CIA Best Practices In Counterinsurgency
CIA Best Practices in CounterinsurgencyWikiLeaks release: December 18, 2014Keywords: CIA, counterinsurgency, HVT, HVD, Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Israel,Peru, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Libya, Pakistan, Thailand,HAMAS,FARC, PULO, AQI, FLN, IRA, PLO, LTTE, al-Qa‘ida, Taliban, drone, assassinationRestraint: SECRET//NOFORN (no foreign nationals)Title: Best Practices in Counterinsurgency: Making High-ValueTargeting Operations an Effective Counterinsurgency ToolDate: July 07, 2009Organisation: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)Author: CIA Office of Transnational Issues; Conflict, Governance, and Society GroupLink: s: 21DescriptionThis is a secret CIA document assessing high-value targeting (HVT) programs world-wide for their impacton insurgencies. The document is classified SECRET//NOFORN (no foreign nationals) and is forinternal use to review the positive and negative implications of targeted assassinations on thesegroups for the strength of the group post the attack. The document assesses attacks on insurgentgroups by the United States and other countries within Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Israel,Peru, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Libya, Pakistan and Thailand. The document, whichis "pro-assassination", was completed in July 2009 and coincides with the first year of the Obamaadministration and Leon Panetta's directorship of the CIA during which the United States verysignificantly increased its CIA assassination program at the expense of capture operations. It produces achart for US officials to use in strategically assessing future operations and methods in HVTassassinations.
SECRET//NOFORN7 July 2009Making High-Value TargetingOperations an EffectiveCounterinsurgency Tool (C//NF)CL BY: 3900238CL REASON: 1.4 (a), (c), (d)DECL ON: 25X1-humanDRV FROM: COL S-06, FORS-06, MIL S-06, HUM S-06OTI IA 2009-037SECRET//NOFORN
SECRET//NOFORNMaking High-Value Targeting Operations anEffective Counterinsurgency Tool (C//NF)Key Findings (U)A CIA review of high-value targeting (HVT) programs worldwideasuggests that HVT operations can play a useful role when they are part of abroader counterinsurgency strategy. HVT operations are most likely tocontribute to successful counterinsurgency outcomes when governmentsdecide on a desired strategic outcome before beginning HVT operations,analyze potential effects and shaping factors, and simultaneously employother military and nonmilitary counterinsurgency instruments. Potential positive strategic effects of HVT operations include erodinginsurgent effectiveness, weakening insurgent will, reducing the level ofinsurgent support, fragmenting or splitting the insurgent group, alteringinsurgent strategy or organization in ways that favor the government, andstrengthening government morale and support. Potential negative effects of HVT operations include increasing the levelof insurgent support, causing a government to neglect other aspects of itscounterinsurgency strategy, altering insurgent strategy or organization inways that favor the insurgents, strengthening an armed group’s bond withthe population, radicalizing an insurgent group’s remaining leaders,creating a vacuum into which more radical groups can enter, andescalating or deescalating a conflict in ways that favor the insurgents. The insurgent group factors that shape the impact of HVT operationsinclude the degree of leadership centralization, succession planning andbench strength, level of visibility, life cycle stage, strength of cause andpopular support, and existence of sanctuary. Several government factors, including the duration and intensity of HVToperations and the choice of HVT method, also affect the outcome ofHVT operations. (C//NF)aWe studied as cases Afghanistan (2001-present), Algeria (1954-62), Colombia (2002-present), Iraq (2004-present),Israel (1972 to mid-1990s, mid-1990s to present), Peru (1980-99), Northern Ireland (1969-98), and Sri Lanka (1983May 2009). We drew additional examples from Chechnya, Libya, Pakistan, and Thailand. (C//NF)iSECRET//NOFORN
SECRET//NOFORNOur study of successful and unsuccessful uses of HVT programs incounterinsurgencies identified several best practices that can be appliedwhen planning or evaluating HVT operations: Identifying Desired Outcome. Because HVT operations can haveunforeseen effects, governments tend to be most successful when they areclear about the desired impact on the insurgent group’s trajectory. Basing Decisions on Knowledge of an Insurgent Group’s InternalWorkings. Governments’ successful use of HVT operations generallydraw on a deep understanding of the targeted group’s internal workingsand specific vulnerabilities, which is usually gained by penetrating thegroup or debriefing defectors. Integrating HVT Operations With Other Elements ofCounterinsurgency Strategy. Governments with effective HVTprograms have integrated them into comprehensive counterinsurgencystrategies, the other elements of which could be adjusted to capitalize onor compensate for the effects produced by HVT operations. Protecting Potential Moderates. Directing HVT operations against themost violent and extremist leaders may increase the likelihood of aneventual political settlement. Many insurgencies have internal divisionsbetween the more militant leaders and those more politically oriented. Capitalizing on Leadership Divisions. Exacerbating or exploitingleadership fissures, for example by co-opting disaffected insurgentleaders, can be as effective as targeting a group’s leadership throughmilitary action. (C//NF)iiSECRET//NOFORN
