U.S. Army Counterinsurgency - U.S. Army Center Of Military .
U.S. ArmyCounterinsurgency andContingencyOperations Doctrine1942–1976byAndrew J. BirtleCENTER OF MILITARY HISTORYUNITED STATES ARMYWASHINGTON, D.C., 2006
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataBirtle, A. J. (Andrew James)U.S. Army counterinsurgency and contingency operations doctrine,1942–1976 / by Andrew J. Birtle.p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index.1. Counterinsurgency—United States—History—20th century. 2.United States. Army. I. Title.U241.B52 2006355.4’25—dc222006020046CMH Pub 70–98–1First Printing
ForewordIn recent years the U.S. Army has been heavily engaged in performing counterinsurgency and nation-building missions in Iraq,Afghanistan, and elsewhere. These undertakings, together with recentoperations in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans, have kindled a stronginterest in the Army’s past experiences in combating irregulars andrestoring order overseas. In response, the Center has commissioned itshistorians to take a close look at the evolution of counterinsurgency andrelated doctrine in the U.S. Army. This volume, covering 1942 to 1976,is the second volume representing that effort.During the third quarter of the twentieth century, powerful political and socioeconomic forces created instability in many countries.Watching international communism exploiting such situations, theUnited States mobilized its resources to fight Communist subversionas part of a post–World War II global “Cold War.” While recognizingthe underlying problems that made societies vulnerable to Communistexploitation, the U.S. Army played a central role in executing allaspects of this policy. It furnished counterguerrilla training, advice, andassistance to foreign armies and police forces. It occupied conquered orunstable countries, organized governments, and supplied men, money,and materiel to help allied nations redress the socioeconomic and political conditions that American policy makers believed fostered unrest.And when necessary, it fought Communist insurgents, guerrillas, andeven regular forces employed in irregular roles.The Cold War is over and the threat posed by communism muchdiminished. However, the conditions that can fuel civil unrest andinsurrection are still with us and will probably always be featuresof human affairs. Soldiers, diplomats, politicians, and analysts willthus benefit from learning about how the U.S. Army has historicallyapproached such problems and the successes and failures that thoseventures have met. Although every historical event is unique, many ofthe issues and challenges involved in such actions are as relevant todayas they were in the past. By examining evolving Army doctrine, training, and field operations, this work provides an in-depth look at howour institution performed its counterinsurgency and nation-buildingresponsibilities during a previous era of global instability, experiencesiii
that might well shed some needed light on the work that must be donetoday and tomorrow.Washington, D.C.15 September 2006JEFFREY J. CLARKEChief of Military Historyiv
The AuthorAndrew J. Birtle received a B.A. degree in history from SaintLawrence University in 1979 and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in militaryhistory from Ohio State University in 1981 and 1985, respectively. Heworked for the U.S. Air Force as a historian for approximately threeyears before joining the U.S. Army Center of Military History in 1987.He has written several articles, pamphlets, and monographs; a book onthe rearmament of West Germany; and U.S. Army Counterinsurgencyand Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941, the companionvolume to this study. He is currently working on a volume concerningU.S. Army activities in Vietnam between 1961 and 1965.
