U. S. ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCES - Small Wars Journal
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FIELDMANUALHEADQUARTERSDEPARTMENT O F THE ARMYWASHINGTON,D.C., 12 November 1963NO. 31-22U.S. ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCESINTRODUCTIONCHAPTER 1. GENERALSection I. I n t r o d u c t i o n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J- .11. U.S. policy and definrtlons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111. Insurgency-history, causes of phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IV. Factors in the prevention of insurgency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9-11CFIAPTEK 2. ROLES OF NONMILITARY AGENCIES AND OTEJER SERVICESSection I. National11. Other military services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12-1617-19PARTTwo.CHAPTER 3.Section I.11.111.IV.1.23,46-8RESPONSIBILITIES AND ORGANIZATIONU.S. AND INDIGENOUS COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCESThe special action force (SAF) .Other U.S. Army counterinsurgency forces .Organization for c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SPECIAL ACTION FORCE AND S A F BACKUP FORCES, ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES. .COMBAT AND COMBAn:1SIJPPORT UNITS.COMBAT SERVICE S U P ? ? O B - T f : f U -------------L-----------I N T E L L I G E N C E - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - LOGISTICS PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES--------------------------PSYCHOLOGICAL -INDIGENOUS PARAMILITARY 99-105106-110111-118TRAININGTRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCYFORCES.APPENDIX I.11.111.IV.v.VI.VII.REFERENCES-- --------------------------EXAMPLES O F CIVIC ACTION--------------SECURE POPULATIONTRANSPORTATIONSPECIAL COUNTERINSURGENCY MEASURES.GUIDELINES FOR ADVISORS AND MEMBERS O F MTT'sSAMPLE TRAINING PROGRAMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --
PART ONEINTRODUCTIONCHAPTER 1GENERALSection I. INTRODUCTION1. Purpose and Scopea. This manual together with its classifiedsupplement (FM 31-22A) provides information and guidance to commanders and staffs forthe training and operational employment ofunits, teams, and individuals designated a s U.S.Army Counterinsurgency Forces. It describesthe organization, missions, and methods of employment of U.S. Army Special Action Forces(SAF), specially trained brigade-size backupforces, support units, and individuals who aredeployed to advise, train and/or provide operational assistance to a host country's counterinsurgency forces. It explains the relationshipof U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces toMAAG's/Missions and other elements of theU.S. Country Team engaged in supporting ahost country's counterinsurgency effort.b. This manual contains U.S. Army doctrineon the organization, operations, control, administration, and logistical support of U.S. Armycounterinsurgency forces in all phases of insurgency. It should be used jointly with otherdoctrinal publications providing guidance, techniques and procedures for field operations.2. ChangesUsers of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyedto the specific page, paragraph, and line of thetext in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment toinsure understanding and complete evaluation.Comments should be forwarded directly to Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Special Warfare Agency, FortBragg, N.C.Section I!. U.S. POLICY AND DEFINITIONS3. U.S. Policya. Approved integrated interdepartmentalpolicy guidance has been developed for the employment abroad of all relevant U.S. resourcesto prevent or defeat subversive insurgency. Included is a concept for the development ofcounterinsurgency plans and programs, and thefunctions and responsibilities of the major departments of the government and their overseas representatives. The chief of the diplomatic mission, as the head of the U.S. countryteam, is charged with the development of theCountry Internal Defense Plan. The Department of the Army has formulated broad guidAGO 6448Aance for U.S. Army counterinsurgency elementsas an extension of the interdepartmental concept.b. A major objective of U.S. policy is tothwart further communist inroads into noncommunist areas by safeguarding and assistingthe less developed nations in fulfilling their*aspirations to remain free, and to fashion waysof life independent from communism or othertotalitarian domination o r control.c. The overall U.S. objective in the field ofoverseas internal defense is to encoupage andassist vulnerable nations to develop balancedcapabilities for the internal defense of their3