SECRET//NOFORNScope Note (U)The paper aims to convey lessons learned, provide a framework forevaluating the strategic utility of high-value targeting (HVT) operations,and assist policymakers and military officers involved in authorizing orplanning HVT operations. Most of our source information relies onclandestine and defense attache reporting, discussions with HVTpractitioners, a CIA-sponsored study on HVT operations incounterinsurgencies, and our review of current and historical casestudies. (C//NF)The two previous papers in the “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency”series were OTI IA 2007-087 (Secret//NF), Making InsurgentDefector Programs an Effective Counterinsurgency Tool (C//NF),3 December 2007, and OTI IA 2007-016 (Secret//NF), Improving SecurityForce Conduct (C//NF), 1 February 2007. (C//NF)iiiSECRET//NOFORN
SECRET//NOFORNMaking High-Value TargetingOperations an EffectiveCounterinsurgency Tool (C//NF)Civilian and military leaders of governmentsfighting insurgencies have often turned to highvalue targeting (HVT) operations to achieveobjectives such as damaging an insurgent group bydepriving it of effective direction and experience,deterring future guerrilla actions by demonstratingthe consequences, demoralizing rank-and-filemembers, promoting perceptions of regimeviability in providing security, and imposingpunishments for past acts, according to a CIAreview of HVT programs worldwide. In evaluatinggovernments’ experiences with HVT programs, westudied the cases of Afghanistan (2001-present),Algeria (1954-62), Colombia (2002-present), Iraq(2004-present), Israel (1972 to mid-1990s, mid1990s to present), Peru (1980-99), NorthernIreland (1969-98), and Sri Lanka (1983May 2009). We drew additional examples fromChechnya, Libya, Pakistan, and Thailand. (C//NF)High-Value Targeting Defined (C//NF)We define high-value targeting as focusedoperations against specific individuals or networkswhose removal or marginalization shoulddisproportionately degrade an insurgent group’seffectiveness. The criteria for designating highvalue targets will vary according to factors such asthe insurgent group’s capabilities, structure, andleadership dynamics and the government’s desiredoutcome. (C//NF)insurgent support, fragmenting or splitting theinsurgent group, altering insurgent strategyor organization in ways that favor thegovernment, and strengthening governmentmorale and support. Potential negative effects of HVT operationsinclude increasing insurgent support, causing agovernment to neglect other aspects of itscounterinsurgency strategy, provoking insurgentsto alter strategy or organization in ways thatfavor the insurgents, strengthening an armedgroup’s popular support with the population,radicalizing an insurgent group’s remainingleaders, and creating a vacuum into which moreradical groups can enter.Potential Strategic Effects of HVTOperations (C//NF)A review of HVT operations incounterinsurgencies worldwide suggests a range ofpositive and negative potential effects on conflictdynamics. Diverse variables, such as insurgentgroup characteristics and government capabilities,make predicting the consequences of HVToperations difficult. HVT operations may, by eroding the “rules ofthe game” between the government andinsurgents, escalate the level of violence in aconflict, which may or may not be in agovernment’s interest. (C//NF) Potential positive effects of HVT operationsinclude eroding insurgent effectiveness,weakening insurgent will, reducing the level ofThis assessment was prepared by the Office of Transnational Issues. Comments and queries arewelcome and may be directed to the Conflict, Governance, and Society Group, OTI, on (703) 874-5140,93-78867 secure, or SIPRNet email: carneyw@jdiss.cia.sgov.gov. (U)1SECRET//NOFORN
SECRET//NOFORNSecretariat member Ivan Rios was killed by abodyguard, and in May 2008 a veteran FARCcommander and ideologue surrendered.13Impact on InsurgentsEroding Insurgent Effectiveness. HVT operationscan cause greater disruption than a group canabsorb when strikes outpace a group’s ability toreplace its leaders or when the strikes result in theloss of individuals with critical skills such asfinance and logistics—who comprise a finitequantity in any insurgency, according to ourreview. HVT operations typically force remainingleaders to increase their security discipline, whichmay compromise a leader’s effectiveness. Rank-and-file morale also suffered whenHAMAS failed in 2004 to announce the name ofits new leader following the deaths of SheikhYassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, according toan academic terrorism expert.14 (S//NF)Changing the Level of Insurgent Support. Thedeath or capture of key insurgents may lead