PrefaceStability operations, nation building, and counterinsurgency: theseare all phrases that are very much in the news today as the United Statesand its allies attempt to bring peace and order to troubled places likeIraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo. None of these terms are new. They alloriginated over forty years ago, when the United States wrestled with anearlier era of global instability. Although the causes of foreign unrest, thenature of the threat, and the circumstances under which the United Stateshas attempted to address those challenges are different today than theywere several decades ago, many of the fundamental issues associatedwith such phenomena remain the same. Indeed, readers of this study andits predecessor volume, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and ContingencyOperations Doctrine, 1860–1941, will find many points of similarityin how the U.S. Army has dealt with counterinsurgency, constabulary,and limited contingency situations in the past. The reasons for thesesimilarities and the principles that form the core of American doctrineare described in the book. The volume also examines the nature of counterinsurgency and nation-building missions, the institutional obstaclesinherent in dealing effectively with such operations, and the strengths andweaknesses of U.S. doctrine, including the problems that can occur whenthat doctrine morphs into dogma. Readers should remember, however,that while many threads of continuity exist there are also developmentsthat have no parallel. Continuity and change are the twin muses of history. No two situations are identical, and the fact that something happenedin one instance does not mean it will occur in another. This is particularlytrue with regard to the subject matter of this book, as a plethora of political, socioeconomic, cultural, environmental, and military factors giveeach counterinsurgency, nation-building, and contingency operation aunique hue. The vagaries of these types of operations encumber both thehistorian and the doctrine writer. Consequently, writers and readers alikeshould always bear in mind that history, like military doctrine, is not anexact science, nor does it have determinative or predictive powers. It isan interpretive art that explains the past, helps us understand the present,and provides insights that may assist us in wrestling with the inevitablechallenges of the future. Hopefully this volume accomplishes all threegoals.vii
Many people, far too many to name, assisted in the production ofthis volume. I would like to extend a general word of appreciation to thestaffs of the National Archives and Records Administration, the Libraryof Congress, the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), theU.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI), and the Pentagon, InfantrySchool, and Command and General Staff College libraries. Individualsworthy of special mention are Wilbert Mahoney of the NationalArchives; Richard J. Sommers, David Keough, and Pamela Cheneyat MHI; and at CMH, Graham Cosmas, Mary Gillett, James Knight,and Geraldine Harcarik. I would also like to recognize the membersof the Center’s Publishing Division who transformed the manuscriptinto a book: Keith Tidman, Beth MacKenzie, S. L. Dowdy, and TeresaJameson. Contractor Anne Venzon created the index. I am especiallygrateful to Diane Sedore Arms, whose expert editing greatly improvedthe quality of the work. Thanks also go to the scholars who reviewedall or portions of the manuscript and made many helpful suggestions:Stephen Bowman, Jeffrey Clarke, Robert Doughty, Paul Herbert, JoelMeyerson, Allan Millett, Richard Stewart, and Lawrence Yates. Finally,I would like to thank my parents and my wife, without whose supportthis work would not have been possible.Though many people contributed to this volume, the author aloneis responsible for all interpretations and conclusions, as well as for anyerrors that may appear.Washington, D.C.15 September 2006ANDREW J. BIRTLEviii
ContentsChapter1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Terms and Their Relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Early Doctrine, World War II, and Postwar Occupations. . . . . .Guerrillas, Civilians, and the Geneva Convention of 1949 . . . .The Army and the Challenges of the Postwar World . . . . . . . . .2. The Counterinsurgency Advisory Experience, 1945–1955. .The Chinese Civil War, 1945–1949. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Greek Insurgency, 1945–1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Philippine Insurgency, 1945–1955. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Indochina War, 1945–1954. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. The Korean Civil War, 1945–1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page3381921313142556685Occupation and Advice, 1945–1950. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85South Korean Counterguerrilla Operations in anExpanded War, 1950–1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98U.S. Army Counterguerrilla Operations, 1950–1953. . . . . . . . . 102Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116The Truman-Era Counterinsurgencies in Retrospect . . . . . . . . . 1174. The Development of Counterinsurgency Doctrine,1945–1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131Sources of Doctrine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132FM 31–20, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . 134The Evolution of Army Doctrinal Literature, 1951–1958. . . . . . 142Counterinsurgency in the Educational and Training Systems. . . 151The Resurgence of Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1958–1960. . . 1575. Cold War Contingency Operations, 1958–1965 . . . . . . . . . . . 183Lebanon, 1958. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183The Emergence of Doctrine for “Situations Short of War”. . . . . 190Doctrine at Work: Thailand and the Dominican Republic . . . . . 199Doctrine in the Aftermath of the Dominican Intervention . . . . . 212ix
ChapterPage6. The Counterinsurgency Ferment, 1961–1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223Kennedy and the Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223Sources of Doctrine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229The Doctrine Development System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231The Evolution of Doctrine, 1961–1964. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234The Development of Doctrine, 1964–1965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250Disseminating Doctrine: The Education System. . . . . . . . . . . . . 257Disseminating Doctrine: The Training System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266The State of Affairs, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2767. Putting Doctrine to the Test: The Advisory Experience,1955–1975. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291The Latin American Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291Advice and Support in Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304The Asian Experience Outside Indochina. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328The Advisory Experience in Retrospect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3448. Doctrine Applied: The U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1965–1973. . 361Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362Operational Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368Operational Practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372Organizational and Tactical Adaptations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382Pacification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387All the King’s Horses: The Army Experience in Vietnam . . . . . . 4059. The Evolution of Doctrine, 1965–1975. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419Words and Organizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420Doctrinal Developments, 1966–1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424Reflections on Nation Building. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435Doctrinal Developments, 1968–1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445Doctrinal Consolidation, 1972–1974. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462The State of Doctrine at the End of the Vietnam War. . . . . . . . . 46610. The Counterinsurgency Legacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477The Great Retreat: Counterinsurgency in the 1970s. . . . . . . . . . 477The Evolution of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Retrospect. . . 484Select Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499
PageGlossary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 543MapsNo.1. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Activities,1942–1976. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. China, 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. Greece, January 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4. The Philippines, 1950. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5. French Indochina, 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6. Korea, 1949. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7. Southern Korea, 1949. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8. Lebanon, 1957 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10. Central and South America, 1961. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11. South Vietnam, 1965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12. Korea, 1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13. Thailand, 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6344357678792185206293306331336IllustrationsU.S. Soldiers Execute a German Guerrilla in the Closing Daysof World War II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Captured “Werewolves” Like These Posed Little Danger Duringthe Postwar Occupation of Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The U.S. Army School for Military Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A U.S. Military Court Tries a German Civilian Chargedwith Illegally Possessing a Firearm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .U.S. Soldiers Meet with Communist Guerrillas in an AttemptTo Negotiate a Truce to the Chinese Civil War. . . . . . . . . . . . .Greek Soldiers Engage Communist Guerrillas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet and Greek Officials InspectGovernment Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Greek Soldiers Assault a Guerrilla Bunker. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Filipino Soldiers of the 7th Battalion Combat Team Search forHuk Guerrillas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Franco-Vietnamese Soldiers Search for Viet Minh Guerrillasin a Village in the Red River Delta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi9101416334547556269
