International Relations: The Key Concepts - YCIS

ALLIANCEAn agreement between two or more states to work together on mutualsecurity issues. States enter into such cooperative security arrangements in order to protect themselves against a common (or perceived)threat. By pooling their resources and acting in concert, the alliancepartners believe that they can improve their overall power positionwithin the international system and their security relative to statesoutside the alliance.Alliances can be either formal or informal arrangements. A formalalliance is publicly recognised through the signing of a treaty in whichthe signatories promise to consider an attack on any one of them asequivalent to an attack on all of them. The North Atlantic TreatyOrganisation (NATO) is a good example of a formal securityalliance. Informal alliances are much looser and less stable and rely, toa large extent, on the word of the parties involved and ongoingcooperation between them. The latter may entail, among other things,joint military exercises, the sharing of strategic information, orpromises of assistance during a military crisis. Informal alliances canalso take the form of secret agreements between leaders.There are a number of benefits in forming alliances. First, they canoffset the cost of defence. It is much cheaper for a state to ally itselfwith a stronger state that possesses a nuclear capability than it is for thatstate to build and maintain its own infrastructure, technological expertise, and weapons delivery systems. This makes alliances especiallyattractive to small, vulnerable states. Second, alliances can provideincreased economic benefits through increased trade, aid, and loansbetween alliance partners. The deployment of foreign militarypersonnel can also be beneficial to a local economy.From the point of view of the great powers, alliances can providethem with a strategic advantage with respect to their actual or potentialenemies. The United States, for example, entered into a number ofbilateral alliances after 1945 in order to gain landing rights, access toports, and the use of military facilities in strategically important locations around the periphery of the former Soviet Union. Alliances canthereby help to contain an enemy and control a region of strategicinterest. In addition, alliances can be useful in maintaining hegemoniccontrol over one’s allies, encouraging them to ‘bandwagon’ with thegreat power as opposed to ‘balancing’ against it!The lifespan of alliances varies. Some last for many years. This mayhave to do with a long-lasting perception of threat, similarity of political systems between member states, or the existence of a powerful1

hegemon. Other alliances decay fairly quickly. The so-called ‘GrandAlliance’ between Britain, the former Soviet Union, and the UnitedStates during the Second World War is a good example. It lasted only aslong as Hitler remained a threat to world peace. As soon as Germanywas defeated in 1945, the alliance broke down. Also, a state may bowout of an alliance if it no longer feels that its partners can fulfil theterms of the alliance. Finally, leadership and ideological changes amongmember states may undermine an alliance.Liberal internationalists from Immanuel Kant onwards haveargued that alliances are a source of conflict between states. After theend of the First World War, US President Woodrow Wilson suggestedthat alliances drew states into webs of intrigue and rivalry. On theother hand, realists tend to argue that states form alliances based ontheir national interests. A change in the national interest can andshould prompt states to rethink the terms of their alliance membership.Alliances should be regarded as highly flexible arrangements that canplay an important role in maintaining the balance of power.It is important to note that alliances are not simply beneficial security arrangements for ‘peace-loving’ states. They can be used to promote aggression as well. The alliance between Germany, Italy, andJapan during the Second World War is a good example. Moreover,alliances may themselves be provocative instruments of foreign policy.It may well be the case, for example, that an alliance between two statesis regarded as a hostile act by a third state. Under these circumstances,an alliance may lead to an arms race. It is for this reason that somestates (such as Sweden and Switzerland) have traditionally pursued apolicy of neutrality and non-alignment in Europe.See also: balance of power; cold war; collective security; common security; concert of powers; national interest; North Atlantic TreatyOrganisation; realism; security dilemmaFurther reading: Reiter, 1996; Snyder, 1997; Walt, 1997ANARCHYIn everyday usage, this term evokes images of chaos, violence, andlawlessness. Derived from the Greek word anarkhos, meaning ‘withouta ruler’, a state of anarchy can be said to prevail when there is nogovernment to keep the peace. Anarchy is often associated withperiods of revolutionary upheaval and extreme social and political2

turbulence. Some science fiction writers and film-makers are fond ofemploying the idea to depict the future of the human race. In thissense, anarchy is the complete opposite of civilised conduct andexpresses an extremely pessimistic view of human potential.Students of international politics use the term in a more specificway. International politics is said to be anarchical because no singlestate or coalition of states has absolute control over the entire system.There is no central government, and the peculiar character of the unitsoperating within the international system is that they are sovereignand autonomous states, responsible for their own fate even though theymay not control it. They exercise legitimate control and authority overtheir own territory and answer to no higher power. They determinewhen it is appropriate to fight, when to make peace, and when to act inconcert with others.Thomas Hobbes was the first modern political philosopher todescribe international relations as anarchical. While it is true that hispolitical philosophy is primarily concerned with the problem of orderwithin the state, his description of the international ‘state of nature’ hashad a major influence on the development of international relationstheory.Hobbes uses the idea (sometimes called the ‘domestic analogy’) of astate of nature to show why rational individuals would and shouldprefer to live under an absolute and supreme power than live in a worldwithout order. According to him, the state of nature is one of miseryand hardship in which individuals continually struggle for survival. Nomatter how strong and powerful they may be, they are incapable ofcompletely securing themselves against attack. Under these conditions,there is no time for leisure, social communion, or civilised behaviour.Life (which he famously described as ‘nasty, brutish and short’) is spentperpetually trying to outwit competitors in order simply to stay alive.This state of affairs is so oppressive that it is in the interest of rationalindividuals to give up their natural freedom and rights in return forprotection and security against others granted by an all-powerfulruler or Leviathan.It is easy to see how this pre-social condition is often said to beapplicable to international relations, particularly among realists in thefield. They argue that the absence of a supreme power capable ofenforcing order across the entire system means that individual states arein a permanent state of insecurity and must be prepared to do whateverthey can to survive in this hostile self-help environment. The relationship between anarchy and war, then, is extremely close.Today, the realist interpretation of the consequences of anarchy for3