societies. Psychologically, few of the developing nations a r e aware of the insidious natureof the threat posed by communist subversion,nor do they know how to cope with the blandishments and false hopes raised by communistpropaganda. An adequate internal defense requires mobilizatioq of national resources andtheir effective use through political, social, economic, milibry and psychological measures.Psychological operations can help to bridge thegap between the people and the government andcan assist in mobilizing the human resourcesof the nation. The key aspect of the U.S. rolein countering subversion and insurgency inthese countries is assisting these peoples t ohelp themselves. The major effort should befrom the indigenous government because theproblems in each area a r e local and unique tothat society. These existing problems must besolved primarily by the local people and theirgovernments. U.S. policy is to provide additional resources and capabilities to augmenttheir own efforts in a constructive and acceptable manner in accordance with the local situation, with the credit for accomplished missions accruing in the fullest degree possible tothe local government.4. Definitionsa. Ccncnterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological andcivic actions taken by a government to defeatsubversive insurgency.b. Military q v i c Acticm. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population a t all levelsin such fields a s education, training, publicworks, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and other areas .contributing to economic and social development,which would also serve to improve the standing of the indigenous military forces with thepopulation.c. Psychological Operations. This term includes psychological warfare, and, in addition,encompasses those political, military, economic,and ideological actions planned and conductedto create in neutral or friendly foreign groupsthe opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behaviorfavorable t o the achievement of national objectives.d . U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces.Those forces which are comprised of SpecialAction Forces and other U.S. Army units, elements o r personnel trained and designated fora counterinsurgency mission assignment. Theseforces a r e capable of operating in vulnerableareas, when invited by a host government, toprovide training and military advice and o perational assistance to indigenous military andparamilitary forces engaged in maintaining orrestoring internal security and defeating subversive insurgency.e. Levels of insurgency. See paragraph 8.f. Country Team. Sge paragraph 16.Section 111. INSURGENCY - HIS1'ORY, CAUSES AND PREVENTION5. Examples of lnsurgency Movementsa. Since World W-ar 11, insurgent movementsof major dimensions have occurred in Greece,the Philippines, Malaya, Indo-China, (Vietnam,Laos, Cambodia), Algeria, Cuba, Indonesia,China and several other countries. In manycases, these movements have involved hundredsof thousands of men on both sides in struggleslasting up to fifteen years. Insurgent activitiesof more limited extent and duration have occurred in many other areas. Some insurrections have resulted in the violent overthrow ofexisting governments. In some cases these newgovernments have been o r become either communist or communist-dominated. Some his4torical insurgency movements are cited bycause and results a s follows :(1) National independence.(a) Algeria is an example of a countrywhich was seeking national independence. The Algerian war, or insurrection, was in progress formany years. Prior to the end ofhostilities, the French committed amilitary force of approximately400,000 troops in an effort t o crushthe insurrection. Although successful militarily, the French failed tosuppress the insurrection for political reasons. Algeria under FrenchAGO 6448A
rule did not represent a truly colonial status; the desire for nationalindependence was greatly influenced by French hegemony in Algerian political, economic and socialsystems. Efforts by the French tonegotiate a settlement were found'to be too little and too late. Therebels forced the French to grantAlgeria political independence in1962. The popular aspiration fornational independence was aphieved.I t remains to be seen what coursethe new Algerian regime will takeand whether i t can provide for thesocial and economic needs of itspeople.(b) The Indonesian revolt against theDutch, between 1947 and 1949, wasbased primarily on the desire fornational independence. The revoltsucceeded with assistance from thecommunists.(2) Relief from actual wr alleged oppression.(a) The initial success in 1951 and 1952of the Huk (Communist) campaignin the Philippine Islands can beattributed in large measure to theoppressive measures taken by landowners against the tenant farmerand his family. Inequitable divisionof land and the disproportionate division of profits were grievanceseasily fanned into flames of discontent by Huk propaganda. The latter created many dissident elementsand resulted in widespread supportof the Huk movement. Under theleadership of Ramon Magsaysay,first as Defense Minister and lateras President of the Republic, thegovernment instituted positive military and civic improvement measures which i t exploited skillfully bymeans of psychological operationsto eliminate the communist inspiredand controlled Huk rebellion. Thesemeasures produced outstanding results in winning the loyalty and support of the people to the government and democratic ideals. TheAGO 644XAcampaign which defeated the Huksis considered a model, particularlyin the area of civic improvementsand psychological operations implemented by the government toovercome those grievances whichled to much of the peasant discontent.(b) The overthrow of the Batista government in Cuba by the Castroforces in 1959 was facilitated by thedesire of many Cubans to obtain relief from the government's oppressive measures. Although most people in and outside Cuba believedinsurgency to be a purely internalaffair, i t is apparent today that thecommunists played a major role inthe final organization of the newgovernment. The agrarian and otherreform measures instituted by theCastro government were a means tothe end but these have been offsetin many cases by other more oppressive measures which have replaced those of the Batista regime.