SRI LANKAN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS DURING EELAM WAR IV
SRI LANKAN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONSDURING EELAM WAR IVComparative Analysis of Galula and Rajapaksa Modelsto Determine Future ApplicabilityA MonographbyMajor Azat Sajjad KhanPakistan ArmySchool of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, Kansas2013-01Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEPublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing datasources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or anyother aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate forInformation Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware thatnotwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently validOMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)2. REPORT TYPE3. DATES COVERED (From - To)23 MAY 2013Master’s ThesisJUN 2012 – MAY 20134. TITLE AND SUBTITLE5a. CONTRACT NUMBERSri Lankan Counterinsurgency Operations during Eelam War IV:Comparative Analysis of Gulala and Rajapaksa Models to DetermineFuture Applicability5b. GRANT NUMBER5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER6. AUTHOR(S)5d. PROJECT NUMBERMajor Azat Sajjad Khan, Pakistan Army5e. TASK NUMBER5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)8. PERFORMING ORG REPORTNUMBERSchool of Advanced Military Studies250 Gibbon Ave.Ft. Leavenworth, KS 660279. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)U.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeATTN: ATZL-SWD-GDFort Leavenworth, KS 66027-230110. SPONSOR/MONITOR’SACRONYM(S)11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORTNUMBER(S)12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENTApproved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES14. ABSTRACT A cursory analysis of the global environment strongly indicates that nations will continue to facethe threat of terrorism, insurgency and separatism. The unpredictable and asymmetric nature of such conflicts hasposed serious challenges for nations encountering them. Its undefined and protracted nature demands radicaladaptation in order to initially understand and subsequently suppress the insurgency. This monograph examinesthe Rajapaksa counterinsurgency model applied by Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka during Eelam WarIV (2005 to 2009) to defeat an insurgency by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Galula’scounterinsurgency theory would serve as a historical construct to carry out comparative analysis with the purposeof ascertaining the applicability of the Rajapaksa Model in a future counterinsurgency conflict. The study explainsthe prevailing environment and nature of both the insurgencies with emphasis on how the counterinsurgencieswere planned and executed. It highlights the principles of both the Galula and Rajapaksa Models to drawsimilairities and differences. By carrying out a comparative analysis the research aims to assist future planners andscholars in understanding the dynamic nature of a counterinsurgency operation with the aim of ascertaining thefuture applicability of the Rajapaksa Counterinsurgency Model.15. SUBJECT TERMSSri Lanka, COIN, LTTE, FLN, Rajapaksha COIN Model, Galula, British COIN, French COIN, FrenchAlgerian War, Eelam War IV16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:a. REPORTb. ABSTRACTc. THIS PAGE(U)(U)(U)17. LIMITATIONOF ABSTRACT18. NUMBEROF PAGES(U)5119a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL PAGEName of Candidate: Major Azat Sajjad KhanMonograph Title:Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Operations during Eelam War IV:Comparative Analysis of Galula and Rajapaksa Models to Determine Future ApplicabilityApproved by:, Monograph DirectorBruce E. Stanley, Ph.D., Seminar LeaderJames D. Sisemore, COL, Director, School of Advanced Military StudiesThomas C. Graves, COLAccepted this 23rd day of May 2013 by:, Director, Graduate Degree ProgramsRobert F. Baumann, Ph.D.The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do notnecessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or anyother governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)ii
ABSTRACTSRI LANKAN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS DURING EELAM WAR IV:COMPARITIVE ANALYSIS OF GALULA AND RAJAPAKSA MODELS TO DETERMINEFUTURE APPLICABILITY, by Major Azat Sajjad Khan, 51 pages.A cursory analysis of the global environment strongly indicates that nations will continue to facethe threat of terrorism, insurgency and separatism. The unpredictable and asymmetric nature ofsuch conflicts has posed serious challenges for nations encountering them. Its undefined andprotracted nature demands radical adaptation in order to initially understand and subsequentlysuppress the insurgency. This monograph examines the Rajapaksa counterinsurgency modelapplied by Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka during Eelam War IV (2005 to 2009) todefeat an insurgency by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Galula’scounterinsurgency theory would serve as a historical construct to carry out comparative analysiswith the purpose of ascertaining the applicability of the Rajapaksa Model in a futurecounterinsurgency conflict.The study explains the prevailing environment and nature of both the insurgencies with emphasison how the counterinsurgencies were planned and executed. It highlights the principles of boththe Galula and Rajapaksa Models to draw similairities and differences. By carrying out acomparative analysis the research aims to assist future planners and scholars in understanding thedynamic nature of a counterinsurgency operation with the aim of ascertaining the futureapplicability of the Rajapaksa Counterinsurgency Model.iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTSI would like to extend my sincerest thanks and gratitude to everyone who helped me incompleting my monograph. A special thanks to my monograph director, Dr. Bruce Stanley, andseminar leader, COL James Sisemore, for their untiring support and guidance throughout thewhole process. It was due to their devotion and patience that I was able to complete my study intime.I also wish to thank my father, Brigadier General (Ret) Aslam Khan, Pakistan Army, forbeing my lifelong supporter and mentor. He was a continuous source of motivation and guidanceas I worked on my monograph and always told me to push on. My mother’s prayers remain mytrue strength and I would be nothing without them.Finally, I wish to express my deepest appreciation to my wife, Nadya, for her unendingsupport and patience as I worked long hours on my study. Her incredible support andencouragement kept me on track and motivatied me to complete this important work.iv
