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DOCUMENT RESUMEED 332 607AUTHORTITLEPUB DATENOTEPUB TYPEEDRS PRICEDESCRIPTORSHE 024 568Barrow, Clyde W.The Theory of Capitalist Regulation and theDevelopment of American Higher Education.Apr 9135p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of theAmerican Educational Research Association (Chicago,IL, April 3-7, 1991).Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Viewpoints(Opinion/Position Papers, Essays, etc.) (120)MF01/PCO2 Plus Postage.*Capitalism; Cultural Influences; Economic Factors;*Educational Change; *Educational Development;*Educational History; Governance; Higher Education;*Marxian Analysis; Po'.tical InfluencesABSTRACTThis paper outlines a neomarxist theoreticalframework for interpreting the history of American higher education.It argues that one can best explain the development of Americanhigher institutions as part of a theory of capitalist development,because higher institutions are generally dependent on externalpatronage and, therefore, on the capitalist class. Drawing onAgliettes "theory of capitalist regulation," the paper suggests thatthe competitive, corporate, and state-capitalist phases ofdevelopment have each resulted in a different structural form ofhigher education. Each structural form is characterized by its owntypes of governance, administration, curriculum, and teaching linkedto the economic, cultural, and political interests of an ascendantsegment of the capitalist class. Contains 55 rE.:rences. *****************************Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be madefrom the original ******************************

THE THEORY OF CRPITALIST REGULATIONAND TEE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATIONClyde W. BarrowDepartment of Political ScienceSoutheastern Massachusetts UniversityNorth Dartmouth, Massachusetts 02747"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THISMATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BYClyde W. BarrowU.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONOfIrre of Educatow Research And improvementEDUCATIONAL RESOURCES tNEORMATIONtrCENTER tERICNSdocument has been rePrOduced aseceived from the Nilson or otOmmulf ionoriginating itMinor eherntelt etsve been made to improvereproduction QualityTO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCESINFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."Point of vrenv or opinions stated irt thiS docu-ment do not neceUarily repretutnt offrciifOE RI position or policyDelivered at the Annual Meeting of the American EducationalResearch Association, Held at Chicago, Illinois, April 3-7, 1991BEST COPY HARAREP.

ABSTRACTThe Theory of Capitalist Regulationand the Development of American Higher EducationThe paper outlines a neomarxist thaoretical framework forinterpreting the history of American higher education.Theauthor argues that one can best explain the development ofAmerican higher institutions as part of a theory of capitalistdevelopment, because higher institutions are generally dependenton external patronage and, therefore, on the capitalist class.Drawing on Aglietta/s "theory of capitalist regulation," theauthor suggests that a competitive, corporate, and statecapitalist phase of development have each resulted in a differentstructural form of higher education.Each structural form ischaracterized by its own types of governance, administration,curriculum, and teaching linked to the economic, cultural, andpolitical interests of an ascendant segement of the capitalistclass.

1THE THEORY 07 CAPITALIST REGULATION AND MX DEVELOPMENT OFAMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATIONThe Concept of Financial HegemonyA radical historiography of higher education was firstsuggested by Karl Marx and Frederich Engels inns GermanIdeoloay.Marx and Engels pointed out that the full-time pursuitof intellectual activities depends on the ability to secureaccess to a "material means of mental production."In otherwords, the economic foundation of a college or university is itsability to pay salaries, support libraries, build classrooms, andprovide research funds to its scholars.However, it is a simplefact that colleges and universities have never been financiallyself-sufficient.Indeed, as Roger L. Geiger has recently noted,all higher institutions have "ultimately had to depend uponexternal sources of patronage.2It is hardly controversial in this context to observe thatinsofar as private capital is the chief source of wealth in acapitalist society, it is also likely to be the chief source ofpatronage.However, it is no doubt more controversial to arguethat virtually everything which goes on in a college oruniversity, therefore, depends upon the presence and continuityof the capital accumulation process.3Nevertheless, the mainthesis of a neorarxist historiography is that because higherinstitutions are generally dependent on the capital accumulationprocess, one can best explain the development of American higher

2institutions as part of a theory of capitalist development.Morespecifically, neomrxist theory predicts that under normalcircumstances "the class which has the means of materialproduction at its disposal has control at the same time over themeans of mental production" and this ability to control patronagewill enable an economically dominant class to "regulate theproduction and distribution of the ideas of their age."4The Theory of Capitalist RegulationNeomarxist economists have often observed that besides thenormal business cycle associated with short-term booms and busts,capitalisi,, economies undergo patterns of expansion known as long-waves of capital accumulation.5Unlike the peaks and valleys ofthe normal business cycle, longwaves are characterized by severaldecades of robust and profitable economic expansion.Paul A.Baran and Paul M. Sweezy argue that each long-wave of capitalistdevelopment has been fueled by the introduction of an "epochmaking innovation" that revolutionizes productionand creates newopportunities for profitable investment;first, the cotton gin,next the railroad, followed by the automobile and, finally, thecomputer.6Ultimately, however, each phase of capitalistdevelopment grinds to an end as the rate of profit on newinvestments starts to fall.7However, the "regulationist schoolft of neomarxist theory hasrecently begun to point out that each longwave is also supportedby an interconnected matrix of social and political institutions

3called a "regime of accumulation."The regulationists haveemphasized that while epoch-making innovations may fuel longwavesof capitalist development, the process of capital accumulationcan be sustained only to the extent that cultural values, formsof business organization, government policy, law, and educationalprocesses are compatible with the requirements of each phase inthe accumulation process.8In this respect, the "non-economic"institutions of society "regulate" the historical process ofcapitalist development bu maintaining or altering patterns ofdomination by the capitalist class.9Three regimes of accumulation have been identified in theUnited States, with each regime marked by the hegemonicascendancy of a particular type of capitalist.10A competitiveregime, in which merchant capital was ascendant, existed from1815 to the mid-1890s.The competitive mode of accumulation wascentered on small enterprises utilizing a craft-based laborprocess and producing mainly for local markets.During thisperiod, economic expansion was primarily linked to populationgrowth and the westward migration." A corporate regime,centered in the hegemonic ascendancy of industrial capital,assumed dominance from the 1890s until the end of World War II.The corporate mode of accumulation was characterized by theemergence of monopolistic industrial enterprises, standardizedlimas production, and the Taylorization of labor processes.During this period, economic growth was sustained by therationalization of enterprises and by the planned expansion ofconsumer demand.12Finally, from World War II to present, the1i

4hegemony of finance capital was institutionalized in a statecapitalist regime.The state-capitalist mode of accumulation hasbeen structured, first, on a partnership between government andmonopoly capital and, second, on a series of historic "accords"or class compromises emboddied in institutions such ais peacefulcollective bargaining.During this period, economic growth hasbeen increasingly sustained by state spending on militaryprocurements and state subidies to offset the rising costs ofprivate sector production.13An "accumulation crisis" always marks the prelude to atransition from one regime of accumulation to another stage ofcapitalist development.14As with long-waves, David Kotzemphasizes that accumulation crises are more than short-termdeclines in business profitably.An accumulation crisis, asconceived by regulationist theory, is a long-term structuralcrisis that "involves a significant reduction in the rate ofaccumulation over a prolonged period of time."15The movement toinstitutionalize a new accumulation regime is thus theculmination of a significant long-term tendency for the rate ofprofit to fall.A key hypothesis of regulationist theory is that as the modeof accumulation changes, (e.g., from competitive to corporate),non-economic institutions (i.e., the superstructure) which oncesupported the process of capital accumulation and class hegemonyeventually become fetters on the process of capitalistdevelopment.Thus, the theory of capitalist regulation explainsaccumulation crises primarily as the result of emerging

5disjunctures between the changing structural requirements ofcapitalist accumulation and the organization or policies ofsupporting institutions such as government and education.As aresult, newly ascendant fractions of the capitalist class findthat social institutions (e.g., the family), culturalorientations (e.g., consumerism), governmental institutions, andeducational policies must all be reconstructed to catalyze andsupport a new long-wave of economic growth.Consequently,business leaders not only reconstruct the existing forms ofbusiness organization and create new labor processes, they alsoinitiate movements to redesign the supporting cultural,political, and social institutions necessary to sustain a newmode of accumulation.It should be emphasized that the reestablishment of afulctional relation between capital accumulation and supportinginstitutions never occurs automatically nor, therefore, withoutorganized resistance both from competing classes and decliningfractions of capital.The interests of antagonistic classes,such as labor or agriculture, compete for hegemonic ascendancy byseeking to reconstruct the same (or alternative) political,cultural, and social institutions.Likewise, declining fractionsof capital, as well as declining classes, seek to preserve theirwaning hegemony by defending institutions that obstruct theemergence a new accumulation regime.Consequently, accumulationcrises tend to produce intense periods of class struggle thatextend across a wide field of economic, political, and culturalinstitutions.In this sense, the regulationists argue, one

6cannot explain the historical development of those same social,political, and cultural institutions without analyzing theirhistorical relation to the capital accumulation process and,hence, to the processes of class formation and class struggle.18Capitalist Regulation and Higher rduoationThe history of American higher institutions can be linked tothe general process of capitalist development in two ways.First, as Thorstein Veblen observes, a university consists "ofmature scholars and scientists, the faculty - with whatever plantand other equipment may incidentally serve as appliances fortheir work."17In this respect, the college or universityestablishes both an economic and a legal relationship between asociety's "intellectuals" and the tangible property necessary toengage in full-time intellectual pursuits.Adam Smith notes that as a historical institution, thecollege and university originated in the craft-based laborprocesses of the medieval guilds.Indeed, in The Wealth ofpations, Smith observes that all incorporations -- whether ofscholars, bakers, smiths, or tailors -- "were anciently calleduniversities, which indeed is the proper Latin name for anyincorporation whatever."18Although this concept of theuniversity was imported from Europe, and even advocated in someearly legal disputes, the Dartmouth College Case (1816)established that the American college was a modern corporationand not a medieval craft guild.18Consequently, the Dartmouth

College case institutionalized "capitalist" property relations byby designating governing boards as the fiduciary trustees (i.e.,"owners") of the college and university.Second, because the accuaulation of capital by a college oruniversity is nearly always dependent upon external patronage,higher institutions must orient their activities towardfulfilling the higher educational requirements of the dominantaccumulation regime.To the extent that higher institutions aredependent on their ability to attract external capital, ascendantor hegemonic fractions of the capitalist class can utilize theirpatronage as leverage to construct higher institutions thatfacilitate a particular accumulation regime.Hence, thedevelopment of American higher education can be explained both interms of the internal operational requirements of each mode ofaccumulation and by its institutional role in sustaining eachaccumulation regime.Therefore, it is my contention that a specific structuralhum of higher education is linked to each of the threeaccumulation regimes.A structural form is a network of socialrelations, organized through institutions, that are thehistorical products of class struggle."The college anduniversity institutionalize structural forms of higher educationthat consist of five social relations to production:of accumulation, 2. a governance process, 3.1. a modean administrativeprocess, 4. a curriculum, and 5. a labor process (i.e., teachingand research).Moreover, to the extent that the mode ofaccumulation conditions the other four processes, and is itself

8dependent on the external accumulation regime, the development ofAmerican higher institutions moves in tandem with the developmentof accumulation regimes. 21The mode of accumulation (i.e., competitive, corporate,state-capitalist) constrains the other four processes because oftheir dependence on the accumulation process.22Colleges anduniversities can pursue educational objectives (e.g., curriculumdevelopment) only to the extent that they accumulate thenecessary educational capital.To the extent that educationalcapital must be partly accumulated through patronage, higherinstitutions must depend on the "goodwill" of those classes whocontrol a society's scarce material resources.The financialhegemony this gives to a dominant class, or class fraction,enables them to command a role in the governance of higherinstitutions.Thorstein Veblen observes that the governance process inhigher education consists of two roles.23The fiduciary role ofgovernance is to secure adequate revenue for current operatingexpenses and to allocate that revenue (after fixed costs) tosupport the administrative process and the labor process (i.e.,teaching and research).The ideological role of governance is todefine a college or university mission and to facilitate,supervise, and implement curriculum that achieves this mission.It is important to note that since the production process inhigher education (i.e., curriculum development, teaching, andresearch) is irreducibly "mental," it cannot be "controlled"through the governance or administrative processes.11In other

9words, a board of trustees, a private foundation, or the statecannot directly control the teaching and research that takesplace in a college and university.Certainly, governance andadministrative institutions cannot dictate the subjective thoughtprocesses of individual teachers or scholars.Instead, thegovernance and administrative processes must be understood asmethods for regulating educational production, rather than asmechanisms for directly controlling research and teaching.The regulation of academic production rrAies on acombination of prescriptive reaulators and incentiveregulators.24Prescriptive regulators consist of disciplines andpunishments designed to force individuals to adopt patterns ofconduct that conform to the educational mission of a college oruniversity.The most powerful presciptive regulator isHowever, a variety of disciplinarytermination and expulsion.prescriptions are available short of termination, such as denialof promotion and raises, sabbaticals, and research grants.Whileprescriptive regulators never succeed wholly in regulating theintellectual workforce, they raise the costs associated withdissent and thus minimize the occurrence of "dysfunctional" formsof thought and behavior.Although it is an unpopular idea evenin contemporary marxist theory, academic repression has been aregular feature of American higher education and it continues invarious forms even today.25However, one can only coerce so much compliance throughprescriptive regulators.The fact remains that unlikereorganizing a factory labor process, college governance can

10rarely force people to develop and teach new curriculum or to dospecific types of research.On the other hand, the governanceand administrative processes can can offer institutional,political, and market inducements to encourage or facilitate thedevelopment of the desired curriculum, teaching, and research.These types of incentive regulators include money, security,prestige, and/or the power attached to various activities likecorporate and government consulting.The objective behindinducement regulators is to motivate individuals to work towardsinstitutional ends (as opposed to personal goals) and,ultimately, by an asymmetrical distribution of inducementregulators to institutionalize a process of self-selection wherepersonal motivations and "systemic" goals become identical.Moreover, the recipients of such inducements will naturallyexcell academically because grants, student assistants, releasetime, sabbaticals, and fellowships allow them the time andresources to excell.Therefore, individuals who come tointernalize the institutional mission of a structural form ofhigher education quickly rise through academic and administrativeranks, while those who are denied inducements tend to beeliminated on "purely academic" grounds if not by overtprescription.26In this manner, the governance process enables those whocontrol educational capital to inititiate, facilitate, orobstruct competing forms of administration, curriculumdevelopment, and teaching through asymmetrical allocations ofinducement regulators.Again, it is important to emphasize that13

a process of capitalist regulation does not mean that everyoneassociated with higher education readily complies with the goalsof capitalists, or that everyone pursues a purely economicmotive, but it does mean that counter-tendencies are constrainedin their effectiveness by the financial hegemony and politicaldominance of the capitalist class.27Thus, the regulatorystructure of a higher educational form is "capitalist" to theextent that it confers asymmetrical benefits on students andeducators that serve the interests of the capitalist class, whilemeting out disproportionate prescriptive regulators to those whooppose them.Hence, Ralph Miliband points out that classhegemony is established not by the elimination of competition orclass struggle, but from a pattern of competition that is "sounequal as to give a crushing advantage to one side against theother. 1128Capitalist Development and Higher educationThe theory of capitalist regulation anticipates that oneshould be able to identify three structural forms of highereducation in the United States linked to the three accumulationregimes discussed earlier.Thus, one should be able to perio

HE 024 568. Barrow, Clyde W. The Theory of Capitalist Regulation and the Development of American Higher Education. Apr 91. 35p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (Chicago, IL, April 3-7, 1991). Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Viewpoin

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