Iranian Public Opinion On The Nuclear Negotiations

Summary of Findings1. Iran’s Nuclear Program (page 8)Overwhelming majorities of Iranians continue to say that it is very important for Iran to havea nuclear program. The nuclear program is seen as one of Iran’s greatest achievements. Alarge majority continues to see the program as driven purely by peaceful goals, though one infive see it as being an effort to pursue nuclear weapons. This support for Iran’s nuclearprogram appears to be driven by a combination of symbolic and economic considerations.However, while a majority sees the program as being an important way for Iran to stand up tothe West, serving Iran’s future energy and medical needs is seen as more important.2. Views on Nuclear Weapons (page 10)A large and growing majority of Iranians express opposition to nuclear weapons in variousways. Two thirds now say that producing nuclear weapons is contrary to Islam. Eight in tenapprove of the NPT goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and establishing a nuclearweapons-free zone in the Middle East. Consistent with these views, Iranians expressopposition to chemical weapons, with nine in ten approving of Iran’s decision, during theIran-Iraq War in the 1980s, to not use chemical weapons in response to Iraq’s use of them.3. Iran - P5 1 Nuclear Deal (page 12)Given information about the nuclear deal being negotiated between Iran and the P5 1, asubstantial majority favors it and only one in six oppose it. A quarter, though, are undecidedor equivocal. Nearly three in four are optimistic that Iran and the P5 1 will arrive at a deal inregard to Iran’s nuclear program. Three in four think the Majlis (Iran’s Parliament) shouldhave a say on a nuclear deal.4. The Potential Removal of Sanctions (page 16)The support for Iran pursuing a deal with the P5 1 appears to rest to some extent on theassumption—held by a large majority—that all sanctions on Iran would be lifted as part of thedeal, and there is optimism that the sanctions would in fact be lifted. Approximately half ofrespondents say Iran should not agree to a deal unless the U.S. lifts all of its sanctions, whilenearly as many say Iran should be ready to make a deal even if the U.S. retains somesanctions, provided all UN and EU sanctions are lifted. Among those who believe that all U.S.sanctions would be lifted, support for a deal is nearly two thirds, while among those whoassume that the U.S. will retain some sanctions, support is a bare majority. The removal ofUN sanctions is seen as more important than the removal of U.S. sanctions.5. Expectations About Positive Effects of a Deal (page 19)Iranians express high expectations that a nuclear deal would result in significant positive effectsin the near term. Majorities say they would expect to see, within a year, better access to foreignmedicines and medical equipment, significantly more foreign investment, and tangibleimprovement in living standards.6. The Sanctions and Iran’s Economy (page 21)The sanctions on Iran are overwhelmingly perceived as having a negative impact on thecountry’s economy and on the lives of ordinary people. However, views of the economy are6Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Negotiations June 2015