Franco-Vietnamese Soldiers Parachute into Dien Bien Phu. . . . . .A U.S. Army Adviser Helps a Korean Constabulary OfficerPlan a Counterguerrilla Operation on Cheju-do . . . . . . . . . . . .A U.S. Army Adviser to the Korean National Police HelpsDisplay Captured Guerrilla Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Korean National Policemen Inspect Captured GuerrillaWeapons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A Korean Soldier Checks the Identity Papers of a Refugee. . . . . .An Armored Railway Car Used by U.S. Military Police ToKeep South Korea’s Railroad Lines Free of GuerrillaInterference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Soldiers from the 65th Infantry Bring in Captured Guerrillas. . . .An American Convoy Defends Itself Against a GuerrillaAmbush in the Korean Mountains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Special Activities Group Soldiers Engage Guerrillas . . . . . . . . . . .American and Korean Soldiers Deliver Food to IndigentCivilians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A Civil Affairs Soldier Organizes a Village Election . . . . . . . . . . .U.S. Soldiers Depart from a Village That They Have Set onFire To Prevent Guerrillas from Using It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lt. Col. Russell W. Volckmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .U.S. Army Cavalrymen Playing the Role of Mounted GuerrillasDuring a Counterguerrilla Training Exercise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .“Guerrillas” Ambush an Unsuspecting Soldier During aTraining Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Soldiers Gain Their Bearings in Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .An American and Lebanese Soldier Man a Joint Checkpoint . . . .A U.S. Tank Clears away an Insurgent Roadblock. . . . . . . . . . . . . .General Maxwell D. Taylor Believed This Photo of a U.S.Soldier Riding a Burro Created Adverse Publicity forthe Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .U.S. Soldiers Undergo Live-Fire Counterguerrilla Training inThailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Soldiers from the 27th Infantry Patrol the Thai-Laotian Border. .Residents of Santo Domingo Express Confusion over theArrival of U.S. Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .An American Checkpoint Controls the Movement of PeopleThrough Santo Domingo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A U.S. Soldier Watches a Manhole To Prevent theConstitutionalists from Moving Men and SuppliesThrough the Sewer System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6187189191201202204207208
A Soldier Distributes Milk to Civilians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker Chats withSoldiers Who Were Playing the Role of Villagers During aCounterguerrilla Training Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .President John F. Kennedy Talks with Brig. Gen. William P.Yarborough. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Classroom Instruction as Part of the Military AssistanceTraining Adviser Course . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .“Guerrillas” Maneuver During a Counterguerrilla Exercise. . . . . .“Guerrilla” Mortarmen Emerge from Concealment DuringVietnam-Oriented Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Soldiers Search “Dead” Insurgents That They Have JustAmbushed During Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Helicopter Shortages Meant That Soldiers Sometimes HadTo Practice Airmobile Operations Using Mock-ups. . . . . . . . .Soldiers Enter a Mock Village During CounterguerrillaTraining in Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .With the Help of an Interpreter and Friendly Village Officials,an Army Patrol Interrogates Captured “Guerrillas” DuringTraining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .American and Ecuadorian Engineers Discuss a Road-BuildingProject as Part of the Alliance for Progress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ecuadorian Villagers Try Out a New Water Pump Built forThem by U.S. Army and Ecuadorian Army Engineers. . . . . . .Nicaraguan Soldiers Take Part in a U.S.-Assisted UrbanCounterterrorism Exercise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A U.S. Army Adviser Observes Guatemalan Soldiers PracticeRiot Control Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A U.S. Army Special Forces Adviser Discusses Tactics withBolivian Troops Prior to a Counterguerrilla Operation . . . . . .A U.S. Army Adviser Accompanies El Salvadoran ArmyMedics on a Medical Civic Action Initiative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .An American Soldier Distributes Propaganda in Comic BookForm to Bolivian Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .South Vietnamese Troops Search for Insurgents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A U.S. Army Medic Treats a Vietnamese Child as Part of theMedical Civic Action Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .South Vietnamese Civilians Build Fortifications Around TheirHamlet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .As in Many Insurgencies, War and Peace Shared an UneasyCoexistence in South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7301303303308318320322
