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Fire-Protection Considerations forthe Design and Operation ofLiquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)Storage FacilitiesAPI PUBLICATION 2510ASECOND EDITION, DECEMBER 1996AmericanPetroleumInstituteStrategies for Today’sEnvironmental Partnership

Strategies for Today’sEnvironmental PartnershipOne of the most significant long-term trends affecting the future vitality of the petroleum industry is the publicÕs concerns about the environment. Recognizing this trend, APImember companies have developed a positive, forward looking strategy called STEP:Strategies for TodayÕs Environmental Partnership. This program aims to address publicconcerns by improving industryÕs environmental, health and safety performance; documenting performance improvements; and communicating them to the public. The foundation of STEP is the API Environmental Mission and Guiding Environmental Principles.API standards, by promoting the use of sound engineering and operational practices, are animportant means of implementing APIÕs STEP program.API ENVIRONMENTAL MISSION AND GUIDINGENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLESThe members of the American Petroleum Institute are dedicated to continuous effortsto improve the compatibility of our operations with the environment while economicallydeveloping energy resources and supplying high quality products and services to consumers. The members recognize the importance of efficiently meeting societyÕs needs and ourresponsibility to work with the public, the government, and others to develop and to usenatural resources in an environmentally sound manner while protecting the health and safety of our employees and the public. To meet these responsibilities, API members pledge tomanage our businesses according to these principles: To recognize and to respond to community concerns about our raw materials, productsand operations. To operate our plants and facilities, and to handle our raw materials and products in amanner that protects the environment, and the safety and health of our employees andthe public. To make safety, health and environmental considerations a priority in our planning,and our development of new products and processes. To advise promptly appropriate officials, employees, customers and the public of information on significant industry-related safety, health and environmental hazards,and to recommend protective measures. To counsel customers, transporters and others in the safe use, transportation and disposal of our raw materials, products and waste materials. To economically develop and produce natural resources and to conserve those resources by using energy efficiently. To extend knowledge by conducting or supporting research on the safety, health andenvironmental effects of our raw materials, products, processes and waste materials. To commit to reduce overall emissions and waste generation. To work with others to resolve problems created by handling and disposal of hazardous substances from our operations. To participate with government and others in creating responsible laws, regulationsand standards to safeguard the community, workplace and environment. To promote these principles and practices by sharing experiences and offering assistance to others who produce, handle, use, transport or dispose of similar raw materials,petroleum products and wastes.

Fire-Protection Considerations forthe Design and Operation ofLiquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)Storage FacilitiesHealth and Environment DepartmentSafety and Fire Protection SubcommitteeAPI PUBLICATION 2510ASECOND EDITION, DECEMBER 1996

SPECIAL NOTESAPI publications necessarily address problems of a general nature. With respect to particular circumstances, local, state, and federal laws and regulations should be reviewed.API is not undertaking to meet the duties of employers, manufacturers, or suppliers towarn and properly train and equip their employees, and others exposed, concerning healthand safety risks and precautions, nor undertaking their obligations under local, state, orfederal laws.Information concerning safety and health risks and proper precautions with respect to particular materials and conditions should be obtained from the employer, the manufacturer orsupplier of that material, or the material safety data sheet.Nothing contained in any API publication is to be construed as granting any right, byimplication or otherwise, for the manufacture, sale, or use of any method, apparatus, or product covered by letters patent. Neither should anything contained in the publication be construed as insuring anyone against liability for infringement of letters patent.Generally, API standards are reviewed and revised, reafÞrmed, or withdrawn at least everyÞve years. Sometimes a one-time extension of up to two years will be added to this reviewcycle. This publication will no longer be in effect Þve years after its publication date as anoperative API standard or, where an extension has been granted, upon republication. Statusof the publication can be ascertained from the API Authoring Department [telephone (202)682-8000]. A catalog of API publications and materials is published annually and updatedquarterly by API, 1220 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.This document was produced under API standardization procedures that ensure appropriate notiÞcation and participation in the developmental process and is designated as an APIstandard. Questions concerning the interpretation of the content of this standard or comments and questions concerning the procedures under which this standard was developedshould be directed in writing to the director of the Authoring Department (shown on the titlepage of this document), American Petroleum Institute, 1220 L Street, N.W., Washington,D.C. 20005. API standards are published to facilitate the broad availability of proven, soundengineering and operating practices. These standards are not intended to obviate the need forapplying sound engineering judgment regarding when and where these standards should beutilized. The formulation and publication of API standards is not intended in any way toinhibit anyone from using any other practices.Any manufacturer marking equipment or materials in conformance with the markingrequirements of an API standard is solely responsible for complying with all the applicablerequirements of that standard. API does not represent, warrant, or guarantee that such products do in fact conform to the applicable API standard.All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, ortransmitted by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,without prior written permission from the publisher. Contact the Publisher,API Publishing Services, 1220 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.Copyright 1996 American Petroleum Institute