fairly sanguine and have been improving. Also, the impact of the sanctions is seen as limitedand a lesser factor affecting the economy as compared to domestic mismanagement andcorruption.7. Views of Rouhani (page 23)As Iran’s parliamentary elections near, Iran’s President Rouhani is clearly one of the strongestpolitical figures in Iran. Half would prefer to see Rouhani supporters win in the February 2016parliamentary elections, while one quarter favors his critics. However, Rouhani supporters havehigh expectations that a deal removing all U.S. sanctions and bringing rapid economic change isgoing to take place. If a deal is reached that does not meet these expectations, Rouhani could beleft politically vulnerable.In a hypothetical presidential match-up, Rouhani currently does better than former presidentMahmoud Ahmadinejad by two to one. Large majorities say Rouhani has been at leastsomewhat successful in improving the economic situation, improving Iran’s relations withEuropean countries, and reducing sanctions. Three in four Iranians say that if the negotiationswere to fail to produce a final agreement, they would only or mostly blame the P5 1 countries.8. Relations with the U.S. (page 26)Views of the United States, especially the U.S. government, continue to be quite negative.Only four in ten believe that U.S. leaders genuinely believe that Iran is trying to acquirenuclear weapons. Asked why the U.S. is imposing sanctions on Iran, the most commonanswers portray the U.S. as seeking to confront and dominate Iran; very few mentionconcerns about nuclear weapons. However, a slight majority has a positive view of theAmerican people.If Iran and the P5 1 reach a deal, a large majority believes that the U.S. will still impede othercountries from cooperating with Iran, and a slight majority believes that Iran makingconcessions on the nuclear issue will likely lead the U.S. to seek more concessions. Just onein six believe that concessions would be likely to lead to greater accommodation; however,this number is higher than a year ago.Large majorities favor various confidence-building measures between Iran and the U.S.,including greater trade, which is more widely supported than a year ago. People-to-peopleconfidence-building measures are especially popular. A majority thinks that it is possible forIslam and the West to find common ground.9. Views of P5 1 Countries (page 30)Two thirds say they do not trust the P5 1 countries—however, the minority expressing trusthas increased since fall 2014. Views of specific countries vary: large majorities have negativeviews of the UK and the U.S.; modest majorities have unfavorable views of Russia andFrance, while views are divided on Germany and China.10. Views of Regional Actors (page 32)A very large majority has an unfavorable view of Saudi Arabia—even slightly more negativethan views of the U.S. A slight majority now has an unfavorable view of Turkey, which wasnot the case a year ago. Large majorities continue to view Syria and Iraq favorably.Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Negotiations June 20157

1. Iran’s Nuclear ProgramOverwhelming majorities of Iranians continue to say that it is veryimportant for Iran to have a nuclear program. The nuclear program is seenas one of Iran’s greatest achievements. A large majority continues to see theprogram as driven purely by peaceful goals, though one in five see it asbeing an effort to pursue nuclear weapons. This support for Iran’s nuclearprogram appears to be driven by a combination of symbolic and economicconsiderations. However, while a majority sees the program as being animportant way for Iran to stand up to the West, serving Iran’s futureenergy and medical needs is seen as more important.The consensus among Iraniansregarding Iran’s nuclear programremains stable. Asked, “In youropinion, how important is it for ourcountry to develop its nuclearprogram?” four in five (83%) calledit very important and another 11%said it was somewhat important.Similar questions have been askedsince 2006 and have consistentlyshown the same high level of support(about 8 in 10).When Iranians are asked in an open-ended question to say in their own words what they thinkhas been Iran’s “most important achievement” in recent years, the country’s nuclear programis their most common answer. Forty percent cited the nuclear program—far more than talkedabout either advances in medicine, science, or technology (11%) or increases in security andmilitary power (12%). Another 11% mentioned economic, cultural, or social progress; 6%mentioned Iran’s greater prominence in regional or world affairs. This same question wasasked by UTCPOR in October 2014,and the results were similar—44%cited the nuclear program.A large majority continues to see theprogram as driven purely by peacefulgoals, though one in five see it asbeing an effort to pursue nuclearweapons. Respondents were askedwhether “Iran’s objective fordeveloping nuclear capabilities” is“for purely peaceful purposes, such8Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Negotiations June 2015

as energy or medical needs,” or “is it also seeking to attain the needed capabilities to be ableto develop nuclear weapons?” Seventy-three percent said they thought the program waspurely for peaceful purposes; one in five (19%) thought Iran is also seeking a weaponscapability. In a July 2014 UTCPOR poll, a question that also offered a third option (“Iran ispursuing both objectives simultaneously”) got a similar overall result: 69% said the programwas purely peaceful, while 18% said Iran had both objectives in view (only nuclear weapons:4%).In order to probe further the roots of public support for the nuclear program, respondents wereasked a series of three questions. First they were asked: “Some say Iran should develop itsnuclear program because it helps meet Iran's energy and medical needs. How important doyou think this reason is?” Seven in ten (70%) rated this reason very important.Next, respondents were offered a different reason for the nuclear program that was groundedin defiance of the West: “Some say Iran should develop its nuclear program because it showsthat Iran will not surrender to Western governments and forego its rights. How important doyou think this reason is?” A lesser majority of 60% described this reason as very important.Finally, respondents were asked: “Of these two reasons, which do you think is moreimportant?” A clear majority of 58% chose energy and medical needs, while 38% chosedemonstrating Iran’s independence.An open-ended question was used as well asking respondents to say in their own words whythey believe “that it is important for our country to develop its nuclear program.” A majority(52%) spoke of concrete needs for medical technology and electricity, and to furthereconomic development in general. Almost a third (29%) spoke of symbolic reasons includingraising Iran’s prestige, especially in science and technology; or simply because Iran has theright to a nuclear program. The implicitly security related concern to deter other countriesfrom attacking Iran was mentioned by just 4%.Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Negotiations June 20159