(c) The Chinese Communists used "relief from oppression" a s a basictheme to drive the Chinese Nationalists from the Asiatic mainland in1949. The prom% of agrarian reforms contributqg greatly to theCommunist succe6s.(3) Elimination of foreign exploitation.The resistance movement in IndoChina from 1946 to 1954 (Vietnam,Cambodia, and Laos) is an exampleof the unified desires of major segments of the population to violentlyresist colonial exploitation. This wasanti-colonialism in its truest form. Allof Indo-China was characterized by anagrarian economy with low standardsof living, high illiteracy, and lowhealth standards. They were easilyexploited by the forces of communism.Ho Chi Minh, a devoted Communist,with external support, launched aninsurgency which culminated in thewithdrawal of France from IndoChina. The insurgency continues in
those portions of Indo-China (Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos)outside the Communistrled DemocraticRepublic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).( 4 ) Desire for economic and soeid improvements. The historical examplesof insurgency movements cited abovehave all been influenced by the desirefor economic and social improvements.Additionally, it is a major factor frequently observed in coups d' etat orinsurrections in Latin America. Thisdesire is continually exploited by thecommunists with their propaganda.(5) Elimination of corruption. This is another primary cause of insurgency.The movements in the Philippines andChina offer good examples of largesegments of the population supportinga communist-inspired insurrection inan attempt to eliminate graft and corruption in the existing government.In the case of the Philippines, positiveaction by the government preventedthe insurgency from succeeding; theoutcome in China is well known.b. Not every insurgent movement has beencommunist-inspired, although many have provided opportunities for subsequent communistexploitation. Some insurgent movements, a s inChina, have been communist in origin and purpose from their 'inception. In Indo-China, aCommunist Party led and dominated a popularmovement to throw off colonial rule, while inCuba a revolution to overthrow a repressiveregime was betrayed and captured by communists. In a number of cases (e.g., Greeceand the Republic of Vietnam) insurgency hasbeen organized and instigated from a neighboring communist state. In such cases the insurgents have enjoyed the advantage of a securebase for training and logistical support, plussanctuary from pursuit, on the communist sideof the border.6. Basic Causes and Motivation Factors ofInsurgencyThe following conditions are characteristicof many transitional societies and lend them6Iselves to the development of insurgent movements :a. Soeial.(1) Conflicts in traditional social organizations and customs as a result of contact with other cultures.(2) The expectation of radically improvedliving standards within a short periodof time.(3) r e s s b r eof a dense and rapidly expanding population in an agrariansociety.(4) Divisive rifts in the population stemming from class, ethnic, religious, orlinguistic differences.(5) Aspirations of the underprivileged forimprovement in their social status andopportunities for individual expression and individual satisfaction.(6) Widespread illiteracy and an inadequate educational system.(7) Indolent national character.(8) The gap between the powerful urbanelite and the unorganized and inarticulate majority of the peasants.b. Political.(1) Present or recent domination by acolonial power ; inexperience of newindigenous leaders and administrators; inadequate civil service system.(2) A government unresponsive to theaspirations of the people.(3) Tyrannical, repressive, corrupt or inefficient leadership.(4) Lack of communication between thegovernment and the people.(5) Lack of control by the governmentover rural areas and consequentbreakdown of law and order.(6) Unstable government.(7) Frustrated and articulate segments ofthe intelligentsia which advocate radical solutions to speed modernization.(8) A small but growing middle class, andextremes of right and left which oppose the struggle of the middle classfor political and economic influence.(9) The immaturity of the political processAGO 644BA
which does not permit the diffusion ofpower in the form of multiple interestgroups and political parties.(10) The unwillingness of the leading eliteto tolerate responsible opposition, andthe propensity for opposition groupsfor conspiracy and subversion.c. Economic.(1) Widespread poverty.(2) Grossly inequitable distribution ofof wealth and income; concentrationof wealth and economic power in oneclass or in a few individuals or families.(3) Agricultural backwardness characterized by low capitalization, low level ofagrarian techniques, poor transportation, incapability of weathering minorcrises, land hunger and one-crop economics.(4) A highly inequitable and inefficientsystem of land tenure tending to produce either vast landholdings or fragmented small holdings, combined withthe lack of capital leading to usuriousinterest rates, chronic indebtednessand a penurious rural populace.