A South Vietnamese Army Cultural Drama Group WoosVillagers as Part of the Battle for the Hearts and Mindsof the Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .U.S. Soldiers Patrol the Barrier Fence Bordering the KoreanDemilitarized Zone. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .South Korean Troops Debark from a U.S. Army HelicopterDuring a Counterguerrilla Operation in South Korea. . . . . . . .A Thai Mobile Development Unit Accompanied by anAmerican Adviser Visits a Village . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A U.S. Adviser Instructs Thai Soldiers in CounterguerrillaWarfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .U.S. Army Engineers Build a School in Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . .General William C. Westmoreland Inspects Viet CongPrisoners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A Viet Cong Prisoner, Wearing a Mask To Hide His Identity,Helps U.S. Troops Locate His Former Colleagues . . . . . . . . . .Vietnam’s Terrain Posed Significant Challenges toCounterguerrilla Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A Member of a Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol. . . . . . . . . . . .Airmobile Infantry Played a Central Role in U.S.Counterguerrilla Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Soldiers Teach English as Part of the Army’s Outreach Effortsin Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .U.S. Infantrymen Search a Village . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Soldiers Round Up Civilians as Part of a Village Search. . . . . . . .A Vietnamese Policeman and an American Soldier CheckIdentities and Look for Contraband at a Joint Checkpoint . . .U.S. Soldiers Forcibly Relocate Civilians from Their Village . . . .A U.S. Patrol Destroys Buildings Used by the Viet Congin the Boi Loi Woods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Dental Services as Civic Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A U.S. Soldier Helps Vietnamese Civilians Build a School . . . . .Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Members of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps UndergoCounterinsurgency Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .West Point Cadets Search a Hut as Part of CounterguerrillaTraining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .“Guerrillas” Enter a Mock Viet Cong Village Used forCounterguerrilla Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Troops Receiving Counterambush Instruction Prior toDeploying to Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394395396397398421457459460463
PageInfantrymen Learning How To Locate and Search Viet CongTunnels During Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464A “Guerrilla” Sniper Takes Aim at a Patrol DuringCounterguerrilla Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466Illustrations courtesy of the following sources: cover and pp. 33,107, 322, 374, Army Art Collection; 9, 10, 14, 16, 62, 90, 95, 96, 99,104, 106, 110, 112, 113, 115, 154, 156, 186, 187, 189, 201, 202, 204,207, 208, 210, 258, 270, 271, 273, 274, 276, 277, 295 (top/bottom), 297(top/bottom), 301, 303 (top/bottom), 308, 318, 320, 326, 332, 333, 338,340, 343, 377, 379, 388, 391, 393, 396, 397, 398, 457, 459, 460, 463,464, 466, National Archives; 45, 47, 55, Library of Congress; 69, 71,226, 228, 363, 373, 394, 395, U.S. Army Military History Institute; 133,We Remained, by Russell Volckmann; 191, United Press International;and 421, U.S. Army Center of Military History.xv
U.S. ArmyCounterinsurgency andContingencyOperations Doctrine1942–1976
1IntroductionRarely do armies have the luxury of being able to prepare for onlyone mission. Although waging conventional war has always lain at theheart of the military profession, it has never been the soldier’s only, oreven most frequently performed, role. Historically, U.S. soldiers havespent far more time performing a variety of constabulary, administrative, diplomatic, humanitarian, nation-building, and irregular warfarefunctions than they have fighting on the conventional battlefield. Thiswork describes the evolution of U.S. Army doctrine for two of themany types of operations other than conventional warfare for which theArmy had to prepare during the three decades that followed World WarII—counterinsurgency and limited peacetime contingency operations.Terms and Their RelevanceFighting insurgents and intervening in the internal affairs of foreign countries had long been missions performed by the Army, butafter World War II these missions achieved heightened significance.The United States emerged from the war as a world leader with globalinterests and obligations. The outbreak of the Cold War magnifiedthese burdens, as the threat of Communist subversion and the need forthe United States to project military power into the internal affairs offoreign states led the Army to undertake a variety of counterinsurgencyand constabulary missions. The extent of these missions, as well asthe doctrinal confusion surrounding them, is illustrated by the plethoraof terms employed to describe them. According to one student of theperiod, soldiers, policy makers, and civilian analysts coined more thanfifty terms to describe the military’s many counterinsurgency functions, an estimate that is probably too low. Among them were such
Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1942–1976expressions as situations short of war, low intensity warfare, cold waroperations, stability operations, subbelligerency operations, para-war,revolutionary (and counterrevolutionary) war, guerrilla (and counterguerrilla) war, internal defense and development, sublimited war, andmost exotic of all, subliminal war.1Because of this extensive but confusing lexicon, a few definitions must be established. For the purposes of this book, the termcounterinsurgency embraces all of the political, economic, social, andmilitary actions taken by a government for the suppression of insurgent, resistance, and revolutionary movements. The military’s role incounterinsurgency embraces two broad categories of activities: combat, frequently counterguerrilla in nature, and pacification. The latterencompasses a broad array of civil, administrative, and constabularyfunctions designed to establish or maintain governmental authority inan area that is either openly or potentially hostile.A contingency operation, according to the Department of Defense,is any military operation that is likely to result either in confrontationswith an opposing force or the call-up of reserves.2 Rather than attemptto cover all the many and disparate activities that could conceivably fitunder the rubric of contingency operations, this work confines its discussion to limited overseas missions undertaken in peacetime to restoreorder, quell an insurrection, bolster a friendly government, or otherwiseserve as an instrument of American diplomacy short of engaging infull-scale hostilities. Limited contingency operations of this type sharewith counterinsurgency a number of features that allow the student ofdoctrine to consider them as a whole. First, the military frequently performs these missions in relatively underdeveloped areas, where transportation systems are often rudimentary and topographical and climaticconditions are difficult. Second, combat in such situations usually pitsthe Army against irregular or semiregular forces. Finally, and mostimportant, political considerations play a crucial role in these activitiesat both the operational and tactical level. Not only is the close coordination of political, diplomatic, and military measures crucial duringboth of these types of operations, but also the ultimate success of thesemissions often depends on the interaction of soldiers with indigenouscivilian populations. Consequently, soldiers engaged in these activitiesmust exercise political and diplomatic skills beyond the martial talentsnormally required on the conventional battlefield.One last term that must be defined is doctrine. For the purpose ofthis study, doctrine is that body of knowledge disseminated throughofficially approved publications, school curriculums, and textbooksth
In recent years the U.S. Army has been heavily engaged in per-forming counterinsurgency and nation-building missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. These undertakings, together with recent operations in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans, have kindled a strong interest in the Arm
Afghan National Army's Counterinsurgency Director's assessment of counterinsurgency capabilities across the Afghan National Army. In order to assess counterinsurgency operations in the Afghan National Army, a Collections and Analysis Team from the Afghan Lessons Learned Center visited ANATC Training Centers and the Corps to gather .
eric c. newman air force 2001-2009 george f. giehrl navy 1941-1945 f conrad f. wahl army 1952-1954 sidney albrecht . william c. westley jr. army 1954-1956 roland l. winters navy 1945-1946 michael a. skowronski army . joseph a. rajnisz army 1966-1971 james l. gsell army army army army army navy army navy air force army army
A CIA review of high-value targeting (HVT) programs worldwidea suggests that HVT operations can play a useful role when they are part of a broader counterinsurgency strategy. HVT operations are most likely to contribute to successful counterinsurgency outcomes when governments decide on a d
Army Counterinsurgency Forces. It describes the organization, missions, and methods of em- ployment of U.S. Army Special Action Forces (SAF), specially trained brigade-size backup forces, support units, and individuals who are deployed to advise, train and/or provide opera- tional assistance to a host country's counter-insurgency forces.
Army Materiel Command (AMC) http://www.amc.army.mil/ AMCOM -Redstone Arsenal http://www.redstone.army.mil/ Association of the US Army (AUSA) http://www.ausa.org/ Army Center for Military History http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/ Army Training Support Ctr http://www.atsc.army.mil/ CECOM http://www.monmouth.army.mil
FMI 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations OCTOBER 2004 EXPIRES OCTOBER 2006 HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to the DOD and DOD contractors only to maintain operations security.
AFGHANISTAN REPORT 7 Carl Forsberg. December 2010. CounterinsurgenCy in Kandahar. Cover Photograph: Canadian soldiers of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, along with Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, took part in a partnered dismounted . patrol around the Panjwai'i District in Kandahar province, Oct. 7, 2010.
Secret Wall O2 Pit to Q2 X2 To Level 7 (X3) A1 Portal to L10 (A2) [] Button Q1 From Pit O1 X3 To Level 7 (X1) 0 Pressure Pad Q2 From Pit O2 X4 To Level 5 (X2) Y Nest In the place where you found a lot of Kenkus (bird creatures) is a place called "Nest." After killing both Kenkus, put all ten Kenku eggs on the floor. The wall will disappear, and .