FOREWORDThis publication covers aspects of the design, operation, and maintenance of liqueÞedpetroleum gas (LPG) storage facilities from the standpoints of prevention and control ofreleases, Þre-protection design, and Þre-control measures. The storage facilities coveredare LPG installations (storage vessels and associated loading/unloading/transfer systems)at marine and pipeline terminals, natural gas processing plants, reÞneries, petrochemicalplants, and tank farms. This publication provides background, philosophy, methods, andalternatives to achieve good Þre protection.Information on the production or use of liqueÞed petroleum gas is not included.This publication is not intended to take precedence over contractual agreements. Existing codes and manuals, wherever practicable, have been used in the preparation of thispublication.API publications may be used by anyone desiring to do so. Every effort has been madeby the Institute to assure the accuracy and reliability of the data contained in them; however, the Institute makes no representation, warranty, or guarantee in connection with thispublication and hereby expressly disclaims any liability or responsibility for loss or damage resulting from its use or for the violation of any federal, state, or municipal regulationwith which this publication may conßict.Suggested revisions are invited and should be submitted to the director of the Healthand Environment Department, American Petroleum Institute, 1220 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.iii

CONTENTSPageSECTION 1ÑGENERAL. 11.1 Scope . 11.2 Retroactions . 11.3 Introduction . 11.4 Failure History . 11.5 Safety Analysis . 21.6 LPG Properties . 21.7 DeÞnition of Terms . 31.8 Referenced Publications . 4SECTION 2ÑFACILITY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY . 52.1 Introduction . 52.2 Site Selection . 52.3 Layout and Spacing . 52.4 Drainage and Spill Containment . 62.5 Ignition Source Control . 62.6 Vessel Design . 82.7 Piping . 82.8 Pumps . 102.9 Instrumentation . 102.10 Relief Systems . 122.11 Vapor Depressurizing System . 132.12 Loading Trucks and Rail Cars . 14SECTION 3ÑOPERATING PROCEDURES. 153.1 Introduction . 153.2 Placing Storage Vessels in Service . 153.3 Product Transfer . 163.4 Water Drawing . 173.5 Sampling . 173.6 Venting Noncondensables . 183.7 Removal of Vessel From Service . 183.8 Emergency Procedures . 18SECTION 4ÑMAINTENANCE PROCEDURES. 194.1 Introduction . 194.2 Vessel Inspection . 194.3 Vessel Accessories, Including Relief Valves . 194.4 Vapor Freeing and Isolating Equipment . 194.5 Work Permits . 204.6 Repair of LPG Equipment . 204.7 Fireproofed Surfaces . 20SECTION 5ÑFIRE-PROTECTION DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS. 205.1 Introduction . 205.2 Water-Application Rates . 205.3 Methods of Water Application . 225.4 Design Considerations for Water Supply . 235.5 Detection Systems . 24v

CONTENTSPage5.6 Portable Fire Extinguishers . 255.7 Foam for LPG Fires . 255.8 FireprooÞng . 25SECTION 6ÑFIRE CONTROL AND EXTINGUISHMENT. 276.1 PreÞre Plan . 276.2 Training . 276.3 Assessing the Fire . 286.4 Applying Cooling Water . 286.5 Isolating Fuel Sources . 296.6 FireÞghting Tactics and Leak Control . 29Figures1ÑPool Fire Radiant Heat Flux . 72ÑNonfreeze Drain for LPG Vessels . 113ÑVessel Shell Overheated Above Liquid Level . 304ÑRupture of a Horizontal LPG Vessel . 315ÑConcentrate Cooling Water on Flame-Exposed Metal . 33Tables1ÑProperties of Two Common LPGÕs . 32ÑTank Pressures for Two Common LPGÕs . 33ÑVapor Volumes Obtained for Two Common LPGÕs . 44ÑFire Emergency Situations Requiring Special Consideration . 215ÑWater-Application Methods . 23vi