(5) A backward, unbalanced industrycharacterized by a small and inefficientindigenous sector specializing in lightindustry and a modern sector moreoften thah not owned by foreigp interests.(6) Inept, naive, ultranationalistic leaderswho are incapable of developing aviable economy.(7) A system of taxation and tax collection which is inequitable and whichprovides insufficient revenue for necessary government functions.(8) Dependence on foreign capital assistance, and a t the same time oppositionto foreign private investment.(9) Overdependence on export of raw materials or a single commodity.(10) Large-scale unemployment, includingan impatient segment of educated unemployed.(11) An unstable currency.AGO 6448A(12) Lack of, or underdevelopecl, naturalresources.(13) Inadequate transportation and coinmunications systems.d. Military.(1) Estrangement of the military forcesfrom the people.(2) Failure to provide effective militaryand police forces.(3) Organizations, equipment, and doctrine that are obsolete or inappropriate to the circumstances.(4) An inadequate intelligence system.(5) Military elements that are unresponsive to higher authority.(6) Factionalism within the militaryforces.(7) Absence of truly national loyalties inthe military establishment.(8) Lack of motivation.(9) Lack of awareness of popular aspirations and attitudes.e. Psychological.(1) A newly awakened nationalism.(2) Lack of national feeling or sense ofnational identity ; persistence of localor tribal loyalites.(3) Anticolonialism.(4) A psychological gap between the government and the people ;lack of knowla g e and identification on the part ofthe people with the goals and objectives of the government.(5) A widespread sense of injustice; lackof means of redressing individual injustices.(6) Lack of faith in the government andin the social and economic system;lack of a dynamic ideology to opposecommunism.(7) Inability or ineptness on the part oftfie government in counteracting comm nist propaganda.(8) Low national morale.(9) Poorly motivated civil and militaryestablishments.(10) A crisis in personal and national identity; a sense of loss experienced a s the
result of relinquishing old values andacquiring new ones.(11) Diffused uncertainty and anxiety concerning personal and national future,causing alternately aggressive andapathetic behavior.(12) The existence of a nation-wide behavior pattern inimical to economicgrowth and political maturation, sucha s taboos in innovation, authoritarianpersonality structure, caste systemsand prejudices anchored in traditionand religion.7. Communism and Insurgency MovementsThe methods used by communist-dominatedinsurgency forces are designed to gain controlof the people and to weaken the governmentand its forces. Insurgent leaders seek to gainpopular support by identifying their objectiveswith the needs and aspirations of the people bypersuasion and resort to immoral and illegalmeans including the use of terror and blackmailto enforce cooperation. They seek to weakenthe government by propaganda discrediting itsaims, its leaders, and its supporters; by eliminating key opposition personnel and demonstrating the government's inability to preservelaw and order and protect its people; and bysabotaging the government's programs and thenational economy. Their methods include subversion, infiltration of the government, sabotage and violence, including acts of destructionagainst public and private property, transportation, and communications systems; raidsand ambushes against military and police installations, personnel, and equipment; terrorismby assassination, bombing, arson, armed robbery, kidnapping, torture, and mutilation ; pro-vocation of incidents; espionage, counterfeiting; and dissemination of propaganda andrumors.8. Levels of Intensity of lnsurgencyThe types of military counterinsurgencymeasures to be employed and the degree ofparticipation by U.S. forces will be largelydetermined by the level of intensity of insurgent activity. Levels of intensity may be portrayed in terms of three general phases :a . Phase I, Latent and Incipient Subversion.This phase ranges from circumstances in whichsubversive activity is only a potential threat,latent or already incipient, to situations inwhich subversive incidents and activities occurwith frequency in an organized pattern. It involves no major outbeak of violence or periodsof uncontrollable insurgent activity. This phase,marked by organization, subversive activity,agitation, and propaganda is a period of preparation for the violent struggle to overthrowthe government.b. Phase ZZ, Organized Guerrilla Warfare.This phase is reached when the subversivemovement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized guerrillawarfare or related forms of violence againstthe established authority. Propaganda andother subversive activities are intensified.c. Phase ZZZ, W a r of Movement. The situation moves from phase I1 to phase I11 when insurgency becomes primarily a war of movementbetween organized forces of the insurgents andthose of the established authority. A rival insurgent government may be announced to seekrecognition and belligerent status. All previousactivities are intensified.Section IV. FACTORS IN THE PREVENTION OF INSURGENCY9. GeneralIn less developed countries, the desires of thepeople for rapid modernization are frequentlycapitalized upon by insurgent elements. Generally, developing countries have just recentlyobtained political independence; some are justemerging into a new era of economic and socialdevelopment. In the past, the problem of counterinsurgency has been viewed primarily, if not8entirely, as an internal security problem of thenation concerned and one to be handled bymilitary and police actions. Viewed as part ofthe larger problem of modernization, the prevention of subversive insurgency runs thegamut of measures for political, economic,social, and military development. Support of amodernization program by the conduct of military civic action is a major preventive measure.AGO 644RA
