Sexual Difference And Ontology - E-flux
01/10Alenka Zupančiče-flux journal #32 Ñ february 2012 Ê Alenka ZupančičSexual Difference and OntologySexualDifference andOntology08.27.12 / 18:05:51 EDTTo even suggest discussing sexual difference asan ontological question might induce Ð notwithout justification Ð strong reluctance fromboth the sides of philosophy (the traditionalguardian of ontological questions) and genderstudies. These two Òsides,Ó if we can call themso, share at least one reason for this reluctance,related in some way to the fact that thediscussion would attempt nothing new.Traditional ontologies and traditionalcosmologies were strongly reliant on sexualdifference, taking it as their very founding, orstructuring, principle. Ying-yang, water-fire,earth-sun, matter-form, active-passive Ð thiskind of (often explicitly sexualized) oppositionwas used as the organizing principle of theseontologies and/or cosmologies, as well as of thesciences Ð astronomy, for example Ð based onthem. And this is how Lacan could say, Òprimitivescience is a sort of sexual technique.Ó1 At somepoint in history, one generally associated withthe Galilean revolution in science and itsaftermath, both science and philosophy brokewith this tradition. And if there is a simple andmost general way of saying what characterizesmodern science and modern philosophy, it couldbe phrased precisely in terms of theÒdesexualisationÓ of reality, of abandoning sexualdifference, in more or less explicit form, as theorganizing principle of reality, providing thelatterÕs coherence and intelligibility.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe reasons why feminism and genderstudies find these ontologizations of sexualdifference highly problematic are obvious.Fortified on the ontological level, sexualdifference is strongly anchored in essentialism Ðit becomes a combinatory game of the essencesof masculinity and femininity. Such that, to put itin the contemporary gender-studies parlance,the social production of norms and theirsubsequent descriptions finds a ready-madeontological division, ready to essentializeÒmasculinityÓ and ÒfemininityÓ immediately.Traditional ontology was thus always also amachine for producing ÒmasculineÓ andÒfeminineÓ essences, or, more precisely, forgrounding these essences in being.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊWhen modern science broke with thisontology it also mostly broke with ontology toutcourt. (Modern) science is not ontology; it neitherpretends to make ontological claims nor, from acritical perspective on science, recognizes that itis nevertheless making them. Science does whatit does and leaves to others to worry about the(ontological) presuppositions and the (ethical,political, etc.) consequences of what it is doing;it also leaves to others to put what it is doing touse.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊPerhaps more surprisingly, modernphilosophy also mostly broke not only with
02/10traditional ontology but also with ontology toutcourt. Immanuel Kant is the name most stronglyassociated with this break: If one can have noknowledge about things in themselves theclassical ontological question of being qua beingseems to lose its ground. This is not the place todiscuss what exactly the Kantian gesture and itsimplications was for modern and postmodernphilosophy, whether it simply closed the doorbehind ontology (and, as some argue, left usimprisoned by our own discursive constructions,with no access to the real) or laid ground for anew and quite different kind of ontology.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊIn any case, it is a fact that the ontologicaldebate, after a considerable time of withdrawalfrom the foreground of the philosophical(theoretical) stage Ð and, perhaps even moreimportantly, of not appealing to general interestÐ is now making a massive ÒreturnÓ to this stage,and is already the reason for the idiom Ònewontologies.Ó2 To be sure, these are very differentphilosophical projects. But it is safe to say thatfor none of them sexual difference (in any form)plays any part in their ontologicalconsiderations. Being has nothing whatsoever todo with sexual difference.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊSince we are debating psychoanalysis andsexual difference, implicating Freud and Lacan inthe discussion of the ontological dimension ofsexual difference Ð in any way but critical, that isÐ might look like the peak of possible oddities.3For this seems to go contrary not only to thenumerous and outstanding efforts the defendersof psychoanalysis have, for decades, invested inshowing the incompatibility of psychoanalysiswith any kind of sexual essentialism; it is alsocontrary to what both Freud and Lacan thoughtand said about ontology. In view of the previouslymentioned desexualisation of reality thatoccurred with the Galilean revolution in science,psychoanalysis (at least in its Freudian-Lacanianvein) is far from lamenting. Its diagnosis ofWestern civilization is not one of the Òforgettingof the sexual,Ó and it does not see itself assomething that will bring the sexual coloring ofthe universe back into focus again. On thecontrary, it sees itself (and its ÒobjectÓ) asstrictly coextensive with this move.4 HenceLacanÕs emphatic statements such as Òthesubject of the unconscious is the subject ofmodern science,Ó or, Òpsychoanalysis is onlypossible after the same break that inauguratesmodern science.