Hilton Case Study V14 - Saïd Business School
Saïd Business School casesAPRIL 5, 2014YPOCHilton Hotels: Real Estate Private EquityNLudovic PhalippouOITCAbstractOn December 13, 2013, two days after its IPO, Hilton hotels traded above 22 a share. This meant thatthe 2007 take-private transaction of Blackstone had produced the largest gain ever in private equity atabout 10 billion. In addition, Hilton had become the largest hotel group in the world by number ofEProoms up from 4th position 6 years previously, when Blackstone bought the company. How can suchsuccess occur with a cyclical business during the worst financial crisis since 1929-1933? Somebodydefinitely deserves a big box of chocolates; but who? The answer is surprising and offers a detailedinsight into the life-cycle of real estate private equity transactions.SNIThis note was prepared by Ludovic Phalippou and Dawoon Chung (MFE ’13) solely as the basis for class discussion. Ludovic Phalippouis Associate Professor of Finance at the Saïd Business School, fellow at Queen’s college and Oxford-Man institute, all at University ofOxford. We are grateful to Tim Jenkinson, Peter Morris for providing useful comments. University of Oxford 2014The University of Oxford makes no warranties or representations of any kind concerning the accuracy or suitability of the informationcontained herein for any purpose. All such information is provided “as is” and with specific disclaimer of any warranties of merchantability,fitness for purpose, title and/or non-infringement. The views expressed are those of the contributors and are not necessarily endorsedby the University of Oxford.Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract 2429357
Hilton hotels: Real estate private equityLudovic Phalippou1. Introduction“Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., once seen as a black mark on Blackstone’s record in real estate, ispoised to generate one of the two biggest private-equity profits of all time.”YPOC“Blackstone has a paper profit of 8.5 billion in the McLean, Virginia-based hotel operator’s initialpublic offering today. That’s second only to the 10.1 billion of gains that Apollo Global ManagementLLC (APO) has had from its 2008 investment in chemicals producer LyondellBasell Industries NV(LYB) Hilton would become No. 1 if the shares rise more than 2 above its IPO price.”1On June 28, 2007, Hilton’s board convened a special telephonic meeting, together with theCompany’s management and legal and financial advisors, to review Blackstone’s offer to acquirethe Company for 47.50 a share. This represented a premium of approximately 40% to thecompany’s stock price. During a lengthy discussion, the board members considered, among otherthings, risks to the Company’s ability to sustain the growth rates given the cyclicality of thelodging industry. Board members also looked at Blackstone’s experience. As it turns out, lodgingcompanies were a specialty of Blackstone, which had acquired over the four preceding yearsalone: Extended Stay America, Prime Hospitality, Boca Resorts, Wyndham, La QuintaCorporation, and the hotel REIT MeriStar Hospitality. These represented investments totaling 13.3 billion.OINTCThe most important aspect of the offer, however, was the price. With 497,738 rooms, Hilton wasthe fourth largest global hotel group (Exhibit 1), a mere 4,351 rooms short of the number threeposition, Marriott, and 58,508 rooms short of the number one, InterContinental. Prior toBlackstone’s offer, Hilton was trading at a multiple of 12.2x (Exhibit 2).2 This was lower thanmost of its peers. This was probably due to the relatively high proportion of owned and leasedbusiness segment in Hilton’s earnings. 