TABLE OF CONTENTSPageACRONYMS . viiTABLES . viiiMONOGRAPH . 1Introduction . 1Review of the Literature . 5The British Counterinsurgency . 7The French Counterinsurgency . 8The Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency . 9Methodology . 13Case Studies . 16French-Algerian War . 17Eelam War . 27Cross Case Analysis and Findings . 34Conclusion . 39BIBLIOGRAPHY . 42v
ACRONYMSALNArmee de Liberation NationaleCOACourses of ActionCOINCounterinsurgencyCRUAComite Revolutionnaire d’Unite et d’ ActionFLNFront de Liberation NationaleGSLGovernment of Sri LankaLTTELiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelamvi
TABLESPageTable 1.COIN Model Comparison . 26Table 2.Similarities and Differences between Galula and Rajapaksa COIN Models . 37Table 3.Summary of Findings from the Case Studies . 38Table 4.Summary of Hypothesis Findings. 39vii
MONOGRAPHIntroductionA cursory analysis of the global environment strongly indicates that nations will continueto face the threat of terrorism, insurgency and separatism. The unpredictable and asymmetricnature of such conflicts has posed serious challenges for nations encountering them. Its undefinedand protracted nature demands radical adaptation in order to initially understand and subsequentlysuppress the insurgency. This monograph examines the Rajapaksa counterinsurgency modelapplied by the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka during Eelam War IV (2005 to 2009)to defeat an insurgency by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Galula’scounterinsurgency theory would serve as a historical construct to carry out comparative analysiswith the purpose of ascertaining the applicability of the Rajapaksa Model in a futurecounterinsurgency (COIN) conflict.For almost three decades (1983-2009) Sri Lanka struggled against a combined threat ofinsurgency, terrorism, and separation from the LTTE. 1 Tamils who comprise eighteen percent ofthe total population of Sri Lanka wanted a separate state in the northeastern part of the country. 2To achieve their goals, the LTTE resorted to conventional military operations, guerilla warfareand terrorism with the financial support of a strong Tamil Diaspora. The efforts of theGovernment of Sri Lanka (GSL) can broadly be divided into two periods: first, from 1983 to2004 (Eelam War I, II, III); and second, from 2005 to 2009 (Eelam War IV). The first period sawthree iterations of the Eelam War and was replete with numerous uncoordinated militaryoperations lacking the desired political will and leadership. Each war ended with a cease fire1Patrick Peebles, The History of Sri Lanka (London, UK: Greenwood Press, 2006),1-2.2U.S. Department of State, “Background Notes: Sri Lanka,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn5249.htm (accessed 11 August 2012).1
agreement which was not respected by either side. 3 The second period started with the narrowvictory of Mahinda Rajapaksa as the President of Sri Lanka in November 2005 and witnessed theEelam War IV. This time under the capable leadership of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the GSLexecuted focused political, economic, military and intelligence efforts primarily through theenemy centric Rajapaksa COIN Model. The Eelam War IV ended in May 2009 with theelimination of the LTTE leadership and effectively the Tamil separation movement.4 Theunprecedented success of the COIN model applied by a legitimate government mandates a deeperanalysis to trace historical similarities and validate its future applicability. This monograph willevaluate the Rajapaksa COIN model 5 in comparison with Galula’s COIN theory applied inAlgiers from 1954 to 1957 with the purpose of recommending its suitability for a future conflict.6The Sri Lankan Government defeated the LTTE during the Eelam War IV (2005-2009)by applying the Rajapaksa COIN Model in contrast to the previous three iterations (1983-2004)which were largely unsuccessful. The model from its conception, planning, and execution bearssimilarities with the Galula’s COIN Theory applied in Algiers. The Rajapaksa Model focuses ona strong and dynamic military operation under a resolute political leadership as the cardinalaspect of the COIN theory. The successful application of the Rajapaksa COIN Model in theEelam War IV proves its validity as an effective COIN theory for future application.3C. A. Chandrapema, Gota’s War: The Crushing of Tamil Tiger Terrorism in Sri Lanka(Sri Lanka: Ranjan Wijeratne Foundation, 2012), 266.4M. R. Narayan Swamy, The Tiger Vanquished (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage PublicationsInc., 2010), 179.5The Sri Lankan Presidential Website, “President Mahinda Rajapaksa in an interviewwith India’s Tehelka Magazine,” 31 July 2009, http://www.president.gov.Ik/inter New.php?Id(accessed 14 August 2010).6David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT PraegerSecurity International, 2006), 42.2