Ó IÕm not pointing this out,however, in order to argue that psychoanalysis isin fact much less centered on the sexual than iscommonly assumed, or to promote theGeorg Dionysius Ehret'sillustration of Linnaeus's sexualsystem of plant classification,1736. During the Enlightenment,Linnaeus system was polemicprecisely because he proposesclassification through sex.08.27.12 / 18:05:51 EDT
08.27.12 / 18:05:51 EDT03/10e-flux journal #32 Ñ february 2012 Ê Alenka ZupančičSexual Difference and OntologyÒculturalized versionÓ of psychoanalysis. Rather,the sexual in psychoanalysis is something verydifferent from the sense-making combinatorygame Ð it is precisely something that disruptsthe latter and makes it impossible. What oneneeds to see and grasp, to begin with, is wherethe real divide runs here. Psychoanalysis is bothcoextensive with this desexualisation, in thesense of breaking with ontology and science assexual technique or sexual combinatory, andabsolutely uncompromising when it comes to thesexual as the irreducible real (not substance).There is no contradiction here. As there is nocontradiction in the Jungian ÒrevisionistÓ stance,which articulates an utter culturalization of thesexual (its transcription into cultural archetypes)while also maintaining a reluctance to forego theprinciple of ontological combinatory (of twofundamental principles). The lesson and theimperative of psychoanalysis is not, ÒLet usdevote all of our attention to the sexual(meaning) as our ultimate horizonÓ; it is instead areduction of the sex and the sexual (which, infact, has always been overloaded with meaningsand interpretations) to the point of ontologicalinconsistency, which, as such, is irreducible.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊLacanÕs emphatic claim that psychoanalysisis not a new ontology (a sexual ontology, forexample) is thus not something that IÕm going tocontest. But the reason for neverthelessinsisting on examining the psychoanalyticconcept of sexual difference in the context ofontology is not simply to reaffirm theirincompatibility or radical heterogeneity in thecircumstances of this ÒreturnÓ of ontology. Thestakes are much higher, and the relationship ofpsychoanalysis to philosophy (as ontology)remains much more interesting and intricate.Perhaps the best way to put it would be to saythat their non-relation, implied in the statementthat psychoanalysis is not ontology, is the mostintimate. This expression will hopefully justifyitself in what follows.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊOne of the conceptual deadlocks in simplyemphasizing that gender is an entirely social, orcultural, construction is that it remains withinthe dichotomy nature/culture. Judith Butler sawthis very well, which is why her projectradicalizes this theory by linking it to the theoryof performativity. As opposed to expressivity,indicating a preexistence and independence ofthat which is being expressed, performativityrefers to actions that create, so to speak, theessences that they express. Nothing herepreexists: Sociosymbolic practices of differentdiscourses and their antagonisms create the veryÒessences,Ó or phenomena, that they regulate.The time and the dynamics of repetition that thiscreation requires open up the only margin offreedom (to possibly change or influence thisprocess). What differentiates this concept ofperformativity from the classical, linguistic oneis precisely the element of time: It is not that theperformative gesture creates a new realityimmediately, that is, in the very act of beingperformed (like the performative utterance ÒIdeclare this session openÓ); rather, it refers to aprocess in which sociosymbolic constructions,by way of repetition and reiteration, arebecoming nature Ð Òonly natural,Ó it is said. Whatis referred to as natural is the sedimentation ofthe discursive, and in this view the dialectics ofnature and culture becomes the internaldialectics of culture. Culture both produces andregulates (what is referred to as) nature. We areno longer dealing with two terms: sociosymbolicactivity, and something on which it is performed;but instead, we are dealing with something likean internal dialectics of the One (the discursive)that not only models things but also creates thethings it models, which opens up a certain depthof field. Performativity is thus a kind of onto-logyof the discursive, responsible for both the logosand the being of things.