10. Military Civic Actiona. Purpose. The purpose of the military civicaction program is to use indigenous militaryresources for the benefit of civilian communities, such a s assisting in health, welfare, andpublic works projects, improving living conditions, alleviating suffering, and improving theeconomic base of the country. In addition, suchprograms seek to gain the support, loyalty, andrespect of the people for the armed forces andto emphasize the concept of freedom and worthof the individual. I t is a concept and techniquewhich as proven effective in reducing the threatof communist exploitation of real or imaginarygrievances against a government. Civic actionsare themselves psychological operations. Theyare undertaken to provide visible evidence ofthe government's interest in the welfare andbetterment of the people. A positive militarycivic action program can help the governmentand its security forces gain the confidence andactive cooperation of the population. However,in its implementation care must be exercisednot to impair the military effectiveness of theunits participating in military civic action projects, and to insure that military civic actionprojects do not duplicate but rather supplement the activities of other agencies. Militarycivic actions should be exploited by appropriatepublicity, locally, regionally and nationally tocreate the image of progress.b. Conduct of Military Civic Action. BothU.S. and indigenous forces may engage in theconduct of military civic action; however, theprimary effort of U.S. individuals and unitswill be to advise, train or assist the indigenousforces. The objective of such advice, training,and assistance should be to increase the capabilities of the indigenous forces and reducedependence on U.S. aid. U.S. and/or indigenousforces and/or their equipment will not be usedin the conduct of military civic action if suchuse will interfere with, or be detrimental to,accomplishment of the military mission assigned them, or training therefor. Militaryforces should not be diverted from their primary mission. Likewise, military equipmentshould not be used in dvic actions to such anextent that its usefulness for military purposesis degraded. Command and individual responAGO6448Asibilities described below are applicable to bothU.S. and indigenous forces.( 1 ) Command. The direction, specific guidance, and control of military civic action is the responsibility of militarycommanders a t a11 levels. The initiative and imagination of subordinateleaders should be exploited and encouraged. The fact that military civicaction is often the result of a naturalimpulse of free men to help others lessfortunate should be recognized andfostered. The guidance and control ofan overall civic action program shouldallow for this natural impulse and encourage the native initiative and imagination of subordinates. The guidance provided should discriminate between the types of projects which asubordinate commander may undertake on his own initiative, and thetypes of projects which require additional funds, supplies, or equipmentand which must be approved by higherheadquarters. They are most effectivewhen they fill a recognized local needand involve some participation of localcitizens.( 2 ) Individual. Military civic action includes individual actions which causethe soldier to be regarded a s a friendof the people, as well a s their protector. Individual military civic actionranges from basic courtesy and discipline to participation in formal projects. In every case the fundamentalsof correct conduct must be followed.For example, troops must be courteousto civilians a t check points and roadblocks, and still be prepared for action if required. A disproportionateamount of formal military civic actionprojects are required to overcome theharm caused by poor troop behavior.The failure to pay a fair price forgoods, a recklessly driven vehicle, ora thoughtless or deliberate discourtesy, may be the act which will makevillagers angry enough to refuse tocooperate or to withhold vital information. If, however, the troops have