Fire-Protection Considerations for the Design andOperation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage FacilitiesSECTION 1—GENERAL1.1 Scopevessel with a full inventory of LPG. The probability of thistype of failure can be made virtually negligible with properlyengineered and operated facilities. The Þre-protection principles of this publication are intended to prevent Þre-inducedvessel failure.1.1.1 This publication addresses the design, operation, andmaintenance of LPG storage facilities from the standpoints ofprevention and control of releases, Þre protection design, andÞre-control measures. The history of LPG storage facilityfailure, facility design philosophy, operating and maintenanceprocedures, and various Þre protection and ÞreÞghtingapproaches are presented. This publication, since it supplements API Standard 2510 and provides the basis for many ofthe requirements stated in that standard, must be used in conjunction with API Standard 2510. In case of conßict, APIStandard 2510 shall prevail. Alternate designs are acceptableprovided equal safety can be demonstrated.1.3.2 Most LPG Þres originate as smaller Þres that have thepotential to become larger and more hazardous. It is important to note that LPG Þres usually occur, not as a result oftank failure, but because of pump seal leaks, piping leaks, orfailure to follow safe work procedures. Human failure suchas overÞlls and piping leaks from poor drawoff (water andsample) procedures can lead to LPG release and consequentÞre. This publication treats the prevention and control ofsuch incidents and provides various Þre extinguishment andcontainment methods.1.1.2 The storage facilities covered by this publication areLPG installations (storage vessels and associated loading/unloading/transfer systems) at marine and pipeline terminals,natural gas processing plants, reÞneries, petrochemicalplants, and tank farms. The following types of LPG installations are not addressed:1.4 Failure History1.4.1 The most serious LPG release is a massive failure ofa storage vessel. Such failures are rare and seldom occurwithout exacerbating circumstances such as exposure to Þreor external explosion.a. Underground storage, such as buried tanks, storage caverns, salt domes, or wells.b. Mounded storage tanks.c. Refrigerated storage at pressures below 15 pounds persquare inch gauge.d. Installations covered by API Standard 2508.e. Installations covered by NFPA Standards 58 or 59.f. Department of Transportation (DOT) containers.g. Those portions of LPG systems covered by NFPA 54(ASME Z223.1).h. Small installations with a single LPG tank of less than2000-gallon capacity.i. Process equipment for LPG manufacture or treatment preceding LPG storage.1.4.2 To project LPG storage vessel failure frequency, Þreprotection professionals have reviewed applicable U.S., British, and German failure statistics for pressure vessels.1 Thesestatistics reveal that the failure rate for pressure vessels fromcauses other than pre-existing Þres or explosions, has beenabout 1 failure per 100,000 vessel years. To assume this failure rate for hydrocarbon storage vessels is conservative, sincemost of the data in these studies are for steam boilers anddrums operating under more adverse conditions.1.4.3 A more likely LPG incident, and in the context ofthis publication a more relevant one, is leakage from pipingor other components attached to or near the vessel followedby ignition, a ßash Þre or vapor cloud explosion, and a continuing pool Þre and pressure (torch) Þre. The possibility ofa pool Þre is greater with lower-vapor-pressure LPG or incold climates. Should ßames impinge on a nearby LPG vessel, a boiling liquid-expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE)involving one or more storage vessels may ensue. Injury tofacility or neighboring personnel and damage losses ofseveral million dollars can be incurred in these types ofLPG incidents.1.2 RetroactionsThe provisions of this publication pertain to new installations, but may also be used to review and evaluate existingstorage facilities. The applicability of some or all of theseprovisions to facilities and equipment already in place or in theprocess of construction or installation before the date of thispublication will have to be considered on a case-by-case basis.1.3 Introduction1.3.1 In developing Þre-protection guidelines for an LPGstorage facility, the greatest concern is the massive failure of a1SpencerH. Bush, ÒPressure Vessel Reliability,Ó Transactions of the ASME:Journal of Vessel Technology, February 1975.1