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊTo a large extent, Lacanian psychoanalysisseems compatible with this account, and it isoften presented as such. The primacy of thesignifier and of the field of the Other, language asconstitutive of reality and of the unconscious(including the dialectics of desire), thecreationist aspect of the symbolic and itsdialectics (with notions such as symboliccausality, symbolic efficiency, materiality of thesignifier) É All of these (undisputed) claimsnotwithstanding, LacanÕs position is irreduciblydifferent from the above performative ontology.In what way exactly? And what is the status ofthe real that Lacan insists upon when speakingof sexuality?ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊIt is not simply that Lacan has to take intoaccount and make place for the other, ÒvitalÓ partof the psychoanalytic notions (such as the libido,the drive, the sexualized body), which gets to bedefined as Òreal,Ó as opposed to belonging to thesymbolic. This kind of parlance, and theperspective it implies, is very misleading, forLacan also starts with a One (not with two, whichhe would try to compose and articulate togetherin his theory). He starts with the One of thesignifier. But his point is that, while this Onecreates its own space and beings that populate it(which roughly corresponds to the space ofperformativity described above), something elsegets added to it. It could be said that thissomething is parasitic of performativeproductivity; it is not produced by the signifyinggesture but together with and Òon top ofÓ it. It isinseparable from this gesture, but, unlike how wespeak of discursive creations/beings, it is notcreated by it. It is neither a symbolic entity nor
04/10Madelon Vriesendorp, Apres L'amour, 1975.08.27.12 / 18:05:51 EDT
08.27.12 / 18:05:51 EDT05/10e-flux journal #32 Ñ february 2012 Ê Alenka ZupančičSexual Difference and Ontologyone constituted by the symbolic; rather, it iscollateral for the symbolic. Moreover, it is not abeing: It is discernable only as a (disruptive)effect within the symbolic field, yet it is not aneffect of this field, an effect of the signifier; theemergence of the signifier is not reducible to, orexhausted by the symbolic. The signifier does notonly produce a new, symbolic reality (includingits own materiality, causality, and laws); it alsoÒproduces,Ó or opens up, the dimension thatLacan calls the Real. This is what irredeemablystains the symbolic, spoils its supposed purity,and accounts for the fact that the symbolic gameof pure differentiality is always a game withloaded dice. This is the very space, or dimension,that sustains the previously mentioned ÒvitalÓphenomena (the libido or jouissance, the drive,sexualized body) in their out-of-jointness withthe symbolic.5 More simply even, it also acts asthe out-of-jointness of the symbolic. It is herethat the sexuality that psychoanalysis speaksabout is situated. For Lacan the unconscioussexuality is not related (as it is for Jung) to somearchetypical remains that would stay with usafter the desexualization (ÒdisenchantingÓ) of theworld; it is the new that accompanies thisdisenchantment, the real that comes to lightwith it. It is neither the remains of the sexualcombinatory nor some aspect of sex that isentirely outside any combinatory. Rather, it issomething that gets produced on top of anypossible (or impossible) combinatory Ð it is whatsignifying operations produce besides what theyproduce (on the level of being and its regulation).ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊSexuality (as the Real) is not some beingthat exists beyond the symbolic; it ÒexistsÓ solelyas the curving of the symbolic space that takesplace because of the additional somethingproduced with the signifying gesture. This, andnothing else, is how sexuality is the Real. It is notthat Ð through its experience Ð psychoanalysisfound and established sexuality as its ultimatereal. For this would mean that psychoanalysisput sexuality, taken as an irreducible fact, in theconceptual place of the real, conceivedindependently. In other words, sexuality wouldcorrespond to what is the most real. Yet what isat stake is something very different: Startingfrom sexualityÕs inherent contradictions Ð fromits paradoxical ontological status, whichprecisely prevents us from taking it as any kindof simple fact Ð psychoanalysis came toarticulate its very concept of the Real assomething new. The Real is not predicated onsexuality; it is not that Òsexuality is (the) realÓ inthe sense of the latter defining the ontologicalstatus of the former. On the contrary, thepsychoanalytic discoveries regarding the natureof sexuality (and of its accomplice, theunconscious) have led to the discovery andconceptualization of a singularly curvedtopological space, which it named the Real.