2. Views on Nuclear WeaponsA large and growing majority of Iranians express opposition to nuclearweapons in various ways. Two thirds now say that producing nuclearweapons is contrary to Islam. Eight in ten approve of the NPT goal ofeliminating nuclear weapons and establishing a nuclear weapons-free zonein the Middle East. Consistent with these views, Iranians express oppositionto chemical weapons, with nine in ten approving of Iran’s decision, duringthe Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, to not use chemical weapons in response toIraq’s use of them.Two thirds of the Iranian public (69%) believes that producing nuclear weapons is contrary tothe principles of Islam, and this majority has grown over the years. When asked, “As far asyou know, is the production of atomic bombs contrary to the principles of Islam or not?” 69%said, “Yes, it is contrary to Islam.” About one in five (22%) said, “No, Islam has not bannedit.” Fewer than 2% volunteered that Islam has no specific opinion on the subject. Further,fully three quarters (75%) say, “Iranian policymakers should take religious teachings intoaccount when they make decisions.”This and similar questions have beenasked in Iran since 2008, and themajorities saying that producingnuclear weapons is contrary to Islamhave risen. In 2008, the majority was58% (WorldPublicOpinion.org), andas recently as October 2014, it was65% (UTCPOR)—slightly below thecurrent 69%. Since October, thosesaying Islam has not banned theproduction of nuclear weapons hasremained low, moving from 25% to22%.A majority of Iranians say they have some knowledge of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT). Fifty-eight percent say they have heard a lot (17%) or some (42%) about the treaty,while 39% have not heard much (16%) or are completely unfamiliar with it (23%)—a level ofawareness unchanged from mid-2014.More significantly, 81% favor “the goal of eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons, whichis stated in the NPT.” This support for the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons has grownsteadily and consistently over the last decade. In 2006, 68% favored it; in 2008, 72%(WorldPublicOpinion.org). In 2014, support reached 74% in July and 76% in October(UTCPOR), and has now risen to 81%.10Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Negotiations June 2015

Support for the idea of a nuclearweapons-free zone in the MiddleEast is also high and on theupswing. Told that such a zone“would include both Islamiccountries and Israel,” and wouldrequire countries not to havenuclear weapons, in the currentpoll, 80% favored it (62% strongly),with 17% opposed. This is up fromnine years ago when 71% favored it(50% strongly,WorldPublicOpinion.org).To probe more deeply into Iranians’ stated opposition to having nuclear weapons, respondentswere asked to reevaluate Iran’s choice not to use chemical weapons in response to Iraq’s useof such weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. Respondents were reminded that:As you may know, during the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam repeatedly made use ofchemical weapons against Iran, but Iran decided not to retaliate in kind and thus didnot use chemical weapons against Iraq.And asked:In your opinion, would it havebeen better for Iran to retaliatein kind at that time and usechemical weapons againstIraq, or was Iran's decision notto use chemical weaponsagainst Iraq a right decision?A near unanimous 87% endorsedIran’s decision to not reply in kind to Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons. Only12% said Iran should have retaliated in kind.Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Negotiations June 201511

