional existence refers to the content of my idea (forexample, my idea of a baseball bat), and formal existence refers to the real thingin the world to which that idea refers (for example, the actual baseball bat inthe locker-room). Anselm’s own example is between the ideas a painter hasbefore painting (intentional) and the finished product, the actual painting(formal).Now, to repeat, Anselm has claimed that the concept of God is the conceptof the greatest conceivable being. He has also argued that even the atheist, indenying the existence of God, is denying the existence of this particular being.In other words, both the believer and the unbeliever, in affirming and denyingGod, have an idea of this being in their minds to begin with: they are boththinking of the intentional existence of God. But, Anselm asks, can the idea ofGod, as the greatest conceivable being, be merely the idea of an intentionalexistence? It cannot, he says. Why? Because if God’s existence is solely intentional, then it will be possible to conceive of a greater God, a God who isnot only an idea but who actually exists, who also has formal existence.For something is greater if it is both conceived of and exists than if it is merelyconceived of. Thus it follows that the being which exists only intentionallycannot be the greatest conceivable being: it lacks the extra attribute of real,formal existence. We may put this another way. Which is greater (i.e., whichcontains the greater number of attributes), the ‘idea of X’ or the ‘idea of anX that actually exists’? Clearly the latter because, unlike the former, it has theextra attribute of actual existence: it alone exists apart from the mind’sconception of it. Thus the thing that is the greatest conceivable being mustexist. For if it did not exist I could conceive of a greater thing by simply addingto it the extra quality of existence.Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, existsin the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greatercan be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. Butobviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists abeing, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists bothin the understanding and in reality.3Why atheists are ‘fools’We can now see why Anselm considers atheists fools. If they accept the ideaof God but deny his actual existence, they are involved in a blatantcontradiction, a contradiction as obvious as the denial that triangles are threesided figures. They are denying what is implied in the idea of the greatestconceivable being – namely, that this being must exist, must possess theadditional attribute of formal existence. What they are saying, in effect, is that3. Ibid., p. 11.

7T H E O N TO L O G I C A L A R G U M E N Tthey r

Anselm’s argument: stage 2 7 Descartes’ ontological argument 9 The two stages of the argument: a summary 11 Kant’s criticism of the ontological argument (first stage) 11 Kant’s criticism of the ontological argument (second stage) 16 The ontological argument revisited: Findlay and Malcolm 19 Karl Barth: a theological interpretation 25