3 As the sum-of-the-parts analysis in Exhibit 3 shows,multiples are highest for the managed and franchised segment, followed by owned and leased andthen timeshare segments.4EPSNAlso relevant to determining a fair price for the transaction was the premium paid in recenttransactions. It is not uncommon to see a large premium when listed companies are taken over,especially when the deal is sponsored by a private equity firm.5 Prior to Blackstone’s offer, twopublicly listed hotels were taken private by PE firms: Fairmont (January 2006) and Wyndham(June 2005), at premia of 28% and 19%, respectively. Another recent relevant transaction wasTPG’s acquisition of Harrah’s Entertainment at a 36% aydays.html. Theshare price reached 22 – hence 2 above the 20 offer price – within days.2Among the top ten worldwide hotel groups by room numbers, those that were publicly traded in U.S. stock marketswere selected for comparison.3In 2006, Choice owned only three out of 5,376 hotel properties, and Starwood’s managed and franchised hotelrooms represented 87.3% of total rooms, compared to 80.6% and 76.6% for Hilton and Marriott, respectively.4Management and franchise segment involves managing hotels, resorts and timeshare properties owned by thirdparties and licensing hotel brands to franchisees. Timeshare segment involves the sales, renting and management oftimeshare properties as well as consumer financing services.5Premium is on average about 20%, and about twice as much when it is sponsored by a private equity firm.2Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract 2429357
Hilton hotels: Real estate private equityLudovic Phalippou2. Hilton HotelsHilton Hotels Corporation is a hospitality company engaged in the ownership, management anddevelopment of hotels, resorts and timeshare properties and the franchising of lodging properties.Conrad Hilton bought his first hotel, The Mobley, in Texas in 1919. The Company he createdwas led by members of the Hilton family up until 1996 when Stephen F. Bollenbach, formerchief financial officer at Walt Disney Co., succeeded Barron Hilton as the chief executive of theCompany.6YPOCJoining the merger and acquisition wave of the late 1990s, Mr. Bollenbach expanded theCompany through a series of transactions. Most notably, he merged Hilton with BallyEntertainment Corporation via a stock swap valued at 2 billion, spun off the firm's gaming arm(Park Place Entertainment), and acquired Promus for 4 billion. As a result of this series oftransactions, Hilton added over 1,300 hotels under various hotel brands including Doubletree,Embassy Suites Hotels, and Hampton Inn. The Company grew its room stock by more than350,000 rooms between 1995 and 2007. This 238% growth was the highest among the top tenhotel groups. In 2007, Hilton was the fourth largest hotel group by room numbers up from beingthe seventh largest hotel group prior to Mr. Bollenbach’s appointment (Exhibit 1).OINHilton’s growth in rooms was accompanied by a substantial growth in revenue and earningsbefore interest tax depreciation and amortization (Ebitda) – as shown in Exhibit 4.7 From 1995 to2006, Hilton’s revenue and Ebitda increased by 2.3x and 3.5x, respectively. The annualizedgrowth in Ebitda of 11.9% was the highest among its peers. This growth was mainly financed bydebt, and following the December 2005 acquisition of Hilton International for 5.7 billion, 8Moody’s cut Hilton’s debt ratings to “junk.” The downgrade of Hilton’s senior notes to Ba2 fromBaa3 affected about 3.7 billion of debt.TCEPThese high annualized growth numbers should not, however, obscure the volatility of the business.Following the September 11 attacks, Hilton's stock fell by 47.0% (from 12.7 on September 4,2001 to 6.7 on September 20, 2001). Starwood fell by 46.5%, while Marriott and Choice fell by34.1% and 33.2%, respectively. The S&P 500 index, which included Hilton, Starwood, andMarriott, declined by 13.1% (Exhibit 5). Consistent with the stock-market reaction, Hilton’sEbitda was down 20% in 2001 and declined further in 2002 and 2003. The Ebitda of Marriott andStarwood suffered even larger declines, with Ebitda falling by 33% in 2001. Both stock prices andEbitda figures recovered relatively quickly. From the trough of 2003 to 2006, the Ebidta of Hiltonand Marriott both doubled and their stock prices trebled.SNI6Note that Appendix A provides a glossary of terms used in this case-study and Appendix B describes the differentcompetitors of Hilton hotels.7From the top ten hotel groups in Exhibit 1, those that were traded in the U.S. stock markets since 2000 wereselected for comparison.8In 1964, Hilton was split in two, with the London-listed Hilton Group focusing on growth outside the U.S. The1964 breakup agreement had banned Hilton Hotels from operating outside of the North America.3