3. Iran - P5 1 Nuclear DealGiven information about the nuclear deal being negotiated between Iranand the P5 1, a substantial majority favors it and only one in six oppose it.A quarter, though, are undecided or equivocal. Nearly three in four areoptimistic that Iran and the P5 1 will arrive at a deal in regard to Iran’snuclear program. Three in four think the Majlis (Iran’s Parliament) shouldhave a say on a nuclear deal.Respondents were presented key points of the understanding reached in Lausanne,Switzerland, before being asked to provide their view. They were first reminded of thenegotiations and that a preliminary understanding had been reached:As you may know, Iran and the P5 1 have been negotiating over Iran’s nuclearprogram. Recently they reached an understanding on some of the key terms of a deal,though there are still specifics that need to be worked out.It was clarified to respondents that the points they were about to hear were those that aredescribed similarly by all the negotiating parties:Both sides have made statements regarding the elements of this understanding. In somecases, the statements made by both sides were at variance, and each side has rejectedsome of the interpretations of the other side regarding the elements of thisunderstanding.Now, setting aside the statements and the interpretations provided by each side, I wouldlike to tell you some important aspects of this understanding that both sides agree on.Respondents were first told the obligations that Iran would have to fulfill, and then theobligations that the P5 1 would have to fulfill.According to this understanding, Iran will:—limit its uranium enrichment to the level needed for the production of nuclear energyfor a number of years;—reduce the number and limit the quality of its operating enrichment centrifuges for anumber of years;—limit its research and development on centrifuges for a number of years;—accept more extensive inspections of nuclear sites by the IAEA for an extendednumber of years;and in return the P5 1 will—accept Iran enriching uranium to the limited extent agreed upon for a number of yearsand then to a greater extent later12Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Negotiations June 2015

—cooperate with Iran onbuilding new nuclear reactorsand supply Iran with nuclearfuel—lift economic sanctions onIranAfter this information respondentswere asked: “Now, do you approveor disapprove of Iran pursuing a dealbased on these terms?” A majority(57%) approved of Iran pursuing the deal; only 15% disapproved. However, another 17% wereequivocal, and 11% said they did not know.Who Favors and Who Opposes a Deal?There were no significant differences in the level of support for a deal by gender, education, oreconomic status. Also, supporters of pursuing a deal outnumber opponents in virtually alldemographic groups, and in most attitudinal groups.Notably, those who think foreignsanctions have the greatest negativeimpact on the Iranian economysupport pursuing a deal at the samemajority levels as those who thinkdomestic economic mismanagementand corruption has the greaterimpact. Likewise, those who thinkthat if there is no deal, sanctions willincrease, support pursuing a deal atthe same majority levels as thosewho think that absent a deal,sanctions are likely to gradually weaken.Support for the deal is more widespread among the young, among internet users, and amongthose who would like to see Rouhani’s supporters make significant gains in the February 2016parliamentary elections.Attitudes about the value of Iran’s nuclear programs are a strong predictor of support.Among the majority who said that meeting Iran’s energy and medical needs is the mostimportant reason for the nuclear program, 65% approved of pursuing a deal. But among theminority who said that the most important reason was to show “that Iran will not surrender toWestern governments and forego its rights,” less than half (48%) approved of pursuing a deal.Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Negotiations June 201513

Other strong predictors of supportare the degree of trust in the P5 1countries, as well as confidence thatthe P5 1 will follow through on theirend of the bargain in the event of adeal. Those most confident in theP5 1 countries on these twoquestions are 24 to 32 points morelikely to support pursuing a deal.Most differences betweendemographic groups were small. Byage, those under 26 were the most supportive group at 64%, compared to 52% of those over45 who supported the deal. Those who use the internet once a week or more were, at 61%,more supportive than those who never use the internet (53%).Among those who want Rouhani’s allies to win the coming parliamentary elections, 62%were supportive, while among those who want critics of Rouhani to win, a lesser majority(55%) were supportive.Optimism that a Deal Will Be MadeA clear majority of Iranians think that an agreement on the nuclear program agreeable to bothsides is more likely than not. Asked, “How likely do you think it is that the current talksbetween Iran and the P5 1 countries will eventually result in a deal that is agreeable to bothsides?” seven in ten (70%) thought this is likely, though most said “somewhat likely” (49%).About a quarte

The University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research (UTCPOR) is an academic research institution dedicated to the study of public opinion in Iran and other countries. Since its inception, UTCPOR has been providing survey research and analysis services to a wide range of clients from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors.