Annual Review 2021 - Ncsc.gov.uk
Annual Review 2021Making the UK the safest place to live and work online
NCSC Annual Review 2021How to report suspiciousemails, websites and textmessages If you have received an email which you’renot quite sure about, forward it to theSuspicious Email Reporting Service (SERS)at report@phishing.gov.uk If you have come across a website whichyou think may be fake and is trying to scamyou, visit website and followthe instructions Phone providers allow you to reportsuspicious text messages for free usingthe shortcode 7726.If you forward a text, your provider caninvestigate the origin of the text and takeaction, if found to be malicious.If 7726 doesn’t work, you can find out howto report a text message by contactingyour provider.2
IntroductionThe National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC),a part of GCHQ, is the UK’s technical authorityfor cyber security. Since the NCSC was createdin 2016 as part of the Government’s NationalCyber Security Strategy, it has worked to makethe UK the safest place to live and work online.This Review of its fifth year looks at some ofthe key developments and highlights between1 September 2020 and 31 August 2021. As partof a national security agency not all its workcan be disclosed publicly but the review seeksto describe the year with insights and facts fromcolleagues inside and out of the organisation.An accessible version can be found atncsc.gov.uk/annual-review-20213
NCSC Annual Review 2021Contents6Introduction6Ministerial Foreword8CEO Foreword10NCSC Overview12Sir Jeremy Fleming14Timeline1632The ThreatResilience18Overview34Overview20Cyber Threat 202135Key Advisories and Interventions21Real-World Impact38Active Cyber Defence Services24Incident Management41MyNCSC26Active Cyber Defence4210 Steps to Cyber Resilience43Early Warning44NCSC’s Response to Covid-1946Engaging and Supporting Sectors54Supporting the Citizen4
Introduction56Technology58Overview61Verified high assurance software59‘Quantum-safe’ cryptography62A new National Crypt-Key Centre59Digital contact tracing in theNHS Covid-19 app62Informing policy through technical adviceand analysis60Using artificial intelligence to detectmalicious activity63Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation60Safeguarding the UK’s critical systems64CYBERUK61Connected Places: new security principlesfor ‘Smart Cities’6680EcosystemGlobal Leadership68Overview82Overview70Introducing young people to cyber8272Growing the talentInternational Engagementfor Real-World Impact74Setting standards, certifyingprofessional practice and assuringservices and products84Influence74Cyber Essentials76Driving professionalisation in cyber security77UK Cyber Security Council79Sharing best practice – and people79Equality, Diversity and Inclusion5
NCSC Annual Review 2021Ministerial ForewordThe past year has been challenging for us all.During Covid-19 we went online to shop, learn,work, and stay in touch with family and friendsmore than ever before. With this huge shifthas come an equally strong effort by criminalgroups to exploit individuals and businesseswith scams. From household goods to vaccineappointments, there have been few avenuescriminals have not tried to exploit.Throughout, the NCSC has delivered realworld impact across the UK and internationally.From protecting our most critical services,building NHS resilience and securing vaccinesupply, to supporting individuals and stoppingopportunistic cyber criminals, to working withlike-minded international partners at the G7and NATO on the most pressing cyber issues,the NCSC continues to lead the way in seekingto make the UK the safest place to live andwork online.This year’s annual review demonstrates theincredible work and commitment of the NCSCto tackle these threats, strengthen the UK’scyber ecosystem and bolster our cyber security.Yet it also recognises there remains much moreto do in particular to grow skills. This year alsomarks the culmination of the 5-year NationalCyber Security Strategy. As we look back,this government and the NCSC can be proudof its achievements in delivering ambitious,world leading policies and services to protectthe UK in cyberspace since 2016.6
IntroductionHowever, cyberspace is continually evolving.As technology and the way people use itchanges, it is vital that cyber remains a priority.The UK must be ready to face these challenges;be more resilient and prepared to compete aswell as co-operate. This is why we are taking anew, comprehensive approach to strengthenour position as a responsible and democraticcyber power. The new National Cyber Strategy(NCS) will help chart the UK’s course through thecyber age, broadening the scope beyond cybersecurity to consider the full range of our cybercapabilities and our approach to cyberspace,and giving greater weight to the underpinningtechnologies and the international environment.The NCS will take a whole of society approachto cyber, which is underpinned by our valuesand alliances. Government, industry and thepublic, in partnership, have an importantrole in helping make the UK and the lives andlivelihoods of its people resilient to the threats,and ready for the opportunities ahead.The Rt Hon Steve Barclay, MP.Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancasterand Minister for the Cabinet Office7
