Safety I&C Systems - Nrc.gov
Safety I&C SystemsSafety I&C SystemsTopical ReportApplicable Codes and RegulationsSafety I&C System Description Overview4th Pre-application Meeting PPS ESF-CCS CPCS QIAS-P Data CommunicationSoftware Development and V&VEquipment ReliabilityDesign Acceptance CriteriaSummaryAPR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-N
Safety I&C Systems4th Pre-application Meeting1 Topical Report1APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsTopical Report (1/1)4th Pre-application MeetingTable of Contents PurposeScopeApplicable Codes and RegulationsI&C System DescriptionSoftware ReliabilityEquipment QualificationEquipment ReliabilityReferencesAppendix A. Conformance to IEEE Std. 603-1991Appendix B. Conformance to IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-2003Appendix C. Conformance to DI&C ISG-042APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
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Safety I&C SystemsApplicable Codes And Regulations (1/8)4th Pre-application Meeting10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria GDC 1, “Quality Standards and Records” Conforms to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, “QualityAssurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants” GDC 2, “Design Bases for Protection against Natural Phenomena” Designed as Seismic Category I Installed in the I&C equipment rooms or MCR that provide protectionagainst other natural phenomena GDC 10, “Reactor Design” Contributes to reactor design margin by providing conservatism insetpoint calculations and fault-tolerant features Uncertainties and setpoint methodology will be submitted as aseparate technical report4APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsApplicable Codes And Regulations (2/8)4th Pre-application Meeting10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria GDC 19, “Control Room” Equipped with manual reactor trip initiation switches and manualESFAS initiation switches in the MCR safety console Implemented with the displays for safe operation in the MCR. GDC 21, “Protection System Reliability and Testability” Maintains the protection function in case of any single credible failure Allows periodic testing without reducing the availability of theprotection systems using bypass function5APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsApplicable Codes And Regulations (3/8)4th Pre-application Meeting10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria GDC 22, “Protection System Independence” Consists of four independent measurement channels for eachprotective parameter GDC 23, “Protection System Failure Modes” Designed to fail into a safe state FMEA method will be described in the Topical Report GDC 24, “Separation of Protection and Control System” Maintains physical separation from non-safety system6APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsApplicable Codes And Regulations (4/8)4th Pre-application MeetingRegulatory Guide Regulatory Guide 1.22, “Periodic Testing of Protection System ActuationFunctions” Provides complete overlap testing during the reactor operating atpower or when shutdown Regulatory Guide 1.47, “Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication forNuclear Power Plant Safety Systems” Provides system level alarms when a component is bypassed orinoperable Regulatory Guide 1.53, “Application of the Single Failure Criterion toNuclear Power Plant Protection Systems” Assures both the reactor safety and resistance to a spurious reactortrip with four channel configuration7APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsApplicable Codes And Regulations (5/8)4th Pre-application MeetingRegulatory Guide Regulatory Guide 1.62, “Manual Initiation of Protection Action” Provides manual initiation of a protective action at the system level forRPS and ESFAS Provides manual switches on the MCR safety console Regulatory Guide 1.75, “Criteria for Independence of Electrical SafetySystems” Located in different geographic fire zones for each channel Electrically isolated using fiber-optic technology Physically separated Regulatory Guide 1.97, “Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation forNuclear Power Plants” Provides the accident monitoring instrumentation according to IEEEStd. 497-20028APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsApplicable Codes And Regulations (6/8)4th Pre-application MeetingRegulatory Guide Regulatory Guide 1.105, “Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation” Setpoint methodology conforms to ISA-S67.04-1994 Uncertainties and setpoint methodology will be submitted as aseparate technical report Regulatory Guide 1.118, “Periodic Testing of Electric Power and ProtectionSystems” Designed to be periodically tested in accordance with the criteria ofIEEE Std. 338-1987 Provides overlapped testing for the RPS and ESFAS without initiatinga reactor trip or ESF actuation Regulatory Guide 1.152, “Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systemsof Nuclear Power Plants” Conforms to IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-20039APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsApplicable Codes And Regulations (7/8)4th Pre-application MeetingRegulatory Guide Regulatory Guide 1.168, “Verification, Validation, Reviews and Audits forDigital Computer Software used in Safety Systems of NPP Conforms to IEEE Std. 1012-1998 and IEEE Std. 1028-1997 Regulatory Guide 1.169, “Configuration Management Plans for DigitalComputer Software used in Safety Systems on NPP Conforms to IEEE Std. 828-1990 and IEEE Std. 1042-1997 Regulatory Guide 1.170, “Software Test Documentation for DigitalComputer Software used in Safety Systems of NPP Conforms to IEEE Std. 829-1983 Regulatory Guide 1.171, “Software Unit Testing for Digital ComputerSoftware used in Safety Systems of NPP Conforms to IEEE Std. 1008-1987 Regulatory Guide 1.172, “Software Requirements Specifications for DigitalComputer Software used in Safety Systems of NPP Conforms to IEEE Std. 830-1993APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-N APR140010
Safety I&C SystemsApplicable Codes And Regulations (8/8)4th Pre-application MeetingRegulatory Guide Regulatory Guide 1.173, “Developing Software Life Cycle Processes forDigital Computer Software used in Safety Systems Conforms to IEEE Std. 1074-1995 Regulatory Guide 1.180, “Guidelines for Evaluating Electromagnetic andRadio Frequency Interference in Safety Related I&C” Qualified according to the EMI/RFI requirements of MIL Std. 461E Regulatory Guide 1.209, “Guidelines for Environmental Qualification ofSafety Related I&C in Nuclear Power Plants” Qualified according to the requirements of IEEE Std. 323-200311APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
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Safety I&C SystemsOverview (1/6)4th Pre-application MeetingOverall I&C System Architecture Safety I&C system uses qualified PLC platform Non-safety I&C system uses DCS platform Provides 4 channel redundancy for safety I&C system except QIAS-P Installed in physically separated I&C equipment rooms Electrical isolation, physical separation and communication independence Between redundant safety channels Between safety system and non-safety system Diversity to cope with the CCF of digital safety I&C system Diverse Protection System Diverse Indication System Diverse Manual ESF Actuation Switches13APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsOverview (2/6)LegendLarge Display PanelSafety ConsoleCommon platform for Safety TInitiationSetpointReset4th Pre-application MeetingGatewayServerProtection & SafetyMonitoring SystemAlarmServerConventional H/W componentsProcessSoft ControlSoft Control NetworkCCGSerial Data LinkSafety networkInformationFPDNon-safety networkHardwired ConnectionESF-CCSPPS / ESF-CCSNon-Safety NetworkComputer server, monitor & peripheralsESCMACIMCPMDedicated equipment for its functionCh. ConfirmSwitchesDedicated H/W RTSSCommon platform for Non-safety afety NetworkControl & Monitoring SystemData SNPCSPP&LCSFWCSSBCSDiverse sQIAS-N NetworkPPS(4 Ch)SDLESFCCSCPCSQIAS-P(4 Ch)(A, B)ENFMSDIS(4 Ch)Startup/ControlM/G SetSafetyAPC-S(4 Ch)DMADISCIMRemote I/ODPSSafety Components(Sensors, Txs, Pumps, Valves, etc.)FissionChamberSensorsICINon-safety Components(Sensors, Txs, Pumps, Valves, etc.)APC-S : Auxiliary Process Cabinet – Safety, CIM : Component Interface Module, CPCS : Core Protection Calculator System, DIS : Diverse Indication System,DMA : Diverse Manual ESF Actuation, DPS : Diverse Protection System, ENFMS : Ex-core Neutron Flux Monitoring System, ESCM : ESF-CCS Soft Control ModuleFIDAS : Fixed In-core Detector Amplifier System, ICI : In-Core Instrumentation , NIMS : NSSS Integrity Monitoring System, NPCS : NSSS Process Control System,OM : Operator Module, P-CCS : Process Component Control System, PCS : Power Control System, QIAS-P/N : Qualified Indication & Alarm System - PAMI / Non-safety14APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsOverview (3/6)4th Pre-application MeetingProtection and Safety Monitoring System Plant Protection System Initiates reactor trip or ESFAS whenever the monitored processvalues exceed the pre-defined limits Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System Controls the operation of ESF components Receives manual ESFAS actuation signals from safety console Core Protection Calculator System Computes DNBR and LPD Provides the trip signal to PPS Qualified Indication and Alarm System – PAMI Displays Type A, B & C variables required by Reg. Guide 1.97 andthe variables for inadequate core cooling monitoring Auxiliary Process Cabinet – Safety Receives safety field signals and distributes them to PPS, ESFCCS, CPCS, QIAS-P and DIS15APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsOverview (4/6)4th Pre-application MeetingControl and Monitoring System Power Control System Controls reactor power level Includes Reactor Regulating System, Reactor Power CutbackSystem and Digital Rod Control System NSSS Process Control System Controls NSSS processes Consists of Pressurizer Pressure & Level Control System, FeedwaterControl System and Steam Bypass Control System Process-Component Control System Controls BOP processes