2API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 2510A1.4.4 An examination of the 100 largest hydrocarbonchemical accidents over a 30-year period has made it possibleto estimate the probability of major accidents (losses of 12,000,000 or more in 1983 dollars) in LPG storage facilities.2 This data and the 1984 disaster near Mexico City3 demonstrate that there were about three major incidentsworldwide every 10 years involving pressurized liquid lighthydrocarbon storage facilities. The number of such facilitiesin operation during the 30-year period examined was between600 and 1000. Hence, the probability that any one facilitywill have a major LPG accident in any one year is from lessthan 1 in 2000 to less than 1 in 3333. Since a typical facilityis likely to contain several vessels, the frequency of a majoraccident at any one facility is probably on the order of 1 per20,000 vessel years. A consideration of the nine major LPGstorage facility incidents studied suggests that many if notmost of the incidents would probably not have occurred orwould have been much less severe if the practices describedin this publication had been observed. Hence, implementation of the recommendations described herein should reducethe frequency of major LPG storage facility Þres from 1 per20,000 vessel years to about 1 per 100,000 vessel years.1.4.5 Some of the causes for releases that have occurred atfacilities that transfer and store pressurized LPG are listedbelow:a. Leakage from an LPG transfer pump seal.b. Leakage from valve stem seals and ßange gaskets.c. Leakage when taking a sample or drawing water.d. Leakage from transfer piping because of corrosion,mechanical damage, or from screwed piping connections.e. Failure of a transfer pipe ßexible joint or cargo hose at theinterface between a Þxed facility and a tank truck, railroadtank car, or tank ship.f. Leakage from a storage vessel because of corrosion.g. Tank overÞlling, which forces liquid out the pressuresafety valves.h. Failure of a storage vessel because of direct ßameimpingement on the unwetted shell.1.5 Safety Analysis1.5.1 Where site location, equipment spacing, or limitedbuilt-in Þre protection increase the risk to the public or thepotential for damage to an industrial area, a safety analysis ofthe LPG facility should be performed. The analysis shouldinclude possible but realistic scenarios of accidents that mayoccur, including LPG release, ignition, and Þre. Refer toOSHA 29 CFR 1910.119 for additional information and2 ÒOneHundred Largest Losses: A Thirty-Year Review of Property DamageLosses in the Hydrocarbon-Chemical Industries,Ó Marsh & McLennan Protection Consultants, 1986.3 ÒAnalysis of the LPG Incident in San Juan Ixhuatepec, Mexico City,November 19, 1984,Ó TNO, Netherlands, May 6, 1985.guidance for evaluating the safe design, operation, inspectionand maintenance of a facility.1.5.2 The safety analysis should be periodically reviewedto ensure that conditions have not signiÞcantly changed andthat the current level of Þre prevention and Þre suppression isstill appropriate.1.5.3 A smaller storage facility that is remotely located,such as at an oil Þeld producing site, should not require asmuch built-in Þre protection as a major facility in an industrial or urban area. An evaluation should be made to establishthe value of the facility, the economic impact if it were lost,and the exposure risk to people and neighboring installations.The level of Þre protection incorporated in the design shouldbe commensurate with the exposure risk and value of thefacility, provided that any reductions in Þre protection wouldnot result in unacceptably high risks to people.1.6 LPG Properties1.6.1 At normal temperature and atmospheric pressure,LPG is in a gaseous state. It can be liqueÞed under moderatepressure or by cooling to temperatures below its atmosphericpressure boiling point but will readily vaporize upon releaseto normal atmospheric conditions. It is this property that permits LPG to be transported and stored in a liquid form butused in the vapor form.1.6.2 LiqueÞed petroleum gas consists of light hydrocarbons with a vapor pressure exceeding 40 pounds per squareinch absolute at 100 F. Examples include propane, propylene, butane (normal or isobutane), and butylene (includingisomers). The most common LPGÕs are propane and normalbutane or a mixture of these, and thus only the properties ofthese gases will be discussed. The properties of propane andnormal butane are shown in Tables 1 and 2.1.6.3 Concentrated LPG vapors are heavier than air; thusthey tend to stay close to the ground, collect in low spots, anddisperse less readily than lighter-than-air gases. Undilutedpropane vapor is 11Ú2 times more dense than air, and normalbutane vapor is twice as dense. However, once LPG isreleased, it mixes with air to form a ßammable mixture, andthe density of the mixture becomes essentially the same as air.Natural air currents, diffusion, and dispersion will eventuallydilute the mixture to below the lower ßammable limit (LFL).1.6.4 Since LPG is stored under pressure and vaporizesreadily when released, it is difÞcult to control leaks once theyoccur. The vapor cloud from a leak tends to stay close to theground and drift downwind toward low areas. This propertymakes it essential that leaks be prevented, ignition sourceskept at a safe distance, and vapor from leaks be dispersedbefore it is ignited. Wind signiÞcantly reduces the dispersiondistance, that is, the size of the ßammable vapor cloud, forany given leak rate.