NCSC Annual Review 2021CEO ForewordI am delighted to present the fifth AnnualReview of the National Cyber Security Centre,a part of GCHQ. Since becoming theorganisation’s Chief Executive Officer in October2020, I have been immensely proud of the workthe NCSC has done – and this review reflectsan impressive year of delivery.Over the last 12 months, the NCSC has playeda key role in managing significant events andtaken action to make the UK a safer place tolive and work online. A particular highlight hasbeen the work that the NCSC did to support theCovid-19 vaccine roll out. The NCSC dealt with777 incidents – an increase on last year –of which 20% were linked to the health sectorand vaccines.One of the trends that the NCSC has seenover the last year was a worrying growthin criminal groups using ransomware toextort organisations. In my view it is now themost immediate cyber security threat to UKbusinesses and one that I think should behigher on the boardroom agenda.An international supply-chain data breachemanating from a compromise of SolarWindswas one of the most significant incidentsthat the NCSC dealt with over the last year.This attack involved one of the world’s mostpopular IT system management platformsbeing breached by the Russian ForeignIntelligence Service and is an importantreminder of the need for organisations to beresilient if one of their suppliers is affected.8
IntroductionBut we haven’t just spent the last year simplydefending against attacks – the NCSC hasalso taken proactive steps that will make ourcountry thrive in the digital age more safelyin the decades to come.We have continued to roll out the NCSC’s ActiveCyber Defence Services. This included launchingthe Early Warning Service, to alert organisationsto emerging threats, and the increasing successof the Suspicious Email Reporting Service, whichallows the public to report potential scams.The latter is run in partnership with the City ofLondon Police, and since its launch in April 2020has received more than 7.25 million reportsfrom the public, with almost 60,000 scams takendown as a result.A big part of the NCSC’s mission involvessharing and collaborating with organisationsand the public. In the last year we have workedwith a range of sectors – from education tofarming, sport to Critical National Infrastructure– to provide bespoke advice on becoming moreresilient. And we also launched GCHQ’s firstTV advertising campaign – directly engagingthe British public with advice on how they canincrease their cyber security.I would like to thank everybody who has helpedto make the UK as safe from cyber threats aspossible over the last year. It is truly a teameffort between the NCSC, government, lawenforcement, business and the public that helpsto ensure all of the UK can make the most of thedigital age and the opportunities it offers us all.Lindy Cameron, CEO of the National CyberSecurity Centre9
NCSC Annual Review 2021NCSC Overview andYear Five highlights The NCSC was established in 2016 to meet theneed for a single focal point in governmentfor cyber security, to improve our nationaldefences and make the UK the safest placeto live and work online. Our Suspicious Email Reporting Service hasreceived 5.4 million reports from the publicof potentially malicious material – leading tothe removal of more than 50,500 scams andmore than 90,100 malicious URLs. In the last 12 months, much of our work hasfocused on surging resources to protect theUK’s response to the Covid-19 response. Up to 3 million additional key workers wereprotected from unintentionally accessingmalicious domains through our ProtectiveDomain Name System service. Our pioneering Active Cyber Defenceprogramme has taken down 2.3 millioncyber-enabled commodity campaigns –including 442 phishing campaigns using NHSbranding and 80 illegitimate NHS apps hostedand available to download outside of officialapp stores. When attacks have got through, we haveoffered support to 777 significant incidents–up from 723 the previous year – with around20% of organisations supported linked to thehealth sector and vaccines. For example, we helped the University ofOxford’s Covid-19 vaccine researchersprotect themselves from an attemptedransomware attempt with the potentialto cause significant disruption to the UK’spandemic response.10This included over 1,000 new organisationswithin the Health and Social Care sector. Of course, our work hasn’t just been aboutthe pandemic this year. We have engagedwith around 5,000 organisations and issuedguidance and threat assessments to 80companies and 14 universities. In our attempt to increase the pipeline of skillsand diversity of the cyber security profession,we have introduced more than 56,000 11-to17 year olds to the world of tech and cybersecurity through our CyberFirst programme– including around 6,500 pupils from 600schools to the CyberFirst Girls competition.