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe something produced by the signifier, inaddition to what it produces as its field, curvesor magnetizes this field in a certain way. It isresponsible for the fact that the symbolic field,or the field of the Other, is never neutral (orstructured by pure differentality), but conflictual,asymmetrical, Ònot all,Ó ridden by a fundamentalantagonism. In other words, the antagonism ofthe discursive field is not due to the fact that thisfield is always ÒcomposedÓ of multiple elements,or multiple multiples, competing amongthemselves and not properly unified; it refers tothe very space in which these different multiplesexist. In the same way that for Marx ÒclassantagonismÓ is not simply conflict betweendifferent classes, but the very principle of theconstitution of the class society, antagonism assuch never simply exists between conflictingparties; it is the very structuring principle of thisconflict, and of the elements involved in it.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe antagonism conceptualized bypsychoanalysis is not related to any originaldouble, or original multiple, but to the fact that aOne introduced by the signifier is always a ÒOneplusÓ Ð it is this unassignable plus that is neitheranother One nor nothing that causes the basicasymmetry and divide of the very field of the One.The most general, and at the same time precise,Lacanian name for this plus is jouissance,defined by its surplus character. One is crackedby what it produces on top of what it produces Ðand this is precisely what incites Lacan to namethis fractured, or Òbarred,Ó field of the symbolicOne the Other. The Other is not the Other of theOne; it is the Lacanian name for the ÒOne plus,Ówhich is to say, for the One in which this plus isincluded and for which it thus has considerableconsequences. This, by the way, is also why theOther referred to by Lacan is both the symbolicOther (the treasury of signifiers) and the Other ofjouissance, of sexuality.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe first and perhaps most strikingconsequence of this is that human sexuality isnot sexual simply because of its including thesexual organs (or organs of reproduction). Rather,the surplus (caused by signification) ofjouissance is what sexualizes the sexual activityitself, endows it with a surplus investment (onecould also say that it sexualizes the activity ofreproduction). This point might seemparadoxical, but if one thinks of whatdistinguishes human sexuality from, letÕs say,animal or vegetal sexualities, is it not preciselybecause of the fact that human sexuality issexualized in the strong meaning of the word(which could also be put in a slogan like, Òsex issexyÓ)? It is never Òjust sex.Ó Or, perhaps moreprecisely, the closer it gets to Òjust sex,Ó the
06/10Sanja Iveković, A New Years Eve Party, Silba, 1969-1970, "Grazia", July 1975, gelatin silver print, magazine page and typewritten text by the artist.08.27.12 / 18:05:51 EDT
The auto-erotic activity of the erotogeniczones is, however, the same in both sexes,and owing to this uniformity there is nopossibility of a distinction between the twosexes such as arises after puberty ÉIndeed, if we were able to give a moredefinite connotation to the concepts ofÒmasculineÓ and Òfeminine,Ó it would evenbe possible to maintain that libido isinvariably and necessary of a masculinenature, whether it occurs in men or inwomen and irrespectively of whether itsobject is a man or a woman.6In other words, at the level of the libido there areno two sexes. And if we were able to say whatexactly is ÒmasculineÓ and Òfeminine,Ó we woulddescribe it as ÒmasculineÓ Ð but we are preciselynot able to do this, as Freud further emphases inthe footnote attached to the quoted passage. 7ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊSo, when confronted with the question ofsexual difference, the first answer ofpsychoanalysis is: From the strictly analyticalpoint of view, there is in fact only one sex, orsexuality. Moreover, sexuality is not somethingthat springs from difference (between sexes); itis not propelled by any longing for our lost otherhalf, but is originally self-propelling (andÒautoeroticÓ). Freud writes, ÒThe sexual drive is inthe first instance independent of its object; nor08.27.12 / 18:05:51 EDT07/10further it is from any kind of ÒanimalityÓ (animalsdonÕt practice recreational sex). This constitutiveredoubling of sexuality is what makes it not onlyalways already dislocated in respect to itsreproductive purpose but also and foremost inrespect to itself. The moment we try to provide aclear definition of what sexual activity is, we getinto trouble. We get into trouble because humansexuality is ridden with this paradox: The furtherthe sex departs from the ÒpureÓ copulatingmovement (i.e., the wider the range of elementsit includes in its activity), the more ÒsexualÓ itcan become. Sexuality gets sexualized preciselyin this constitutive interval that separates it fromitself.