Hilton hotels: Real estate private equityLudovic Phalippou3. Blackstone GroupFounded by Stephen A. Schwarzman and Peter G. Peterson in 1985, Blackstone is a global assetmanagement and advisory firm. Blackstone began as a mergers and acquisitions boutique with amodest balance sheet of 400,000. Since then it has grown to be the largest private equity firm bytotal assets under management (AUM). Blackstone’s AUM of 70 billion in 2006 was more thandouble that of KKR, which was founded almost ten years earlier in 1976 (Exhibit 6).Interestingly, while Blackstone was privatizing Hilton, it took the reverse action of listing itselfonto the New York Stock Exchange. Blackstone’s 4 billion IPO on June 22, 2007 is believed tohave been at least seven times oversubscribed.9YPOCAlthough the firm started as an advisory firm, its asset management business, including themanagement of corporate private equity funds, real estate funds, and mezzanine funds, hasbecome the most important activity in terms of revenue contribution. The revenue from the fundmanagement business grew by 49% annually from 2002 to 2006, comprising 76% of the totalrevenue in 2006 (Exhibit 7). In particular, the real estate business had grown its assets undermanagement significantly, from approximately 3.0 billion as of December 31, 2001 to 17.7billion as of March 1, 2007, representing an annual growth of 41%.10OINSince Blackstone began its private equity and real estate business in 1987, it raised five privateequity funds and eight real estate funds with total capital commitments of 34 billion and 24billion, respectively (Exhibit 8). Funds have been regularly spaced over time, with typically threeyears between each fund. Exceptions are between the first and second funds and between thethird and fourth funds. The second and fourth buyout funds should have been raised around 1990and 2000 respectively (instead of 1994 and 2003), but 1990-1991 and 2000-2001 were lean yearsfor buyout funds.TCEPNote also the two real estate funds raised in a row (2006 and 2007) testimony of both the massiveflow of capital is search of real estate investment vehicles over these years and Blackstone’s highreturns in its real estate funds (Exhibit 9). Hilton’s acquisition was financed by Blackstone RealEstate Partners VI and Blackstone Capital Partners V funds, both funds having been recentlyraised. Blackstone Real Estate Partners VI was the largest real estate fund ever raised, withcapital commitments of 11 billion, and had the largest stake in Hilton.SNIWhen a PE firm acquires a company, the exit plan is a crucial part of the analysis. Given thatsecondary buyouts, in which one PE firm sells its equity stake to another, had been increasinglypopular as an exit route (Exhibit 10 & Appendix C), it was important to examine which PE firmscould potentially buy Hilton from Blackstone. As shown in Exhibit 11, the size of Blackstone realestate business was only comparable to that of Morgan Stanley Real Estate Investing and LoneStar 2107097944849. From the public offering, Schwarzman received 684million in cash, and his Blackstone stake was worth 8.83 billion after the first day, which made him ranked byForbes as the 53rd-richest person in America in 2008.10Blackstone company filing (2007)4
Hilton hotels: Real estate private equityLudovic Phalippou4. Landscape of the Institutional Real Estate Market in 2006Real estate attracted record amounts of capital in the 2000s. As shown in Exhibit 12, U.S.commercial real estate transactions totaled 307 billion in 2006, up from 76 billion in 2001.Increasing appetite for commercial property investment drove up transaction values of real estate,which is measured by capitalization rate. Low capitalization rates mean high prices and low yield(see Appendix A). Exhibit 13 shows the drop in capitalization rates from about 9% in 2001 to 7%by 2006. Throughout this period of “cap rate compression”, the appropriate level of cap rates waswidely discussed and debated.11 There were wide concerns that real estate was experiencing yetanother “bubble”. Cheerleaders pointed out that over the last decade real estate performance hadbeen higher than that of listed equity, and with a much lower volatility. Cassandras replied thatfor illiquid assets such as real estate, volatility figures may be downward biased and that pastperformance