toreduced domestic or foreign support for the group,as supporters recalculate the insurgent group’schances of winning the conflict and consider thepotential costs of backing the losing side. Such aphenomenon is enhanced when leadership strikescoincide with other counterinsurgency successes. In Colombia, successful HVT strikes againsttop insurgent leaders in early 2008, inconjunction with earlier strikes against secondand third-tier leaders and finance and logisticsspecialists, substantially eroded theRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s(FARC) capabilities, according to clandestine,Colombian National Police, and US Embassy inBogota reporting.1 2 3 4 Malaysia’s arrest in 1998 of four top leaders ofthe southern Thai separatist insurgent groupPattani United Liberation Organization (PULO),in concert with civil-military programs and anexpanded amnesty, led to substantial increases inseparatist defections and a decline in domesticsupport for the group, according to reportingfrom the US Embassy in Bangkok.15 16 17 (C//NF) In Iraq, Jaysh Muhammad (JM) suffered asignificant setback in late 2004 after Britishforces captured the head of JM and hisreplacements in short succession, according tothe Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate.5HVT strikes, however, may increase support forthe insurgents, particularly if these strikes enhanceinsurgent leaders’ lore, if noncombatants are killedin the attacks, if legitimate or semilegitimatepoliticians aligned with the insurgents are targeted,or if the government is already seen as overlyrepressive or violent. Because of the psychologicalnature of insurgency, either side’s actions areless important than how events are perceived bykey audiences inside and outside the country,according to an academic expert oncounterinsurgency.18 Usama bin Ladin’s measures to avoiddetection, including his reliance on lowtechnology communications, his reluctance tomeet with subordinates, and his contentmentwith leading from a sequestered distance viainfrequent contact, have affected his ability tocommand his organization, according to detaineereporting.6 7 8 9 10 11 (S//NF)Weakening Insurgent Will. Leadership losses canerode morale at all levels of the insurgency andreinforce the costs and risks of involvement,especially when no clear succession plan is inplace. The March 2008 death of FARC Secretariatmember Raul Reyes is likely to have seriouslydamaged FARC discipline and morale, evenamong its leadership, according to a CIA fieldcommentary.12 Within a week of Reyes’ death, Israeli HVT efforts from 2000 to 2002strengthened solidarity between terrorist groupsand bolstered popular support for hardlinemilitant leaders, according to US Embassyofficials in Jerusalem and clandestinereporting.19 20 21 22 23 (S//NF)2SECRET//NOFORN
SECRET//NOFORNFragmenting or Splitting the Insurgent Group.The removal or marginalization of unifying leaderscan exacerbate divisions in a group and cause it tofragment. This potential for fragmenting isespecially pronounced when insurgentorganizations are made up of coalitions of groupsor factions.Impact on GovernmentsConducting HVT operations can positively ornegatively affect a government’scounterinsurgency effort, for example bystrengthening the morale of and support for thegovernment or by misdirecting government focus.Because both insurgents and counterinsurgentscommunicate with the wider audience as theyfight, a government may find that HVT successessend a message to the government’s supportersthat the state is taking serious steps to attackthe insurgency. The deaths of two senior Libyan Islamic FightingGroup (LIFG) leaders in a US missile strike inJanuary 2008 are probably hindering the group’smerger with al-Qa‘ida and exacerbating divisionsbetween the LIFG’s North Africa– and Europebased members.24 25 (S//NF) Public support for the Colombian Governmentsolidified in the wake of the killing of FARCSecretariat member Raul Reyes in March 2008,with President Alvaro Uribe’s approval ratingincreasing from the mid-70-percent range to ashigh as 84 percent, according to a US pressreport and a CIA field commentary.30 31 (S//NF)Altering Insurgent Strategy or Organization. Byaltering internal divisions, an HVT program maycause an insurgent group to change its goals andstrategy. For example, degradation of an insurgentgroup’s leadership may lead the group to shiftfrom pursuing political goals to engaging incriminal activity, according to an academic experton counterinsurgency.26HVT operations can capture the attention ofpolicymakers and military planners to the extentthat a government loses its strategic perspective onthe conflict or neglects other key aspects ofcounterinsurgency. Since 2004, the ThaiGovernment’s fixation on targeting southerninsurgent leaders—which in the late 1990s provedeffective against an earlier generation ofinsurgents—has caused Bangkok to misperceivethe decentralized nature of the movement and missopportunities to counter it, according to reportingfrom the US Embassy in Bangkok.32 (C//NF) The Iraqi Government has been using HVTefforts to eliminate irreconcilable Sadrist militantleaders and moderate the Sadrist movement.27 In Chechnya, Russia’s