established a good relationship withthe people, have created a mutual feeling of respect and confidence, and havedemonstrated a sincere desire to helpthe people, then their active cooperation and support may increase. Inessence then, proper troop behaviorsupports the overall objectives of military civic action programs and psychological operations.c. Examples of Military Civic Action. Seeappendix 11.11. Psychological Operationsa. Psychological operations are planned andemployed by all units as an essential elementof counterinsurgency operations. Objectivesmay include the following :(1) Divide and induce defection of the insurgents.(2) Reduce civilian support of guerrillaforces.(3) Dissuade civilians from resistance activities.I(4) Win the support of uncommitted civilians.(5) Preserve and strengthen friendly civilian support.(6) Win approval for the presence of themilitary forces.(7) Development of unity or disunity asdesired.b. For purposes of conducting psychologicaloperations, the population may be divided intothree major target groups(1) Civil population.(2) The insurgents.(3) Indigenous armed forces.c. Psychological tasks and themes are basedon both the recognizable aspects of the friendlycivil programs and the potentially divisive characteristics of hostile target audiences. Possibledivisive factors a r e (1) Political, social, economic, and ideological differences among elements ofthe resistance movement.(2) Leadership rivalries within the resistance movement.(3) Danger of betrayal.(4) Harsh living conditions of guerrillaforces.(5) Scarcity of arms supplies.(6) Selfish motivation of opportunistssupporting the resistance movement.d. For more detail on psychological operations, see chapter 10 an FM 33-5.\AGO6448A
CHAPTER 2ROLES OF NONMILITARY AGENCIES AND OTHER SERVICESSection I. NATIONAL AGENCIES12. GeneralThe Military Assistance Program (MAP) tothe country of interest in most cases will provide the basic requirements for support by U.S.Army Counterinsurgency Forces. The militaryassistance program is a part of the CountryInternal Defense Plan.13. Department of State (Diplomatic Mission)At the country level the U.S. Ambassador orthe principal United States Diplomatic Officeris the Chief of the Dip1 matic Mission and ofthe Country Team. He is responsible for insuring that all U.S. military, economic andpolitical assistance programs in the country towhich he is accredited are fully integrated andcoordinated. Although not in the line of military command, he works closely with the military commander of the U.S. unified or specifiedcommand to insure a full exchange of information. Coordination of all in-country U.S. effortis accomplished through the Country Teamwhich normally consists of a senior member ofeach of the major U.S. government diplomatic,economic and military agencies located in thesubject country. One of the primary responsibilities of this team is to develop a CountryInternal Defense Plan to achieve approved U.S.objectives and to delineate the U.S. resourcesrequired for its accomplishment. The plan issubmitted to Washington for consideration andapproval by all departments and agencies concerned and becomes the basis for program proposals.e14. The U.S. Agency for International Develop
Army Counterinsurgency Forces. It describes the organization, missions, and methods of em- ployment of U.S. Army Special Action Forces (SAF), specially trained brigade-size backup forces, support units, and individuals who are deployed to advise, train and/or provide opera- tional assistance to a host country's counter-insurgency forces.
Afghan National Army's Counterinsurgency Director's assessment of counterinsurgency capabilities across the Afghan National Army. In order to assess counterinsurgency operations in the Afghan National Army, a Collections and Analysis Team from the Afghan Lessons Learned Center visited ANATC Training Centers and the Corps to gather .
eric c. newman air force 2001-2009 george f. giehrl navy 1941-1945 f conrad f. wahl army 1952-1954 sidney albrecht . william c. westley jr. army 1954-1956 roland l. winters navy 1945-1946 michael a. skowronski army . joseph a. rajnisz army 1966-1971 james l. gsell army army army army army navy army navy air force army army
A CIA review of high-value targeting (HVT) programs worldwidea suggests that HVT operations can play a useful role when they are part of a broader counterinsurgency strategy. HVT operations are most likely to contribute to successful counterinsurgency outcomes when governments decide on a d
In recent years the U.S. Army has been heavily engaged in per-forming counterinsurgency and nation-building missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. These undertakings, together with recent operations in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans, have kindled a strong interest in the Arm
Army Materiel Command (AMC) http://www.amc.army.mil/ AMCOM -Redstone Arsenal http://www.redstone.army.mil/ Association of the US Army (AUSA) http://www.ausa.org/ Army Center for Military History http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/ Army Training Support Ctr http://www.atsc.army.mil/ CECOM http://www.monmouth.army.mil
hhOperational art in counterinsurgency appears more impressionistic and mosaic: a complex series of tactical, operational, and strategic transitions. These transitions require the employment of military, political, economic, and diplomatic "forces" in sequence and simultaneously.
FMI 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations OCTOBER 2004 EXPIRES OCTOBER 2006 HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to the DOD and DOD contractors only to maintain operations security.
The Certificate in Russian Language is six- month programme of 16 Credits. The programme aims at providing beginners with basics of Russian Language. The objective of the programme is to introduce learners to the basics of Russian grammar and phonetics so that they can read, write, listen and speak Russian in an accurate manner. The programme is bilingual (Russian/English) in medium and has .