is no guide to the future.YPOCReal estate investment is broadly classified as either public or private. Public real estate, referredto as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), uses the pooled capital of numerous investors topurchase, manage and develop income-generating properties. REITs are required to distribute atleast 90 percent of their income to shareholders annually in the form of dividends. Private realestate investment funds, such as real estate private equity funds, have a specified exit timeline,typically six to eight years. As shown in Exhibit 14, real estate private equity is about twice aslarge as real estate public equity in the US. As a source of capital, however, both are dwarfed bydebt providers. Real estate transactions are highly levered. On aggregate, in the US, for each 1billion of equity there is over 3 billion of debt, implying a leverage ratio of about 75%.OINTCAs Exhibit 15 shows, private real estate fundraising grew more than five-fold, from 19.3 billionin 2000 to 104.7 billion in 2006. Fundraising was at its lowest in 2002, following the 2001recession, down to 14.2 billion from 21.8 billion in 2001. Of particular interest, hoteltransaction volumes were relatively flat from 1998 to 2003, hovering below the 20 billion a yearmark. Starting in 2004, hotel deals grew exponentially and reached 80 billion in 2006 (Exhibit16). Along with developers and private investors, private real estate funds were a major investorin the hotel industry. REITs were not as active as PE firms due to the cyclicality of the hospitalitysector. The changes in both occupancy rates and room rates immediately affect the cash availablefor distribution to shareholders.12EPSNIThis real estate boom was probably ignited by the very low interest rate policy of the U.S.Federal Reserve and other central banks after September 2001. From 2002 to 2004 the LIBORrate, which is the interest rate at which banks lend to one another, hovered below 2% per year. Asreal estate prices and volumes skyrocketed, central banks increased interest rates and the LIBORsurfed over the 5% per annum mark in 2006-2007 (Exhibit 17).11“Cap Rates and Real Estate Value Cycles: A Historical Perspective with a Look to the Future” Babson CapitalResearch Note, June 200912REIT Guide (2nd Editoin), Deloitte5
Hilton hotels: Real estate private equityLudovic Phalippou5. Capital StructureIn a leveraged buyout, the target company’s existing debt is usually bought back, a large amountof new debt is raised, cash reserves brought to a minimum, and significant credit lines arenegotiated. The large amount of debt and the retiring of cash, however, leads to highervulnerability to downturns. A PE firm might have difficulty making large interest paymentsduring economic downturns and run the risk of seeing its company seized by debt-holders.YPOCIn the case of Hilton, Blackstone funded the transaction with 78.5% debt and 21.5% equity. Sucha high leverage was typical, albeit of the high side, of buyout transactions conducted in 20052007. Another important metric to gauge leverage is the debt to Ebitda multiple. In Hilton’s case,it was 12.4x and this was about twice as much as the average that year (Exhibit 18). To compare,the largest PE transaction ever – Texas power company TXU Corp., which was taken private byKKR and TPG a few months earlier (February 2007) – had a similar leverage (81.5%) but a moretypical debt to Ebitda multiple of 6.6x. Exhibit 19 shows the capital structure of the Reader’sDigest LBO in November 2006. Again the leverage was about 80%, but the debt to Ebitdamultiple was twice that of Hilton. Hence, Hilton’s high debt to Ebitda ratio was high but notexceptional.OINThe main characteristic of the 2005-2007 credit boom was that debt tended to be ‘cov-lite’, i.e.with minimal covenants. This was the case for Hilton’s debt. Traditionally, lenders would attacha number of covenants to any debt package and particularly so when the company takes on boarda large amount of debt. Many were alarmed by this development. The Economist thought it wasconcerning and short-sighted. The Financial Times endorsed the view of Anthony Bolton, whowarned on his retirement from Fidelity Investments in May 2007 that cov-lite is "the tinder paperfor a serious