Qualified Indication and Alarm System – Non-safety Supports continuous plant operation when Information ProcessingSystem is unavailable Provides the indications required for EOP execution, safe shutdownand critical operator action required by PRA and HRA16APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsOverview (5/6)4th Pre-application MeetingDiverse Actuation System Diverse Protection System Provides defense against CCF of PPS/ESF-CCS (SECY 93-087,BTP 7-19) Reduces the risk of ATWS (10 CFR 50.62) Diverse Indication System Displays Position 4 variables (SECY 93-087, BTP 7-19) Diverse Manual ESF Actuation Switches Provide Position 4 actuation (SECY 93-087, BTP 7-19)17APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsOverview (6/6)4th Pre-application MeetingHuman – System Interface Large Display Panel Display of overall plant operation Operator Consoles Monitor and control all processes Safety Console– Backup operation during total failure of the operator consoles; EOPs operation and safe shutdown Critical operator actions required by PRA and HRA Manual ESF system level actuation switches and reactor tripswitches Alarms, displays, controls needed to perform periodic surveillancetest18APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsPlant Protection System (1/5)Design Features4th Pre-application Meeting Qualified PLC platformReactor Trip & ESFAS initiation function Mitigates the consequences of safety related design bases eventsFour independent channelsRedundancy within each channel to enhance availabilityFail-safe design for component failure or loss of electrical powerContinuous automatic on-line testing Hardware self diagnostics Cross channel comparisonsManual testing Computer-aided surveillance testing19APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsPlant Protection System (2/5)System Description4th Pre-application Meeting Bistable Processor Generates trip signals when the process value exceeds a setpoint Local Coincidence Logic Processor Determines the trip state based on the state of the four channelbistable trip inputs and respective bypasses Generates the initiation signal for RTSS or ESF-CCS Maintenance & Test Panel Shared with ESF-CCS, CPCS and QIAS-P Provides manual control functions using soft control with FunctionEnable Key switches to meet DI&C-ISG-04 Displays system operating status20APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsPlant Protection System (3/5)4th Pre-application MeetingSystem Description Interface & Test Processor– Transfers the safety system operating status to IPS and QIAS-N– Supports surveillance test Operator Module– Shared with ESF-CCS and CPCS– Located on the Safety Console– Provides PPS control functions using conventional switches on theSafety Console operating bypass, variable setpoint reset– Displays system operating status RPS Reactor Trip Initiation Switches 4 switches in the MCR Safety Console Hardwired directly to the RTSS21APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsPlant Protection System (4/5)4th Pre-application MeetingSystem Configuration22APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsPlant Protection System (5/5)Testing Function Self-testing Continuous and automatic diagnostics for detecting hardware andsoftware error Cross channel comparison for channel operability check4th Pre-application Meeting Manual testing Performs under administrative control Complete overlapped testing23APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsESF-CCS (1/3)Design Features4th Pre-application Meeting Common platform with PPSConsists of 4 channelsConsists of Group Controller and Loop ControllerGroup Controller– Performs 2/4 logic using the ESFAS initiation signals from PPS– Performs load sequence logic for emergency diesel generator Loop Controller– Performs the component control cPPSGCLCCIMESFComponents(Pump, Valve, )APC-SESF-CCS24APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsESF-CCS (2/3)System Description (CIM)4th Pre-application Meeting Main Function Integrates component command signals from different controlplatforms Arbitrates component command and prioritize control by systembased and state-based priority. Hardware-based safety grade module Diverse from safety platform (PPS & ESF-CCS)Permanent logic implemented by solid-state device technologyFully testable designSeismic Category IEMI/RFI qualification25APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsESF-CCS (3/3)System Description (CIM)4th Pre-application Meeting Priority Logic Hardware-based logic State-based priority (safe state first)26APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsCPCS (1/3)System Description Common platform with PPS4th Pre-application Meeting Four independent channels Generates the low DNBR trip and high LPD trip to PPS Provides CEA Withdrawal Prohibit signals to the Digital Rod ControlSystem Transmits all the CEA positions to the Information Processing System27APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsCPCS (2/3)4th Pre-application MeetingSystem Description CPCS consists of CPC, CEAC and CPP Core Protection