international relations is much debated in international relations theory. Some liberal internationalists, for example, agree that anarchy isimportant, but argue that realists tend to exaggerate its effects on statebehaviour. Similarly, constructivists accept that anarchy is the characteristic condition of the international system, but argue that, by itself, itmeans nothing. For example, an anarchy of friends is quite differentfrom an anarchy of enemies, but both are possible. In short, the natureand effects of anarchy among states depend a great deal on the particular level of analysis that different theories focus on, and how theyjustify the character and relationship between different levels.See also: constructivism; international society; inter-paradigm debate;levels of analysis; liberal internationalism; prisoners’ dilemma; realism; relative gains/absolute gains; warFurther reading: Bull, 1995; Milner, 1991; Powell, 1994; Waltz, 1979; Wendt, 1992APPEASEMENTAppeasement is an extremely problematic foreign policy goal. It isbased on the assumption that acceding to the demands of aggressivestates will prevent war from breaking out. The folly of this approachlies in the fact that aggressive states are rarely satisfied in this way.Capitulating to their demands simply feeds their thirst for power,making them stronger. In the long run, such a policy is likely toincrease the risk of war rather than reduce it.Britain and France pursued a policy of appeasement with AdolfHitler throughout most of the 1930s. Hitler had never made a secret ofhis expansionist (and racist) aims in Europe. They are clearly spelt outin his book Mein Kampf [My Struggle]. In the late 1930s he orchestrated a propaganda campaign against the Czechoslovak government,claiming that it was persecuting the Sudeten Germans. There was agrain of truth in this claim. The Sudeten Germans were excluded fromgovernment positions for linguistic reasons and many Sudeten Germans were unhappy about this discrimination. Hitler took advantageof the situation to promote further unrest among the Sudeten Germans. Consequently, he demanded that Sudetenland be turned over toGerman control. Of course, this was totally unacceptable to theCzechs. But Hitler continued to press his claims against Czechoslovakia. The Western states, eager to avoid another European war, insistedon an international conference to settle the matter. On 30 September4

1938 the Munich Agreement was signed and control of the Sudetenland passed to Germany, with France and Britain guaranteeing thenewly drawn borders of Czechoslovakia. Hitler also pledged not togo to war with Britain. Within six months, Hitler had invadedCzechoslovakia and controlled the whole country.As a consequence of the Munich Agreement, Hitler consolidatedhis grip on Eastern Europe and invaded Poland the following year.Clearly, the policy of appeasing Hitler had failed dismally. Rather thanforestalling war in Europe, the Munich Agreement actually made warpossible by tipping the balance of power in Germany’s favour. Hadthe West been prepared to go to war to protect Czechoslovakia againstGermany, a full-scale world war might have been averted. This is, ofcourse, conjecture. But there is no doubt that the annexation of theSudetenland made Hitler a more formidable enemy than he otherwisemight have been.The moral which policymakers and scholars have drawn from thisunsavoury affair is that the international community must not accommodate aggressive and unreasonable states. To do so is to court disaster.But while this holds true in the case of Nazi Germany, it is importantnot to rule out conciliation altogether. There may well be occasionswhen appeasement is an appropriate policy option. It is conceivablethat a state may have legitimate grievances which should be heard andaccommodated. One of the dangers with ruling out accommodationand conciliation is that it may actually increase the possibility of misperception and leave a state with no other option but to go to war.Moreover, there is now a tendency for government elites to use theexample of Munich to defend their own aggressive foreign policies. Itis no accident that US policymakers revisited the Munich case as a wayof justifying their involvement in Iraq and in the former Yugoslaviaduring the 1990s. But it is as important not to swayed by such rhetoricas it is to recognise that a policy of appeasement can have dangerousoutcomes. Whether a policy can be condemned as a form of appeasement is ultimately context-dependent. Each case needs to be evaluatedon its merits.See also: arms race; balance of power; misperception; prisoners’dilemmaFurther reading: Carr, 1946; McDonough, 1998; Robbins, 19975