reversal in the market."13TCEPExhibit 20 shows the “LBO model” for Hilton using management projections, assuming exit after6 years and the same exit and entry multiples. Depreciation and amortization is assumed to be23% of Ebitda (based on analyst projections), and tax rate is set to be 30%. Interest expenseprojections are based on a constant LIBOR set to the rate as of June 2007 (5.07%). Notice thenegative net earnings for the first two years despite optimistic management projections. This iswhy PE firms secure a revolving credit facility for leveraged buyouts. The credit limit, however,needs to be carefully chosen to minimize fees. In Hilton’s case, a cash reserve had been depositedwith the lenders which could, upon the Company’s request, be used for debt service, capitalexpenditures and general corporate purposes.SNIAlthough at the time the Daily Telegraph reported that there were “worries over a global creditcrunch as investors start to baulk at the increasingly risky debt investment vehicles being hit byrising interest rates”, if it all goes as planned, Blackstone would more than quadruple itsinvestment from 5,700 million to 27,247 million.13Others argued that the move to cov-lite was a welcome simplification of loan documentation, fully justified as thebanks would hedge their risk by transferring exposure to the loan in the CDO market. It was also pointed out at thetime that cov-lite loans operated in a very similar way to bonds, but at lower values.6
Hilton hotels: Real estate private equityLudovic Phalippou6. The day of reckoningBlackstone executives probably knew that the Ebitda projections, if anything, were a bit on theoptimistic side. If they came true, Blackstone would earn a whopping 22 billion – by far thelargest capital gain ever in the PE/RE space. This meant that there were margins for error.YPOCBut maybe this time it needed more than a margin for error. June 2007 turned out to be the verypeak of the leveraged buyout and real estate market. The headlines radically changed. On 25March 2008, the Financial Times ran an article explaining that since this Hilton deal:“not a single private equity deal has been hatched above 4bn, and only 49bn of leveragedbuyouts larger than 1bn have come forth ( )significant bankruptcies in private equityportfolios are a certainty, as is the next round of bad press that will accompany them. ( ) Notonly are new deals scarce, a number of agreed deals that had not yet closed have hit the rocks,spawning recriminations and litigation.( ) In recent weeks, both Moody's and Standard &Poor's have issued reports identifying an increasing number of debtors at risk of default. Notsurprisingly, many of those companies are private equity-backed. S&P's list includes morethan 50 worrisome private equity portfolio companies.”OINIt looked as though the private equity world was doomed right after the Hilton transaction closed.Diane Vazza, a managing director at ratings agency Standard and Poors, commented on thesituation in PE by saying, "the day of reckoning has arrived". This was certainly not the type ofmarket timing skills that Blackstone would like to boast to future investors. Blackstone’s ownearnings forecasts were widely missed, and in less than seven months since its successful debuton the stock market, Blackstone stock price plunged to 4 in February 2009, a breath-taking 87%dive from the IPO price of 31!TCEPHilton was certainly not the only one in trouble. Other hotel groups, although not as highlyleveraged, would still suffer the dive in Ebitda generated by this cataclysmic financial crisis. On 6March 2009, the Starwood and Marriott stock prices were down 85% and 71%, respectively(from July 2007 - the time of the Hilton deal).14 Choice fell 39%, and the S&P 500 fell by 55%(Exhibit 21).SNIOne good aspect of being private may be that you do not see your stock price hitting zero! Butthe harsh reality bites nonetheless. Due to lower than expected earnings, many companies couldnot service debt and bankruptcy rates skyrocketed. In 2009, Hilton’s Ebitda was only about halfof what had been projected at the time of the deal for 2009. How could debt be serviced,covenants met and Hilton avoid being seized by debt-holders then? To begin with, remember thatHilton’s debt was cov-lite. In addition, the Fed decreased its interest rate to a first-time ever rockbottom of 0.25%, pushing down the Libor rate to 0.68% in 2009. This rather unexpectedcombination of events led to a miracle: net earnings ended up being the same in 2009 as the(rosy) projections.14As of December 31, 2007, Starwood, Marriot, and Choice had net debt to enterprise value ratio of 29%, 17%, and10%, respectively.7