NCSC Annual Review 2021Sir Jeremy FlemingLife today is dependent on technology.The hard definition between online and thereal world is blurring. This Annual Reviewshows why world class cyber security,enabled by the expertise of the NCSC as partof GCHQ, continues to be vital to the UK’ssafety and prosperity.The cyber threat continues to grow. The pastyear saw the cyber attack on Microsoft, linkedto a Chinese state-backed threat actor,and the SolarWinds attack, attributed to Russia’sForeign Intelligence Service. Two of the mostserious global cyber incidents we’ve seen inrecent years.In the UK there was an increase in the scaleand severity of ransomware attacks, targetingall sectors from businesses to public services.In response, the NCSC has identified andmitigated numerous threats, whethercommitted by sophisticated state actors,organised criminal groups or lone offenders.12
IntroductionOf course, coronavirus continues to shapewhat we see. Cyber criminals are still exploitingthe pandemic, while hostile states shifted theircyber operations to steal vaccine and medicalresearch. The NCSC worked across the fournations to protect those involved in the UK’sresponse, including the NHS, medical researchand the vaccine supply chain. The NCSC’simpact has been substantial and far reachingat a time of global crisis.The Government’s investment in cyber securitymeans we know much more about thechanging threats the country faces today thanwe did five years ago, when the NCSC was setup. And we are looking ahead too. We can seetechnology leadership is shifting eastwards.The key technology we will rely on for futureprosperity and security won’t necessarilyhave democratic values at its core. We willwork with partners around the world to helpthe UK and allies face this moment of reckoning.Sir Jeremy Fleming, Director GCHQ13
NCSC Annual Review 2021NCSC Timeline 2020-202119 OctoberUK and partnerscondemned GRUcyber attacksagainst Tokyo 202023 NovemberNCSC issuedfresh guidancefor onlineshoppers aheadof Black Fridayand CyberMondaySeptemberOctoberNovember21 OctoberBritish RetailConsortiumlaunched theCyber ResilienceToolkit for Retail5 OctoberLindy Camerontook over as ChiefExecutive Officerof the NCSC1426 FebruaryCyber Aware’sCyber ActionPlan launched,a selfassessmenttool for soletradersand microbusinesses202120201 SeptemberUK joined internationalallies in issuing cyberdefence advice aimedat helping organisationsstay safe from maliciouscyber actors15 DecemberNine universitiesrecognisedas AcademicCentres ofExcellence inCyber SecurityEducation(ACE-CSE)DecemberJanuary22 DecemberFirst-ever cybersecurity advicefor farmersreleased4 DecemberCyber Aware TV andonline marketingcampaign launchedFebruary
Introduction26 AprilPupils atHighgate School,London crownedchampionsof the NCSC’sCyberFirst GirlsCompetition15 MarchEarly YearsPractitionersGuidancepublishedMarch26 MarchLindy Cameronwarned, in herinaugural speechas CEO, thatcyber securityis still not takenas seriouslyas it shouldbe, and is notembedded inboardroomthinking.25 MayNCSC launchedCyberSprinters,an online cybersecurity gamefor children11 JuneNCSC forStartupsannounced14 JuneCEO gaveRUSI AnnualSecurityLecture onransomware29 AprilInternationalRansomwareTask Forcereport publishedApril15 AprilUK and USattributedSolarWindscompromiseto Russiabasedactions.May19 JulyUK andallies heldChinese stateresponsiblefor pervasivepattern ofhackingJune10 MayFourth ActiveCyber Defencereport published11-12 MayCYBERUK 2021took place online11 MayNCSC’s EarlyWarningservice launched,a free servicedesigned to helporganisations12 AugustSERS Office365 reportingbuttonlaunchedJulyAugust11 May10 Steps toCyber Securityguidancepublished19-22 JulyCEO made firstinternationalvisit at Tel AvivCyber Week12 MayCyberEssentialsReadinessTool launcheda free onlineresourcethat helpsorganisationsprepare forcertification20 JulyReport publishedby the OversightBoard of theHuawei CyberSecurity EvaluationCentre (HCSEC)15
The ThreatHow the NCSC assesses, responds to,disrupts and deters cyber threats16
17