ARMS CONTROLOne way of dealing with the proliferation of weapons is through negotiated arms control agreements, which have a long history in international relations. The Athenians, for example, entered into a range ofarms control measures with the Spartans almost 2,500 years ago. In theearly nineteenth century, the Rush-Bagot Treaty (1817) demilitarisedthe border between the United States and Canada. The number ofarms control agreements increased markedly in the twentieth century,however. This is partly due to the advent of nuclear weapons and thedanger of a nuclear war between the superpowers. But the problemof the horizontal spread of weapons among states – both conventionaland nuclear – has also been an important stimulus to arms control.Arms control is different from disarmament. Advocates of thelatter argue that the only way to ensure peaceful international relationsis to eliminate weapons from the calculations of states. In contrast, thepurpose of arms control is purely regulatory. Its goal is not to constructa new world order, but to manage the existing one. Indeed, armscontrol may go hand in hand with an increase in the numbers andtypes of weapons among states.Controlling the proliferation of weapons can be accomplished in anumber of ways, and different treaties embody different strategies.These include:12345limiting the number and kinds of weapons that can legally be usedin war;limiting the potential for destruction after war has broken out byreducing the size of arsenals;reducing the overall number of weapons;banning technologies which may have a destabilising effect on thebalance of power;developing confidence-building measures.Typically, arms control agreements ban certain classes of weaponsand weapons systems, place upper limits on the number of weaponsthat states may possess, limit the size and destructive power of weapons,ban the production of weapons that will increase the likelihood of war,and stop or at least slow the development of new technologies. Theyalso include new methods of communication, verification, and compliance. Since 1945, many arms control agreements have focused onthe proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, theproblems associated with anti-ballistic missile systems, and on reducing6

the frequency of nuclear tests around the world. Some of the mostfamous agreements include: the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of gas and bacteriologicalweapons;the 1959 Antarctic Treaty preventing states from using Antarctica formilitary purposes;the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention banning the manufactureand possession of biological weapons;the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) limiting the transferof nuclear weapons and allied technologies to non-nuclear states;the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT 1) controlling thedevelopment and use of anti-ballistic missile systems;the 1989 Conventional Forces in Europe (CAFE) Treaty limiting thenumber of conventions arms that could be deployed in Europe;the 1991–92 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START 1) reducing thesize of the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals;the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requiring thatsignatories destroy their chemical weapons stocks within a decade;the 1998 Anti-Personnel Landmines Treaty (APLT).While there is little doubt that arms control played an importantrole in reducing tensions between the superpowers during the coldwar, the history of that period reveals a number of problems with armscontrol agreements. Most importantly, accurate verification is difficult.Put bluntly, states often cheat. They sometimes fail to disclose the fullextent of their weapons stocks, build secret installations, and move theirweapons around. They can also be uncooperative and evasive with onsite inspectors. Even with technical advances such as satellite surveillance, it is impossible to be certain that states will abide by the terms oftheir agreements. The spectre of mistrust haunts all arms controlagreements.Closely allied to this problem is the propensity of states to disregardarms control agreements after they have signed them. Although theUnited States has signed the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, forexample, it has developed substantial quantities of chemical weaponssince then. This raises the issue of the enforceability of arms controlagreements. How does the international community enforce armscontrol agreements in a world of sovereign states? Short of armedintervention, there are few credible options available. Sanctions, economic inducements, and diplomatic persuasion have all been tried,but their overall success is difficult to gauge. At any rate, even if these7

sorts of coercive measures work against small, economically weak states,it is difficult to see how the international community could enforcesuch agreements against the United States, China, or Russia.These problems highlight the extremely fragile nature of arms control agreements. It is for this reason that a number of scholars haveexpressed scepticism about their contribution to international stability.Perhaps the biggest problem is the unequal distribution of power in theinternational system. A number of countries in the Third World haveargued that arms control agreements, like the 1968 Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT), are a way for the First World to maintain its strangleholdover the international system. Rather than leading to a reduction in theincidence of war and to a lessening of international tension, armscontrol ensures the continued subservience of many of the world’s lesspowerful states. Whether one agrees with this view or not, it is certainly a powerful criticism and one not likely to change in the nearfuture.See also: arms race; arms trade; cold war; deterrence; disarmament;mutually assured destruction; nuclear proliferation; securitydilemma, weapons of mass destructionFurther reading: Adler, 1992; Freedman, 1981; Gallagher, 1998; Pierre, 1997ARMS RACEA competitive struggle between two or more states seeking to improvetheir security relative to each other by building up their militarystrength. The logic behind arms races is sometimes referred to as anaction–reaction phenomenon. If state A embarks on an aggressive military acquisitions programme, a neighbouring state B may assume theworst, i.e. that state A is preparing for war. Prudence, and the fact thatinternational relations occur in a ‘self-help’ environment, suggests thatstate B should also increase its military spending to match that of stateA. Failure to do so would leave it open to the possibility of attack. Butthe attempt to restore the balance of power by state B may not besuccessful. State A may interpret B’s reaction as a hostile act and ‘upthe-ante’ even further. The result is an increase in the level of hostilitybetween

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE KEY CONCEPTS Featuring 150 entries, International Relations: The Key Concepts is the essential guide for anyone interested in international affairs. Com-prehensive and up-to-date, it introduces the most important themes in