FIRE-PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF LIQUIFIED PETROLEUM GAS (LPG) STORAGE FACILITIESTable 1—Properties of Two Common LPG’sPropertySpeciÞc gravity of gas (air 1.0)Vapor pressure at 60 F, psiaaVapor pressure at 60 F, psiaaBoiling point, FCubic feet of gas/gallon of LPG at 60 FLower ßammable limit (LFL), percent in airUpper ßammable limit (UFL), percent in airGross Btu/ft3b of gas at 60 FPropanen-Butane1.5105190-442.02652 3136.42.09.5251631.81.59.03262Note: n normal. pounds per square inch absolute.bBtu/ft3 British thermal units per cubic foot.apsiaTable 2—Tank Pressures for Two Common LPG’sTank Pressurea(Pounds per square inch gauge)Liquid Temperature(Degrees 080n-Butane3e. LiqueÞed petroleum gas, when vaporized, leaves no residue.f. Pure LPG is noncorrosive to steel and generally noncorrosive to copper alloys. However, when sulfur compounds andother impurities are present in the LPG, corrosion can be aserious problem.g. LiqueÞed petroleum gas has no lubricating properties, andthis fact must be taken into account when specifying LPGhandling pumps, compressors, and so forth.h. LiqueÞed petroleum gas is colorless. However, when theliquid evaporates, the cooling effect on the surrounding aircauses condensation of water vapor in the air, which usuallymakes it possible to see an escape of LPG. This may notoccur in the case of a vapor release if the vapor is near ambient temperature and its pressure is relatively low.i. Pure LPG is practically odorless. For safety purposes, it isrequired that an odorizing agent (such as ethyl mercaptan) beadded to commercial grades of LPG to make them detectableby smell.1.7 DefinitionsTerms used in this publication are deÞned in 1.7.1 through1.7.19.1.7.1 adiabatic: A closed thermodynamic system inwhich changes take place with no net gain or loss ofenergy.Note: n normalaVapor pressure at the listed temperature. Actual tank pressure can exceedthese values if the vessel contains noncondensable gases such as nitrogen.1.7.2 autorefrigeration: The chilling effect fromvaporization of LPG when it is released or vented to a lowerpressure.1.6.5 Both propane and normal butane have low boilingpoints. Since the boiling point of liquid propane is far belowtemperatures typically found in nature, propane generallydoes not form a liquid pool when spilled. However, liquidnormal butane is more likely to remain liquid if accidentallyreleased at low ambient or storage temperatures, due to its31 F atmospheric pressure boiling point.1.7.3 boiling liquid-expanding vapor explosion(BLEVE): A phenomenon that occurs when an LPG vesselfails catastrophically releasing its contents. The most common cause of a BLEVE of a LPG vessel is prolonged, directexposure to a Þre with ßame contact above the liquid level. ABLEVE can occur when a vessel containing a liquid failswith the liquid at a temperature above the boiling point of itscomponents at atmospheric pressure.1.6.6 Other characteristics of LPG include the following:a. LPG exerts a chilling effect from vaporization whenreleased or vented to a lower pressure. This effect is knownas auto-refrigeration; the liquid temperature approaches itsboiling temperature at atmospheric pressure (see boilingpoint in Table 1).b. The density of the liquid is approximately half that ofwater, and thus water will settle to the bottom in LPG.c. Small quantities of liquid will yield large quantities ofvapor as shown in Table 3.d. High rates of vaporization and st

ments API Standard 2510 and provides the basis for many of the requirements stated in that standard, must be used in con-junction with API Standard 2510. In case of conßict, API Standard 2510 shall prevail. Alternate designs are acceptable provided equal safety can be demonstrated. 1.1

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