NCSC Annual Review 2021The ThreatThe cyber threat to the UK and its alliescontinued to grow and evolve this year: fromindiscriminate phishing scams against massvictims, to ransomware attacks against publicand private organisations, to targeted hostileacts against critical national infrastructureand government.brought about an acceleration in digitisation,with businesses and local governmentincreasingly moving services online andessential services relying ever more on cloud ITprovision. This has broadened the surface areafor attacks and has often made cyber securitymore challenging for organisations.While the threats came from a range of actorsusing an array of methods, they had one thingin common; they led to real-world impact.Life savings were stolen, critical and sensitivedata was compromised, healthcare and publicservices were disrupted, and food and energysupplies were affected.In response the NCSC built on the experiencesof last year in protecting sectors respondingto the pandemic, including the NHS (acrossall four nations), medical research, vaccinemanufacturers and distributors, encouragingthem to take up the services available torespond to threats to their security.In the past 12 months the NCSC continued,in partnership with law enforcement, tomonitor, counter and mitigate the threat,whether committed by sophisticated stateactors, organised criminal groups or low-leveloffenders. This section describes the keythreats, who was behind them and how theNCSC responded.The compromise of the software companySolarWinds and the exploitation of MicrosoftExchange Servers highlighted the threat fromsupply chain attacks. These sophisticatedattacks, which saw actors target less-secureelements - such as managed service providersor commercial software platforms - in thesupply chain of economic, government andnational security institutions were two of themost serious cyber intrusions ever observedby the NCSC.Covid-19 continued to shape the cybersecurity landscape. Cyber criminals continuedto exploit the pandemic as an opportunity, whilehostile states shifted their cyber operations tosteal vaccine and medical research, and toundermine other nations already hamperedby the crisis. The pandemic has alsoIn March 2021, Microsoft announced that fourzero-day vulnerabilities in Microsoft ExchangeServers were being actively exploited withat least 30,000 organisations reportedlycompromised in the US alone, affecting manymore worldwide. In July the NCSC assessed thisattack was highly likely to have been initiatedand exploited by a Chinese state-backed threatactor, with the objective of enabling large-scaleespionage, including the acquisition of personaldata and intellectual property.The SolarWinds attack enabled the onwardcompromises of multiple US governmentdepartments, and the British cloud and emailsecurity firm Mimecast, among other victims.In April the NCSC assessed that Russia’sForeign Intelligence Service (SVR) was highlylikely to have been responsible for the attack.18
The ThreatRansomware became the most significantcyber threat facing the UK this year. Due tothe likely impact of a successful attackon essential services or critical nationalinfrastructure, it was assessed as potentiallyharmful as state-sponsored espionage.In 2020 the NCSC observed the evolvingmodel of criminals exfiltrating data beforeencrypting victim networks; data which theythen threatened to leak unless the ransomwas paid (known as double extortion).Ransomware gained increased public attentionfollowing attacks on Colonial Pipeline in theUS, which supplied fuel to the East Coast, andagainst the Health Service Executive in Ireland.In the UK there was an increase in the scaleand severity of ransomware attacks. HackneyBorough Council suffered significant disruptionto services – leading to IT systems being downfor months and property purchases within theborough delayed. Attacks this year were acrossthe economy, targeting businesses, charities,the legal profession and public services in theeducation, local government and health sectors.Among other ransomware incidents investigatedwas a major attack on the American softwarefirm Kaseya. In July, the NCSC helped toidentify and support British victims after theFlorida-based company was infiltrated by ahacking group, which seized troves of data anddemanded 70m ( 51.5m) in cryptocurrencyfor its return.The NCSC welcomed international efforts intackling ransomware when it was discussedat the G7 meeting of world leaders in Cornwall,underlining the need for co-ordinatedmultilateral attention.clear that many of the organised crime gangslaunching ransomware attacks against westerntargets were based in Russia.China remained a highly sophisticated actorin cyberspace with increasing ambition toproject its influence beyond its borders and aproven interest in the UK’s commercial secrets.How China evolves in the next decade willprobably be the single biggest driver of theUK’s future cyber security.While less sophisticated than Russia and China,Iran and North Korea continued to use digitalintrusions to achieve their objectives, includingthrough theft and sabotage.