Calculator– Calculates Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio and Local PowerDensity based on CEA position and penalty factor– Generates Low DNBR / High LPD trip and CWP to PPS Control Element Assembly Calculator– Monitors CEA positions– Calculates CEA position penalty factor CEA Position Processor– Performs A/D conversion for the signals from the Reed SwitchPosition Transmitters– Transmit the CEA positions to CEAC28APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsCPCS (3/3)4th Pre-application MeetingSystem Description (Function) Receives the following signals from the process sensors, RSPT andENFMS– RCS cold leg and hot let temperature– Pressurizer pressure– Reactor coolant pump speed– Ex-core neutron flux power– CEA positions Calculates DNBR and LPD values Compares the calculated DNBR and LPD values to setpoints Provides the output to PPS– Low DNBR trip, pre-trip– High LPD trip, pre-trip– CEA Withdrawal Prohibit29APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsQIAS-P(1/2)4th Pre-application MeetingSystem Description Common platform with PPS Two channel redundancy (Ch. A & B) Provides two separate FPDs (continuous and dedicated) at the SafetyConsole Displays accident monitoring instrumentation variables– Type A, B and C parameters required by Reg. Guide 1.97 Rev.04 Displays inadequate core cooling variables (NUREG-0737, Sec.II.F.2)– Primary coolant saturation margin– Rx vessel level (HJTC)– Core exit temperature30APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsQIAS-P (2/2)QIAS-P ArchitectureQIAS-P Display Ch. AQIAS-P Display Ch. AQIAS-PIPSCh.A(B)QIAS-NControl & Monitoring NetworkData LinkQIAS-P Display Ch. AMTPITPQIAS-P Display Ch. A4th Pre-application MeetingSafety networkQIAS-P Cabinet Ch.A(B)QIAS-P Display Ch. ADISDIS Display (Ch.A only)APC-SCETHJTCData LinkSplitterHardwiredSafety networkNetwork PR1400
Safety I&C SystemsData Communication (1/6)4th Pre-application MeetingData Communication Independence Data communication meets the requirements of R.G. 1.75and DI&C-ISG-04– Physical separation: distance between redundant channels– Electrical isolation: fiber optic technology– Communication independence: broadcast only The serial data link transmission is used for transmitting safetysignals– No acknowledgement from the other side The communication and processing section processors share databy means of dual-ported memory– Interface via dual-ported memory separate functionally betweenprocessing processor and communication processor32APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsData Communication (2/6)Data Communication NetworkNon - Safety NetworkSafety to Non-safety InterfaceGatewayServerIPSQIAS-NITP NetworkInformation Processing System4th Pre-application MeetingMTPITP’sin Ch. B. C, DITPSafety Network (Ch. A)CPCSLCLBPGCLCQIAS-PPPS to ESF-CCS Data LinkCCC Data LinkTo LCLin Ch. B, C, DFrom LCLin Ch. B, C, DFrom BPin Ch. B, C, DCCC : Cross Channel Communication33APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsData Communication (3/6)Data Communication between Redundant Safety ChannelsBetween PPS channelsBetween CPCS channelsBetween PPS and ESF-CCS channelsBetween ITPs in each channelCommunication Interface CardBuffering CircuitFOMFOMCSCSDPRAMPSDPRAM4th Pre-application Meeting PSElectrical IsolationChannel A Bistable processorCh. A, B, C or D LCLprocessorsSerial data link between Bistable processorand LCL processor for examplePS : Processing SectionCS : Communication Section34APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsData Communication (4/6)Data Communication from Safety to Non-safety system Between ITPs in each channel and QIAS-NBuffering CircuitCommunication Interface CardPSDPRAMInternal NetworkFOMCSFOMCINon-SafetyComputer4th Pre-application MeetingElectrical IsolationInterface & Test ProcessorQIAS-N Between MTPs in each channel and Gateway ServersBuffering CircuitCommunication Interface CardInternal NetworkMTPCIFOMFOMGatewayServerIPSElectrical Isolation35APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsData Communication (5/6)Soft Control Communication Replaces the conventional dedicated pushbuttons and M/A station.4th Pre-application Meeting Enable operators to control all ESF components using the ESF-CCSSoft Control Module (ESCM) Safety related soft control– Selects ESF component to be controlled on the Information FPD– Information FPD sends component ID to ESCM– Controls the selected ESF component using the componentcontrol template the ESCM– ESCM control signals are transmitted to the ESF-CCS viaControl Channel Gateway (CCG)– The control signals are validated by channel confirm switches.36APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsData Communication (6/6)Soft Control CommunicationInformationFPDCh. Confirm SwitchesABCDESCM4th Pre-application MeetingSoft Control NetworkCPMHardwiredSerial Data LinkCCGESF-CCSCPM : Control Panel MultiplexerCCG : Control Channel GatewayESCM : ESF-CCS Soft Control ModuleSafety components37APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C Systems4 Software Development4th Pre-application Meetingand