HVT efforts between2002 and 2006 precluded political resolution ofthe conflict and centralized control of theinsurgent movement under jihadist faction leaderShamil Basayev, according to an academicexpert on counterinsurgency.28 (C//NF)Some insurgencies adapt to leadership losses byadopting a decentralized organizational structureand taking other measures to improve operationalsecurity. HVT efforts can force an insurgency withan aboveground political or propaganda wing to gopurely underground to protect its leaders.Diverse Factors Shape the Contributions ofHVT Operations to CounterinsurgencyOutcomes (C//NF)Insurgent group characteristics, such asorganizational structure, and government factors,such as the effectiveness of military andnonmilitary counterinsurgency instruments, shapean insurgent group’s vulnerability to leadershiplosses, according to a review of HVT operationsworldwide. (C//NF) The arrest of four senior PULO leaders in 1998prompted another southern Thai insurgent group,the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate(BRN-C), to decentralize command and controlto improve operational security, according toreporting from the US Embassy inBangkok.29 (C//NF)3SECRET//NOFORN
SECRET//NOFORNLevel of Visibility. Leadership losses may havedifferent effects on insurgent groups usingstrategies requiring a public face than on highlyclandestine groups. The loss of visible publicfigures has wider psychological repercussions thanthe loss of underground leaders, according to anacademic expert on counterinsurgency.51Insurgent Group FactorsStructure. Groups are most susceptible toleadership losses when they are centralized andpersonality driven, according to our study, andorganizations with more decentralized structures,such as HAMAS and al-Qa‘ida, usually have morecapacity to adapt and regenerate after sufferinglosses from HVT operations. Effective insurgentleaders possess a rare combination of initiative,charisma, strategic vision, and communicationsskills, according to former insurgents.33 Since Hizballah and HAMAS carry out state-likefunctions, such as providing health-care services,these groups’ leaders have prominent publicprofiles. The public may have little awareness ofthe leaders of clandestine groups such as AQI,which exercise limited parallel governanceroles. (C//NF) The Taliban’s military structure blends a topdown command system with an egalitarianAfghan tribal structure that rules byconsensus, making the group more able towithstand HVT operations, according toclandestine and US military reporting.34 35 36 37 38Life Cycle Stage. Insurgencies, like otherorganizations, are more fragile and moredependent on a few individuals during theirformative stage—or late in their life cycle whenthey are in decline—than during their maturemiddle stage, according to an academic expert oncounterinsurgency.52 (C//NF)39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Like al-Qa‘ida networks outside Iraq, al-Qa‘idain Iraq (AQI) as of late 2008 delegatedconsiderable operational control to local leaders,a practice that, until early 2007, allowed AQI toweather leadership losses such as the death ofAbu-Musab al-Zarqawi, according to clandestineand US diplomatic reporting.46 47 48Cause and Popular Support. An insurgent group’sunifying cause, deep ties to its constituency, or abroad support base can lessen the impact ofleadership losses by ensuring a steady flow ofreplacement recruits, according to academicexperts on counterinsurgency.53 54 HAMAS’shighly disciplined nature, social service network,and reserve of respected leaders allowed itto reorganize after the killing of leadersSheikh Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi in2004, according to the International CrisisGroup.55 56 (C//NF) Peru’s Shining Path, which was highlycentralized and based on a cult of personality,could not recover from the 1992 capture offounder Abimael Guzman and most of thegroup’s senior leaders. (S//NF)Succession Planning and Bench Strength.Insurgent groups’ succession planning, breadth anddepth of military and political competence, andability to elevate promising commanders throughtheir ranks contribute to their resilience to HVToperations. The Taliban and al-Qa‘ida can mostlikely replace lost leaders, especially at the middlelevel. Numerous al-Qa‘ida leaders oversee externaloperations, minimizing the disruptive impact ofindividual losses, according to clandestinereports.49 50 (C//NF)Existence of Sanctuary. Inter
A CIA review of high-value targeting (HVT) programs worldwidea suggests that HVT operations can play a useful role when they are part of a broader counterinsurgency strategy. HVT operations are most likely to contribute to successful counterinsurgency outcomes when governments decide on a d
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Afghan National Army's Counterinsurgency Director's assessment of counterinsurgency capabilities across the Afghan National Army. In order to assess counterinsurgency operations in the Afghan National Army, a Collections and Analysis Team from the Afghan Lessons Learned Center visited ANATC Training Centers and the Corps to gather .
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