“We will work with the FCDO to put cyber powerat the heart of the UK’s foreign policy agenda,strengthening our collective security, ensuringour international commercial competitiveadvantage and shaping the debate on thefuture of cyberspace and the internet.“We will need to reinforce our core alliancesand lead a compelling campaign aimed atmiddle-ground countries to build strongercoalitions for deterrence and counter thespread of digital authoritarianism. This willinvolve better connecting our overseasinfluence to our domestic strengths, leveragingour operational and strategic communicationsexpertise, thought leadership, tradingrelationships and industrial partnershipsas a force for good.”Lindy Cameron, NCSC’s CEOGlobal threat actorsThe NCSC continued its work with global partnersto detect and disrupt shared threats, the mostconsistent of these emanating from Russia andChina. In addition to the direct cyber securitythreats posed by the Russian state, it became19
NCSC Annual Review 2021Cyber Threat 2021Ransomware and supplychains as an attack vectorwere prominent in the UK’scyber threat landscape.Double ExtortionIn 2020, criminals soughtto exfiltrate data beforeencrypting victim networks,data which they thenthreatened to leak unlessthe ransom was paid(so-called doubleextortion). This has nowbecome routine.Supply chains in which managedservice providersoperate - are basedon trusted relationships.Compromises providedaccess to betterprotected targetsin multiple sectors.Ransomwaregained increasingpublic notorietythrough attacksagainst:This threat is not new butSolarWinds and MicrosoftExchange Servers wereparticularly high-impactoperations.Colonial Pipeline, USHealth ServiceExecutive, IrelandIn the UK, educationhas been among thetop sectors targeted.Ransomware threatof leaking stolen datais almost certain to grow.Further UK victims ofthis dual-crime arehighly likely.Supply chain incidentshighlight the viability,effectiveness andglobal reach of supplychain operations as ameans of compromisingcomparatively welldefended targets.Further such operationsare almost certain overthe next 12 months.Visualisation of the core threat in 2021, which focused on ransomware and supply chains20The SolarWinds compromiseenabled onward accessto multiple US governmentdepartments, Mimecast(the UK cloud and emailsecurity firm) and manyother victims. NCSC assessesthat Russia’s ForeignIntelligence Service (SVR)was highly likely responsible.Open source reportingindicates that 30,000organisations werecompromised in the USalone from zero-dayvulnerabilities in MicrosoftExchange Servers. NCSCassesses that it was highlylikely initiated and exploitedby a Chinese State-backedactor. It was highly likelyin support of a large-scaleespionage operation.
The ThreatReal-World ImpactThe real-world impact of these attacks inthe UK and around the world was stark:food supplies were affected, local fuel pricesincreased, citizens were denied access topublic services, at-risk children’s details werelost and the costs to businesses and publicfunds ran into hundreds of millions of pounds.In July the Irish Health Service Executiveannounced the recovery costs from an attackin May would be 600m ( 442m), while HackneyBorough Council estimated in February it wouldcost approximately 10m to recover from acyber breach in 2020.As part of the wider intelligence community,the NCSC has a role in identifying threat actors,and attributing – in partnership with thegovernment – their malign activity. Attributioncontinued to be an important part of cyberdeterrence, with perpetrators identified andtheir actions exposed.Due to the interconnected nature of cyberspacemost major attacks carried out overseascaused an impact in the UK. The NCSCsupported those organisations affected withguidance and tools to help prevent compromise,or to recover systems and services.While high-profile ransomware attacksattracted public attention, it was not just globalcorporations or Critical National Infrastructure(CNI) affected by the cyber threat this year.According to the DCMS Cyber Security BreachesSurvey published in March, 39% of all UKbusinesses (that’s 2.3m) reported a cyberbreach or attack in 2020/21, compoundingan already difficult year for many SMEs.Image credit: ink drop - stock.adobe.com21