V&V38APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsSoftware Development and V&V (1/2)4th Pre-application MeetingSoftware Reliability Software design life cycle– Software life cycle model consistent with IEEE Std. 1074– Software life cycle activities consistent with NUREG 0800, BTP 7-14– Major software plan documents software quality assurance plan – IEEE Std. 730 software V&V plan – IEEE Std. 1012 software configuration management plan – IEEE Std. 828 software safety plan – IEEE Std. 1228 Software classification– Classified according to the grade of importance (its function to beperformed)– Software within a processor have the same classification– Most rigorous V&V requirements are applied to protection grade S/W39APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsSoftware Development and V&V (2/2)Software ClassificationIEEE 1012-1998Criticality4th Pre-application MeetingHigh(Level 4)APR1400 Software Classification- perform RPS control actions- perform ESFAS control actions- perform safe shutdown control actionsProtection(Safety Critical)Major(Level 3)Important to Safety(ITS)- monitor or test protection functions- monitor plant critical safety functions- provide supplemental means to performprotection functionsModerate(Level 2)Important toAvailability (ITA)- maintain operation of plant systems andequipment that are necessary tooperate the plantGeneral Purpose- perform functions other than thatdescribed in the previous classifications- not installed in the on-line plant system.Low(Level 1)40APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C Systems4th Pre-application Meeting5 Equipment Reliability41APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsEquipment Reliability (1/3)4th Pre-application MeetingTypes of Equipment Qualification Environmental Qualification– Located in mild environments where qualified HVAC is provided– IEEE std. 323-2003, as endorsed by RG 1.208 Seismic Qualification– Classified in Seismic category I– IEEE std. 343-1987, as endorsed by RG 1.100– To be qualified by test, analysis or a combination of both methods Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)– Qualified for EMI/RFI emission / susceptibility and SWC– MIL. std. 461E and IEC std. 61000 series, as endorsed by RG1.18042APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsEquipment Reliability (2/3)4th Pre-application MeetingReliability Analysis (FMEA) Potential single failure analysis for hardware components Assumes that one of the redundant PPS bistable trip channels isbypassed for maintenance Analysis to the level of replaceable modules FMEA table includes– Component and number– Failure mode– Symptom and local effect– Effect on protective function– Method of detection– Fault classification43APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsEquipment Reliability (3/3)4th Pre-application MeetingReliability Analysis (Unavailability) Probabilistic analysis using fault tree model– PPS fails to trip the reactor on demand– ESF-CCS fails to actuate the ESF components on demand Analysis considers– Independent component hardware failures– Common cause component hardware failures– Unavailability due to trip parameter in bypass– Human (operator) errors Major components for impacting system reliability– Reactor trip : CCF of RTSS, CCF of LCL DO module– ESFAS : CCF of Component Interface Module44APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsDesign Acceptance Criteria4th Pre-application Meeting645APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsDesign Acceptance CriteriaDigital Platform and Safety I&C SystemSystemDigitalPlatform forSafety SystemDesign AreaDC PhaseHardware Component Detail Design- Response Time- Uncertainty- Deterministic Performance- System DiagnosticsData Communication Independence4th Pre-application MeetingEquipment QualificationCommercial Grade DedicationSafety System- RPS- ESF-CCS- CPCS- QIAS-P- Data Comm.DACSystem DescriptionDetail DesignDesign BasesDetail DesignFunctional DesignDetail DesignSoftwareDACSet-point CalculationsReliability Analysis46APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C Systems4th Pre-application Meeting7 SUMMARY47APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Safety I&C SystemsSummary APR1400 I&C system overview provides the information for:– Common PLC for safety I&C and DCS for Non-safety I&C– Design feature and system description of PPS, ESF-CCS, CPCS,QIAS-P and data communications– S/W design process4th Pre-application Meeting– Safety I&C reliability I&C system licensing plan– DAC is used for safety system digital platform and software– Component design details will be provided for reference Safety I&C systems topical report will be submitted48APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-NAPR1400
Pre-g Safety I&C Systems 5 APR1400 -R I I(EC) 11001 N APR1400 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria GDC 19, "Control Room" Equipped with manual reactor trip initiation switches and manual ESFAS initiation switches in the MCR safety console Implemented with the displays for safe operation in the MCR.
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