Hilton hotels: Real estate private equityLudovic Phalippou7. Doubling upThe waves of quantitative easing might have helped preserve net earnings for Hilton, but it doesnot mean that the equity stake is preserved. PE-owned companies such as Hilton may not see itsdaily stock price but the value of the debt can be a good indicator. When debt trades below par,the equity is usually not worth much (only the option value). The sharp decline in hotel stockprices raised the likelihood that Hilton’s equity was worthless and Blackstone actually wrotedown the value of its equity stake in Hilton by 70% in 2009. But Blackstone saw what could becalled an investment opportunity (or a doubling strategy): buying back the debt and then cashingin both the increase in equity and in debt value in case of a recovery? Buying distressed debt wasa specialty of the house. The head of Blackstone’s corporate advisory and restructuring practice,Mr Studzinski, was reported to be “having the time of his life. He and his stable of 134 advisershave been riding high on the opportunities being created by companies in trouble.”15YPOCIn April 2010, after tough negotiations with banks and other debt holders, Hilton's debt was cut to 16 billion from 20 billion, and maturity was extended by two years. The restructuring includedthe repurchase of 1.8 billion of secured mezzanine debt for a cash payment of 819 million,representing a 54 percent discount from par value. Funding for the repurchase of the securedmezzanine debt was provided by 819 million in new equity investment from Blackstone. Recallfrom Exhibit 8 that Blackstone raised a large fund in 2007, and this money needed to be spent by2012. As not many deals were being executed, Blackstone was actually under pressure to find ahome for all this cash. This looked like yet another reason to pursue this strategy. Finally, 2.1billion of junior mezzanine debt was converted into preferred equity. Singapore's sovereignwealth fund, GIC Private Ltd, an active investor in franchised hotel properties across theU.S., was one of the lenders that participated in the debt restructuring. 16OINTCEPA year and a half later, things still looked gloomy. Moody’s released a ‘splashy’ report arguingthat the large leveraged buy-outs of 2006-2008 underperformed the wider market in terms ofratings, default rates and revenue growth despite the recent wave of debt restructuring. High-yieldbonds for Clear Channel and Harrah’s Entertainment, now renamed Caesars, both of which hadalready restructured, were trading at 70 cents on the dollar. The senior bank debt of the largestLBO ever, TXU, was trading at 60 cents on the dollar. The hotel industry, if anything was moreaffected for its heavy reliance on corporate travel, wages and discretionary consumer spending. Arecord number of lodging companies filed for bankruptcy protection in 2009 (e.g. Extended StayAmerica, which Lightstone acquired from Blackstone two months prior to Hilton’s transactionfor 8 billion, financed by 4.1 billion of securitized first mortgages, and 3.3 billion ofmezzanine loans). Bruce Force, senior vice president for sales at Lodging Econometricscommented after the company’s bankruptcy filing,SNI“Between the dip in prices and the overleverage and the reduction in revenue, it’s like onetwo-three, you’re ng.html. After Hilton’s IPO, GIC owned roughly 5% of Hilton’s outstanding stock.8