NCSC Annual Review 2021Supply Chain AttacksSolarWindsIn April 2021 the NCSC, together with itssecurity counterparts in the US, revealedfor the first time that Russia’s ForeignIntelligence Service (SVR) was behindone of the most serious cyber intrusionsof recent times, an attack on the popularSolarWinds IT management platform.The Protective Domain Name Systemallowed the NCSC to immediatelyidentify historical evidence of compromiseof customer organisations, while the HostBased Capability service provided the abilityto build a more detailed view of affecteddevices and activity on customer networks.This major attribution came five monthsafter the first warning by the NCSC thatSolarWinds had been compromisedand could be used for further attackson connected systems.The NCSC was able to identify whichorganisations and sectors were affectedto help further the investigation, and tohelp make contact and provide technicaladvice and support.A US cybersecurity firm, FireEye, foundthat an attacker had been able to adda malicious modification to SolarWindsOrion products which allowed them tosend administrator-level commandsto any affected installation. The NCSC,working with colleagues in the US andacross industry, investigated the impactof this incident.Investigators assessed that it was highlylikely that the SVR was responsible forthe attack and subsequent targeting.At the same time a technical advisory withmitigation advice was issued by the NCSC,in partnership with the US National SecurityAgency (NSA), Department of HomelandSecurity’s Cybersecurity InfrastructureSecurity Agency (CISA) and the FBI.When the attack became apparent,NCSC analysts used data from ACD servicesto estimate the extent of the incident,inform decision-makers in government,and support affected organisations.22
The ThreatSupply Chain AttacksMicrosoft ExchangeResearch and analysis carried out by theNCSC enabled the UK Government in July2021 to call out Chinese state-backed actorsfor gaining access to computer networksaround the world via Microsoft Exchangeservers in what is the most significant andwidespread cyber intrusion against the UKand allies ever observed by the NCSC.NCSC experts assessed the attack washighly likely to enable large-scale espionage,including acquiring personally identifiableinformation and intellectual property. It wasreported that at least 30,000 organisationswere compromised in the US alone, withmany more affected worldwide.As part of a UK Government response, theNCSC issued tailored advice to over 70affected organisations to enable them tomitigate the effects of the compromise.The NCSC used its technical understandingof the Chinese cyber threat to inform theattribution and the subsequent multi-lateralefforts when the UK joined 38 partners,including the Five Eyes, NATO, the EU andJapan, to attribute variously HAFNIUM,APT31 and/or APT 40 to the Chinese state.Acts included the targeting of maritimeindustries and naval defence contractorsin the US and Europe, and targeting offoreign democratic institutions, includingthe Finnish parliament in 2020.“The attack on MicrosoftExchange servers wasanother serious exampleof a malicious actby Chinese statebacked actors incyberspace. This kind ofbehaviour is completelyunacceptable andalongside our partnerswe will not hesitate tocall it out when we see it.”Paul Chichester, NCSC’s Directorof Operations23
NCSC Annual Review 2021IncidentManagementWhile the NCSC does all it can to preventattacks in the first place, it works continuouslywith its partners to respond to breaches,while helping victims to recover. The NCSC’soperations and incident response team,which works closely with law enforcementand intelligence partners, handled highvolumes of incidents as well as majorattacks that affected thousands of victims.Incident Management response model:NCSC becomesaware of incidentNCSC triageincidentNCSC supportvictimX-HMGcoordinationIncident closure& insight sharing NCSC’s 24/7incidentmanagementfunction Initial engagementwith the victim tofully understandthe incident Deliver effectivereal world responseto minimise harm Incident is reportedto NCSC by victim Determine iffurther responsemerited and aticket assigned Lead the NationalIncident Responseincluding liaisingwith:– Whitehall– Law Enforcement– Industry– internationalpartners Alongside NCSCResilience team,provide aftercareand inform “Lessonslearned” for widerUK resilienceOR Incident is reportedto NCSC by partnerorganisationOR Incident is detectedby NCSC A preliminarydecision on thecategorisationof the incident Determine whetherNCSC support isappropriate Facilitate thetechnical responseto an incident,drawing on X-NCSCteams including– Industry partners– Technicalspecialists– Communications