The eight key principles of the successful Rajapaksa Model bear some startlingsimilarities with the Galula’s four COIN courses of action and eight tactical steps to defeat aninsurgency. This monograph will provide an in-depth comparison of both COIN theories;focusing on the environment, planning and execution. Specifically, the role played by the politicaland military instruments in achieving the objectives and desired end-state of both COINoperations will be examined.This study asserts that the Rajapaksa Model focuses on a strong and dynamic militaryoperation under a resolute political leadership as the cardinal aspect of the COIN theory. Thesuccessful application of the Rajapaksa COIN Model in the Eelam War IV strongly suggests itsvalidity as an effective COIN theory for future application.The significance of the study is paramount as application of the Rajapaksa COIN modelsignifies how a resolute democratically elected government, having learned from its mistakes, candefeat a persistant insurgency through a focused political, economic and military strategy. In thepresent era of persistent unconventional conflicts the unprecedented success of a recently appliedCOIN model demands a deeper analysis to accrue desired lessons for the future. This study willestablish its validity by comparing it with Galula’s COIN theory with recommendation for futureapplicability.The following terms assist in understanding the subject and are used to better frame itscontext.Counterinsurgency (COIN): The military, paramilitary, political, economic,psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. 7Eelam: The homeland of the Tamil people. 87Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and AssociatedTerms (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 12 April 2001), 112.8Edgar O’Balance, The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka 1973-88 (London,UK: Brassey’s, 1989), 12.3
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): The insurgent organization determined tocreate an independent homeland for the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The organization pioneered the useof suicide belts and suicide bombers including female suicide volunteers. Vellupilai Prabhakaranwas the political and military leader of the LTTE.9Enemy-Centric: COIN operation focused on defeating the insurgent/terrorist group. 10In this era of persistent conflict, nations will continue to face the threat of insurgencies.The complex nature of the threat emanates not only from states but also from the non-state actorswhich further compounds the problem. Militaries around the globe are continuously assessing andre-evaluating their COIN doctrine to keep them at pace with the changing nature of the threat.The study will focus on the Rajapaksa COIN model and draw comparative analysis withGalula’s COIN theory. A critical examination of the basic principles and key aspects of both thetheories would be carried out to ascertain similarities and differences. The political and militaryenvironment faced by both Sri Lanka and Algiers serves as an important factor while determiningthe effectiveness of the theories from conception to execution. Comparison of the RajapaksaModel with an already established COIN theory assists in determining the efficacy of the conceptand determine its future utility as a workable COIN concept.Two hypotheses are used to test the thesis. First, if applied properly keeping in view thepeculiarities of the environment, the Rajapaksa Model will achieve the objectives and desiredend-state of a COIN operation. Second, if strong military and resolute leadership are the keyelements of a COIN theory it will succeed in defeating the insurgency in a future environment.Four research questions guide this study. First, what are the main elements of Galula’sand Rajapaksa COIN Model? Second, what were the similarities in the operational environment9O’Balance, 13.10U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, n/119629 (assessed 20 August 2012).4
faced in both the insurgencies? Third, what were the objectives and end-state of the COINmodels? Fourth, what was the role of military operations and political leadership in successfulexecution of the COIN theories?This study acknowledges three limitations. The first limitation is that the referencematerial would be obtained from the Combined Army Research Library at Fort Leavenworth andthe global network. The second limitation is the non-availability of classified material regardingthe execution of the Rajapaksa Model from GSL. However, this factor was somewhat mitigatedby obtaining information from official unclassified sources. A Sri Lankan officer attendingIntermediate Level Education also provided relevant material which greatly assisted the research.The third limitation is that the length of the study precludes an exhaustive review of all Eelamwars. Only Eelam War IV which was fought from 2005 to 2009 is used as a case study.This research study is organized into five sections. Section one includes the background,problem statement, purpose, significance, definition of terms, theoretical framework, researchquestions, limitations, and delimitations of the study. Section two presents a review of theliterature, and section three explains the methodology used for the research study. Section fourpresents a comparative analysis of Rajapaksa and Galula’s COIN theories to ascertain similaritiesand differences from conception to completion of operations. Section five proffersrecommendations based on the applicability and effectiveness of Rajapaksa Model in a futureCOIN environment.Review of the LiteratureThis section presents the existing literature on the COIN doctrines of contemporaryarmies and establishes the foundation to study the Rajapaksa COIN Model for its applicability ina future COIN environment. A historical ove
SRI LANKAN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS DURING EELAM WAR IV: COMPARITIVE ANALYSIS OF GALULA AND RAJAPAKSA MODELS TO DETERMINE FUTURE APPLICABILITY, by Major Azat Sajjad Khan, 51 pages. A cursory analysis of the global environment strongly indicates that nations will continue to face the threat of terrorism, insurgency a nd separatism.
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