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊSo far weÕve discussed the question of theReal in respect to the psychoanalytic notion ofsexuality (or the sexual) in its peculiarontological status. But how does sexualdifference enter this debate? What is therelationship between sexual difference andsexuality tout court? Is it accidental or essential?Which comes first? Is sexuality something thattakes place because there is sexual difference?FreudÕs answer is unambiguous and perhapssurprising. In Three Essays on the Theory ofSexuality (1905) he insists on the originalnonexistence of any germ of two sexes (or twosexualities) in preadolescent time.is its origin likely to be due to its objectÕsattractions.Ó8ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊDoes this mean that sexual difference isonly and purely a symbolic construction? Herewaits the other surprise (not unrelated to thefirst, of course) of the psychoanalytic stance:Sexual difference doesnÕt exist in the symboliceither, or, more precisely, there is no symbolicaccount of this difference as sexual. ÒIn thepsyche, there is nothing by which the subjectmay situate himself as male or female being.Ó9Andy Warhol,Unidentified Male (With Decorative Stamps), 1950sballpoint and stamped ink on paper 17 x 13 in.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThat is to say, although the production ofmeaning of what it is to be a ÒmanÓ or a ÒwomanÓis certainly symbolic Ð and massive Ð it doesnÕtamount to producing sexual difference assignifying difference. In other words, sexualdifference is a different kind of difference; itdoesnÕt follow the differential logic. As MladenDolar most concisely puts it:There is a widespread criticism goingaround that aims at the binary oppositionsas the locus of enforced sexuality, itsr glementation, its imposed mould, itscompulsory stricture. By the imposition ofthe binary code of two sexes we aresubjected to the basic social constraint.But the problem is perhaps rather the
And sex does not function as a stumbling blockof meaning (and of the count) because it isconsidered morally naughty. It is consideredmorally naughty because it is a stumbling blockof meaning. This is why the moral and legaldecriminalization of sexuality should not takethe path of its naturalization (Òwhatever we dosexually is only natural behaviorÓ). We shouldinstead start from the claim that nothing about(human) sexuality is natural, least of all sexualactivity with the exclusive aim of reproduction.There is no Òsexual natureÓ of man (and noÒsexual beingÓ). The problem with sexuality is notthat it is a remainder of nature that resists anydefinite taming; rather, there is no nature here Ðit all starts with a surplus of signification.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊIf we now return to the question of what thisimplies in relation to ontology in general, and,more specifically, to the performative ontology ofcontemporary gender studies, we must startfrom the following, crucial implication: Lacan isled to establish a difference between being andthe Real. The real is not a being, or a substance,but its deadlock. It is inseparable from being, yetit is not being. One could say that forpsychoanalysis, there is no being independent oflanguage (or discourse) Ð which is why it oftenseems compatible with contemporary forms ofnominalism. All being is symbolic; it is being inthe Other. But with a crucial addition, whichcould be formulated as follows: there is onlybeing in the symbolic Ð except that there is real.There ÒisÓ real, but this real is no being. Yet it isnot simply the outside of being; it is notsomething besides being, it is Ð as I put it earlierÐ the very curving of the space of being. It onlyexists as the inherent contradiction of being.Which is precisely why, for Lacan, the real is thebone in the throat of every ontology: in order tospeak of Òbeing qua being,Ó one has to amputatesomething in being that is not being. That is tosay, the real is that which the traditional ontologyhad to cut off in order to be able to speak ofÒbeing qua being.Ó We only arrive to being quabeing by subtracting something from it Ð and this08.27.12 / 18:05:51 EDT08/10something is precisely that which, while includedin being, prevents it from being fully constitutedas being. The real, as that additional somethingthat magnetizes and curves the (symbolic) spaceof being, introduces in it another dynamics,which infects the dynamics of the symbolic,makes it Ònot all.ÓÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊNow, a very good way of getting closer to therelationship between sexuality as such (its real)and sexual difference is via an excerpt from alecture by Joan Copjec, in which she made thefollowing crucial observation:The psychoanalytic category of sexualdifference was from this date [the mid1980s] deemed suspect and largelyforsaken in favor of the neutered categoryof gender. Yes, neutered. I insist on thisbecause it is specifically the sex of sexualdifference that dropped out when this termwas replaced by gender. Gender theoryperformed one major feat: it removed thesex from sex. For while gender theoristscontinued to speak of sexual practices,they ceased to question what sex orsexuality is; in brief, sex was no longer thesubject of an ontological inquiry andreverted instead to being what it was incommon parlance: some vague sort ofdistinction, but basically a secondarycharacteristic (when applied to thesubject), a qualifier added to others, or(when applied to an act) something a bitnaughty.11e-flux journal #32 Ñ february 2012 Ê Alenka ZupančičSexual Difference and Ontologyopposite: the sexual difference poses theproblem of the two precisely because itcannot be reduced to the binary oppositionor accounted for in terms of the binarynumerical two. It is not a signifyingdifference, such that it defines theelements of structure. It is not to bedescribed in terms of opposing features, oras a relation of given entities preexistingthe difference É One could say: bodies canbe counted, sexes cannot. Sex presents alimit to the count of bodies; it cuts themfrom inside rather than grouping themtogether under common headings.10I would like to use this quote as the backgroundagainst which the following thesis can fullyresonate: It is because sexual difference isimplicated in sexuality that it fails to register assymbolic difference. Indeed, psychoanalysisdoesnÕt try to de-essentialize sexual difference.What de-essentializes it most efficiently (and inthe real) is its implication in sexuality as definedabove; that is, as the out-of-beingness of being.And this is what psychoanalysis brings out andinsists upon Ð as opposed to the genderdifferences, which are differences like any other,and which miss the point by succeeding toomuch, and by falling in the trap of providinggrounds for ontological consistency. It mightseem paradoxical, but differences like formmatter, yin-yang, active-passive É belong to thesame onto-logy as ÒgenderÓ differences. Evenwhen the latter abandon the principle ofcomplementarity and embrace that of gendermultiplicity, it in no way effects the ontologicalstatus of entities called genders. They are said tobe, or to exist, emphatically so. (ThisÒemphaticallyÓ seems to increase with numbers:One is usually timid in asserting the existence of
08.27.12 / 18:05:51 EDT09/10ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊPsychoanalysis is not the science ofsexuality. It doesnÕt tell us what sex really is; ittells us that there is no ÒreallyÓ of the sex. Butthis nonexistence is not the same as, say, thenonexistence of the unicorn. It is a nonexistencein the real that, paradoxically, leaves traces inthe real. It is a void that registers in the real. It isa nothing, or negativity, with consequences.Which brings us to the logic implied in thefollowing joke:ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊA guy goes into a restaurant and says to thewaiter, ÒCoffee without cream, please.Ó Thewaiter replies, ÒI am sorry sir, but we are out ofcream. Could it be without milk?ÓÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊSexuality is that cream whose nonbeingdoes not reduce it to a mere nothing. It is anothing that walks around and makes trouble.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe fundamental lesson of psychoanalysisis precisely that of the joke above: ifpsychoanalysis cannot ÒserveÓ us anythingwithout sexuality, it is because there is noSexuality that it could serve us. And it isprecisely this Òthere is no,Ó this non-being whichnevertheless has real consequences, that is lostin translation when we pass from sex to gender.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ This paper was originally presented at the conference "OneDivides Into Two: Negativity, Dialectics, and Clinamen," heldat the Institute for Cultural Inquiry Berlin in March 2011.e-flux journal #32 Ñ february 2012 Ê Alenka ZupančičSexual Difference and Ontologytwo genders, but when passing to the multitudethis timidity disappears, and their existence isfirmly asserted.) If sexual difference isconsidered in terms of gender, it is made Ð atleast in principle Ð compatible with mechanismsof its ontologization. Which brings us back to thepoint made earlier, and to which we can now adda supplementary point: De-sexualization ofontology (its no longer being conceived as acombinatory of two, ÒmasculineÓ and ÒfeminineÓprinciples) coincides with the sexual appearingas the real/disruptive point of being. And takingthe sexual away (as something that has noconsequences for the ontological level) opensagain the path of the ontological symbolism ofsexual difference.ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThis is why, if one Òremoves sex from sex,Óone removes the very thing that has brought tolight the problematic and singular character ofsexual difference in the first place. One doesnÕtremove the problem, but the means of seeing itand eventually tackling it.12ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊThe fact that Òsexual differenceÓ is not adifferential difference (which might explain whyLacan actually never uses the term ÒsexualdifferenceÓ) can explain why LacanÕs famousformulas of sexuation are not differential in anycommon sense: They donÕt imply a differencebetween two kinds of being(s) Ð there is nocontradiction (antagonism) that exists betweenM and F positions. On the contrary,contradiction, or antagonism, is what the twopositions have in common. It is what they share,the very thing that binds them. It is the very pointthat accounts for speaking about ÒmenÓ andÒwomenÓ under the same heading. Succinctlyput, the indivisible that binds them, theirirreducible sameness, is not that of being, butthat of contradiction or out-of-beingness ofbeing. This is also what it means that Òthere is nosexual realtionshipÓ: It doesnÕt mean, as thepopular title goes, that Òmen are from Mars andwomen from Venus,Ó and as such it can neverform a harmonic couple. It is not something thataims at explaining the war between sexes, Òthewar of the Roses,Ó the alleged incompatibility ofsexes. For these explanations are always full ofclaims about what is ÒfeminineÓ and what isÒmasculineÓ Ð something that psychoanalysisdenies all knowledge of, as weÕve already seen.The psychoanaly
psychoanalysis to philosophy (as ontology) remains much more interesting and intricate. Perhaps the best way to put it would be to say that their non-relation, implied in the statement that psychoanalysis is not ontology, is the most intimate. This
community-driven ontology matching and an overview of the M-Gov framework. 2.1 Collaborative ontology engineering . Ontology engineering refers to the study of the activities related to the ontology de-velopment, the ontology life cycle, and tools and technologies for building the ontol-ogies [6]. In the situation of a collaborative ontology .
method in map-reduce framework based on the struc-ture of ontologies and alignment of entities between ontologies. Definition 1 (Ontology Graph): An ontology graph is a directed, cyclic graph G V;E , where V include all the entities of an ontology and E is a set of all properties between entities. Definition 2 (Ontology Vocabulary): The .
To enable reuse of domain knowledge . Ontologies Databases Declare structure Knowledge bases Software agents Problem-solving methods Domain-independent applications Provide domain description. Outline What is an ontology? Why develop an ontology? Step-By-Step: Developing an ontology Underwater ? What to look out for. What Is "Ontology .
ontology database, we can answer queries based on the ontology while automat-ically accounting for subsumption hierarchies and other logical structures within each set of data. In other words, the database system is ontology-driven, com-pletely hiding underlying data storageand retrieval details from domain experts,
A Framework for Ontology-Driven Similarity Measuring Using Vector Learning Tricks Mengxiang Chen, Beixiong Liu, Desheng Zeng and Wei Gao, Abstract—Ontology learning problem has raised much atten-tion in semantic structure expression and information retrieval. As a powerful tool, ontology is evenly employed in various
This research investigates how these technologies can be integrated into an Ontology Driven Multi-Agent System (ODMAS) for the Sensor Web. The research proposes an ODMAS framework and an implemented middleware platform, i.e. the Sensor Web Agent Platform (SWAP). SWAP deals with ontology construction, ontology use, and agent
Ontology provides a sharable structure and semantics in knowledge management, e-commerce, decision-support and agent communication [6]. In this paper, we described the conceptual framework for an ontology-driven semantic web examination system. Succinctly, the paper described an ontology required for developing
I believe my brother’s sons have weak interpersonal communication skills, and I’m convinced this is partly due to their lifelong infatuation with the personal computer. They have few skills at reading or expressing empathy. If they were more skilled, they might have been able to assess their father’s reduced self-esteem, personal control and belongingness, and then do something about it .