Work with lawenforcementin supportof a criminalinvestigationIt was a record year for incidents dealt withby the NCSC. The team managed 777 incidents,another increase on the previous record,breaking 723 total from last year. NCSCsupported the NHS during 8 high severityalerts from April 2020 to March 2021.This year’s total means that since the NCSCcommenced operations in 2016, the organisationhas co-ordinated the UK’s response to a total of3,305 incidents (annual totals of 590, 557, 658,723 and 777). Several incidents came onto theNCSC’s radar proactively, through the expert24 To manage theincident andensure coherenceof response Provide incidentinsight to informWhitehall policy Develop exercising& red teaming torespond effectivelyto similar incidentsin futurework of its threat operations and assessmentsteams. Many others were raised by victims ofmalicious cyber activity.While the NCSC has world-leading capabilitiesin identifying, confronting and responding tocyber threats and deterring those responsiblefor them, it is just as important to improvedefences to stop attacks getting through in thefirst place, and when they do, that organisationsare better able to recover and limit the impact.The next chapter will describe how the NCSC ishelping to create
The ThreatRansomwareEver evolving threatIn the last Annual Review, the NCSC set out howthe ransomware model had shifted from notonly withholding data but threatening to publishit as well. This year the model has developed
The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), a part of GCHQ, is the UK's technical authority for cyber security. Since the NCSC was created in 2016 as part of the Government's National Cyber Security Strategy, it has worked to make the UK the safest place to live and work online. This Review of its fifth year looks at some of
NCSC Zero Trust Archite cture De sign Principle s For more detaile d informat ion from t he NCSC s e e h ps://www.ncs c.gov.uk/colle ct ion/zero-trust-archite cture 1 - Know your archite cture, including us ers, device s, s er vice s and data In order to get t he benets from zero trust, you ne e d to understand each comp onent of your archite .
California Service Center: csc-ncsc-followup@dhs.gov Vermont Service Center: vsc.ncscfollowup@dhs.gov Nebraska Service Center: NSCFollowup.NCSC@uscis.dhs.gov Texas Service Center: tsc.ncscfollowup@dhs.gov If you do not receive a response within 21 days of emailing the service center, you mayFile Size: 784KBPage Count: 5
August 2, 2021 15 August 2, 2021 16 August 2, 2021 17 August 3, 2021 18 August 4, 2021 19 August 5, 2021 20 August 6, 2021 21 August 9, 2021 22 August 9, 2021 23 August 9, 2021 24 August 10, 2021 25 August 11, 2021 26 August 12, 2021 27 August 13, 2021 28 August 16, 2021 29 August 16, 2021 30 August 16, 2021 31
Dec 16, 2021 · 21102001-MP Emerson Board of Education: Annual Review 13032108-NM Borough of Franklin Lakes: Annual Review 09101505-MP Borough of Eatontown: Annual Review 17060803-MP Township of Parsippany Troy-Hills: Annual Review 06031602-MF County of Passaic County Clerk eFiling: Annual Review 12021604-NM County of Passaic: Annual Review
SPEAKERS’ BIOGRAPHIES Updated 01/06/2017 Matt Carus, NCSC – NFV Security Tutorial Matt is a Security Researcher for NCSC and prior to that worked for CESG. He has more than 10 years' experience in Networking and Infrastructure Engineering and now focuses on security topics in cloud infrastructures. He
specific set of outcomes. Each organisation assessing the NCSC Cloud principles will have different security needs and therefore the importance of each principle will vary accordingly. This document aims to provide the reader an assertion against each of the 14 Principles in the context of the cloud hosted elemen
National Cement Share Company Page 5 Management) strategy. 3. Phases of the NCSC's Marketing Strategy The NCSC's Marketing and Strategy will be organized in two phases, i.e.: (a) 'Geographic' phase: the preliminary domestic and overseas mapping of the 'supply and 'demand side', (b). 'Sectoral' phase --- the in-depth analysis of sectors from the supply and demand point of view
Have a brain storming session where they generate 10-15 themes. (Be patient, they'll get there eventually.) After they generate the list, allow people to talk in behalf of specific ideas Sometimes they may combine items Give everyone 3 votes and go through the list voting. If there is a clear winner then proceed. Otherwise repeat the process, but with one vote. Post the chosen theme .