Hilton hotels: Real estate private equityLudovic Phalippou8. Exiting HiltonBlackstone used the same formula to convince creditors holding debt on its other hotelinvestments to complete similar restructuring deals. Among the lenders rumored to have sold itsmezzanine loans at a discount was the German bank Hypo Real Estate Holding AG, which washighly distressed. However, the cost of buying back debt was getting higher. In 2009 and 2010,mezzanine debt on some hotel portfolios could be bought for as little as 20 cents on the dollar.But hotel performance rebounding sharply in the U.S. in 2011-2012 eliminated many debtdiscounts. So maybe it was time to change gear and start thinking of selling instead of buying.YPOCThe end game for Blackstone's hotel investments was an initial public offering (IPO; seeAppendix C for a discussion on exit routes). For this to happen, two ingredients are necessary:Ebitda (and its recent growth) needs to look good, and the IPO market needs to be alive and well.Two hotel owners sought IPOs in 2011 with tepid results.17 Summit Hotel Properties, owner of68 hotels, saw its stock quickly trading lower than the IPO price. On May 10, 2011, RLJ LodgingTrust, owner of 140 hotels, priced its IPO at 18 a share, lower than RLJ's anticipated range of 19 to 21, and the stock price stuck around the issue price thereafter. But the magic ofquantitative easing was going to strike again. Various commentators drew a link between the Fedmonetary policy and both the reduction in stock market volatilities and increased investorconfidence. Irrespective of the explanation, equity indices and IPO activity gathered streamconcurrently. By mid-2013 the S&P 500 was back to October 2007 levels. 112 IPOs wentthrough in the first three quarters of 2013, representing a 48% increase from the same period in2012. First day returns averaged a healthy 14.2% in Q3-2013.18 Interestingly, the U.S. housingmarket continued to see recovery, and the real estate sector dominated the 2013 IPO market,boasting 22 IPOs raising 4.2 billion (representing 12% of total IPO volume) in the first threequarters of 2013. Blackstone itself tipped the water with a 565 million IPO for Extended StayAmerica, which it co-owned with Centerbridge Partners, and Paulson & Company. The numberof PE-backed IPOs surged to 38 in the first three quarters of 2013 (32% of the total) – elevenmore than the full-year 2012 total (Exhibit 22).19 The stock-market seemed ready to welcomeback Hilton – as long as the Ebitda and growth numbers were right.OINTCEPSNDuring recessionary periods, the fee based management and franchised model performs muchbetter than the owned and leased model. And that was the strategy pursued by Hilton. Despite thefinancial crisis, Hilton continued its expansion but focusing on franchising agreements, a lesscostly approach than owning property outright. In 2013, Hilton was the largest global hotel groupby room numbers ahead of InterContinental, which had ranked first in 2007. 302 new hotels wereadded by Hilton in 2009 alone, the second most in the Company’s 91-year history. Between June30, 2007 and September 30, 2013, Hilton’s management and franchise segment grew by 40% interms of number of rooms, representing 98% of its overall room growth, with virtually no capitalI17There were nonetheless some rare success stories – such as HCA, the US hospital operator taken private by KKR,Bain and Merrill Lynch for 31bn, which floated in 2011 or KKR’s Dollar General.18EY Global IPO Trends Report, Q3 201319Q3 2013 IPO Report, WilmerHale9
Hilton hotels: Real estate private equityLudovic Phalippouinvestment by the Company. As Christopher J. Nassetta, President & Chief Executive Officer ofHilton, said:“Our category-killer brands are attracting capital from all over the world, and it is theircapital we are growing with, not ours”YPOCThe adjusted Ebitda for the management and franchise segment grew by 25% from 2007 to 2012,increasing its contribution to total earnings from 47% to 53%.20 But Hilton also outperformed itscompetitors in the timeshare segment, with annual interval sales increasing over 40% since 2007.A similarly capital-efficient strategy was employed there. For instance, for the twelve monthsended September 30, 2013, 50% of its sales of timeshare intervals were developed by thirdparties versus 0% for the year ended December 31, 2009. The results fro
Hilton hotels: Real estate private equity Ludovic Phalippou 3 2. Hilton Hotels Hilton Hotels Corporation is a hospitality company engaged in the ownership, management and development of hotels, resorts and timeshare properties and the franchising of lodging properties. Conrad Hilton bought his first hotel, The Mobley, in Texas in 1919.
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